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Abstract 
This thesis aims to interrogate the current practice of transitional justice from the 
viewpoint of the victims of the violations that it seeks to address. The study challenges 
approaches to legacies of violence that are rooted solely in the human rights discourse 
and that emerge from national and international elites, remote from those most impacted 
by conflict. The needs of victims of one of the most serious and intractable violations, 
disappearance, are investigated in two contexts emerging from conflict, Nepal and 
Timor-Leste, and the impact of ongoing transitional justice process on those needs 
evaluated. The aim is to understand how a victim-centred transitional justice process can 
be constructed. 
Victims of conflict in both Nepal and Timor-Leste have little understanding of 
rights, articulating the needs, often the most basic, with which they are confronted on a 
daily basis. Whilst rights are the product of a discourse that claims to be global and 
universal, needs are necessarily local and particular, the product of culture and context. 
This drives the methodology of the study which is ethnographic, using qualitative 
research methods with families of the Missing. The research was conducted in a 
participatory way with Associations of Families of the Missing, with the aim of 
empowering victims‟ organisations, and the results published in relevant languages in 
both contexts with the aim of impacting policy. The result of this engagement with more 
than 300 families of the Missing in the two states was a comprehensive understanding of 
the impact of disappearance. In contrast to the legalist orientation of the global 
transitional justice project victims do not see judicial process as a priority. Rather, they 
urgently seek an answer concerning the fate of the Missing and to retrieve human 
remains. The latter is motivated partly by traditional spiritual beliefs, particularly in Timor 
where the impact of malign spirits of the Missing is severe. As important are livelihood 
issues where families are struggling to cope with the loss of breadwinners and seek 
support to ensure economic security. In Nepal the social impact on wives of the Missing 
was extreme, with women stigmatised in family and community as a result of traditional 
patriarchy. In both contexts families sought recognition for both the Missing and 
themselves as victims, demanding a place in collective memory through memorials and 
other reparative process.  
The gap seen between the needs of victims and what transitional justice process 
has delivered is a result of the institutionalised and prescriptive approach the 
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international community advances in all contexts, dominated by trials and truth 
commissions, that fail to resonate with the needs of victims remote from such institutions. 
Victims of violations require process that is rooted in the social and symbolic worlds in 
which they live and that accounts for the complex dynamics of post-conflict societies. 
They seek a transformative transitional justice that challenges the narrow agenda of 
political and ethnic elites and that resonates with the everyday experience of those most 
impacted by conflict. The study draws a map for the empowerment and mobilisation of 
victims of conflict to become actors in an emancipatory approach to legacies of violence.     
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The Book of Belongings of Those Found Dead 
lies open across my lap. I cradle it 
and look and look, not knowing 
what I must find, half hoping 
to recognise nothing. Photograph 
after photograph, page after page 
of someone’s jacket, trousers, shirt: 
I’m searching the fabric for stitches 
my hands had known, for threads 
my thumb had pulled. This book 
is heavy with more than belongings: 
with gestures an arm has left 
in a sleeve, with breath filling 
the breast of a shirt. I place 
a plate on a table surrounded 
by empty chairs. Each speaks to me 
in the voice of a husband, a son. 
Those found dead are a handful. 
I sweep away the crumbs. 
 
Poem by Brian Johnstone from his collection "The Book of Belongings" [Arc, 2009] 
(Johnstone, 2009) 
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For my Mum 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.1 Defining the problem  
The first decade of the twenty-first century has been characterised by the emergence of 
a new politics of human rights. Globalisation has seen not only a transnational flow of 
labour and capital but also the increasing circulation of rights-based norms and 
representations that have made human rights the defining agenda of much national and 
international politics and the terrain on which many movements for social justice have 
been waged. This universalist discourse has gained unprecedented leverage in global 
debate, propelled by valorising narratives that rarely pause to question the ontology that 
underlies them. This is nowhere more true than in the practice of human rights after 
conflict or political violence, where transitional justice has become a hegemonic 
approach to addressing legacies of violations, backed by an industry of practitioners and 
donors.  
 
This study aims not to revisit debates about cultural relativism or the validity of 
this claimed universality, but to explore the impacts of this transnational discourse on 
those most affected by the violations of conflict: their victims. It seeks to understand how 
human rights claims are instantiated in a concrete context and how this emergent global 
human rights culture operates in highly unequal societies emerging from conflict. By 
focussing on a particular set of victims, the families of those disappeared and missing, 
this study aims to understand how transitional justice impacts on the everyday lives of 
those attempting to recover from conflict. The ethnographic approach taken here seeks 
to allow the perspectives of the everyday to be the lens through which the impact of 
transitional justice is measured, and through this to drive a practice that places the victim 
at its centre. This necessarily challenges universalist understandings with the local and 
the particular, with the well-being of victims and the addressing of victim needs serving 
as the ultimate arbiters of the success of such process: 
The everyday is a space in which local individuals and communities live and 
develop political strategies in their local environment, towards the state and 
towards international models of order. It is not civil society, often a Western-
induced artifice, but it is representative of the deeper local-local. It is often 
transversal and transnational, engaging with needs, rights, custom, 
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individual, community, agency and mobilisation in political terms. Yet, these 
are often hidden or deemed marginal by mainstream approaches. 
(Richmond, 2010: 6) 
This study aims to ask who sets the goals of processes that seek to respond to 
histories of violations and how is success defined for such processes. Transitional justice 
aims to impact on those communities most affected by conflict and to transform societies 
in ways that ensure sustainable peace. Despite this, the question as to what such 
communities seek after conflict is one that remains frequently unasked. By privileging the 
views of victims, typically those from the most marginalised communities, this study 
seeks to understand how they compare with the agendas of the powerful who drive such 
processes. How does what victims seek relate to the perceived goals of global 
transitional justice and how do the national goals of a transitional justice process 
compare and contrast with the very local and particular goals of victims in a rural 
society? Given the assumption that transitional justice builds peace, this study will 
attempt to understand what victims‟ needs of peacebuilding are at a local level and ask 
how and whether these map onto building a broader national peace.  
Whilst transitional justice typically seeks to create institutional mechanisms, it is 
clear that victimhood has emotional, psychological and social impacts. These have rarely 
been explored in terms of their implications for such processes and are a principal topic 
of investigation here. More particularly, this thesis constitutes a detailed study in two low 
income contexts of the impact of disappearance on individuals, families and 
communities, conducted with the aim of understanding how a state can respond to these 
in ways that most effectively address the needs that disappearance creates. The aim is 
to develop an empirical analysis of the globalising rights discourse, with an emphasis on 
how it impacts upon those most affected in states emerging from conflict. The study 
seeks to contrast an ontology „from below‟ that privileges the perspectives of the 
disempowered and the victimised with the largely external and elite perceptions that 
drive the contemporary practice of human rights after conflict. This study aims to define a 
victim-centred approach to transitional justice, in which traditional violation and 
perpetrator centred approaches to violations are replaced by mechanisms that have an 
awareness of the centrality of victims and their needs to the process.  
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Responses to the violations of conflict 
Responses to histories of violence have typically been motivated by a desire to either 
„build peace‟ following conflict or institute a legal response to crimes committed, the latter 
often on the understanding that accountability and the rule of law strengthen peace. In 
neither case do efforts to understand the needs of victims drive processes: international 
peace builders are concerned largely with re-establishing institutions, whilst the human 
rights and transitional justice discourses emerge from a legalist analysis and prioritise 
truth and justice, restricting their interest to the minority of victims whose cases will be 
brought before some formal mechanism. Such prescriptive approaches, premised on a 
Western model of “liberal proceduralism” (Gready, 2011: 61), are remote from the 
communities they claim to serve. Approaches that emphasise institutions have been 
challenged by those who assert that recovery from conflict must be rooted in an 
understanding of how mass violations have impacted and transformed affected 
populations (Pouligny et al., 2007; Breen Smyth, 2007). In many post-conflict 
interventions both the individual and collective consequences of violations remain largely 
unexamined. To go beyond a prescriptive approach, studies are required that engage 
with those who have experienced violations, understanding the meaning that populations 
give to such events and the symbolic and social worlds people occupy:  
It is not possible to respond to the different needs of the victims and 
survivors of mass crime if one does not understand the local forms and logic 
of social ties, their transformations and the manner in which local actors have 
tried to survive and understand mass violence: their cultural strategies of 
dealing with death, mourning and suffering. (Pouligny et al., 2007: 2-3).  
The views of conflict affected populations have only rarely been considered in the 
creation or evaluation of transitional justice mechanisms; indeed, much of the literature 
of transitional justice is of experts speaking for victims: 
[A] grave disservice is done to victims by those who seek to speak on their 
behalf, whether in the name of justice or reconciliation. By so doing, […] they 
render the victims silent. Generalised and conveniently summarised victims‟ 
expectations tend to denigrate the complex and inconsistent human identity 
of such victims and survivors, ignoring the extent to which needs vary from 
victim to victim and change across time. Presumptions that victims need or 
demand punitive justice are no more reliable than are the claims that victims 
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are willing to forgive perpetrators who confess, or that they merely seek 
acknowledgement and symbolic reparations.  (Cullinan, 2001: 19)  
To response to violations rooted in the experience of its victims demands an 
understanding of the subjective reality of victims, of the narratives and meanings that 
have been created by their experience of conflict: this requires an empirical and an 
ethnographic approach (Pouligny, 2006), necessitating empirical work of a highly 
interdisciplinary nature and an understanding of the role of the so-called „primary‟ 
institutions of the family and community that hold the key to recovery from such extreme 
events (Bonnano, 2007; Sveaass and Castillo, 2000; Hawley and de Haan, 1996). 
Studies made on this basis can also begin to understand the implications for recovery at 
all levels: individual, family, community, institutions and the state.  
This research examines the process of transition in societies emerging from 
conflict from the point of view of victims, and appraises the impact of contemporary 
transitional justice processes on victims. The research will allow victims themselves to 
identify their needs, and evaluate the extent to which transitional justice process has 
succeeded in addressing these. The research seeks to develop an understanding of 
what victims need and how transitional processes can fully respond to those needs. 
The Missing 
missing: adjective 1 absent and of unknown whereabouts. 2 not present 
when expected or supposed to be. (OED, 2010)  
Definitions of the Missing flow from law, and in this study the Missing will be understood 
as all those “unaccounted for as a result of international or non-international armed 
conflict or internal violence” (Crettol and La Rosa, 2006: 355). This definition derives 
from International Humanitarian Law and can be contrasted with that deriving from 
Human Rights Law where „disappearance‟ is confined to those persons taken under the 
control of states and never seen again, excluding those not explicitly arrested and cases 
perpetrated by non-state actors. These definitions and their implications are discussed in 
detail in Appendix I. Here, the Missing will include all those whose families are unaware 
of their fate as a result of conflict or political violence, and those killed in conflict whose 
bodies have not been retrieved by their families.  
Disappearance is more than anything a demonstration of power and of the ability 
of the state to exercise control over individual life, what Foucault called biopolitics (1978). 
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Whilst modernity has given the state the potential to protect and nurture life, it has also 
enabled life to be included in the mechanisms and calculations of state power: “modern 
man is an animal whose politics calls his existence as a living being into question” (ibid: 
188). Most of the Missing discussed here are those whose politics (or ethnicity) have led 
to their lives becoming subject to the capricious demands of states that feel threatened 
by them. More than simple killing however, disappearance confronts those impacted by it 
with the power of perpetrators; power to not only deny life, but to deny even confirmation 
of death. As a result, power is embodied not only in the very present absence of the 
bodies of the Missing but also in the minds and bodies of their families through trauma 
and somatism. More than any other violation disappearance has a power that outlives 
even the regimes and individuals responsible for it. The Missing, situated as they are 
between life and death, assume a power of their own, something familiar that has been 
made unfamiliar as a result of political repression. It is a defining feature of the Missing 
that they resist the dichotomous classification of present versus absent, and it is this that 
most determines the experience of the families of the Missing as characterised by 
ambiguity and ambivalence (Section 9.2). This „ghostly‟ role that the Missing play is 
reinforced in the traditional societies studied here where the discontented spirits of the 
Missing are themselves actors in mechanisms to address the needs of families.  
One of the key tensions examined here will be that between the bodies of the 
Missing as evidence of crime (the rhetoric of truth and justice) and the bodies as a 
reference point for mourning and the addressing of trauma (the rhetoric of memory) 
(Damanska, 2006). Whether the bodies of the Missing are considered objects of forensic 
investigation that serve judicial purpose or are sacred relics of a loved one that must 
permit mourning determines which of these understandings is prioritised. This thesis is 
premised on the understanding that work with the Missing serves the living and most 
notably their families. It will be seen that the bodies of the Missing represent a space of 
conflict between different interests, including power, knowledge and the sacred (ibid). 
The evidential approach will seek to emphasise the past, while families will seek 
approaches that permit them to address their present and their future, which will include 
the identification that transforms remains from an object into the relics of a loved one. In 
contrast to most approaches to the issue that privilege discourses external to the context 
from which the disappeared come, here the perspective that is prioritised is that of the 
families of the Missing.     
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It has been argued by Agamben (1998) that the abandoning of enemy bodies to 
spaces beyond legality, as most exemplified by disappearance, is simply the extension 
of other forms of disempowerment. That the social exclusion that typifies both the 
contexts studied here can be seen as a qualification for or prelude to disappearance will 
be explored in this thesis. This echoes Agamben‟s concept of „bare life‟ (1998), in which 
certain groups occupy a liminal category excluded from legal protection. This 
emphasises the extent to which disappearance is a problem of context. People are 
disappeared as a result of who they are and the communities they come from and this is 
made possible by social exclusion that dehumanises them. As a result, the impact of 
disappearance is collective with entire communities affected, as is the explicit goal of 
such political violence. The role of context and community in both ameliorating and 
deepening the impact of disappearance for the families of those missing is ever present 
in this study. 
1.2 Transitional justice: an introduction 
This section aims to introduce transitional justice, the concepts that underlie it, dominant 
contemporary approaches and their critiques, through a brief review of the literature. 
Transitional justice describes what societies do to try to come to terms with the legacy of 
the past when emerging from a period of armed conflict or political violence (Teitel, 
2000). Typically, these are institutional responses to violations of international 
humanitarian law, human rights law or domestic law that occurred during a previous 
regime. That transitional justice has become “an entire new academic discipline” 
(Weschler, 1998: 283) has been a consequence of the sheer number of transitions, 
largely to democracy, that have taken place since the end of the cold war (Garrett, 
2000): the so-called “third wave” of transition (Huntington, 1991). Transitional justice 
emerged from a legal standpoint and whilst emphasising a prosecution based response 
to violations is dependent upon a broader understanding of the concept of justice that 
includes non prosecutorial mechanisms.  
The goals of transitional justice include:  
 Addressing the divisions in society that both caused the conflict, and that were 
created or deepened by the conflict; 
 Seeking closure and healing wounds of both individuals and society at large, 
through “truth telling”; 
 Providing justice to victims, and making perpetrators accountable; 
 27 
 
 Creating an accurate historical record for society; 
 Restoring and strengthening the rule of law; 
 Reforming institutions to promote democratisation and human rights; 
 Ensuring that human rights violations are not repeated;  
 Promoting national reconciliation, co-existence and sustainable peace. 
(Anderlini et al., 2004; Hayner, 2011)  
It is clear from the breadth of these goals, that transitional justice must 
necessarily define the concept of „justice‟ in a way that goes beyond the traditional 
prosecutorial, retributive way it is understood in a criminal justice system. Whilst 
transitional justice process is about what has happened in the past, its aim is to modify 
outcomes in the future, i.e. “…to address the past in a constructive future-oriented 
manner” (Rigby, 2001: 2). The agenda of transitional justice in any particular context is of 
course highly contested, and there remain debates about who drives such process and 
whose goals are or should be privileged. The research of this study seeks to understand 
the extent to which the aims of contemporary transitional justice processes coincide with 
victims‟ goals of transition. In particular, we will seek to grapple with the concept of a 
“victim-centred approach” to transitional justice:  a term often used (e.g. Aldana, 2006; 
Leman-Langlois, 2000), most notably with reference to the South African Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission (TRC) (Republic of South Africa, 2003) to suggest that a 
process revolves around the interests of victims, placing them at its centre. This idea 
however remains poorly conceptualised, and is discussed in detail in Section 3.2.  
Contemporary literature on transitional justice issues has been dominated by two 
general orientations, a legalist approach that is normatively driven, and a more pragmatic 
consequentialist approach, premised on achieving certain goals (Vinjamuri and Snyder, 
2004). The legalistic approach is premised upon the primacy of a universal standard of 
justice, and is characterised by an emphasis on judicial process to enforce international 
law. The principal legalist argument is that trials of individual violators are the best way of 
preventing and deterring future violations (Orentlicher, 1991). It is also claimed that 
punishment is able “…to honor and redeem the suffering of the individual victim.” 
(Weschler, 1990: 244), and that “…the individualization and decollectivization of guilt … 
would help bring about peace and reconciliation.” (Meron, 1998: 282). A legalist 
approach has heavily influenced the human rights community, notably certain NGOs, 
and this perspective has driven the campaign to create the International Criminal Court.  
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The consequentialist approach stems largely from political realism, and takes 
note of power relations in transition, and of the self-interest of elites in preventing 
retributive justice:  
[W]hat happened was little affected by moral and legal considerations. It was 
shaped almost exclusively by politics, by the nature of the democratisation 
process, and by the distribution of political power during and after the 
transition. (Huntington, 1991: 213-15, discussing the transitions of the „third 
wave‟.) 
Pragmatists are more likely to see trials as not always feasible, given limiting political 
factors. Non-retributive processes, such as the truth commission, were seen as crucial 
when the scope of prosecutions was limited by a desire to prevent a return to conflict 
(Cobban, 2007; Lambourne, 2009). Such a position refutes any antagonism between 
peace and justice, by pursuing all transitional goals, including accountability, but through 
whatever means are possible at any one time in the process (e.g. Roht-Arriaza, 2006). 
Such an outlook is more likely to consider non-retributive mechanisms as an alternative 
route to justice, pending the possibility of prosecutions at some point in the future.  
Attempts to define transitional justice are also framed by these categories. A 
more legalistic definition is given by Teitel:  
Transitional justice can be defined as the conception of justice associated 
with periods of political change, characterised by legal responses to confront 
the wrongdoings of repressive predecessor regimes. (Teitel, 2003: 69) 
Such a definition gives less emphasis to the many non-retributive mechanisms which 
have constituted much of the practice of transitional justice in recent decades: whilst 
transitional mechanisms in practice will be seen to be largely institutional, many of them 
are actually non-legal in nature (Section 3.1). Roht-Arriaza offers an alternative 
definition:  
[T]ransitional justice includes that set of practices, mechanisms and 
concerns that arise following a period of conflict, civil strife or repression, and 
that are aimed directly at confronting and dealing with past violations of 
human rights and humanitarian law. (Roht-Arriaza, 2006: 2) 
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This definition broadens the remit of transitional justice beyond the purely legal, to 
„practices, mechanisms and concerns‟, the latter indicating that the breadth of transitional 
justice includes potentially all those areas where society is impacted by the legacy of 
conflict. Whilst a legalist understanding sees transitional justice as „justice to the extent 
possible‟, i.e. a limited justice, a broader view sees it as a “...a different kind or type of 
justice - one especially befitting the circumstances of transitional societies.” (Llewellyn, 
2006: 88, emphasis in original). This latter approach attempts to address past wrongs 
without undermining a potentially fragile transition and acknowledges that criminal justice 
may have to be compromised and non-retributive processes emphasised, in order to 
address the broader goals of transition. It does not acknowledge that the justice it seeks 
is limited, only that it is more appropriate. In such an understanding restorative 
approaches (Section 1.2) are usually emphasised, in contrast to the traditional, 
retributive response to wrongdoing.  
 
Concepts of transitional justice 
The fundamental objectives that drive approaches to transitional justice are typically 
defined as justice and reconciliation (e.g. Anderlini, 2004; Rigby, 2001; Abu-Nimer, 
2001):  
[In transitional justice] there are two underlying values involved: justice and 
reconciliation. Although they appear to be at opposite ends of the spectrum 
the goal in both cases is an end to the cycles that perpetuate war, violence 
and human rights abuses. (Anderlini, 2004: 1, emphasis in original) 
The mechanisms of transitional justice, such as truth telling, payment of reparations or 
trial and punishment can be seen merely as instruments of these two concepts. This 
section aims to review the conceptual framework of transitional justice and the nature of 
its practice, as it is seen in relevant literature. The breadth of the understanding of 
justice, once seen beyond the confines of retributive process, can be substantial:  
Justice here refers to a multifaceted, ongoing set of processes moving 
toward social relations that are regarded as equitable by the people engaged 
in them. […] We are most concerned here with varying degrees of justice 
among parties in social relations, as assessed by members of those parties 
themselves. (Kriesberg, 2001: 48) 
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Whilst not all processes or approaches will presume such a broad definition, it will be 
seen that the goals of some processes are set high indeed, in terms that echo this 
understanding. By choosing to define justice in terms of social relations, this puts a 
successful engagement with those most concerned with the violence of the past at the 
heart of a transitional justice process.  
Reconciliation is a concept that has been placed at the centre of ideas of 
transitional justice, and there is a consensus in rhetoric of its importance but no 
consensus as to what reconciliation actually means, or how to achieve it. Most 
acknowledge reconciliation as relationship mending and that after conflict: 
“Reconciliation implies that both parties not just get to know, but truly acknowledge, what 
happened in the past.” (Bar-Tal & Bennink, 2004: 11). Bar-Tel and Bennink (ibid.) 
propose the need for a „new narrative‟ to replace the previous collective memory on all 
sides, suggesting that issues of truth and memory are at the centre of the process of 
reconciliation. The literature encompasses the ambiguity of reconciliation as both 
process and outcome. Much of the work on reconciliation that is now applied to societies 
emerging from conflict originated in concepts deriving from interpersonal reconciliation 
and, as a result, many psychological concepts such as hurt, trauma, healing and 
acknowledgement are applied (e.g. Barsalou, 2005). In much literature this vocabulary is 
applied to societies or communities, even though these terms may not be well 
understood in their new context (Fletcher and Weinstein, 2002): as long as the language 
and literature of post-conflict reconciliation borrow terms from social psychology which 
remain poorly defined or only vaguely understood the literature will not serve 
practitioners well. One alternative is to permit those most affected to define reconciliation 
on their terms; this will be attempted here.  
Retributive and restorative justice in transition 
Justice as retribution has been a traditional response to wrongdoing in many societies, 
and is considered to be crucial in societies emerging from violence to end cultures of 
impunity and ensure non-repetition (e.g. Olson, 2002). Whilst many emphasise the 
importance of maintaining global norms that demand the prosecution of those 
responsible for violations of international law, in practice it is extremely difficult to ensure 
the prosecution of all offenders. Pursuing prosecutions may not always be possible 
despite their desirability: where powerful elites associated with the previous regime still 
have sufficient power, prosecution will not be possible without threatening peace. Where 
prosecutions have occurred following transition these have often involved those at the 
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highest levels or with most responsibility for violations, i.e. “exemplary prosecutions” 
(Orentlicher, 2007: 15). 
Contemporary approaches to trying perpetrators of violations of human rights and 
humanitarian law offer a range of possibilities. Justice has globalised with the rights 
discourse:  international tribunals have been created in those situations where the 
international community believes it should contribute to the process (i.e. Rwanda and 
former Yugoslavia) and hybrid processes containing both domestic and international 
components have been used (e.g. East Timor, Sierra Leone, Iraq, Cambodia). With the 
creation of the International Criminal Court, there also now exists a standing global 
mechanism to address such violators where domestic courts are unable (Schabas, 
2007). Data have been presented that suggest that domestic trials of human rights 
violators are the dominant mechanism of contemporary transitional justice (Sikkink and 
Walling, 2007): in each year of the last decade some 30 countries have been holding 
such trials.  However, post-conflict judicial systems are likely to be weak and the 
domestic courts may be unable to handle the load. Punitive justice is seen as one of the 
principal priorities of victims, in that prosecutions can give victims a sense of justice that 
allow grievances to be addressed and so prevent further rounds of conflict. However, the 
fundamental limitations of prosecutions are that alone they will not address the range of 
concrete needs of victims, nor address the societal condition that led to abuses (Hayner, 
2011).  
Restorative justice is a term that has increasingly been used in the literature of 
transitional justice, but which originated in approaches to criminal justice (e.g. Zehr, 
1990).  Restorative justice sees wrongdoing in terms of harms to relationships, and aims 
to restore relationships between people and communities, after wrongdoing: doing 
justice means repairing these harms. The most obvious relationship damaged by an 
offence is that between victim and offender, but a restorative justice process aims to 
restore all relationships damaged by wrongdoing. Restorative process puts the victim at 
the centre of any process, rather than as witness or spectator, as in a purely punitive 
approach (e.g. Huyse, 2003: 111). This approach is echoed in the needs based 
approach of this study and may as a result aid an understanding of victim-centred justice 
in transition (see Section 3.2). Restorative justice is usually presented as an alternative 
to retributive justice since, whilst few have suggested that restorative processes can 
entirely replace the retributive in transitional contexts, they have a role to play 
complementary to judicial process, particularly where the latter is delayed or denied. In 
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addition to the concepts of victim and community participation in restorative models in 
criminal justice, there is an emphasis on contact between victim and offender:  
Restorative justice is a process whereby all the parties with a stake in a 
particular offence come together to resolve collectively how to deal with the 
aftermath of the offence and its implications for the future. (United Nations, 
2002). 
Whilst a significant literature exists on the restorative model in a transitional context (e.g. 
Gormally, 2005; Menkel-Meadow, 2007; Llewellyn, 2006) it remains under 
conceptualised. In transition the nature of the restoration of relationships will differ 
fundamentally from those in a criminal justice context:  
Restorative justice does not aim at a return to the status quo ante. It is not 
focussed on discovering some prior state of equality to which it seeks to 
return. If this were its ambition then restorative justice would have nothing to 
offer transitional contexts, in which very often the history of the society is one 
of inequality and intergroup conflict, oppression, or violence. (Llewellyn, 
2006: 92) 
In terms of facilitating justice (in its broadest sense) and reconciliation, restoration is less 
likely to be a backward looking concept, and more likely to involve looking forward to a 
future situation in which both the injustice of the violation and any general longstanding 
injustice in the relations between victim and perpetrator are addressed. In a typical 
situation where the perpetrator is the state this suggests that restorative goals are very 
broad indeed, if they include an addressing of issues of general social injustice. 
However, many transitional processes do include such aims, at least notionally. The 
relevance of restorative justice for a victim-centred approach to the missing issue is 
discussed in Section 3.2. 
Contemporary approaches to transitional justice and their critiques 
Two profound critiques of current transitional justice process drive the methodology of 
this study, namely the lack of an evidence base for most interventions, which drives the 
empirical element of the research, and the lack of victim agency in most processes 
(Section 2.2.2), which is the basis for a needs driven study, using the language that 
victims themselves choose. There is a range of other critiques of contemporary practice 
in transitional justice relevant to this study, largely centred around the fact that it is 
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perceived as offering a „one size fits all‟ approach (Crocker, 1998; Nagy, 2008) to post-
conflict societies that can fail to appropriately consider the context in which it works. 
Transitional justice has been called “implicitly prescriptive” (McGrattan, 2009: 165) and 
accused of representing a solution to the challenges of post-conflict societies that is 
highly decontextualised (Nagy, 2008).  
Much conflict in low income states is structurally driven by poverty and exclusion, 
with victimhood often exacerbating existing livelihood challenges. Whilst transitional 
processes are not a panacea to solve all the problems of states emerging from conflict, 
they do permit an examination of the broader injustices in society. To prevent the re-
emergence of conflict it will often be necessary to address the grosser aspects of social 
exclusion and a lack of access to basic needs, and in this sense, social and economic 
justice will be on the transitional agenda (Arbour, 2007). This is a test of the limits of 
transitional justice: victims seek to confront the poverty of the past, rather than seek a 
return to it through a purely restitutive process. If transitional justice is to address the 
past in ways which impact on the future (Rigby, 2001), then as well as the violence of 
violations it must confront the structural violence of poverty and inequality and a lack of 
economic development that very often contributed to conflict. Transitional justice has 
been critiqued for largely ignoring such issues historically, but has recently begun to 
engage with the issues of development and social injustice (e.g. Mani, 2008) and to 
challenge a narrower understanding of its remit. Many conflicts emerge from systematic 
social, economic and political marginalisation on the basis of ethnicity, gender and/or 
class. Those most disempowered in such societies seek approaches to transition that aid 
empowerment, and address not just the direct impact of conflict but also help deliver 
social justice. The rupture that conflict and transition represent can be used to advance 
progressive agendas and challenge inequalities that threaten long-term peace, to deliver 
„transformative justice‟ (Lambourne, 2009). The data of this study will be used to reflect 
on how reparation might potentially address such issues and how it can be linked to 
issues of development.  
Transitional justice and the liberal peace 
The language of peacebuilding has emerged to imply that peace is a practice that can be 
consciously pursued, rather than something which simply emerges when conflict ceases 
(UN General Assembly, 1992). It is an overarching concept that includes conflict 
transformation, justice, the healing of trauma, reconciliation, development and 
governance: it clearly overlaps, and by some definitions entirely contains, transitional 
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justice. Peacebuilding has become a label used by a range of organisations working in 
conflict and post-conflict contexts as well as by the international institutions of the UN 
and its powerful member states in describing interventions of all types. Emerging as it did 
in a post-Soviet world where a liberal-democratic dispensation was perceived as the goal 
of peacebuilding, the peace that such interventions try to build has been called the 
„liberal peace‟ (MacMillan, 1998; Duffield, 2001; Paris, 2004). The strongest critique of 
the liberal peace is that the institutions of liberal democracy are the priorities of such 
peacebuilding, with an emphasis on peace agreements, elections and the mechanics of 
democracy, rather than a commitment to social justice (Richmond, 2002 & 2006). It is 
argued that the liberal peace is a peace „from above‟, imposed by the powerful according 
to a global prescription that serves to reinforce existing hierarchies of power and neglect 
the social, economic and political needs of those most affected by conflict (ibid). This 
extends to critiques of transitional justice:   
To further understand how transitional justice actors often rob victims of their 
agency in ways that are inimical to victims‟ empowerment, let alone active 
citizenship, we need to view „transitional justice‟ as a global project aimed at 
reconstructing Third World states in Western liberal democratic terms 
(Madlingozi, 2010) 
The implications of this critique for the addressing of legacies of violence is that both the 
inputs to and outputs of transitional justice are constructed to align with liberal 
democracy, blind to social justice and the structural violence that underlies conflict 
(Nagy, 2008; Mani, 2002). Such approaches ignore cultural and social factors that 
differentiate the contexts studied here from the “benevolent models” (Nagy, 2008: 277) of 
the liberal democracies that promote them. This echoes Galtung‟s understanding of a 
„negative peace‟, implying the absence of armed conflict, and a „positive peace‟ in which 
all forms of violence, including the structural, are addressed (Galtung, 1996). Both 
transitional justice and the liberal peace of which it is often a component have a vision 
that aligns largely with that of peace as the absence of armed conflict.    
Whilst definitions of transitional justice have broadened from previously highly 
legalistic definitions to include issues of social justice (e.g. Roht-Arriaza‟s, in Section 
1.2), such elements remain almost wholly absent from practice. The „global project‟ 
(Nagy, 2008) that transitional justice has become is criticised for consisting of a range of 
mechanisms that reflect a liberal bias that emphasises freedom and liberty over equality 
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(Mani, 2002) and consistently assign lower priority to the gendered and socioeconomic 
impacts of political violence than its victims do. Whilst approaches that also emphasise 
social, economic and cultural rights have begun to be discussed, these remain largely 
absent from praxis (Arbour, 2006). The alternative proposed by those advancing this 
critique is an emancipatory peacebuilding, rooted in the lives of ordinary people:  
[W]hereas the Liberal peace is concerned first with centralizing the 
„legitimate‟ use of force in the hands of the State and creating elite political 
institutions in metropolitan centres, emancipatory postconflict peacebuilding 
is not constrained to such limits [...] it would reflect what a majority of the 
population needed after mass direct violence has been checked. And, rather 
than the locus of such discussion involving solely elite institutional 
democratization, it would be concerned with matters identified by the 
population, from below. (Roberts, 2011)  
This perspective informs the desire here to seek a victim-centred process (Section 3.2), 
one rooted in what victims seek from transition and in the everyday lives of the conflict 
affected. Whilst conceptual discussion of the emancipatory peace as an alternative to a 
hegemonic liberal peace is well advanced (e.g. Richmond, 2007; Patomaki, 2001), there 
is little empirical work that engages with the concrete needs and views of the conflict 
affected in a specific context. This study thus constitutes one of the first empirical efforts 
to concretise the implications for emancipatory and transformative approaches to 
peacebuilding.  
1.3 Aims and objectives of the study 
Armed conflict has always left a legacy of human misery in its wake and continues to 
devastate lives across the globe. Contemporary conflict is fought not on the battlefields 
of the past, but in communities and population centres (Münkler, 2004; Kaldor, 2007). 
Increasingly conflict is internal to the state, inter-ethnic and inter-communal: violence 
involves states targeting their own populations and insurgents targeting civilians. The 
laws of war and the international norms that have been painstakingly established over 
the last century to define the limits of conflict are increasingly violated. The result of such 
violence is to transform individuals, communities and societies; new social identities are 
constructed by conflict (Theidon, 2007). Those most deeply affected are the victims of 
conflict, with lives and families utterly changed by their experience and their victimhood 
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used by those who benefit from conflict to mobilise their community, deepen social 
divisions and perpetuate violence.   
From the starting point of the highly contingent everyday needs of victims of conflict, this 
study seeks to engage with the following themes:  
 An evidence base for work with victims of conflict: Norm based approaches 
tend to deprioritise the need for an evidence base and in much current 
transitional justice practice there is little emphasis on the impact of such 
processes (van der Merwe, Baxter, and Chapman, 2009). This study will 
propose methodologies for evaluating the quality of transitional justice 
processes that are rooted in the needs of victims.   
 A contextualisation of transitional justice process: Universalist approaches do 
not significantly acknowledge culture and the particular as inputs to the 
development of mechanisms to address legacies of violence. This study will 
determine the extent to which such generalisation is valid.  
 Needs and rights: Whilst transitional justice emerges from a rights driven 
approach, it ultimately aims to address the needs of both individuals and 
societies. This thesis will examine what concepts of both victims‟ needs and 
rights bring to the understanding of processes to address violations in conflict 
and how these respective perspectives interact with the power relations that 
determine who drives transitional justice process. 
 Victim agency and empowerment: This thesis will ask who determines what 
processes occur to address violations in conflict and what role victims play in 
their creation, particularly in highly unequal societies. It will seek ways in 
which marginalised communities that have been victimised can become 
agents in addressing the impact of violations. 
This study proceeds from the premise that victim needs can be a crucial part of a 
state‟s efforts to recover from conflict and build sustainable peace. Here the needs of 
victims of conflict will be assessed as a potential driver of transitional process, in contrast 
to rights driven approaches that are led by a legalist logic. It is argued that reframing 
transitional justice as needs based necessarily localises approaches, challenging the 
prescriptive and universal nature of global discourses, and leading to local and particular 
approaches that emerge from the culture and context. This work aims to impact policy in 
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states in transition and of the international community in working with such states, to 
inform theories of transitional justice and provide evidence of the feasibility of a victim 
centred approach in societies in transition.  
This victim-centred and needs based approach is explored using a set of victims 
of disappearance, perhaps the most difficult violation to address and one that severely 
impacts the families of those missing. The contexts researched, Nepal and Timor-Leste, 
are typical of those in which much contemporary conflict occurs, low income states with 
long histories of violence and inequality. Ethnographic research methods are used to 
understand the impact of disappearance on families and the range of needs families 
perceive their victimhood creates. This research has been conducted in a participatory 
way with families and victims‟ organisations with the explicit aim of impacting ongoing 
responses to violent pasts in both primary contexts. The needs of those families, in the 
broadest sense, are investigated and the success of transitional justice mechanisms in 
addressing those needs is tested. This research constitutes a victim centred evaluation 
of the efficacy of transitional justice in societies emerging from conflict in answering 
victim needs, as perceived by victims themselves.   
The orientation of the study as a victim driven exploration of the impact of 
disappearance necessarily demands that it draws upon a range of disciplines, rather 
than attempting to examine victim experiences through the lens of any one particular 
approach. As a result this research engages with a diverse range of approaches, 
including law, psychology, anthropology, memory studies, post-war recovery and 
peacebuilding, among others. One implication of a victim-centred approach is that the 
politics of victimhood, of disappearance and of post-conflict contexts more generally is 
made explicit: the addressing of the needs of families of the Missing demands political 
action both in relation to disappearance and to communities that were traditionally 
excluded.  
Towards an evidence based transitional justice  
The most relevant question to ask when trying to review or evaluate transitional justice 
process is “Did it make a difference?” (Roht-Arriaza, 2009: viii), and this is a question 
that directly challenges the substantial body of research and scholarship that exists in 
the field. The tradition of scholarship in transitional justice is of the study of transitional 
mechanisms through a largely descriptive approach, rather than through empirical 
research that uses observation to accumulate evidence for or against theory.  
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One issue with many empirical studies in the field is that their starting point is an 
institution of transitional process. Measuring the impact of a transitional justice process 
necessarily demands asking if the broad goals of transition were met, and not just if any 
one mechanism, such as a truth commission, satisfies its particular aims. Studies that 
start from the needs of transition of those most affected, such as victims, as well as of 
the broader society, offer the possibility to both construct and evaluate what has been 
called „evidence-based transitional justice‟ (Pham and Vinck, 2007). Beyond this there 
are questions as to who defines what is being measured, particularly in terms of 
operationalising abstract concepts such as truth and reconciliation, in practice largely 
done by elites and external experts remote from the lives of those most affected. Here, 
the victim-centred approach explicitly aims to allow victims to articulate the goals of a 
transitional justice process and to evaluate its success in terms of meeting those goals. 
This is done through an ethnographic approach, with a participatory component that 
gives victims the opportunity to both steer the direction of the research and to benefit 
from its outputs. This study thus constitutes Action Research, in that it aims to impact on 
both the victims studied and on national policies towards the families of the Missing.    
The symbolic worlds victims and their communities (and indeed perpetrators) 
occupy determine how the events of the past are perceived and, inevitably, how they 
should be addressed: 
Particularly crucial in such a process are the public and private rituals and 
narratives that sustain collective and individual memories of the history, 
causes and course of mass crime. (Pouligny, Chesterman and Schnabel, 
2007: 12).  
Recovery from the events of conflict for such communities means developing new 
narratives of the past. To construct coherent and comprehensive interventions in such 
communities demands empirical studies, of a necessarily ethnographic nature to 
understand the highly contextual needs of victims. It also requires an acknowledgement 
that victims are not passive subjects of intervention, restricted to being witnesses in trials 
and recipients of reparations, but actors who can be mobilised on the basis of their 
victimhood to prolong conflict, just as they can become the prime movers of 
reconciliation and peacebuilding. Victims and communities have resources that can be 
mobilised and coping mechanisms that can be strengthened to transform both their own 
lives and their societies, but this can only be done on the basis of an understanding of 
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what these are and what victims need. This understanding forms the foundation upon 
which the study of this thesis is built.  
1.4 Research design 
Here the formal structure of the research design is reviewed in terms of the research 
question, supporting theoretical propositions and questions of validity. 
Research question and theoretical propositions 
How effectively do transitional justice processes address the needs of families of the 
Missing in societies emerging from armed conflict and political violence, and which 
mechanisms are most effective in addressing those needs? 
 
This question has two components, namely an understanding of the needs of families of 
the Missing, and a study of the effectiveness with which transitional mechanisms 
address those needs. This leads to additional theoretical propositions that will be tested 
in this work 
 
Proposition one 
The needs of families of the Missing are largely described by the following:  
- Truth, human remains, resources, justice, support. 
The priorities families assign to these needs depend upon culture, context and degree of 
need; the marginalised who constitute many of the victims of contemporary conflict 
prioritise basic needs over prosecutorial justice. Support here is to be defined 
contextually, but is likely to include both emotional support and assistance with basic 
material needs.  
Proposition two 
The mechanisms created during the transitional period to address issues arising from 
conflict are largely determined by the balance of political forces at the time: victims of the 
conflict play little role in this and their needs are generally not given a high priority in the 
development of transitional mechanisms.  
Proposition three 
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Rights driven approaches fail to give sufficient consideration to the social, economic and 
culturally contingent needs of victims, prioritising instead civil and political rights.  
Proposition four 
Transitional justice mechanisms are most likely to address the needs of victims when 
victims participate in both their creation and implementation.  
The research approach 
A case study is: “…an in-depth, multifaceted investigation, using qualitative research 
methods, of a single social phenomenon.” (Feagin, Orum and Sjoberg, 1991: 2): as such 
it is peculiarly suited as a strategy for this research. There are two principal components 
to the research: the understanding of family needs, and the study of transitional 
mechanisms and their effectiveness in meeting those needs. The focus on families of the 
Missing allows the latter question to be answered through the understanding of the 
families themselves. Implicit in this is a constructivist ontological approach that 
understands that victims‟ views of both their needs and the success of efforts to address 
them are a product of their own cognition.  
The case studies seek to understand the ecology of a transitional society at 
several levels, notably those of victims, civil society and those driving the transition: each 
case is thus a vertical case study (Vavrus and Bartlett, 2006), albeit with an emphasis on 
victims. These analyses allow an understanding of the interconnectedness of observed 
phenomena with global processes, and how power and policy are locally instantiated 
(ibid), situating local action and interpretation within a broader political and historical 
investigation. To understand the complex nature of the transitional mechanisms in any 
context demands an engagement with a number of actors at various social locations, 
and the study of a wide range of issues that interact. In bringing the two strands of the 
analysis together and understanding which transitional mechanisms have addressed 
which needs in any one context, there is a need to understand the interaction between 
the mechanisms and the needs of families (i.e. across the vertical levels of analysis). 
Thus whilst the data of the study derives primarily from families, the needs they express 
are contextualised in the framework of an ongoing transitional process driven by other 
actors.   
The unit of analysis in this research, i.e. the „case‟ being studied, is the 
interaction in each context between the transitional justice mechanisms and the needs of 
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the families. This is a result of the study seeking to understand not just the needs of 
families of the Missing but the impact that transitional justice has on them: the quality of 
this interaction determines the effectiveness of a victim-centred process. Since there are 
two components to the analysis this will be approached using two embedded units of 
analysis, namely the needs of the families and the transitional mechanisms (or more 
precisely the performance of those mechanisms). The empirical results of the case study 
research will be generalised using the theory developed by the propositions of Section 
1.4 (analytic generalisation). Thus the two embedded cases, concerning the needs of 
families and the performance of the transitional mechanisms, will be generalised to the 
relevant propositions (namely one and two respectively). The results of the global 
analysis of the effectiveness with which the mechanisms meet family needs will be 
generalised using proposition three. The interpretations of propositions one and three 
are defined by families and so these will necessarily be unambiguous. The veracity of 
proposition two concerning the drivers of transitional mechanisms will be inferred from 
data largely derived from documentary sources and elite interviews, and care will have to 
be taken not to permit the common rhetoric of inclusive process to obfuscate the largely 
elite origins of most mechanisms.  Proposition three, understanding the role the global 
rights discourse plays in the development of transitional justice process and its 
relationship to victim priorities, will be tested through a comparison of the priorities of 
victims with those expressed by elites, both in interviews and in documentary sources. 
The final proposition is likely to be the most difficult to confirm or refute, since victim 
participation in transitional process remains minimal in all contexts: conclusions will be 
drawn on the basis of experience where victims have been able to play a role in such 
mechanisms.   
The contexts studied have been chosen to provide the most effective set of cases to test 
the propositions of Section 1.4 and in so doing to effectively answer the research 
question. This choice will now be justified.  
To understand family needs (proposition one), since a literal replication of results 
in each context is expected, we need only to ensure that contexts with a sufficient 
sample of families of the Missing can be accessed.  In order to control for potential 
cultural effects in the data, these contexts should ideally be culturally similar in some 
respects.  Given that the addressing of some needs can affect the perception of others 
(as illustrated by Maslow‟s pyramid of needs in Section 2.2.4), ideally one context should 
be at an early stage in the development of transitional processes, i.e. where needs have 
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not yet been addressed at any significant level. To understand what drives transitional 
process (proposition two), why some mechanisms are created and not others, and the 
political process behind this, requires an early stage transition that can be studied in 
some detail. Conversely, to understand the nature of transitional process and which 
mechanisms are effective in addressing family needs (proposition three), it is necessary 
to find transitional process that is rather advanced, i.e. a context where any ongoing 
process is highly developed. The advanced context studied should also present a range 
of transitional process, including both restorative and retributive components, so that the 
effect of each can be studied in terms of the addressing of needs.  
The two contexts chosen, Timor-Leste and Nepal, thus represent two states in 
transition, comparable in some ways culturally, that represent one well advanced 
transition and one that is at an early stage. The discussion of Chapter 4 demonstrates 
that both Nepal and Timor-Leste are low income states, suffering from inequality and 
uneven development and both emerging from decades of structural violence and armed 
conflict. Cultural traditions in both states are important to those who suffered most in the 
years of conflict and traditional structures of governance, healing and spirituality have 
thrived as a remote state remained barely present in many areas. Rural communities in 
both Nepal and Timor-Leste have been forced to rely on their own resources and have a 
relationship with the post-conflict state that remains ambiguous in many respects. 
Experiences of disappearance in the two contexts resonate: in both a majority of cases 
were perpetrated by a state from which rural people were alienated, with a minority 
perpetrated by those who claimed to be fighting on behalf of ordinary people. The 
transitional process in Timor-Leste is considered largely complete, while in Nepal in the 
two years between the end of armed conflict and this research, political stalemate 
prevented any progress on the mechanisms of transitional justice. In both contexts 
violence and instability has continued as those who feel excluded by the emerging post-
conflict dispensation, encouraged by political spoilers, resist elements of current 
governance.  
Scope of the study  
This study has the primary intention of contributing to the theory and practice of 
transitional justice and responses to violations in conflict more generally, but also of 
increasing understanding of the impact of disappearance. The study has created a 
qualitative data set with victims of conflict in two contexts that is largely unprecedented in 
terms of its ability to inform processes to address victim needs. Transitional justice 
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remains resistant to the use of empirical methods, with most studies rooted in largely 
descriptive approaches rather than rigorous evaluation or comparative work (van der 
Merwe, Baxter & Chapman, 2009; Fletcher, Weinstein & Rowen, 2009). This study 
conceptualises a victim-centred approach to transitional justice that can be used to both 
steer and evaluate transitional justice process according to victim priorities. It represents 
a proof of concept of an empirical evaluation technique that seeks to test many of the 
assumptions that underlie transitional justice, particularly concerning the value to victims 
of trials and truth processes. It also demonstrates the importance to the addressing of 
the impact of political violence of culturally particular understandings, such as the 
spiritual, and challenges a liberal Western perspective of what drives change in 
traditional societies.  
The study highlights novel approaches to addressing legacies of violence, such 
as psychosocial programmes (Section 9.2) and „valorisation‟ schemes (Section 7.5) that 
are not part of mainstream transitional justice practice. It also serves to underline the 
importance of issues of basic needs and livelihood to victims in low income contexts that 
remain marginal in the transitional justice discourse, and consequently demonstrates the 
need for an engagement of transitional justice with the broader issues of development 
and structural violence. The study ultimately argues that a rights driven approach is not 
congruent with one that addresses the needs of those most impacted by violations, and 
that the rights discourse fails to define an agenda that coincides with that of victims. 
More generally, this study has confirmed the irrelevance of much transitional justice 
process to victims, as a result of its origins among elites and foreign experts, far from the 
lives of those most affected by violence. It is shown that transitional justice can be a 
discourse used by domestic elites to advance their own agendas at the expense of the 
traditionally marginalised and thus remains intrinsically political (Section 9.1).  
This study represents the most comprehensive of families of the Missing in any 
context that aims to articulate victim priorities, rather than investigate solely on the basis 
of an external agenda (e.g. Wagner, 2008). It demonstrates that one cannot generalise 
about the needs of such victims, as they are deeply contingent upon the context, in 
terms of culture, livelihood and power relations in family, community and society. 
Spiritual aspects become crucial in societies where the spirits of the dead are considered 
to be actors in a transitional process. In patriarchal and hierarchical societies, 
disappearance can deepen and complicate issues of stigmatisation and exclusion. In 
both Nepal and Timor-Leste the results of the study have been published (ICRC, 2009: 
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ICRC, 2010a) with the intention of impacting policy makers, and in both contexts 
legislation has been modified in direct response to its findings (Section A4.5).  
1.5 Thesis structure 
This section summarises the layout and contents of this thesis. Following this 
introduction, Chapter 2 seeks to localise victims in the post-conflict context, 
understanding both the impact they and their unmet needs have on prospects for peace 
or continued violence and reviewing the range of needs articulated by conflict victims. 
Global and universal human rights are compared with the local and particular needs 
voiced by victims. The literature on the needs of families of the Missing is then reviewed, 
and an argument made that victims‟ needs must be privileged in post-conflict contexts to 
ensure sustainable peace. Chapter 3 continues the review of relevant literature, by 
examining the mechanisms that have defined the praxis of transitional justice, each of 
which is addressed in terms of its potential to impact upon the needs of the families of 
the Missing, and the neglected topic of gender in transitional justice is introduced.  
Chapter 4 introduces the two contexts, Nepal and Timor-Leste, studied in this 
thesis. For both, cultural issues are discussed, including social structures and attitudes to 
death that can be important in approaching the missing issue, and the histories of 
violence that led to persons being missing briefly outlined. The status of transitional 
justice in the two contexts is then presented and the literature around those processes, 
very modest in the case of Nepal and substantial for Timor-Leste, reviewed. The two 
contexts are then compared in terms of their relevance for this study: many similarities 
are found not least in the way in which transitional justice process is exclusively defined 
by elites.  
Chapter 5 describes the methodology of the research, introducing the 
ethnographic and participatory philosophy that underlies it and the engaged, activist role 
of the researcher. The formal research structure, in terms of the research question and 
supporting propositions, is presented and the qualitative research methods (interviews 
and focus group discussions) outlined. Potentially problematic issues of sampling and of 
ethics, addressed largely through the participatory element, are discussed.  
The data collected in the two contexts are presented in Chapter 6 (Nepal) and 7 
(Timor-Leste). In each case this begins with a profile of the more than 150 families 
interviewed and a summary of the priorities they identified when asked an open question 
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about the needs arising from the disappearance. This is followed by the presentation of 
data concerning each of the needs discussed, using quantitative data from interviews as 
well as qualitative input from both interviews and focus groups, including quotations from 
victims. Chapter 7 includes an overview of victims‟ attitudes towards the transitional 
justice mechanisms that are largely complete in Timor-Leste, providing a victim-centred 
evaluation of the decade of transitional justice process.  
Chapter 8 and Chapter 9 aim to discuss the data and draw conclusions for 
processes in Nepal and Timor-Leste and for transitional justice process more generally.  
Chapter 8 critiques the practice of transitional justice in the light of the gap seen between 
the needs of victims and the goals of contemporary process.  It highlights the „top-down‟ 
nature of such process, the dependence upon the concept of truth as reconciliation and 
healing, the excessive legalism that defines it and the failure of reparative process to be 
relevant to disempowered communities. Chapter 9 seeks to use the data of the study to 
provide a context for transitional justice to be more relevant to victims. It outlines how 
and why transitional justice is a largely elite discourse and how issues that appear to be 
of an emotional or psychological nature for victims can have a substantial impact on the 
politics of memory in a society attempting to deal with a violent past. The importance of 
culture in such processes in traditional societies is then discussed, considering how 
trauma expresses itself in a society where the spirit world is important and how the rights 
discourse that drives transitional justice is a fundamental challenge to how traditional 
people conceive of their world.  
The final chapter, Chapter 10, aims to make concrete proposals for the creation 
of victim-centred transitional process, on the basis of the data of this study. It suggests 
that transitional justice as a discipline is too narrow to address the needs of victims, and 
broader approaches, including recovery and peacebuilding must be integrated with it. A 
victim-centred process is conceptualised in terms of challenging liberal approaches that 
dominate transitional justice today and ensuring the agency of victims, through 
empowerment and mobilisation.  
Four Appendices add further details. Appendix I discusses legal definitions of the 
Missing and the disappeared; Appendix II contains the research instruments, semi-
structured interview scripts, used to collect data from families of the Missing in each of 
the two contexts; Appendix III lists the interviews and focus groups made in the two 
contexts; Appendix IV summarises the recommendations of the study for the 
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Governments of Nepal and Timor-Leste in terms of addressing the needs of the families 
of the Missing and concludes with a summary of the impact of the Action Research 
component of the research on legislative and other processes in both.  
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Chapter 2 Emphasising the local and the 
particular: Needs after conflict  
This chapter describes the contingent nature of the demands of victims of conflict of both 
transitional justice in particular and the transition more broadly. These are dependent on 
the type and form of violence to which they have been subject, but also on the 
socioeconomic context in which it occurred and the impact of marginalisation and 
disempowerment that both pre-existed the violation and is exacerbated by it. This 
chapter explores the literature on the nature of the overlap and interaction between 
needs and rights and in particular their respective links to the local and the universal. It 
seeks to understand the implications for victim agency of privileging a particular 
discourse in the light of victims‟ demands. This discussion serves to define a framework 
in which the empirical work of this thesis is made, using a methodology that does not 
privilege either needs or rights, but seeks to understand victims‟ articulation of the way 
they seek to address the impacts of their victimisation, on their own terms. It will be seen 
that the majority of victims met in the study, poor and with little formal education, 
predominantly articulate their demands in terms of needs (Chapter 6 and Chapter 7).    
2.1 Post-conflict recovery and the needs of victims  
Whilst there are normative reasons to prioritise the addressing of victim needs: “societies 
have a special moral obligation to those who have suffered the worst” (Soni, 2009: 192), 
there are also very practical motives. Conflict victims1 occupy a unique role in their 
societies; they signify the history of the conflict for a community, shaping memories of 
suffering, and their needs can serve to justify further violence. This work contends that 
victims and the needs of victims should be privileged to maximise the success of 
peacebuilding and transition from conflict.  
Violent conflict occurs when “society cannot manage or resolve its different 
interests in a productive manner, thus initiating a degenerative or destructive cycle of 
violence” (de Zeuw, 2001: 10). A principal aim of transitional justice is to end such cycles 
of violence by addressing the consequences of conflict and, as a result, the causes of 
future conflict. Whilst the fields of transitional justice, post-conflict recovery (or 
reconstruction) and peacebuilding are uniquely defined, in practice they necessarily 
                                               
1 
Definitions of who is a victim are discussed in 2.3.  
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overlap (Barakat, 2005): all are ultimately about the prevention of future conflict. This has 
been made explicit by Leatherman, who writes that conflict interventions require: “...a 
rehabilitative dimension oriented to the past, a resolutive dimension oriented to the 
present, and a preventive dimension oriented to both the present and future.” 
(Leatherman, 1999: 204) This could equally serve as a description of the broader aims of 
transitional justice (see Section 1.2). The World Bank‟s definition of post-conflict 
reconstruction focuses on “the rebuilding of the socio-economic framework of society” 
and the “reconstruction of the enabling conditions for a functioning peacetime society [to 
include] the framework of governance and rule of law.” (World Bank, 1998) An emphasis 
on governance has emerged in the recent theory and practice of post-war recovery (e.g. 
Barakat and Chard, 2002) as the most crucial component in preventing state failure that 
is both a cause and consequence of conflict. Whilst governance approaches often focus 
on institutions, definitions of fragility include issues of rights, poverty and development, 
with state fragility characterised as “the failure of states to perform certain functions to 
meet citizens‟ basic needs and expectations” (McGloughlin, 2009, emphasis in original). 
As such, a needs-based approach would appear to be an effective way to measure 
fragility, effectively the lack of governance. Governance has, in turn, been defined as 
consisting of security, legitimacy and effectiveness (Brinkerhoff, 2005): successful post-
conflict governance demands the delivery of all of these to populations.   
Violence will often continue in a limited fashion in a post-conflict context, and the 
challenge is to contain and defuse it. Security after conflict is most threatened by 
„spoilers‟ (Stedman, 1997) seeking to advance agendas that challenge peace. Victims 
play a crucial role in justifying the violence of spoilers: the cycle of conflict is largely 
perpetuated by feelings of revenge for real or imagined transgressions:  
After violent conflict, revenge takes many forms, from reciprocating one‟s 
own suffering by expelling the expeller to creating myths about the eternal 
evil of the ethnic Other. Often motivated by personal frustration with 
continued injustice, individuals act to solve their own problems where jural 
authorities, or the state, will not or cannot act. (Borneman, 2002: 288) 
Often the locus of a spoiler problem will be a victim community seeking recognition 
and redress of a grievance, real or imagined (Stedman, 2000: 12-14): the perceived 
suffering of victims will serve to mobilise a community and legitimise a discourse of 
continued violence: “Indeed hatred (and the desire for revenge) often seems to be more 
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the result than the cause of violent conflict...” (Mueller, 2004: 15). This is particularly true 
in traditional societies where networks of social relations provoke much stronger 
obligations than are felt to the state (Boege, 2007). To undercut such appeals for 
revenge, the grievances of victims must be understood as broadly as they are by victims 
themselves, and not according to some external and prescriptive discourse. Legitimacy 
of post-conflict governance refers to the acceptance by populations of a post-conflict 
regime as correct and appropriate (Brinkerhoff, 2005), ultimately understood to revolve 
around a population‟s willingness to be ruled (e.g. Simmons, 2001). In most transitions 
the new regime is linked to at least one of the parties to the conflict and, as such, the 
victims of those assuming authority will be the most challenged to accept the legitimacy 
of the new authorities.  
To maximise victim communities‟ acceptance of the new regime the state must 
make efforts to be inclusive, representative and to address injustices perceived by 
victims: participation from victim communities in governance, including in institutions 
devoted to transitional justice can serve to demonstrate this. This will be particularly 
relevant where victims come predominantly from minorities who have not traditionally felt 
allegiance to rulers from the majority community. Victims are the most vulnerable in their 
communities; they are the displaced, the disabled, the orphaned and the widowed. They 
are visible to their community as in need of services from the state and represent the 
greatest challenge to the effectiveness of the state. Despite the addressing of the needs 
of the population not featuring highly in the legitimacy discourse in comparison with the 
satisfaction of international norms, there is an emerging literature that challenges global 
benchmarks as the sole basis for the legitimacy of governance. Milliken and Krause 
(2002) suggest that everyday needs and their addressing are a source of legitimacy for 
the state, expanding understandings of what creates conditions for governance from 
security and order to welfare and basic needs. Given that the populations of post-conflict 
states are often characterised by extreme and unmet needs, the ability of a state to 
deliver core services and address needs is perceived as impacting upon its legitimacy 
(Clapham, 2003; Call and Cousens, 2008). Defining legitimacy locally, rather than 
according to global benchmarks, and understanding that populations legitimate states 
according to the lives they lead, has been called “performance legitimacy” (Francois and 
Sud, 2006), relating both to the policy priorities of states and the quality of their 
realisation. Where victims‟ needs can be met their communities can gain confidence that 
the state not only intends to serve them but also that it has the capacity to do so. This in 
turn serves to enhance the legitimacy of the new regime in the eyes of the victim 
 50 
 
community. Since issues of legitimacy and governance in large measure depend upon 
victims, with their treatment crucial to the acceptance of a post-conflict dispensation by 
those to be governed, victim-centred2 approaches can act as an empirical test of the 
quality of governance at the grassroots.  
2.2 Needs and rights, the local and the universal 
This section explores the relationship between needs and rights in the context of the 
violations of conflict, and the implication for work with victims of privileging one over the 
other. Rights have emerged in recent years as the central focus for most work with 
victims of conflict and remain the central pillar of transitional justice, constituting claims 
rooted in law. Rights arise from a universalist discourse, with claims of global validity and 
relevance, while needs are contingent upon all aspects of context and the circumstances 
of the individual or group articulating them. Whilst human need remains a leitmotif in 
humanitarian aid and the very justification for its existence, there is little theorising about 
what constitutes needs in such work and who defines them. This section reviews the 
literature on theories of need and attempts to understand how needs and rights relate to 
each-other and the implications for understanding and addressing victims‟ demands. 
This study seeks not to normatively prioritise either approach but in articulating a victim-
centred approach uses open questions to understand what victims seek. This permits 
victims to use the language that they prefer and that reflects their own experience, and 
serves to guarantee victim agency in the elaboration of a victims‟ agenda.  
2.2.1 The global rights discourse and the local victim 
The needs focus of this study arises indirectly from a very traditional critique of rights, 
namely that the subject of rights is abstract in nature, divorced from the real person who 
is both socially situated and constructed:  
Abstract rights are so removed from their place of application and the 
concrete circumstances of the persons who suffer and hurt that they are 
unable to satisfy their real needs. (Douzinas, 2002: 154) 
Such abstraction contrasts with the very real needs with which victims are confronted 
daily in the highly unequal societies studied here. The subject of human rights has lost 
                                               
2
 Victim-centred as understood in this thesis is defined in Section 3.2. 
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her real identity, with its class, gender and ethnic characteristics, even though these lead 
directly to many of her needs. Indeed, an increasing critique of transitional justice 
practice is that the structural violence of poverty and exclusion is absent from its remit 
(e.g. Mani, 2002 & 2008). For both structural factors and the violence of conflict many 
impacts are collective, impacting communities as well as individuals, and demanding 
approaches that encompass the collective and the social. This section will discuss the 
efforts made to bridge the gap between local circumstance and universal rights 
discourse to address very particular needs.  
Whilst the claims to universalism of the discourse of rights have long been 
critiqued from a culturally relativist perspective (e.g. Donnelly, 1984; Perry, 1997; Franck, 
2001), this is not the aim of this thesis. It seeks rather to understand how rights work in 
the real world, in particular contexts with particular people, subject to victims‟ limited 
understandings of what rights are and existing power relations as well as the cultural 
world in which victims live. Rights operate in contexts where they must compete with 
other normative frameworks and subject to a range of competing political agendas: there 
is ultimately a disjuncture between the universalist conception of human rights and the 
local scale upon which social actors use the concept.  
In order for human rights ideas to be effective, they need to be translated into 
local terms and situated within local contexts of power and meaning. They 
need, in other words, to be remade in the vernacular. (Merry, 2006: 55)  
This section aims to summarise more recent efforts to nuance the understanding of the 
practice of human rights work with an appreciation of context and of local and particular 
perspectives, notably those that engage with anthropological approaches and are largely 
discursive. Such approaches see human rights as constituted by the actions of actors in 
a context, rather than this being merely the site for the articulation of a universal concept 
(e.g. Baxi, 2002).  
Conflict, and in particular the ethnic conflict that has characterised many of the 
wars of recent decades, has been driven by understandings of culture. Just as culture 
can serve to incite and prolong war so it plays a substantial role in defining the needs of 
its victims, even where this is seen not as something eternal and essentialised, but 
rather as contingent and constructed, often by the conflict itself (Nagel, 1994). Whilst this 
may be seen as reducing the contribution that can be made by a universal rights 
discourse, it has been suggested by rights scholars that culture can itself be an analytic 
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tool to “make sense of claims-making in the global context” (Cowan, Dembour and 
Wilson, 2001: 2), in which the pursuit of rights is seen as a cultural process. Whilst the 
cultural relativist critique sees rights versus culture, so anthropologists have added the 
perspective of rights as culture (ibid). This latter understanding suggests that rights in the 
real world in some sense can both compete with and complement local mores, dictating 
how violations are represented and constructing a particular subjectivity for victims. One 
aim of this study will be to test this understanding to see whether the culturally 
embedded expression of victims can use the rights discourse, or if rights actually 
compete with their own normative frameworks (see Section 2.2.2).  
Rights scholars have addressed issues of rights in practice, and tried to relate the 
abstract concept of rights to their instantiation in culturally specific times and places. 
Such studies have used largely ethnographic methods to understand both the shape and 
impact of rights-based interventions in a number of contexts (Wilson and Mitchell, 2003; 
Cowan, Dembour and Wilson, 2001; Wilson, 1997; Malkki, 1995). Using such empirical 
and anthropological methods breaks the hold that law has traditionally had over rights 
scholarship, humanising it and allowing rights to be seen as one framework among many 
in which people approach their world. Such work reflects an epistemological challenge to 
a legally based human rights that has become hegemonic, claiming the contextual and 
the ethnographic to be not just relevant to the study of rights, but crucial. This underlies 
an approach that is also integral to this thesis, that effective and emancipatory rights 
practice demands not the traditional paradigmatic approach, but a synthetic approach 
derived from a base of evidence (Goodale, 2009).  
Perhaps the most relevant ethnographic study in this context is Richard Wilson‟s 
of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (2001), in which the rhetoric of 
truth and reconciliation was confronted with an anthropological study of those on whom 
the process most impacted. The result is a critique of the South African process and of 
the use of rights more generally: “We must therefore be more cautious about what 
human rights can accomplish and give greater attention to what social institutions and 
social actors actually do with rights...” (Wilson, 2001: 224) This demonstrates how the 
understanding of the limits of rights is emerging from such scholarship, whilst the 
practice of rights in transition appears little informed by it. (See the rhetoric around the 
proposed TRC in Nepal for example, Sections 4.2 & 9.1.)  
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This thesis will engage with the discursive view of rights, seeing them as actively 
constructed by the actions of actors, both those seeking to assert them and others, in an 
environment containing a range of more or less competing normative frameworks. The 
rights discourse then becomes a tool as useful as it is effective, and where alternative 
approaches, such as the potential needs emphasis described here, are seen to be more 
empowering (Section 2.2.2) these can be used alongside rights.  
2.2.2 Needs, rights and victim agency 
Agency is considered important because it reflects an ethical imperative: "The doctrine of 
action has become essential to our recognition of other people's humanity" (Asad, 1996: 
272) Agency is understood primarily as the autonomy of the subject, both as individual 
and community: the sense in which victims are in control of their own destiny and are 
agents in processes to address their needs. Victims are subordinate not only because of 
their victimhood, but in many cases prior to their victimisation for reasons of 
marginalisation by poverty, gender or ethnicity. Their needs result from the confluence of 
long-term marginalisation and the violations of conflict; it is thus crucial that victims 
themselves have agency and voice in the process to address these impacts. What 
distinguishes rights from needs is that while both offer analyses of deficits that impact on 
human life, needs are a simple articulation of that deficit (see Section 2.2.4), while rights 
provide a tool for action. Rights are held by a particular individual subject and in 
exercising rights that subject asserts her claims, backed by obligations in law. Rights are 
asserted to empower their subjects (e.g. Donnelly, 1984) and since they are actively 
claimed they are understood to give victims agency (e.g. Ignatieff, 2003). This study can 
test the extent to which rights are seen to promote or ensure agency in those 
communities most in need of it, in societies where the rural people who were most likely 
to become victims of the conflict know little of rights (Section 9.1).  
Critics of the rights discourse see it as constructing victims as subjects on the 
terms of the atrocities committed against them (Humphrey, 2005): victims are perceived 
as defined by their experience and its codification in law as, for example, „families of the 
disappeared‟, in a way that denies them agency over their own identity. Scholars from 
post-colonial states have taken this critique further: Mutua (2001) uses the metaphor of 
„saviours‟, in which those with access to the rights discourse intervene to redeem victims. 
The impact of this for the subject of rights, the victim, is that her subjectivity is 
constructed entirely upon the basis of this external discourse, serving to reduce agency. 
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Mamdani echoes this, seeing the rights discourse as representing victims as “wards 
needing Protection” (2009: 471), constituting “a depoliticizing discourse whose effect is 
to transfer agency from victims to their „protectors.‟” (ibid). This study will serve to 
understand how victims see their own subjectivity, and the extent to which it overlaps 
with that constructed by the rights discourse.  
The practice of human rights highlights the difference between rights on a 
conceptual level, the global and the universal idea that drives the discourse, and how 
they are instantiated in particular social settings, subject to the power relations that exist 
between the actors involved (e.g. Stammers, 1999). In the highly unequal societies 
studied here, rights constitute a discourse that is preferentially available to the powerful: 
rights are saturated with what Habermas described as a “technocratic consciousness” 
(1971: 112 - 113) and this serves to restrict access to such discourse, which can become 
a tool for power to be exercised, potentially denying the disempowered agency. 
Additionally, rights are mediated by the actors who articulate them: in an unequal 
society, as any other discourse, they may well become subject to existing power 
relations. This is a demonstration of the disjuncture between the epistemology of human 
rights and the social ontologies in which they are embedded (Goodale, 2007). Privileging 
discourse alien to victims, such as that of rights, can empower elites and outsiders at the 
expense of victims, particularly the most disempowered who have both the greatest need 
and least access to the language of rights. Chandler has connected rights and agency by 
describing rights that are constructed independently of their subjects as “fictitious […] 
because there is a separation between the subjects of these rights and the political or 
social agency giving content to them.” (Chandler, 2009: 59). This is an articulation of the 
fact that in a state where only elites know what rights are, they can become something 
that are largely claimed on behalf of victims rather than by victims themselves. The result 
is that victims must be represented by human rights experts, substituting empowerment 
for passivity and dependence upon others: 
Understood in this way the human rights discourse is actually often 
detrimental to the empowerment of victims as it produces a lack of agency 
(the notion that „victims‟ or oppressed people cannot wage the struggle by 
and for themselves) and trusteeship (the idea that others must „represent‟ or 
„take up the cause on behalf‟ of „victims‟)  […] Despite all the talk about victim 
empowerment then, the victim produced by transitional justice NGOs and 
others in the international human rights movement is a hapless, passive 
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victim dependent on NGOs and others to speak for her and argue her case. 
(Madlingozi, 2010: 6) 
Whilst the rights discourse claims to address all rights equally, in practice civil 
and political rights are prioritised over others, notably the social, economic and cultural 
(e.g. Arbour, 2006; Aguirre, 2008; Pasipanodya, 2008), particularly after conflict. This is 
seen in many contexts where victims of conflict are cast as such, overshadowing the 
broader needs that both pre-existed the conflict and that are exacerbated by the impact 
of the violation. The effective hierarchy of rights, that subjugates victims‟ own 
perceptions of their priorities to an agenda that elevates civil and political rights, drives 
more legalistic approaches to transitional justice (McEvoy, 2008). Constraining victim 
identity to derive exclusively from the violence of conflict neglects the structural violence 
of poverty and marginalisation. There is evidence (e.g. Rubio-Marin, 2006) that many 
victims prioritise exactly the basic needs that are marginalised by the rights discourse 
after conflict. Thus, rights comes with its own priorities, which serve not only to reduce 
victim agency but to depoliticise the discussion of peacebuilding, marginalising agendas 
of social and economic justice in favour of a legalism that privileges the civil and political.  
Rights are largely individual, reflecting what has been called the atomism of 
liberalism (Taylor, 1985), in contrast to anthropological understandings of the social 
nature of being and subjectivity as something constituted collectively. The 
methodological and ontological individualism of the rights discourse is an approach that 
fails to resonate with more traditional collective societies who see needs, desires and 
capacities as formed within, rather than outside or prior to, society (Cowan, Dembour 
and Wilson, 2001). The social nature of the impact of the violations studied demands a 
collective understanding of the lives of victims, which rights alone struggle to achieve.  
This thesis empirically examines this range of critiques of rights as a discourse of 
empowerment, seeking to probe the relationship between rights and agency in a highly 
unequal society, and ask what role they play in constructing victims as subjects. It will 
ask how needs and rights emerge from victims‟ subjectivity and if prioritising needs over 
rights can better ensure victim agency in addressing the impacts of violations. The data 
of this thesis constitute a test of the hypothesis that because need is the direct and 
ongoing experience of the powerless it is the most natural way for them to express what 
they seek of any process (Section 9.1), potentially less easily instrumentalised as a tool 
of power than rights and more effective in mobilising the disempowered. 
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2.2.3 Needs versus rights? 
The two vocabularies of needs and rights have long been in tension, with both theoretical 
and ideological debates around them (Waldron, 2000), but have run largely in parallel, 
with little intersection (Munro, 2007); the literature that explicitly contrasts or compares 
the two is thin.  At one extreme the apparent conflict between the universalist discourse 
of human rights and poststructuralism led to the Critical Legal Studies movement which 
saw rights as not natural or inalienable, but historical creations of state and law (e.g. 
Douzinas, 2000; Kennedy, 2002) and rejected rights in favour of needs (e.g. Tushnet, 
1984). At the other extreme is the approach that the vocabulary of rights is the only one 
required, because needs are assimilated into it and because needs do not have the 
authority of rights-based demands. This dismisses “needs-based arguments as 
paternalistic, based on charity and moralism, soft ground compared to legal obligations.” 
(Munro, 2007: 10). In practice there is a relationship between the concepts of needs and 
rights, indeed some theories of rights are based explicitly on human needs (Sen, 2004 
and see below). Nussbaum draws distinctions between her concept of capabilities 
(essentially a contextualised theory of needs, Section 2.2.4) and rights, which clarify the 
rights-needs relationship. Appealing to rights communicates more than the appeal to 
needs, rights are a rhetorically direct way of emphasizing what is to be guaranteed by 
the state, and rights place value on individual choice and autonomy (Nussbaum, 2000).  
The needs-rights debate has reflected an historical emphasis on needs in 
development, and on civil and political rights from the human rights perspective. Their 
overlap traditionally concerned the arena of the social and economic: in the 1970s 
development work was led by a “basic needs” approach, paralleled by the 
contemporaneous development of social and economic rights (International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 1966). Some have attempted to refute that 
„positive‟ social and economic rights are rights rather than merely needs, given that they 
have a cost attached in contrast to the largely „negative‟ civil and political rights 
(Streeten, 1980).  More broadly, the vocabulary of economic and social rights has been 
critiqued as overemphasising the role of states whereas in many societies it is less 
formal mechanisms, notably communities and families, who actually ensure subsistence 
for many. The basic needs approach in development has largely disappeared as it was 
seen to fail in addressing issues of agency, autonomy and power relations, explicitly 
lacking a social justice perspective. Contemporary development orthodoxy now 
emphasises „rights-based approaches‟ (see below), incorporating the entire framework of 
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human rights instruments; civil, political, social, economic and cultural (e.g. UN 
Development Group, 2003). There is some congruence between the Covenant on 
Economic and Social Rights and a „basic needs‟ approach, in particular concerning the 
rights to food, health, shelter, and education.  There remains a difference between the 
concepts of rights and needs however: declaring basic needs as rights gives a moral and 
legal weight to their satisfaction, with political commitment and enforcement to their 
fulfilment, at least in principle. Regardless of the reality of this enforcement the human 
rights regime has largely failed to define what economic and social rights mean in terms 
of concrete indicators3 and instead has emphasised the instruments of enforcing such 
rights, such as universal primary education or vaccination, and the means, by ensuring 
the broadest possible participation in social and economic activities. The Millennium 
Development Goals represent the latest global effort to provide such performance 
targets but largely dodges the setting of benchmarks through the use of relative goals, 
i.e. “Reduce by two thirds, between 1990 and 2015, the under-five mortality rate.” (UN, 
2010: MDG 4) The MDGs have been criticised for setting a lower standard of 
achievement than that stipulated in international human rights treaties and permitting 
states to “turn their back on their human rights obligations” (Symington, 2004: 16). 
Whilst rights are universal, the practice of human rights remains far from it: „on 
the ground‟ it is a discourse that must compete with local political and other imperatives. 
As a result, the study of the practice of human rights is necessarily discursive; to 
understand how the global rights discourse impacts in particular places upon human 
actors, given the webs of political and social relationships in which it must operate 
(Goodale, 2007). This thesis interrogates where and how the global discourse of human 
rights is constituted, and how the way these norms are constructed in practice relates to 
the needs of victims of conflict who are the notional target of that discourse. This 
highlights the difference between human rights on a conceptual level, the global and the 
universal idea that drives the transnational discourse, and how they are instantiated in 
particular social settings, subject to the power relations that exist between the actors 
involved (e.g. Stammers, 1999). 
This thesis studies the boundary where the global rights discourse meets victims 
situated in a particular culture and expressing particular needs, and seeks to understand 
the impact of this confluence of global and local. The emphasis of donors, governments 
                                               
3
 See however: Apodaca (1998), Chapman (1996), and the discussion in Section 2.2.4. 
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and other actors on rights-based approaches impacts upon those who are the target of 
their actions: the fundamental question of this study is to interrogate how effective that 
global practice is in addressing local needs. In this study, the goal of a victim-centred 
approach (Section 3.2) drives the methodology. Victims themselves are invited to define 
and prioritise what action they seek in response to the violations to which they have been 
subject. The nature of the very open questions asked of victims, that do not a presume a 
rights or needs oriented understanding, can be seen in Appendix II. Responses can and 
will include both basic needs (e.g. food, shelter, education and healthcare) as well as 
those needs that are traditionally addressed through the framework of civil and political 
rights, including rights to truth, restitution, reparation and non-repetition. In summary, the 
approach is not one of needs or rights, but needs and rights: the addressing of needs 
through any strategy, one important component of which will be a rights-based agenda. 
Participation and empowerment as tools of agency 
This thesis seeks to be driven by whatever demands victims make of a transitional 
process, whether these can best be characterised as needs or rights, or some 
combination of the two. The ultimate aim is to ensure victim agency. Historically, „basic 
needs‟ approaches (Section 2.2.4) in development were abandoned due to the absence 
of a social justice perspective such as rights contains, and one result of this was the 
move towards „rights-based approaches‟. Rights-based approaches (RBAs) have been 
used in a very large number of areas, most visibly in development but no means 
restricted to it, and reflect a plurality of perspectives. Gready (2008) has defined RBAs in 
terms of core principles: participation, accountability, equality and non-discrimination, 
transparency, and empowerment. RBAs define poverty and other challenges as rights 
violations and seek to both address duty bearers, such as governments, and ensure that 
rights-holders themselves play a role in claiming their rights. RBAs have a normative 
justification, in that they put values and politics at the centre of practice and challenge 
the power relations that lead to rights violations:   
[W]hereas a needs-based approach focuses on securing additional 
resources for delivery of services to particular groups, a rights-based 
approach calls for existing resources to be shared more equally and for 
assisting the marginalised people to assert their rights to those resources. 
(Cornwall and Nyamu-Nusembi, 2004: 1417) 
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RBAs challenge the passivity of those practice seeks to benefit, by seeking to ensure the 
agency of rights-holders in claiming their rights: “poor people fulfil their individual needs 
by claiming or securing their human rights” (Action Aid, 2008: 4). They have been seen 
as explicitly referencing the addressing of marginalisation, i.e. not just the symptoms but 
the causes of violations, “promoting human dignity through the development of claims 
that seek to empower excluded groups” (Uvin, 2004: 163). Participatory approaches are 
not new, but RBAs represent the politicisation of such strategies following the 
instrumentalisation of such approaches in development in the 1990s (Cornwall and 
Nyamu-Nusembi, 2004). 
The concept of agency, through processes of empowerment and participation, is 
central to RBAs and, in a transitional context, reveals a route to the addressing of 
victims‟ demands that focuses as much on process as on goals. This discussion serves 
to shift the focus away from the tension between rights and needs and towards the 
processes through which agendas are articulated, rights claimed and needs addressed. 
Through the lens of participation, the critiques of the rights discourse made above can be 
seen as a comment on the “politics of location” (Cornwall and Nyamu-Nusembi, 2004: 
1419). Processes of empowerment necessarily shift the context of rights-talk from the 
metropolis, where those most able to access the rights discourse are located, to the 
communities where violations occur. This is relevant both for the typical mechanisms of 
transitional justice, the trials and truth commissions physically located in capitals, and for 
those advocating for transitional justice process, who are often similarly positioned far 
from victims. This thesis will attempt to take the concepts of participation, accountability, 
transparency and empowerment, and understand their potential role in ensuring the 
agency of victims in processes to address their demands of transition.  
To some extent this thesis can be said to represent a plea for a rights-based 
approach to transitional justice: despite transitional justice being a rights-driven 
discourse many of the elements that are considered central to RBAs remain largely 
absent from its practice. A rights-based approach to transitional justice would seek to 
address structural causes of violations as well as ensuring participation and 
empowerment of those most impacted by violations, both largely absent from current 
transitional justice practice. Victims may articulate agendas dominated by either needs or 
rights alone, or perceive rights as a way to address needs; it is also possible that victims 
construct their own contextualised politics that emerges from their everyday lives, using 
language and concepts that emerge from local culture and circumstance. Whatever 
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discourses victims choose to use, the methodology of this thesis will privilege them, 
seeing this as consistent with processes of empowerment that ensure agency. A 
significant project of this thesis is to forge emancipatory approaches to transitional 
justice, and it is hoped that victims themselves will demonstrate strategies to do this, and 
ensure that whether rights or needs (or both) are the basis for action, victims are 
empowered to play the largest possible role in any process.   
2.2.4 Theories of need 
Whilst theories of need have prompted far less scholarship than the rights framework, 
there is a significant body of work that attempts to theorise human needs. This is briefly 
summarised here to contextualise the efforts of this study to understand the needs of 
victims.  
In the environment of humanitarian action, needs emphasise the urgent, i.e. 
those required for life. There is no shared definition of humanitarian need, but evidence 
of broad agreement around four „core‟ elements: “the protection of life, health, 
subsistence and physical security.” (Darcy and Hoffmann, 2003) For the victims met in 
this study needs include these and other „higher‟ needs beyond the physiological that 
would traditionally be excluded by an emergency humanitarian approach. Here we 
discuss a hierarchy of needs where these include, but are not restricted to, these most 
urgent or basic needs.  
The classic paper of Maslow (1943) presents a hierarchy of human needs, 
defining five levels of need (see Figure 1), beginning with physiological needs and 
ascending to needs which are psychological in nature. The bottom two levels of this 
hierarchy have been associated with basic needs. Maslow claimed that only when lower 
needs are satisfied will an individual seek to address the higher needs. Whilst this 
approach is not unchallenged it does allow us to provide a basis to assess the priorities 
of families of the Missing.  Primary needs are likely to be physiological: to ensure that the 
family can continue to feed and shelter itself in the absence of the missing person, and 
this may translate into a desire to guarantee economic security.  Safety needs are also 
likely to be important for those emerging from a situation of armed conflict: in some 
cases the fact that a family member is missing in a situation of conflict, perhaps arrested, 
may pose a genuine security risk to other family members. 
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Figure 1 Maslow’s hierarchy of needs (Maslow, 1943).
4
  
Maslow emphasises that for children safety includes enjoying a “normal family setup” 
(ibid: 7), and to avoid separation from parents. Health is also placed into this category by 
Maslow, and in those contexts where affected families are poor, a reduction in household 
income through loss of the missing person‟s contribution will often impact through an 
inability to afford basic healthcare. Where physiological and safety needs are met the 
need for love becomes dominant. The absence of a spouse, a parent or a child, and 
resulting thwarting of such needs is at the core of “maladjustment and more severe 
psychopathology” (ibid: 9). The psychological need to know the truth about a missing 
person will be inextricably linked to basic needs for love and belonging. What Maslow 
called „esteem needs‟ are hugely challenged by a relative being missing. This will include 
those impacts occurring in the social spaces of family and community, such as 
stigmatisation or exclusion, as well as perceptions that an authority, such as the state, is 
contemptuous of the family.  
Maslow fails to consider the timescale on which needs remain unmet. Clearly the 
basic physiological needs cannot remain unmet in the long term, but it is the nature of 
the phenomenon of the Missing that the problems families face are chronic in nature. As 
a result, economic security can be precarious in the long-term. The nature of not 
knowing the fate of a missing person is that it continues indefinitely, and it is not being 
                                               
4
 Image taken from Wikipedia commons.  
 62 
 
able to resolve the ambiguity of the loss of the loved one in the long term that most 
defines the particular psychological torment of families of the Missing (see Section 2.3).   
Burton (1990) and others (Lederer, 1980; Galtung, 1980) have built upon 
Maslow's ideas to develop theories of human need. Burton posits the existence of certain 
universal needs that must be satisfied, and argues that conflict and instability in 
developing countries arise because people are denied not only their biological needs, but 
also psychological needs that relate to growth and development (1997). Burton, 
however, perceives human needs in a different way from Maslow, seeing them as a 
collection of requirements for human development which do not have a hierarchical 
order; rather, the addressing of all needs is sought simultaneously in an intense and 
relentless manner (Burton, 1990). The basic axioms of such a needs theory have been 
articulated as: 
A need is a conscious or unconscious recognition of a lack of something 
„indispensable‟ for a state of personal equilibrium, physically or emotionally. 
The indispensable something, the obtaining of which relieves the feeling, is a 
„satisfier‟. A need can be defined only as it is relieved by the specific satisfier. 
(Freidman, 1990: 257)  
In the case of individual victims, this approach demands that we define a need in terms 
of what is required to address it. This theoretical approach then suggests a methodology 
in which needs are defined by those most able to define the relevant „satisfier‟, i.e. the 
victims themselves. This suggests that a victim-centred methodology can most 
effectively understand such needs. The implications of Burton‟s approach are that:  
…while basic human needs themselves are universal, transcending 
differences in class, gender, and culture, their satisfiers are culturally 
determined. [..] In absolutising basic human needs, John Burton and his 
fellow thinkers absolutely relativised their satisfiers. (Rubenstein, 2001)  
This reflects the tension when attempting to understand needs empirically 
between the universalising tradition in both the rights discourse and development and an 
understanding, reinforced by the post-modern turn, that needs are highly relative. 
Policymakers ignore cultural projections of human needs at their peril (Douglas et al., 
1998). Doyal and Gough (1991) have proposed a hierarchical theory of needs in a 
developmental context in which universal goals (avoidance of harm, participation) give 
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rise to basic needs (physical health, critical autonomy, autonomy of agency), also 
universal, distinguished from wants which are driven by personal preference and cultural 
environment. Basic needs then define intermediate needs which are satisfied in a 
culturally dependent way. An example would be the basic need for nutrition that is 
satisfied according to cultural norms by locally preferred and available food. However, 
Doyal and Gough posit that these satisfiers have universal satisfier characteristics; in this 
example the fact that foodstuff must satisfy a minimum daily calorific requirement. The 
result of their approach is a list of universal goals, basic needs and universal satisfier 
characteristics with claims to universality, but with a framework that understands the 
difference in the expression of need across contexts. This permits the possibility of a 
universalism around basic needs, but on the understanding that their expression and 
satisfaction will be local and contingent. 
Sen and Nussbaum have developed another approach, formulated in terms of 
human functional capabilities, i.e. what people are actually able to be and to do. For Sen 
functionings “constitute a person‟s being” (1992: 4-7) and since functionings are 
“intrinsically valuable” (ibid) they amount to states of well-being. Capabilities are the set 
of functionings that are feasible to a person, i.e. from which she can choose and which 
relate to needs but indirectly, since what any one individual can do with a certain 
resource is dependent upon their functioning. The capability approach demands an 
understanding of the needs individuals have for resources and their diverse abilities to 
convert resources into functioning. Nussbaum has formalised this approach in a style 
similar to Gough and Doyal, making a list of these capabilities (Nussbaum, 2000), in 
which all are considered equally fundamental. Nussbaum‟s approach explicitly embraces 
universalism, critiquing a relativist approach. The language of rights can then use this list 
to draw basic normative conclusions: one defines a level of capability to function and 
aims to enforce that.   
The resolution of the desire for a universal theory of needs, not least as a tool for 
practice, with acknowledgement of the reality of cultural difference has prompted much 
debate. Gough has written that:  
There remains a deep contradiction between the domination of post-
modernism and cultural relativism in intellectual life and the universalism and 
globalism dominant in the real world of institutions and politics. (Gough, 
2002: 1) 
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This tension between the supposedly universal and the local is encompassed by this 
study. For Gough the solution is clear: needs are universal, but satisfiers are time and 
place specific (2002). In practice, in the development setting in which such theories 
arise, a universalist and prescriptive approach dominates as seen in the formulation of 
the Millennium Development Goals, Human Development Index etc. In transitional 
justice similarly prescriptive approaches have dominated and this thesis will argue that 
greater attention to the cultural context in which victims‟ needs develop is required for 
transitional justice mechanisms to be created which can address the needs of both 
individuals and communities.  
 That satisfiers are highly local leads to the expectation that the needs expressed, 
or at least the demands made in response to victimhood, are likely to also be local and 
contingent. This has methodological implications, in that acknowledging the importance 
of context implies that ethnographic methods should be privileged where possible. 
However, a strongly localist approach will challenge the ability of such studies to 
compare across contexts. In practice there is no simple conflict between the local and 
the global. Needs are constructed at many levels: individual, family, community, region 
and nation; the extent to which each is relevant can be explored in ethnographic 
research. It will be seen that in the victim communities studied here local factors and 
national constructs have a greater impact than the discourse of hegemonic globalisation 
allows. This thesis will attempt to understand needs in a context-specific way, as they 
are understood by those expressing them. It will also however seek phenomena and 
variables that are common across contexts, with the overarching aim of proposing policy 
and methodologies that can most effectively comprehend and address such needs 
across a wide range of contexts. This may arise from an understanding of what Doyal 
and Gough call „intermediate needs‟ (1991), analogous in some cases to basic needs, 
that may be sufficiently common that they can constitute the foundation of a genuinely 
bottom-up universalism.  
The idea of „measuring‟ needs implicitly involves two elements: the application of 
relevant norms (such as would come from a benchmark established by a basic needs 
approach); and an assessment of how the reality differs. In this sense, needs 
assessment is concerned with identifying and measuring deficits and as such this study 
employs the traditional paradigm of humanitarian assistance as a deficit replacement 
approach. The novel element of the victim-centred approach (Section 3.2) used here is 
that victims themselves define those benchmarks.  
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Just as rights are presented by their advocates as apolitical, so humanitarians 
present needs as somehow beyond politics:  
We get round the profoundly political nature of needs by saying instead that 
needs are basic, fundamental and just deeply human. Our humanitarian 
belief is - quite simply - that needs pre-exist politics and that meeting them 
should thus transcend particular political priorities and policies. (Slim, 2004: 
3)  
Those who seek to actively deny the addressing of needs are aware of their political 
uses: “Need is also a political instrument, meticulously prepared, calculated and used.” 
(Foucault, 1977: 26) Fraser (1988) maintains that the politics of needs is characterised 
by actively appearing non-political, assuming that the interpretation of needs, and indeed 
who makes that interpretation, is unproblematic and that existing public discourse on 
needs is authoritative and fair. The fact that this is so often not the case drives the victim-
centred approach, in which victims themselves interpret and articulate their needs. 
Throughout this study, an awareness of the politics of needs and of their addressing, in 
families, communities and states, is maintained through an emphasis on the discursive 
and an understanding that statements of needs are intrinsically political. 
One critique of all these approaches to human needs is that they construct the 
person as fundamentally non-social (Douglas and Ney, 1998). With the exception of 
Maslow‟s discussion of love, belonging and esteem, theorists of need define humans as 
non-relational beings with individual needs. In practice, poverty itself is perceived as 
something relative, measured not in absolute terms but as a deficit in comparison with 
others. More general concerns about equity are excluded from the needs narrative, 
social justice is never touched upon. The economistic approach of needs theories that 
claim universality is challenged by the data of this study that show that social structures 
and relationships with family, community and the broader society are a key component of 
how people perceive needs. Thus whilst the above theories will inform the understanding 
of this thesis, they will not constrain it.    
2.3 Families of the Missing as victims and their needs  
This section explores the victimhood of families of the Missing, how this is defined and 
what its impact is. It surveys the literature on the needs of victims more generally and 
that which specifically impinges upon the needs of families of the Missing. How the 
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mechanisms of transitional justice can then address these needs is discussed in Section 
3.1.  
Whilst the Missing themselves are victims, the families they leave behind are also 
victims, as acknowledged in international law:5  
„victim‟ means the disappeared person and any individual who has suffered 
harm as the direct result of an enforced disappearance. International 
Convention on the Prevention of all Persons from Disappearance (OHCHR, 
2007) 
In principle, a victim is defined as such by what has been done to them, with this codified 
in the violations defined by various bodies of law. In practice victimhood does not 
emerge naturally from the experience of being harmed, but is constructed socially and 
subjectively, with a range of factors determining who will be accorded victim status. 
Rombouts and Vandeginste call these “public recognition selection processes” (2000-
2003:114) in which some “„have the „power‟ to enforce recognition (socially and legally)” 
(ibid). Most formally, bodies established to deal with victims, such as Truth Commissions 
or prosecutorial bodies, will determine who is considered a victim. More locally, in many 
contexts victims‟ groups and NGOs will engage with victims and define criteria that may 
impact on understandings of victimhood within communities. These understandings may 
or may not coincide with those of victims themselves, usually being created by those with 
authority in the capital and remote from affected communities. A political agenda or a 
certain narrative of the conflict may privilege a particular conception of victimhood: 
victims constitute a part of the contested terrain of the memory of the conflict, at both 
national and local levels (Section 9.2), often creating a hierarchy of victimhood 
(Rombouts, 2002). The Truth Commission represents the formalisation of this process, in 
which victim memory is transformed into public knowledge (Humphrey, 2002), 
sanctioned by authority.  
The language of victimisation remains potentially problematic, implying “an 
imbalance of strength and disequilibrium in the position of power: the strong, powerful 
                                               
5
 There are also very broad definitions of victim, explicitly including family members of direct 
victims, in The Declaration on the Right to Restitution for Victims of Gross Human Rights 
Violations (UN General Assembly, 2006), and The Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for 
Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power (UN General Assembly, 1985).  
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victimizer and the weak, helpless victim.” (Fattah, 1991:4). As a result the passive 
implications of the term „victim‟ have been increasingly challenged through the use of 
terms perceived as positive and empowering, such as „survivor‟, although this appears to 
have rarely been done on the terms of those being so renamed. The victim subject, 
particularly in developing world contexts such as are discussed here, has been 
essentialised as a disempowered brown (and often female) person dependent upon 
Western discourses such as feminism and human rights for their emancipation. This 
liberal discourse implies that being a victim and being an agent are mutually exclusive, 
reinforcing the lack of agency of the victim: human rights has been criticised as effecting 
the transfer of agency from victims to their „protectors‟ (Section 2.2.2). Victims 
themselves may well find that victimhood serves as a basis for making claims on the 
state and others, and value that status. This study will attempt to privilege the language 
that victims use to describe themselves and explore the interaction between their self 
constructed subjectivity (in contrast to simply being the objects of violations) and that of 
others, notably elites and others using imported discourses, and the impact this has on 
victim agency.  
Individual relatives of the Missing will be impacted by their victimhood according 
to their relationship to the missing person, mediated by the culture and society in which 
they live. Disappearance itself will often be contested, not just by those denying any 
violation, but by those not emotionally impacted by the phenomenon who believe it to be 
self evident that the Missing are dead. This demonstrates that the identity of a victim (in 
this case as wife or widow) can be contested at many levels, including within the 
community and family (see Section 6.2.3). The family will also be the principal coping 
mechanism and so the discussion of needs as well as responses will here emphasise 
the family as a unit, rather than the individual. Since a majority of the Missing in most 
contexts are men, those left behind will predominantly be women, often with children to 
support.  As such, there are often explicit gender issues that impact upon the needs of 
families (see Section 6.2.3). Here, a contextual approach has been taken acknowledging 
that no victim, whether family or individual, is only a victim; victims are actors with roles 
in society and with both internal and external resources. It is likely that the most effective 
responses to needs will build on these resources.  
Needs of families of the Missing  
General theories of victim need have emerged in criminal justice and victimology (e.g. 
Fattah, 2000). Stauffer and Hamber (1996) define the core of victimisation as 
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„disconnectedness‟ and „disempowerment‟, and thus see victims‟ needs as driven by 
what can address these feelings. Danieli (2006) has enlarged upon this with specific 
reference to victims of „massive trauma‟, notably the Holocaust and the crimes of the 
military regimes in Argentina and Chile, to define victim needs as including: 
 Reestablishment of the victim‟s equality of power: compensation, restitution, 
rehabilitation and commemoration;  
 Relieving stigmatisation: commemoration, memorials, empowerment, education;  
 Repairing the nation‟s ability to maintain equal value under the law, and justice: 
prosecution, apology.  
 
For families of the Missing answers will always lie at the heart of what they seek: being 
able to tell the truth of disappearance is to refute the efforts of perpetrators to deny that 
anything untoward has happened. Whilst psychological needs may be extreme, and 
have received great attention from scholars, it is important not to neglect the practical 
needs of victims (Macguire, 1991), although for victims of rights violations generally there 
is lack of literature that discusses their impact on and contribution to poverty.   
The majority of the literature discussed here comes from studies in societies that 
can generally be considered to share a culture with the West, with conclusions that are 
largely perceived as being universal and applying to victims generally or to families of the 
Missing everywhere. There is a dearth of efforts to understand needs of those from other 
cultures and to understand how cultural elements impact on needs of victims, and their 
addressing. The family that is the unit of analysis of this study is itself a concept that is 
culturally dependent, with families in the Asian contexts studied being largely patrilocal,6 
patriarchal (often highly so) and multi-generational. The functions of the family: sexual, 
economic, reproductive and educational (Georgas, 2006) are universal, but are 
expressed in such radically different ways across societies that it is inevitable that they 
will impact significantly on the needs that arise when a member of the family is missing. 
The literature review that follows thus comes with the caveat that its relevance to the 
families of Nepal and Timor-Leste may well be limited, particularly when discussing 
psychosocial impacts. This in itself demonstrates the need for studies such as this one in 
                                               
6
 Patrilocal refers to the fact that the majority of the world‟s families reside with or close to 
patrilineal kinsmen (Georgas, 2006), i.e. on marriage a women will typically move into her 
husband‟s family, as seen in both Nepal and Timor.   
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what has been called the “majority world” (Kagitçibasi, 2007), as opposed to Western 
societies.  
The net impact on families and individuals of having a missing relative will be the 
sum of the emotional, psychological, material, cultural and social effects, subject to the 
resources of individuals and communities to cope.7 One lens through which to look at 
such impacts is that of human well-being, which has formed the basis for a number of 
projects in understanding human needs and their satisfaction (e.g. Gough and 
McGregor, 2007) and measuring the impact of poverty and development (Sen, 1993; 
Nussbaum, 2000). Definitions of well-being derive largely from utilitarian understandings, 
in traditional senses of utility in terms of both state of mind, and a state of the world 
(Griffin, 1986). Well-being is defined as “the state of being comfortable, healthy, or 
happy.” (OED, 2010) and this is why problems arise in defining well-being in terms that 
can escape cultural construction; a reprise of the discussion of the challenges in 
universalising needs in the face of local preference discussed in Section 2.2. Thus well-
being encompasses both „objective‟ and „subjective‟ well-being, where the former is 
something “normatively endorsed” (Gasper, 2004) and the latter defined by the “feelings 
of the person whose wellbeing is being estimated” (ibid: 12). The approach of this study 
leans towards a subjective understanding, assuming that this largely encompasses 
objective considerations such as basic needs (Section 2.2). Where mental states (e.g. 
understanding pleasure and pain) drive approaches, „psychosocial well-being‟ is often 
discussed, a concept that is preferred to narrower understandings of mental health by 
emphasising social and cultural (as well as psychological) influences on well-being 
(Psychosocial Working Group, 2003). As several scholars have pointed out, the 
experience of pain and suffering is also fundamentally social (Erikson, 1976; Good et al., 
1994) and so it is understood that well-being is both relational and dynamic, a product of 
the social and cultural worlds in which people are immersed.  
In summary, subjective well-being is an approach that drives the engagement of 
this research with victims‟ needs. However, since well-being remains both contested and 
inexactly defined, needs will be discussed divided into topics driven both by approaches 
from the literature and priorities identified by research subjects. This permits a direct 
                                               
7
 The International Committee of the Red Cross has made assessments of the needs of families 
of the Missing in a large number of contexts; the results of these are largely not publicly available, 
but some details can be found in ICRC Annual Reports (e.g. ICRC, 2010b). 
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understanding of the relevance of expressed needs to actual and potential transitional 
justice mechanisms.  
The fate of the Missing and the impact of ambiguous loss 
Studies have been made of both the general impact of war on civilians and of families of 
the disappeared in particular, dominated by approaches that privilege investigations of 
the psychological sequelae of trauma, and in particular posttraumatic stress disorder 
(PTSD) (American Psychiatric Association, 2000). Quirk and Casco (1994), for example, 
studied families of the disappeared in Central America and found that many of the 
indicators of PTSD (increased arousal, physiological reactions, stress symptoms) were 
elevated in families of the disappeared. There has however been a sustained critique of 
the relevance of trauma based approaches across cultures (e.g. Summerfield, 2004; 
Mezey and Robbins, 2001; von Peter, 2008), in favour of the privileging of context, 
indigenous understandings and interventions rooted in the affected community. An 
additional reason to query a trauma-centred approach to disappearance is evidence that 
the impact of disappearance is very different from that of a single, traumatising event, 
being of a chronic nature that has emotional, psychological, economic and social 
consequences (Blaauw and Lahteenmaki, 2002). Whilst mental health and potential 
posttraumatic stress symptoms are clearly an area of interest when attempting to 
understand the response of victims to disappearance, this must be placed in context 
through an understanding of the social ecology that can ameliorate or worsen emotional 
and mental responses to disappearance, i.e. an approach to psychosocial well-being 
(see Section 2.2). Disappearance leaves families with no certainty regarding the fate of 
loved ones, unsure if the Missing are alive or dead. This has led to efforts to consider the 
impact of disappearance as an interrupted grieving process (Pérez-Sales, Durán-Pérez 
and Herzfeld, 2002), while Blaauw and Lahteenmaki (2002) have reviewed the impact of 
disappearance across cultures in terms of the inability to mourn and conduct rituals, and 
the resulting psychological and emotional impacts.   
Hunter (1983) has made a study of families of US servicemen missing in action in 
Vietnam that informs understanding of psychological impact. In the early stages after a 
family member goes missing, families will often assume their loved one is captive and 
alive. Studies of families of those held captive indicate that the ambiguity of the situation 
and its indeterminate duration induce feelings of helplessness and hopelessness 
(Hunter, 1983: 171). The uncertainty of the continuing absence of the missing person 
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can result in a breakdown of the family‟s ability to cope, resulting in: stagnation, self-
enforced isolation, blaming (themselves and the victim), parental pressure and neglect. 
Hunter found that maintaining family rituals and actively seeking group support increased 
the ability of families to remain functional. Mothers were much less likely to believe that 
their sons were dead than others: “You wives can still have another life; he was my only 
son; I shall never have another. I shall always hope that someday he will come walking 
through that door.” (Hunter, 1983: 177), a phenomenon that has been seen elsewhere in 
the world (e.g. Femenía, 1987, concerning mothers of the Argentinian desaparecidos).   
One explicit aim of this study is to support appropriate intervention with families of 
the Missing, necessarily including those that emphasise the psychosocial. The ability of 
individuals to withstand the impact of traumatic events has been called resilience: “good 
outcomes in spite of serious threats to adaptation or development” (Masten, 2001: 2) and 
there is a large literature discussing resilience in the face of both conflict and 
bereavement (e.g. Bonanno, 2004, 2007). Any intervention should aim to work to support 
and promote the “ordinary magic” (Masten, 2001) of resilience. Interventions to support 
such families have few theoretical foundations; ambiguous loss is one of the few that 
may be relevant and as such is discussed in some detail here.  
Ambiguous loss is „„a situation of unclear loss resulting from not knowing whether 
a loved one is dead or alive, absent or present‟‟ (Boss, 2004: 554). Where a family 
member is absent in an unclear way, the lack of knowledge about the loved one gives 
rise to a challenge to transform the experience into one with which the family can live. 
Ambiguous loss occurs where a family member is psychologically present, but physically 
absent, as for families of the missing or disappeared in conflict, or victims of natural 
disasters. (Or where a family member is physically present but psychologically absent, 
as in cases of Alzheimer‟s disease or other chronic illness, Boss, 2006). Ambiguous loss 
is an explicitly relational perspective, which differs from individualised trauma 
approaches, such as that of PTSD, in that it characterises the stress as external and 
ongoing.  
A range of studies (Boss, 2006, 2004, 1977) indicate that situations of ambiguous 
loss predict symptoms of depression, anxiety and family conflict. The literature reveals 
the need of families of the disappeared for closure to end the ambiguity of loss, but in 
most contexts this is something denied families. The ambiguous loss model confronts 
this perceived need for closure:  
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The goal is to find meaning in the situation despite the absence of 
information and persisting ambiguity. Here, resiliency means being able to 
live with unanswered questions. Instead of the usual epistemological 
question about truth, we ask, „How do people manage to live well despite not 
knowing?‟”(Boss, 2007: 106).  
This directly contradicts conventional practice with families of the disappeared, 
where a demand for truth drives advocacy, notably that of the human rights community. 
Interventions based on an understanding of ambiguous loss offer a way forward for 
those families who may never receive an answer concerning the fate of their loved one, 
where the aim of intervention is to strengthen family resilience. The importance of peer 
support suggests that resilience is not simply intrinsic but is something that can be 
boosted (or indeed depleted) by all elements that impinge on an individuals‟ well-being, 
most notably social structures. Some studies have confirmed the importance of family to 
resilience and coping (Tol et al., 2008) while Hunter‟s studies demonstrate the value of 
support from other families in the same position (Hunter, 1983). A range of data indicates 
the value of professional therapeutic assistance to families. However, in the contexts 
studied here such support is largely not available. 
Culture plays a major part in defining family composition and where family 
boundaries are placed and so cultural factors are a determinant in when ambiguous loss 
occurs and how it manifests itself.  Almost all studies to date of ambiguous loss (Carroll, 
Olson and Buckmiller, 2007) have been made in a Western culture, largely in the United 
States among families who reflect contemporary North American social and cultural 
norms. This study represents the first to explicitly seek to test the ambiguous loss model 
in non Western contexts.  
Trauma in traditional societies is understood through the lens of culture and as 
such the repeated dreams and other emotional impacts associated with trauma may be 
seen as evidence of the spirit of the Missing voicing their disquiet. Because traditional 
societies are so highly collective, trauma is manifested more communally than in 
individualistic Western societies (e.g. Igreja, 2003; Cole, 2004; Eppel, 2002). Western 
approaches to psychological trauma involve a „coming to terms‟ through the revisiting of 
traumatic experience in a cathartic process of verbalization of the experience (e.g. Allan, 
2000; Hamber, 2001), exactly the metaphor that drives the concept of the truth 
commission, critiqued in Section 8.2. In traditional contexts however there is evidence 
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that the trauma of conflict is best addressed non-discursively through ritual process and 
„starting afresh‟, consciously avoiding the verbal or other recalling of traumatic 
experience (Marratto, 1996). In such societies a harmony is perceived to exist between 
humans, their environment and the ancestors: any disruption of this balance through an 
inappropriate treatment of a spirit jeopardizes the well-being of the community. The ill-
health that results from having a missing relative is ascribed not to traumatic stress but to 
spiritual disharmony and the resulting „treatment‟ is the correcting of the spiritual issues, 
i.e. burial of the body or other ritual. There is a significant literature discussing the role of 
the spirits of the dead both during and after conflict in traditional societies (Ellis, 1995 & 
2001; Igreja, 2003; Eppel, 2002; Kwon, 2008). In some African conflicts of recent 
decades magical and spiritual aspects drove much of the behaviour of combatants and it 
has been common in such contexts for the impact of trauma to be understood 
collectively as the result of spiritual activity (Igreja, 2003; Baines, 2007). In the contexts 
discussed by Igreja and Baines (Mozambique and northern Uganda, respectively), 
recovery from the impact of the violence demanded that these spiritual deficits be 
addressed. Baines reports how the spirit of a young woman, missing by the definition 
used here, haunts her sister (2007): the solution to this haunting, and to the sickness it 
was perceived to have caused, was the performance of the ritual that the sister has long 
been denied.  
The need of families of the Missing to end the ambiguity of loss is best addressed 
through the recovery and return of physical remains. The need for a body appears to be 
universal (Boss, 2004) serving several purposes (Boss, 2002): 
  
 The evidence of a body, and the rituals that accompany mourning and disposal 
of remains break down the denial of death.  
 Cognition and rationality demand a body: in its absence families cannot grieve or 
make decisions.  
 The body allows family to say goodbye, and promotes detachment.  
 The body allows rituals that are themselves comforting, and bring people around 
the family to support them. 
  
This is supported by reports of families strongly expressing the need to perform the 
rituals appropriate to their culture:  
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For the Srebrenica survivors, and especially the women, the absence of 
bodies has robbed them not only of funerary ritual but of the visual cues that 
would help them to acknowledge the death of loved ones and to pass 
through the states of mourning and grief. (Stover and Shigekane, 2002: 860).  
Sant Cassia describes the need of families of the Missing for remains of loves ones in 
terms of Freudian „reality testing‟ (2005): the bones serve to discriminate the mental 
image of the missing person as alive somewhere from the reasonable expectation that 
he is dead. The demand for a body then becomes a validation in itself of suffering, with 
remains a prerequisite for „normalcy‟ for families, its absence serving to underline their 
victimhood and justify their identity as victims. This is the foundation for the most 
negative form of coping, where the trauma of ambiguity itself becomes valorised and 
closing emotional wounds is perceived as betraying the Missing. In most cases, the only 
route to access remains of loved ones is through the painstaking process of exhumation 
and identification (Blaauw and Lahteenmaki, 2002). For families of the Missing a body is 
in some sense the „best‟ truth, in that it most effectively informs the family of the fate of a 
loved one, but given that families living with ambiguity never cease to hope the Missing 
are alive it is also the „worst‟ truth.  
In some cases concerning persons missing in conflict it is possible to give 
families an answer, but not a body. This answer may be a death certificate, a document 
summarizing official information on the events leading to death or a statement of a 
perpetrator regarding death.  Such symbols can be a way of „permitting‟ families to begin 
mourning, without having them feel they are not being faithful to the pursuit of their loved 
one alive (Blaauw and Lahteenmaki, 2002). However, these abstract indications of 
“paper death” (Stover and Shigekane, 2002: 855) do not have the same impact on a 
family as the body, and the reasons given by Boss above shed light on this. A document 
cannot permit social rituals, such as burial, and above all a document does not answer 
the family‟s visceral need to know beyond any doubt that their loved one is dead, and 
have the physical evidence in front of them. There are instances where ritual can take 
place in the absence of a body: funerals were permitted by some religious leaders 
following the 9/11 attacks in New York, and the city offered both a „certificate of 
presumed death‟ and an urn of ashes from „ground zero‟ to all families of the Missing. 
“The brother of a missing man said, „I choose to believe that part of my brother‟s body is 
in these ashes.‟” (quoted in Boss, 2002: 16). Such rituals can address some of the needs 
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for the body even in its absence and can blur the boundary between a grave containing a 
body and a symbolic memorial.  
Truth, acknowledgement and justice  
Truth for families of the Missing is most immediately the truth about their loved one that 
ends ambiguity and that allows families to retrieve remains and perform ritual. In the 
theory and practice of transitional justice however truth is something that emerges from 
state sanctioned process such as trials and truth commissions. These two different 
understandings of truth can be considered in the light of Foucault‟s claim that power 
relations underlie the institutional production of knowledge (1980): not only must truth be 
sanctioned by the institutions of power for it to be „true‟, but for the families of the Missing 
it is seen that the very definition of truth is something imposed on a context by those with 
the authority to do so that often diverges from their own understanding. The research of 
this study attempts to challenge this by allowing victims to articulate their own 
understandings of truth, and showing how truth is almost always partial, masking certain 
power relations. This issue is discussed further below and in Section 8.2.  
Acknowledgement and truth are clearly linked, to the extent that truth becomes 
reparative when it is endorsed by authority: victims seek to use existing power relations 
to legitimate their experience. Thomas Nagel has said: “[Acknowledgement is] what 
happens […] to knowledge when it is officially sanctioned, when it is made part of the 
public cognitive scene.” (quoted in Govier, 2003: 67). This public sanctioning of victims‟ 
suffering is crucial to victims (Summerfield, 1995) and reparative:  
The victims … need to know that their society as a whole acknowledges 
what has happened to them... Truth means the end of denial and silence... 
Truth will be achieved only when literally everyone knows and acknowledges 
what happened during the military regime. ... Social reparation is thus... 
simultaneously a sociopolitical and a psychological process. (The Latin 
American Institute of Mental Health and Human Rights, quoted in Becker et. 
al, 1990: 147-8).  
Wagner (2008) defines recognition for the families of the Srebrenica missing in three 
ways: attaching identity to mortal remains, recognising the Missing when presented with 
DNA (or other) evidence of their identity, and commemorative ceremonies held at the 
memorial site to the Missing. She defines the sum of these as “the restoration of 
 76 
 
personhood” (ibid: 15), localising a loved one both geographically and giving them a 
fixed place in individual, family and national memory. In this sense there are two truths: 
the particular truth concerning a family member that is constituted by knowing the 
circumstances of disappearance and the location, retrieval and identification of remains; 
and the more general truth, i.e. the fact of disappearance that families seek 
acknowledged and remembered.  
Many victims articulate a need for justice to be done, both in terms of 
prosecutions and as the emergence of truth. In many cases, victims are seen to 
interweave truth and justice as a single indivisible demand. In some cases, such as that 
of South Africa, victims‟ poverty has been unchanged by transitional process and they 
articulate a desire for social justice (Wilson, 2001; Mamdani, 2000). Whilst one of the 
goals of the research of this study is to understand what justice means to families of the 
Missing, retributive justice is often a key demand of victims. The existing research base 
on the impact of trials on victims is summarised in Section 3.1.  
2.4 Summary and conclusions 
This chapter has reviewed the literature on the needs of victims of conflict generally and 
on those of families of the Missing in particular, with an emphasis on the local and 
particular, and the fact that victims‟ needs emerge from their everyday lives. In doing this 
it has focussed on the role victims play in post-conflict contexts and their potential 
importance to building a sustainable peace, and the fact that the needs arising from 
victimhood are contingent, rooted in context and circumstance.  
Victims can play a crucial role in sustaining or ending cycles of conflict. They can 
be instrumentalised by conflict entrepreneurs who use victims‟ ongoing suffering to 
mobilise communities to continue or restart conflict. The addressing of victims‟ needs 
can undercut the claims of spoilers to represent them and their communities and support 
peacebuilding efforts. Sustainable peace can be contingent upon the legitimacy that is 
conferred on regimes through the addressing of victim needs, and the resulting 
perceptions of post-conflict governance. This understanding, as well as the normative 
and moral claims of victims, drive the focus of this study on the needs of victims. Rights 
are universal, which permits moral and legal claims on the states that purport to enforce 
them, but are remote from the daily experience of ordinary people. Needs, however, are 
expressed in terms rooted in the context in which victims live, constituting local and very 
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particular claims: because they emerge from victims‟ experience they ensure victim 
agency. This study navigates between the competing discourses of needs and rights, 
local and global, seeing how each is applied in the real world with the aim of using 
whatever has the greatest emancipatory potential to address victims‟ aspirations. 
Theories of need have been reviewed and, despite efforts to universalise needs-
based approaches, suggest needs are something that necessarily contain a component 
that is local and particular. The most complete theories imply that although basic needs 
may be universal, the way they are expressed is best understood in terms of their (local 
and particular) satisfiers, emphasising that those perceiving needs are best placed to 
articulate them. In the light of the critiques of rights reviewed here these reflections 
suggest that both needs and rights can be regarded as both local and global when 
perceived from the very human level of the victim. Whilst the rights discourse is 
universal, it reflects local power hierarchies in its expression in any concrete context; 
whilst needs are highly local, they have universal elements that may serve to drive a 
more general approach to addressing the needs of victims. The contingency of needs 
drives the victim-centred approach (Section 3.2). Whilst this will follow standard 
humanitarian practice of measuring deficits in needs against a benchmark, the novelty of 
this approach is that this benchmark is set by victims themselves.  
The needs of victims emerge in the literature from understandings both from 
criminal justice and from the massive trauma of conflict and mass violence. This 
literature however focuses almost entirely upon victims in Western cultures; the impact of 
victimhood in other contexts is poorly documented. This is well demonstrated in the 
literature on the emotional and psychological impact of conflict, where medical 
approaches dominate, notably an emphasis on post-traumatic stress disorder which 
many consider to be a culturally based diagnosis. The alternative approach of 
ambiguous loss has been referenced as a model to understand the impact of 
disappearance, and this study will constitute a test of this in non-Western contexts.   
There is a modest literature on the specific needs of families of the disappeared 
discussing the need to know the fate and to find the body of the disappeared and a 
larger literature that emerges from the human rights perspective with a more legal 
emphasis on truth and justice. This is the product of a rights discourse that has been the 
preferred lens through which to examine disappearance. In this study this will be 
contrasted with approaches rooted in needs and well-being that victims themselves 
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appear to prioritise. This leads to the inclusion of basic needs such as those for food, 
health and education in the responses that victims seek to violations, even though these 
are rarely discussed within a transitional justice framework. The following chapter 
engages with the discourse of transitional justice as it is currently instantiated and 
examines typical mechanisms in terms of their potential impact on the needs of families 
of the Missing.  
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Chapter 3 Transitional justice and the Missing  
This chapter discusses transitional justice as a means to address violent pasts and its 
explicit role in meeting the needs of families of the Missing. It summarises some of the 
substantial critiques of current praxis in transitional justice and conceptualises the victim-
centred approach that will be taken here. The practice of transitional justice is examined 
with particular reference to mechanisms that have the capacity to address needs of 
families of the Missing, combined with a survey of how the discourse of transitional 
justice approaches victims of violations. Implicit here is a critique of such approaches in 
that they approach disappearance, as all violations, in a largely juridical way, being 
driven far more by normative considerations than an understanding of how people are 
impacted by such extreme phenomena in the real world. Here, an explicitly 
consequentialist approach has been taken to seek an understanding of both the 
demands that emerge from families with a missing relative and their implications for 
transitional justice praxis. These topics are returned to in the light of the data of this 
research in Chapter 8. One trenchant critique of both the theory and practice of 
transitional justice is that it is conceived to be a largely „top down‟ exercise, failing to 
engage with victims of violations and promoting agendas that come from elites (McEvoy 
and McGregor, 2008). The data of this study aims to both test this hypothesis and to 
develop approaches that could drive a more inclusive transitional justice. This chapter 
includes a discussion of how victims‟ agendas can be incorporated into transitional 
justice, and an articulation of the need for processes that place victims at their centre: 
the „victim-centred‟ approach.  
3.1 Transitional justice mechanisms as a means to address the 
needs of families of the Missing  
Following a discussion of the needs of families of the Missing in Chapter 1, this section 
will reflect on existing experience of the effectiveness of various transitional justice 
mechanisms to address those needs.  
Exhumations and the truth about the fate of the Missing 
Where the Missing are confirmed dead, return of human remains is a priority of families 
(Section 2.3). However, the scale of the problem, the technical challenges and a lack of 
resources will often prevent significant action being taken towards identifying gravesites, 
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exhuming remains and identification. In some scenarios, bodies are not retrievable; in 
many cases efforts will have been made by perpetrators to prevent remains being 
exhumed.8 Such challenges are additional to the political obstacles that must be 
overcome for such investigations to begin.  
The very substantial resources devoted to prosecutions of violations, notably by 
the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia, have driven much of the work of 
exhumations of victims of conflict in recent years. In the decade of the 1990s, “134 
anthropologists from 22 nations investigated nearly 1300 sites in 33 countries” 
(Steadman and Haglund, 2005: 1), in an attempt to retrieve remains of victims in 
connection with human rights investigations.  Tensions have arisen between the legal 
and evidentiary needs of prosecution and the needs of families of victims, notably over 
the issue of individual identification, which is often unnecessary in a trial (Stover and 
Shigekane, 2002).  Where exhumation and identification is driven by a humanitarian 
need to identify bodies, a process of collecting both ante-mortem and post-mortem data 
is required (Huffine et al., 2001). Where resources permit, in terms of both finance and 
expertise, DNA testing can be used to confirm matches made between ante and post-
mortem data, and such a process has been widespread in the Balkans (Wagner, 2008). 
In many contexts however where families have a desperate desire to know the fate of 
missing relatives such resources to identify the Missing are not available.  
Culture is a crucial factor in defining the needs of families of the Missing (Section 
2.3) since Western concepts of trauma will often fail to resonate in traditional societies 
which will interpret the impact of loss and ambiguity in ways that derive from their own 
cultural traditions. Kwon (2008) describes how the ghosts of the Missing in Vietnam from 
the American war haunt survivors, urging them and aiding them to ensure that they are 
buried in ways which honour them appropriately. In Zimbabwe, victims of those killed in 
the Matabeleland violence of the 1980s saw their needs as driven by the ancestral 
spirits: the greatest issue was to give an appropriate funeral and other rituals to the dead 
which not been possible for the Missing. They were in graves considered unacceptable, 
which caused tremendous psychological suffering since the spirit of the dead could not 
return as an ancestor (Stover and Shigekane, 2002). Exhumations had no legal goal, but 
were done simply at the request of families: 
                                               
8
 An infamous example comes from Argentina‟s „dirty war‟ in the throwing of live, drugged 
detainees into the sea from aircraft, so-called „death flights‟ (BBC, 2005).  
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[T]he process of exhumation and reburial does physically what 
psychotherapists in the west do metaphorically - it encourages people to 
explore their past and see the links with their current experiences. (Eppel, 
2002) 
This emphasises the extent to which humanitarian responses to the issue of Missing 
persons should ideally be driven by families and communities, and not be determined by 
outsiders‟ preconceptions. In some cases, the human rights discourse which drives 
much work around such crimes, despite its claims to universalism, privileges priorities 
rooted in cultures other than those in which victims live. This issue is discussed further in 
Section 9.3.  
Truth and acknowledgement  
After conflict, truth will emerge subject to both political agendas seeking to advance 
certain narratives and personal and collective memory, and in turn each will mediate the 
other. Truth Commissions represent an effort to formalise the construction of such 
narratives and have become the principal transitional justice mechanism tasked with 
delivering (or „recovering‟) truth following conflict and political violence. These are bodies 
authorised by the state that focus on past events and investigate a pattern of abuse over 
some fixed time period (Hayner, 2011). The Truth Commission emerged as an 
alternative to trials in contexts where prosecutorial process was not (or not yet) possible 
due to limiting political factors and so represented: “principled compromises on the 
transitional justice issue of „punishment or impunity‟” (Teitel, 2000: 81). In practice, truth 
commissions are a way of mediating memory (Andrews, 2003), determining what should 
be remembered and what forgotten in the construction of a state‟s post-conflict identity. 
The early Truth Commissions were able to not only find evidence that a regime had 
committed violations, particularly concerning disappearance, as in Argentina and Chile, 
(Aguilar, 2002; Graham-Yooll, 2005), but to recover truths that previous regimes had 
sought to hide in such a way that society could be confronted with the reality of what had 
happened, and on that shared understanding move forward.  
The linking of the Truth Commission to concepts of restorative justice (Section 
1.2) and the emergence of a narrative of „truth as healing‟ can be traced to the South 
African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) where amnesty was explicitly given 
to perpetrators in exchange for truth. As a result of the South African TRC truth and 
reconciliation and, more explicitly, truth as reconciliation, has become a dominant 
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narrative of transitional justice. This claims that the public telling of truth leads to healing 
for victims individually, and through the broader truths that emerge, healing and 
reconciliation for the nation as a whole: what has been called a „therapeutic ethic‟ 
(Colvin, 2003). The TRC claimed to be „victim-centred‟, as a result of this process being 
primarily performative, institutionalising the truth claims of victims through public truth-
telling with the social goal of reconnecting victims and society (Humphrey, 2003). In 
addition to the product, i.e. its final report, the TRC emphasised the importance of the 
process of truth recovery. Trauma as the lens through which to understand societies 
emerging from mass violence has led to a medicalisation of the understanding of the 
impact of war on civilians (Summerfield, 2004), dominated by approaches that co-opt 
psychoanalytic concepts of cathartic release and apply them to societies as a collective. 
This entirely Western lens largely neglects indigenous or grassroots approaches to 
addressing the impact of conflict, privileging prescriptive solutions imported from a global 
discourse that “analyses political, economic and social issues in terms of cycles of 
emotional dysfunction” (Pupavac, 2004). The trope of truth as reconciliation underlies a 
broad range of recent transitional mechanisms and yet appears to be rooted in little 
empirically tested practice. The relevance to victims of a discourse of truth as healing is 
discussed in Section 8.2 in the light of the findings of this study, which represent an effort 
to empirically test the claims that, for victims, truth (and explicitly the truth of a Truth 
Commission) is healing. Beyond the claims of „healing‟, Truth Commissions can 
potentially address the needs of families of the Missing in several ways:  
 Acknowledging the fact of disappearance, and the responsibility for it;  
 Learning the fate of the Missing;  
 Instigating exhumations; 
 Giving a public forum in which families can present their testimony;  
 Initiating compensation and reparation schemes;   
 Naming perpetrators and initiating prosecutions.  
 
Despite the South African TRC having been the object of huge study rather little data is 
available about how its work is perceived by victims.9 The most comprehensive study of 
victims‟ responses to the TRC, by the Centre for the Study of Violence and 
Reconciliation (1998), suggested that victims wanted those perpetrators who had been 
amnestied to contribute to their reparation and rehabilitation. Victims expressed the view 
                                               
9
 See however the edited collection: Chapman and van der Merwe, 2008.  
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that their role in the TRC process was not sufficient, and that they would be interested to 
meet with perpetrators: an echo of the idea of encounter that is a pillar of restorative 
justice (Section 1.2).  It has been suggested that exposure to discussion of trauma, and 
the potential retraumatisation, in such a forum can be damaging for victims (Silove et al., 
2006; de Ridder, 1997).  Many victims‟ families were angered by perpetrators walking 
free (Gibson and Gouws, 1999), but South Africans in general found amnesty to be 
unfair but necessary (ibid).  
More recent truth commissions have reflected a growing global intolerance of 
impunity and typically have a connection to a prosecutorial mechanism. In most cases, a 
Truth Commission is not able itself to address the need for the truth about the fate of the 
Missing. Investigations, exhumations and identification require substantial dedicated 
resources, technical expertise and a long timescale, making the Truth Commission 
approach imperfect for the task. In practice, Truth Commissions have been able to 
demonstrate the fact of disappearances and to document representative cases. In the 
most successful contexts this has then served to initiate the action required to learn the 
fate of the Missing, and address other needs of families. The South African TRC was 
able to conclude from testimony that the state was centrally involved in sanctioning and 
planning disappearances (Republic of South Africa, 2003: Section 4:1). As a result, a 
number of exhumations were made by the TRC itself (ibid: Section 4:2) and, on its 
recommendation, a Missing Persons‟ Task Team created to make further investigations, 
to confer victim status on the disappeared, allow families access to reparations, identify 
gravesites and facilitate exhumations (EAAF, 2008; Republic of South Africa, 2008). 
An alternative path to truth for families of the Missing is through a mechanism 
that explicitly engages with perpetrators of disappearances, using confidential channels 
to encourage disclosure on a humanitarian basis. Such mechanisms, typically called 
Missing Commissions or Working Groups, are generally established after conflict by the 
concerned state or states, often with an international or neutral third party presence:  
The commission‟s mandate should be independent and humanitarian, 
focusing on the provision of remedies and information. It should be in contact 
and approachable by the families. Its first goal should be seeking to clarify 
the status of the missing. It should answer the question of whether someone 
is dead or alive, if dead the circumstances of the death and the location of 
the human remains. It should as well work on proper exhumation of the 
 84 
 
human remains and on identification of the recovered remains. (Werntz, 
2007, discussing the possibility of a Missing Commission in Nepal) 
To function effectively such mechanisms have to engage with those persons, usually the 
political leadership of the parties to the conflict or their successors, who have access to 
the information needed to resolve the fate of the Missing. The element of engagement 
with perpetrators is crucial, and an inability to do this is the most frequent cause for the 
failure of such mechanisms, often exacerbated by the political use of the Missing issue. 
At their most successful, such mechanisms offer truth and the return of remains, but not 
prosecutorial justice. The Commission on Missing Persons in Cyprus (CMP), containing 
representatives of both main communities on the island, is leading a non-sectarian 
process that, after years of inactivity, has in recent years led to hundreds of exhumations 
and identifications of the Missing (Kovras, 2009). Following the Dayton Peace Accord of 
1995, in Bosnia and Herzegovina a Working Group on Persons Unaccounted for brought 
together representatives of the Governments of Bosnia and Herzegovina from the three 
principal communities. Using information gained from the Working Group, and the 
identification technology of the Sarajevo based International Commission on Missing 
Persons (ICMP), the mortal remains of more than 5,500 persons have been returned to 
families (ICRC, 2008a).   
Reparations and memory 
Reparation refers to the obligation of a wrongdoing party to redress the damage caused 
to an injured party (Permanent Court of International Justice, 1928), and international law 
has established a „right to reparations‟ (Joinet, 1997). Reparations encompass three 
main types of remedy: restitution, compensation and satisfaction. Restitution aims to 
restore the conditions that existed prior to a violation, something impossible of course 
where a missing person does not return, but where efforts can be made to address some 
of the impacts on a family. Compensation involves monetary payment for material or 
moral injury, while satisfaction addresses non-material injuries and may involve official 
apologies; assurances of non-repetition of the offence; judicial proceedings; and truth 
and reconciliation commissions (Bradley, 2006). In many transitional contexts, where 
justice is absent or incomplete, reparations may be the most tangible manifestation of 
the state addressing harms suffered by victims of conflict (de Grieff, 2008). Reparation 
also has a significant socio-political role, to impact on the broader society through the 
drawing of a line under past violations and the reinforcing of a commitment to the rule of 
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law. Indeed, it is seen that the reparative demands of victims often demand the changing 
of state behaviour. 
Reparations are an approach to political violence that attempt to link the 
addressing of individual needs, emotional, psychological and livelihood related, with 
norm-setting processes in society that aid recovery. The victim-centred approach taken 
here will focus on the impact of reparations on victims, but will also consider implications 
for the broader community. Reparations are the one mechanism that should be 
intrinsically victim-centred and such efforts will fail to be reparative if victim needs are not 
considered. Yet very often reparation schemes fail to consider victims‟ wishes in their 
design and implementation (Waterhouse, 2007). The literature of reparation consistently 
blurs boundaries between the rights of victims as outlined in legal instruments and their 
needs as they express them (Cullinan, 2001). The Basic Principles (UN General 
Assembly, 2006) do not mention the word „need‟, but state that “[r]eparation should be 
proportional to the gravity of the violations and the harm suffered” (7: IX, 15). This is an 
acknowledgement that needs must play a role, even though there is a reluctance for the 
rights vocabulary to accommodate such language on the understanding that it is the 
violation that creates a right to reparation and not the harm suffered (e.g. Mario-Rubin, 
2008).  
Reparation, whilst potentially providing material compensation to victims, is 
primarily about acknowledgment of what has happened and the responsibility for it, and 
is thus intimately linked to concepts of truth (see above); in some contexts victims seek 
that the state or perpetrators themselves provide such recognition. The financial 
component is a way of demonstrating this, and not an end in itself. Where reparations 
have been financial, putting a value on a life is problematic, and the families of some 
victims have rejected such payments (Femenia, 1987). Reparations can equally be 
symbolic, and involve the state supporting restorative processes such as death 
certificates to families of the Missing or the facilitation of exhumations. Symbolic or non-
financial reparations can include formal acknowledgement of the truth regarding the 
Missing, official apologies, designating days of remembrance, granting the Missing an 
official legal status, construction of memorials and appropriate reburial services (Jelin, 
2004). Thus, reparation can have a beneficial effect on victims as part of the 
rehabilitative process (El-Sarraj, 1995), although the impact of reparations on victims is 
little studied:  
 86 
 
A major gap in the literature found to date is in the area of follow-up studies 
of survivors who have (or have not) received reparation. In the absence of 
studies into the effects of reparation, one is faced with speculation and 
generalizations. (Cullinan, 2001: 50) 
One study with ex-political prisoners in the Czech Republic (David and Choi Yuk-ping, 
2005) showed that only a minority of victims was satisfied with financial reparation, but 
that money increased access to rehabilitation and symbolised social acknowledgement 
and justice (ibid.). In South Africa, a study found that victims regarded reconciliation and 
reparation as linked, and were generally in favour of symbolic reparation (Centre for the 
Study of Violence and Reconciliation, 1998). A review of reparations processes 
(Waterhouse, 2007) suggests that reparation that prioritises action by perpetrators rather 
than the recovery of victims replicates the role of victims as passive objects: “programs 
that enable victims to play a part in critical societal institutions offer a more thorough 
remedy to past harms by fostering victims‟ moral agency.” (ibid: 2).   
Memory is the way in which truth is assimilated into narrative, both individual and 
collective (Assman, 2006). The literature of transitional justice however has little room for 
individual memories, focusing on collective memory and the impact of institutional 
processes, such as the reports of truth commissions and national memorials (e.g. Jelin, 
2007; Hutchinson, 2009), rather than processes that are enacted in the social spaces of 
family and community. Even in societies where the spiritual is not greatly relevant, the 
Missing can be said to haunt the present, there but not there at both a personal and a 
political level: 
A missing person is a human being without a body, a voice which cannot be 
heard, but is always there, a memory which refuses to go away. (From a 
leaflet of the Pancyprian Committee of Relatives of Undeclared Prisoners 
and Missing Persons, Nicosia, Republic of Cyprus: Quoted in Sant Cassia, 
2005: 83),  
Whilst there is clearly a connection between a family‟s traumatic memory of an individual 
disappearance and national schemes to remember the dead and the Missing (Bell, 
2009), little has been written of how individual events of violence, and experience of 
them, are transformed by politics and power into formal memorialisation. Indeed, the 
focus of memory scholarship on events that collectively traumatised the West such as 
the first World War and the Holocaust appear to drive the study of such issues away 
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from the individual and towards an emphasis on scale and the collective (e.g. Winter, 
2010). This study will take a converse view and study memories and the need for 
memorialisation within families and infer how processes of remembrance and institutions 
can serve these.  
Memorialisation traditionally serves the powerful in society as part of the politics 
of a transitional process (Jelin, 2007) and as such is rarely done exclusively on the terms 
of victims. Sant Cassia (2005), for example, has written powerfully about how in Cyprus 
memories of the Missing have been manipulated by the state to reinforce certain 
narratives that directly impacted how families perceived the fate of missing relatives. This 
echoes the great distance between private memory and public representations found in 
the authoritarian societies where disappearances occur. However, memorials can also 
promote social repair through acknowledgement, and have the potential to be restorative 
(Barsalou and Baxter, 2007). For families of the Missing, where human remains may not 
be retrievable a memorial can be a space for mourning and remembrance while 
physically refuting the effort at disappearance. Pollack (2003) discusses the attitudes of 
the families of the Missing from the Srebrenica massacre, who believe that the memorial 
located at a mass burial site where killings occurred, takes precedence over individual 
identifications. As part of reparative process, a memorial can endorse and institutionalise 
those narratives regarding the past privileged by victims.  
Trials and judicial process 
It is almost universally presumed that prosecutions benefit victims and that impunity is in 
itself traumatic for survivors. Where no measures are taken against those who caused 
the injury; some authors (Edelman, 1996; Rauchfuss, 2008) contend that a life of 
repetition of the trauma is created and that impunity is devastating for the health of the 
survivor: 
Impunity interrupts the normal process of healing of the survivor of 
repression, the grief of the families of disappeared victims, and the process 
of social reparation. Impunity prolongs the psychopathological consequences 
of repression, both in the individual and in the society. (Gurr and Quiroga, 
2001: 27). 
Despite these claims, there has been little empirical work on the issue of whether 
prosecutions of violators are of benefit to the victims of those tried.  Indeed one of the 
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few scholars to address the issue calls this an “intellectual void” (O‟Connell, 2005: 299). 
O‟Connell interviewed therapists and human rights lawyers who had worked with victims 
of violations (largely in Argentina and Chile), to determine the effect trials had on victims. 
His conclusions are that impunity inflicts „psychological pain‟ and that trials can be 
cathartic and provide acknowledgement through the breaking of social silence. However, 
trials could also retraumatise victims (see Section 5.3), and the pardoning of perpetrators 
was highly traumatic. Those victims who participated in trials, either as plaintiffs, 
witnesses or deponents, felt different effects. Relatives of the Missing describe the 
process as “validating”, with one saying power “flowed back from the accused to me” 
(Stover, 2004: 118-119). Others however deny that there is any therapeutic element for 
victims in trials (Fletcher and Weinstein, 2002), while Hamber claims that the context in 
which testimony is given is crucial and that a trial is often not the best environment 
(1996). O‟Connell concludes that many victims are potentially damaged by giving 
testimony in an adversarial process, while some who had themselves fought for and 
found justice claimed that it changed them positively. He concludes that judicial action 
should not be considered a „healing‟ experience for victims on the basis of current 
evidence, and that attention should be paid to non-judicial alternatives to address 
victims‟ psychological needs. 
Claims that judicial process is necessary for peace and enhances reconciliation 
(e.g. Goldstone, 1996) remain unproven: the little empirical evidence, from international 
tribunals, suggests it does not (Biro et al., 2004: Kerr, 2005). It has been claimed that the 
centrality of courts to narratives of the transformative potential of transitional justice are 
an example of „judicial romanticism‟ (McMahon & Forsythe, 2008). Whilst this study 
cannot directly comment on the impact of trials on peacebuilding, it will attempt to 
understand their impact on victims of violations.  
Gender in transitional justice 
Disappearance is a violation that largely targets men and is overwhelmingly perpetrated 
by men. It is women however, notably the wives and mothers of the disappeared, who 
are the survivors most impacted by disappearance and are themselves its victims 
(Section 2.1). However, both the literature and practice around gender issues in 
transitional justice emphasise sexual violence against women, and more particularly 
judicial process to address such violations (e.g. Ayub, Kouvo and Sooka, 2009; Duggan, 
Bailey and Guillerot, 2008; Henry, 2009). This discourse reduces women to their injury in 
a violation and perpetrator centred way, rather than focussing on victims‟ needs and 
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priorities. The focus on sexual violence allows the cultural and socioeconomic issues that 
often underlie disempowerment in traditional societies (and that facilitate sexual 
violence) to be neglected, and ignores the structural violence in many low income 
contexts where women are marginalised by poverty as well as gender. Such phenomena 
constitute both the root causes of such violence and amplify the impact of all violations, 
including disappearance. The psychosocial impact on female victims, mediated by 
patriarchal societies, will be both different and more extreme than that on men. Gender is 
always enmeshed in a nexus of discursive practices: legal, political and social. 
Transitional justice preferentially addresses the legal, but remains subject to the social, 
and this becomes most clear when women are victims.  
Studies indicate that the demands expressed by victims are gendered, with 
women most strongly emphasising basic needs (Rubio-Marin, 2008). This is indicative 
not only of extreme needs, but also of the low awareness of rights that women have. It 
has been suggested that for women in low income states emerging from conflict the very 
idea that reparation can erase the impact of a violation should be abandoned (Bell and 
O‟Rourke, 2007), in favour of simply trying to improve the situation of such women and 
support rehabilitation. The transition period, as a time of rupture, can also serve as a 
window of opportunity to empower women, promote gender equality, advance women‟s 
position in society, and bring wider benefits to many elements of society. 
…feminist theory should focus on how transitional justice debates help or 
hinder broader projects of securing material gains for women through 
transition, rather than trying to fit a feminist notion of justice within transitional 
justice frameworks. (Bell, 2007: 23) 
This coincides with the goal here of letting the demands of victims rather than prescribed 
frameworks define approaches to disappearance. The research of this thesis will focus 
particularly on understanding the needs of female relatives of the Missing and how the 
confluence of victimisation, gender and disempowerment determine the forms of 
intervention that such women seek. It will also attempt to enlarge the scope of 
transitional justice and understand how a broader agenda to advance the position of 
women can be integrated into responses to violations in general and disappearance in 
particular.  
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Customary approaches and traditional justice  
While Western approaches seek to put restorative models of transitional justice into 
practice, a number of societies have customary practices that take a restorative 
approach.  Many cultures have developed indigenous ways of resolving disputes and 
scholars looking for more relevant approaches to transitional justice have begun to turn 
to these.  Such customary process can be more affordable, accessible and less 
intimidating than formal courts: they are necessarily embedded in the local and 
particular. One disadvantage of customary forms of justice is that they have been 
developed to deal within a community with minor offences, and questions have been 
raised about the extent to which they can be extended to cope with serious offences and 
years of conflict and oppression. There are also issues arising from the subordination of 
such processes to local power structures that may exclude women and other 
disempowered groups (e.g. Robins, 2009).  
Perhaps the best known of these processes is gacaca in Rwanda, where the 
post-genocide government chose to adapt a customary process to deal with the massive 
number of persons accused in connection with the violence of 1994 (Longman, 2006). 
Gacaca has been criticised however for being largely a local retributive process, with 
little link to genuine tradition (Waldorf, 2006) and no restorative component beyond the 
public truth-telling in what is essentially a village based trial. In northern Uganda, as a 
part of an uncertain peace process, traditional Acholi restorative dispute resolution 
processes rooted in reconciliatory concepts have been proposed to address the return of 
fighters from the rebel Lord‟s Resistance Army to their communities. Whilst the principle 
of such processes is supported by local leaders (Liu Institute, 2005), many questions 
remain and the process is yet to be formally used. The most obvious critique of both 
these processes from a victims‟ view is that all decisions concerning the use of such 
traditional approaches were made by elites with little consultation with those most 
affected. In both cases it appears that expediency drove government policy, with the 
Rwandan legal system overwhelmed with defendants and the Ugandan authorities 
seeking to justify excluding LRA fighters from the formal justice system as an incentive 
for a peace deal. An alternative to attempting the use or adaptation of customary process 
for transitional justice is to establish mechanisms which include traditional elements, but 
which are part of a broader process. This was done in Timor-Leste as part of a truth 
commission where the Community Reconciliation Processes was created to deal with 
lesser crimes through an informal process that engaged with traditional practices (Babo-
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Soares, 2004); this is discussed in Section 4.3.3. In none of these cases however has 
genuine local process that enjoys the approval of victims been supported by the 
authorities, but rather a decision has been imposed to co-opt traditional process for a 
role to which it is not necessarily well suited.  
3.2 Conceptualising a victim-centred transitional justice 
The term „victim-centred‟ has been used increasingly to describe transitional justice 
processes, most notably around the South African TRC (Republic of South Africa, 2003; 
Aldana, 2006; Leman-Langlois, 2000) in an attempt to suggest that the process places 
the victim at its centre. This echoes restorative justice practice (Section 1.2) that aims to 
restore relationships between individuals and groups damaged by wrongdoing, and 
perpetrators. However, restorative justice in transitional contexts is poorly conceptualised 
and as a consequence it remains unclear what implications such a restorative approach 
has for a transitional justice process. In this section a victim-centred approach to 
transitional justice is defined and conceptualised in terms of both increasing victim 
agency in transitional justice processes and creating a new means for measuring their 
success. Whilst it refers to concepts of restoration, it seeks to go beyond a restorative-
retributive dichotomy to build an approach that encompasses the complexities and 
tensions in victims‟ demands of transition. The victim-centred approach is driven by the 
demands that victims themselves make of the transition, and these are understood as 
needs that are conflated with the normative understanding of needs explored in Chapter 
2: needs, rooted in satisfiers that emerge from local and particular circumstances, can 
best be articulated by the individuals who experience them. Needs are discriminated 
from wants by the understanding that a failure to satisfy them is personally or socially 
destructive (Rubenstein, 2001), including not just basic needs but also those for 
recognition and identity.       
Defining victim-centred transitional justice process 
We can attempt to understand what restoration might mean for families of the Missing. In 
terms of relationships, the damaged relationship is most obviously that between the 
victim‟s family and the perpetrator, where the perpetrator in this situation is likely to be 
identified as the state, rather than an individual. This suggests that restorative justice 
attempts to repair the relationship between the family and the state, and presumably the 
community of the victim‟s family and the state, particularly where entire communities 
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were targeted. Since the relationship between the state and its victims is likely to 
traditionally have been a highly unequal one, restoration here would most certainly not 
mean returning to a situation that existed before the violation that defined the victim, but 
looking forward to addressing both the injustice of the violation and other injustices in the 
relations between victim and perpetrator: to restore an “ideal of right relationship” 
(Llewellyn, 2006: 93). Where the perpetrator is the state this suggests that restorative 
goals may be very broad indeed, including an addressing of issues of general social 
injustice and exclusion. The requirements of the victim, or the family or community of the 
victim, for restoration would then have to be defined, most obviously by the family and 
community themselves (Section 2.2.4). This would tend to suggest that the needs of 
victims, at an individual, group and community level define the primary goals of 
restoration.  
The substantial literature on victim-centred process in criminal justice suggests 
that a victim-centred approach is necessarily restorative, in opposition to a retributive 
process (e.g., Braithwaite and Pettit, 1990; Wright, 1991). It is often seen however that 
victims seek a balance of restorative and retributive process, and particularly for serious 
offences both victims and society seek to see punishment of offenders, in contrast to the 
lesser offences from the addressing of which restorative criminal justice practice has 
evolved. Daly (2001) has described as a „myth‟ the assumption that restorative justice is 
somehow the „opposite‟ of retributive justice, referencing her experience that victims 
seek multiple justice aims that are restorative, rehabilitative and retributive (ibid). In the 
transitional context the experience from empirical work is that victims articulate exactly 
such mixed goals (e.g. Wilson, 2001; CSVR, 1998; ICTJ and HRC Berkely, 2005; Vinck 
et al., 2007). This is consistent with restorative practice conceived of as being a „third 
way‟ between the retributive and the rehabilitative (Daly, 1999), driven in this 
conceptualisation by the demands of victims. The crucial point of this approach is that it 
is victims who determine the balance between reparation and healing, on one side, and 
retribution on the other, rather than a norm-based system divorced from the political and 
other realties of the situation. The reference here to restorative process is also intended 
to emphasise community engagement and ownership in such process rather than 
exclusive „professional‟ stewardship (McEvoy and Newburn, 2003).  
The term „victim-centred‟ will be used in the sense that it is referenced in criminal 
justice systems: 
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A victim-centered system is a change in perception from a case focus to a 
victim/survivor focus. Some professionals may fear that a shift to a victim-
centered response calls for allowing the victim/survivor to make all the 
decisions about who does what and how it is done. This is not the case. 
Victim-centered denotes an awareness of the centrality of victims/survivors 
and their needs to the whole process. (SAIC, 2010, with reference to sexual 
assault in the criminal justice system)   
Here, the term victim-centred process is defined as any transitional justice process that 
arises as a response to the explicit demands of victims. Such an approach abandons the 
dichotomy of retributive versus restorative process and instead allows the victim to 
define their preferred goals of the transitional justice process, likely to include both 
restorative and retributive elements. This does not imply that all goals of the process are 
made subservient to the agenda of victims, but that an awareness of the centrality of 
victims and their needs to the whole process drives it. External constraints, not least the 
political, as well as broader societal demands must be accommodated by any transitional 
process. A victim-centred approach implies that the agenda of victims is known and that 
victim goals constitute a key driver of the form that process takes. Here, a victim centred 
approach is used to advance specific ways of enhancing the quality of transitional 
process, namely: to challenge external and prescriptive approaches, to counter elite 
control of the transitional justice agenda, and to optimise the addressing of victim needs. 
A deeper conceptualisation of victim-centred approaches to transitional justice is made in 
the light of the data of this study in Section 10.2.  
A victim-centred transitional process is one that is necessarily emancipatory. It 
empowers victims through their engagement with the process itself which serves to 
transfer agency that has traditionally lain with experts and national elites to the victims 
most impacted by legacies of violence. The result is that such processes, rooted in the 
lived experience of victims, serve to address the impacts of violations in ways that are 
transformative for victims. This echoes the language used to define emancipatory 
approaches to peacebuilding and as a result emerges as one potential constituent of 
such transformative processes: 
In contrast with the prevailing orthodoxy, emancipatory perspectives are 
context-specific, driven by people‟s needs in post-conflict places and are 
evidentially-constructivist. This means that the political space involved is 
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reconstructed around the evidence of everyday lives and needs rather than 
the ideological fantasies of foreigners [...] accepting the subjective ontology 
of peace. (Roberts, 2011)  
This thesis aims to be an articulation of that „ontology of peace‟, evidence based and 
demonstrating that local understandings of justice and of the impact of violations will 
necessarily diverge from that of global discourses and that such knowledge is the most 
effective foundation for a process to address those impacts.  Implicit in this approach is 
that such processes will be locally owned as far as is possible, suggesting that 
particularly in the poor and rural societies studied here they will necessarily be highly 
decentralised and involve the mobilisation of victims around their agendas. Such process 
will take seriously the lived realities and everyday struggles of ordinary people; this is the 
only way to ensure that impacts such as those linked to the spirits of Timor (Section 
7.2.3) or the social stigmatisation of wives of the Missing in Nepal (Section 6.2.3) can be 
comprehended and addressed, alongside and as part of issues of truth, justice and 
reparation.  
A victim-centred approach demands that transitional mechanisms be created in 
response to victim needs, and thus those needs must be known; this requires a process 
either of broad consultation among victims, or for victims and their representatives to be 
engaged at all levels of the planning and implementation of transitional process. This 
then makes the process of transitional justice as important as its outcome; this is 
discussed below. An evaluation of the effectiveness of a victim-centred transitional 
process must be measured, at least partly, in terms of its impact in addressing victims‟ 
needs, and this is also discussed below, providing the rationale for the test of 
contemporary approaches to transitional justice that this thesis adopts.  
Whose transitional justice? 
Despite a widespread understanding that it is the poor and disempowered who suffer 
most in conflict and who constitute most of its victims, a sustained engagement with such 
constituencies has not become part of mainstream transitional justice practice. Whilst the 
rhetoric of participation has become orthodox in post-war recovery, its practice still 
remains far from ideal:  
In recent years greater attention has been paid to the issue of participation, 
but this has often taken the form of co-option of local people (often local 
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elites) into schemes that were inspired, funded and led by external 
interveners. (Barakat, 2005: 252)  
In transitional justice this criticism remains even truer and whilst some literature is now 
emerging to challenge this deficit (McEvoy and McGregor, 2008) there remains a dearth 
of praxis that interrogates the idea of a transitional justice driven by the grassroots. In 
many contexts, conflict took a very local form, and addressing these from the capital 
without engaging victim communities marginalises the very people who are most in need 
of transitional process. Local visions of the future or local meanings of justice must 
inform the process to ensure that the contingencies of context are considered, 
challenging legalism and positivism in search of a „thicker‟10 transitional justice (McEvoy, 
2008).  
An issue that this thesis will address is that of participation, the only way in which 
victims can have agency in such a process, and this is likely to demand victim 
mobilisation (see Section 2.2.3). Victims‟ groups have been seen to be crucial for 
victims of conflict, both in terms of being one of the very few mechanisms through 
which they can influence policy and in providing support for victims in their 
communities. Despite this, there are almost no published studies of the dynamics of 
such groups in post-conflict contexts. The only existing work is that of Hamber et al. 
(2000) which remains unpublished, and Madlingozi (2010), both of the Khulumani 
support group in South Africa. In many states emerging from conflict one can see 
substantial activity at the grassroots, through the mobilisation of victims and survivors, 
and groups at the community level organised to press for their interests. Often these 
activities will be invisible at the international level, and hard to discern at the national or 
Governmental level and for that reason may not be considered as relevant for a state-
wide transitional justice process. In some cases the views and agenda of such groups 
have made themselves heard in the literature of transitional justice, (The Ardoyne 
Commemoration Project (Lundy and McGovern, 2006) is an example), but they remain 
largely submerged beneath discourses that come from various establishments. 
Rajagopal (2003) has engaged with this problem with regard to social movements, and 
in particular those that are „resistant‟ to an increasingly hegemonic and globalising 
                                               
10
 This comes from the anthropological approaches of Geertz (1977), where the concept of „thick 
description‟ implies scholarship that is complex, multi-layered and actor-oriented, in contrast to 
„thin‟ approaches that are narrowly descriptive and positivistic.  
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framework of international law. This represents an attempt to introduce subaltern 
analyses (Spivak, 1988; Ludden, 2001), where the voices and agendas of the 
disempowered are taken as the basis for an alternative analysis to that provided by a 
hegemonic power structure: an approach „from below‟. An analysis of the victim as 
subaltern can both explore this relationship and provide new ways to inform practice, 
notably in acknowledging and incorporating such perspectives.   
This thesis is premised on the idea that ordinary people, and in particular victims 
of conflict and their communities must play a role in determining the shape and form of 
transitional justice process if it is to have relevance in transforming societies towards 
sustainable peace. Theoretical understandings of this engagement are emerging in the 
literature: this study represents an effort to contribute to both the recognition of non-elite 
and victim perspectives in transitional process and to provide methods to understand 
these perspectives and incorporate them into the mechanisms of transitional justice. This 
study will attempt to understand how transitional justice is and, more importantly could 
be, qualitatively impacted through its engagement with victims.  
Evaluating transitional justice 
The theory and practice of transitional justice offer few tools that can serve to measure 
the effectiveness of a transitional process (and even to define what „effective‟ means), or 
to permit comparison between different processes. The tradition of scholarship in 
transitional justice is of the study of transitional mechanisms through a largely descriptive 
approach, rather than through empirical research that uses observation to accumulate 
evidence for or against theory (van der Merwe, Baxter & Chapman, 2009). Efforts to 
evaluate transitional justice have centred on particular mechanisms‟ ability to address 
particular goals. A number of studies, largely focussed on South Africa, have attempted 
to answer the question as to the benefits for victims of such processes (Backer, 2004; 
Hamber, Nageng and O'Malley, 2000). Also in South Africa, Gibson (2004, 2006) used 
quantitative methodologies, extracting indicators for the abstract concepts that 
constituted the goals of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) and 
demonstrating that, with a good understanding of context, one can measure even the 
least tangible goals of a truth process. A similar approach is used in Hamber and Kelly‟s 
study of reconciliation in Northern Ireland: reconciliation is defined in terms of five 
„strands‟ that are probed through qualitative research with the communities concerned 
(2009). All these approaches however reinforce transitional justice as a „top-down‟ 
process, with the goals to be evaluated defined by elites or outsiders. Studies that start 
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from the needs of transition of those most impacted by violations or of the general 
population offer the possibility to both construct and evaluate „evidence-based 
transitional justice‟ (Pham and Vinck, 2007), using social science research methods to 
determine the attitudes of populations of states in transition as a tool to understand the 
efficacy of transitional processes. In addition to determining the effectiveness of a 
transitional process that is complete or underway, one can also determine the perception 
of a population as to their needs of transition before processes are initiated. In this sense 
it becomes a tool for making transitional process responsive to needs. This empirical 
approach has been pioneered by the Human Rights Centre at the University of 
California, Berkeley, using a mix of both qualitative and quantitative methods in several 
contexts (Biro et al., 2004; ICTJ and HRC Berkeley, 2004, Weinstein and Longman, 
2004; ICTJ and HRC Berkeley, 2005; Vinck and Pham, 2010).  
The victim-centred approach presents a natural framework for both steering the 
creation of appropriate mechanisms and evaluating the impact of the global transitional 
justice process. Rather than focussing on the effect of a single mechanism, the impact of 
the entire transitional justice process can be understood. Victims will themselves define 
their expectations of a process. Such studies demand research methodologies that can 
understand the highly local attitudes that drive victims‟ needs: i.e. empirical 
methodologies that can engage effectively with victims. This steers the ethnographic 
approach that has been used here.  
3.3 Summary 
This chapter has reviewed the theory and practice of transitional justice as a response to 
legacies of conflict and political violence and the range of mechanisms that have been 
used, with an emphasis on those that can potentially impact upon the needs of families 
of the Missing, as discussed in Chapter 2. Transitional justice theory and practice, 
emerging as it does from a legalist paradigm, emphasises institutional approaches 
(McEvoy, 2008), and this leads to a significant literature on its principal mechanisms, 
namely trials and truth commissions. Despite this range of scholarship however there is 
little data on the impact such processes have on victims, with empirical approaches rare. 
Transitional justice scholarship seeks rather to use normative, mostly legal, frameworks 
to base studies, which remain largely descriptive, offering little potential for objective or 
comparative evaluation of particular processes. The principal critiques of contemporary 
transitional justice process have been discussed, with an emphasis on those that 
 98 
 
perceive transitional justice as prescriptive and elite-driven and part of a liberal approach 
to post-conflict societies. These are seen to emphasise a liberal institutionalism that 
neglects issues of poverty, social exclusion and a lack of development that often drive 
conflict.  
The chapter has argued that whilst transitional justice has internalised a rhetoric 
of restorative justice that can complement retributive process, that process will be of only 
limited value to victims as long as it is not steered by their needs and perspectives. It has 
proposed a victim-centred approach, defined by the prioritising of the needs of victims as 
defined on victims‟ terms. Such an approach goes beyond the dichotomy of retributive 
and restorative approaches to steer transitional justice process rooted in the 
communities that are most impacted by the legacy of conflict. The rest of this study will 
elaborate this approach and implement studies of victims‟ needs in two contexts.  
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Chapter 4 Nepal and Timor-Leste: The politics of 
transition 
4.1 Low income states in transition 
This thesis aims to make an ethnographic study of families of the Missing in two low 
income states emerging from conflict: one context where no significant transitional 
process has yet occurred and one where the mechanisms of transitional justice are well 
advanced. The fact that the two contexts share a number of important characteristics but 
are dissimilar in the variable(s) of interest, here the transitional process itself, enables 
the study to also have a comparative element. Nepal and Timor-Leste are both small 
Asian states with dispersed rural and agricultural populations of great ethnic diversity, 
living in joint families as part of larger clan structures. The people of both states have a 
traditional spiritual outlook that has been influenced by faiths that have arrived in recent 
centuries. The populations of both Nepal and Timor-Leste were touched by colonialism, 
but most only lightly. Both states are emerging from conflicts driven by alienation from 
their rulers and at the time of the research they had almost identical per capita GDP.11 
There are however clear divergences in the experiences of the populations of the two 
states; one conflict was essentially a struggle for national liberation and the other an 
ideologically driven effort to seize state power. Were this a study of the mechanics of 
political change, such variables would be crucial; for the families of the Missing however 
it will be seen that from the viewpoint of the marginalised rural people who constitute 
most victims in both contexts, the two conflicts looked remarkably similar.  Clearly, not all 
the variables that impact on perceived needs of families of the Missing converge in the 
two contexts. Efforts will be made to test the dependence of needs in both contexts on 
variables such as gender, wealth, urban against rural populations etc., permitting the 
influence of such variables to be understood. The form that transition took in the two 
states has been quite different: Timor-Leste has been subject to the full machinery of 
liberal peace and statebuilding, including a hybrid judicial process and two truth 
commissions; in contrast Nepal has resisted internationalisation of the transition and 
elites continue to oppose even domestic judicial process and truth-telling mechanisms. 
                                               
11
 Annual per capita GDP, 2008: Timor-Leste $461; Nepal $435 (World Bank, 2010).   
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This chapter addresses Nepal and Timor-Leste in turn, discussing the relevant 
cultural aspects and a history of the conflict in each context. This section introduces the 
cultural and social world in which families live and in which violations occurred. To root a 
response to gross violations in the experience of those most affected demands an 
empirical and an ethnographic approach to reach a holistic understanding of the 
transformations wrought by conflict. Such an approach demands an understanding of the 
role of the social structures, including family and community in which people‟s lives are 
embedded, and that hold the key to recovery from such extreme events. As such, this 
chapter will survey all those elements, cultural, social, economic and political, that impact 
on families‟ responses to disappearance and their resources to cope with its impact. The 
state of the transitional process in each context is then discussed and a final section 
compares the two contexts in terms of their transitional processes, and the relative 
experience of victims.  
4.2 Nepal 
4.2.1 Conflict analysis: the People’s War 
Nepal‟s Maoist insurgency was driven by a legacy of centuries of feudalism in a Hindu 
kingdom built on a codified framework of social and economic exclusion that 
marginalised indigenous people, lower castes and women. The impact of the state in 
many parts of rural Nepal has long been negligible, with central leaders traditionally 
using local proxies and few services delivered to the population. Structural factors that 
led to the conflict include social exclusion, extreme poverty, particularly in the remote 
Mid-west where the conflict began (see Figure 2), the absence of the state in many 
areas and the lack and unevenness of development. These horizontal inequalities 
(Murshed and Gates, 2005) give support to a grievance interpretation as a significant 
cause of the conflict. Indeed, in some areas of the Midwest, the Maoist insurgency either 
encompassed or paralleled a separate conflict between indigenous tenant farmers and 
landlords.  
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Figure 2 A map of Nepal, showing regions shaded according to their Human Poverty Index, 
darker being poorer (UNDP, 2009). The Maoist insurgency began in the Mid-western hills.  
The first democratic elections were held in 1991, following a popularly supported 
but elite led „People‟s Movement‟ and elected Governments‟ failure to address any of the 
substantive issues of poverty, social exclusion, or the violence implicit in many economic 
relations was the greatest proximate cause of the conflict. With the onset of democracy 
local elites had learnt to run political parties in their areas as machines of patronage and 
in many areas the rich and powerful were able to ensure that their chosen candidates 
won elections. Whilst there existed significant „constitutional‟ Marxist parties (i.e. 
prepared to participate in elections), who assumed power in coalition in 1994, their 
disunity and opportunism guaranteed their inability to address the fundamental 
grievances of the people (Lieten, 2002). Policies of the early 1990s that followed the first 
democratic elections saw economic reforms that succeeded in raising GDP but 
unevenly, with a greater fraction arising in urban areas (Deraniyagala, 2006), increasing 
rural-urban differences. Expectations of various elements of society, notably educated 
youth, had been raised by the arrival of democracy, as well as by the promises of 
politicians (Thapa and Sijapati, 2003). These far outpaced the realities of their country‟s 
development. Many of the earliest recruits to the insurgency were educated youth with 
some experience of urban life.  
From the backdrop of an active left in rural Nepal and violent suppression of 
communists in the Rapti hills of the Midwest (Battachan, 2000) the Communist Party of 
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Nepal (Maoist) [CPN-M] emerged with an explicit Maoist agenda, a commitment to use 
violence and a leadership with the charisma and intent to attract recruits (de Blieck, 
2006). The CPN-M used the objective complaints of rural western Nepalis to mobilise 
them, primarily youth, against the regime. Despite democracy, the CPN-M was able to 
portray a feudal system, with the king at its head, as being solely responsible for the lack 
of development and ethnic and caste based exclusion in rural areas. The CPN-M 
undertook campaigns that emphasised gender equality and the rights of minority 
ethnicities and the lower castes, explicitly acknowledging the importance of both the 
economic/social agenda and the issue of the „oppression‟ of the indigenous ethnicities 
and lower castes (Prachanda, undated). The insurgency began on February 13th 1996, 
when Maoists attacked a police post in a remote area of Rolpa district and seized 
weapons. A senior Maoist has reported that at this time the CPN-M nationally had 60 full 
time workers, and about 500 other supporters.12 The conflict escalated to the point 
where, at the time of the ceasefire in April 2006, the Maoists had effective control of 80% 
of the territory of the state and an army of perhaps 20,000.  
Initially the state responded to the rebellion as a law and order issue, using the 
modestly armed police force to combat the Maoists.  Disappearances perpetrated by the 
state, which had begun even before the formal start of the conflict (Sapkota, 2007) 
began to increase. As support for the insurgency grew, and the Maoist People‟s 
Liberation Army (PLA) was able to bring significant numbers of troops to bear in the field, 
the state created a paramilitary Armed Police Force, to enable heavier weapons to be 
used. Amnesty International (2002a, 2002b) has reported that a pattern of 
disappearances and long-term unacknowledged detention by the state began from May 
1998 when the police launched “intensified security mobilisation” operations. The Maoist 
forces themselves decided to bring the Royal Nepal Army (RNA) into the conflict, 
through an audacious attack on a barracks in Dang, in the Midwestern Terai, in 
November 2001.  This represented a calculated attempt to target an army under the 
direct command of the king, and to escalate the conflict (Gersony, 2003).  At the same 
time the Government declared a state of emergency and issued the Terrorist and 
Disruptive Activities (Control and Punishment) Ordinance (known as TADO) (TADO, 
2001), which gave sweeping powers to the security forces, including the ability to detain 
in protective custody for up to one year without trial, on the authority of the Chief District 
                                               
12
 Narendra Jung Pitar, personal communication.  
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Officer. In 2002 the king seized power from the elected Government and the army 
continued to be under his direct command.  
Where the Maoists had control, they imposed their own governance, through 
„People‟s Governments‟, which divided their territory into ethnically defined „autonomous 
republics‟, and taxed or extorted the population to fund the insurgency.  In areas under 
their control, CPN-M forces were able to take persons into their custody and many of 
those missing at the hands of the Maoists disappeared in this way. The response of the 
RNA to Maoist control took the form either of raids on foot (given the absence of roads), 
or attacks on Maoist bases from the air. In both cases, civilians were often the victims in 
attacks that served to strengthen Maoist support (Gersony, 2003).  Certainly the RNA‟s 
involvement significantly increased total casualties in the conflict (see Figure 3). From 
the end of 2001, with the involvement of the RNA, violations of the laws of armed conflict 
by the state were seen to have increased dramatically, according to human rights 
agencies (INSEC, 2007).  
 
Figure 3 Total numbers killed during the conflict by year, by the state and CPN-M 
(INSEC, 2007). 
Many of the missing cases also arise from this period of intense conflict.  Figure 4 shows 
the pattern of persons becoming missing as a function of time, showing that, as for 
killings, disappearances also peaked between 2001 and 2004.  
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Figure 4 Persons becoming missing in Nepal by year. (ICRC, 2008). 
Whilst both parties to the conflict perpetrated disappearances, the vast majority 
were the responsibility of the forces of the state, apparently as a deliberate strategy of 
war by military commanders at several levels in the hierarchy (OHCHR, 2006a & 2008). 
One motivation was the elimination of those perceived to be part of the Maoist threat, 
and this drove the disappearance and apparent extra-judicial execution of students and 
Maoist activists. In rural areas there were additional dynamics that encouraged 
disappearance linked to the traditional power structures of caste, class and ethnicity that 
were the underlying cause of the conflict. In Bardiya for example, the district worst 
affected by disappearance with 272 recorded as missing,13 the People‟s War was 
perceived by many as the continuation of a long running conflict over land between the 
majority indigenous Tharu community and high caste landlords who had established 
control of much agricultural land over recent decades. In addition to disposing of Tharu 
activists, the RNA leadership in the region had an interest in enforcing traditional power 
relations, and the wave of disappearances that followed the declaration of the state of 
emergency in 2001 achieved this.  In Bardiya, the arrest of victims from their homes at 
night, in many cases by forces acting on information from informers, was in the tradition 
of authoritarian regimes deliberately creating an atmosphere of terror in communities 
perceived as being loyal to insurgency. Elsewhere, one of the most well known cases of 
disappearance in Nepal concerns a fifteen year old girl from a dalit community who was 
                                               
13
 ICRC Kathmandu, private communication: the ICRC list is being constantly updated, this 
represented the number missing in Bardiya in February 2011. 
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arrested by RNA troops, tortured to death and buried at an army camp (OHCHR, 2006; 
Advocacy Forum, 2010). The same group of soldiers had earlier raped and killed other 
teenagers from the community, putting issues of caste and gender at the heart of the 
violations.   
The end of the conflict came due largely to the lack of judgement of King 
Gyanendra. The CPN-M appeared to have realised that the international community, i.e. 
India and the US, would never tolerate a Maoist state in Nepal, and that they were 
militarily unable to take Kathmandu and the district headquarters that constituted the 
20% of the state‟s territory that the Government still controlled.  Once King Gyanendra 
seized absolute power in 2005, he drove the political parties who had previously run the 
war towards alliance with the Maoists against his autocracy. India brokered talks 
between the CPN-M and the political parties and it was this unity between the Maoists 
and protestors led by political parties that resulted in the „People‟s Movement‟ (Jana 
Andolan) of April 2006. This ended the King‟s absolute power and led to the restoration 
of parliament and the consequent peace process.  
4.2.2 Cultural aspects: a history of poverty and exclusion 
Nepal is the poorest country in Asia and the 8th poorest in the world, with income per 
capita of $435 per year; 55% of the population lives on less than $1.25 per day (World 
Bank, 2010). The vast majority - between 85 and 90% - of the population lives in rural 
areas and are dependent upon agriculture for their livelihood (Seddon and Hussein, 
2002). The feudal social relations that have persisted into modern times impact upon 
these livelihoods, with a significant fraction of the rural population being landless and a 
lack of access to land the dominant cause of rural poverty (Deraniyagala, 2006). 10% of 
the rural population is absolutely landless and 58% functionally landless, with holdings 
too small for subsistence; 30% of rural households are unregistered tenants and 60% of 
the country‟s productive labour works under some type of tenancy arrangement (Uprety, 
Rai and Sedhain, 2005). For many in Nepal, livelihoods are never less than precarious, 
with only about 20% of rural populations, the rural upper classes, generally secure 
(Blaikie et al., 2002). Of the remaining 80%, half are largely self-reliant, often with 
income sources additional to agriculture, such as remittances or seasonal employment. 
The poorest third of the population live in poverty and livelihoods are a constant struggle, 
with precarious daily labour or small retail activities supplementing what little land they 
might have access to (Seddon and Hussein, 2002). The lives and livelihoods of girls and 
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women are generally more precarious in terms of access to resources, earning 
opportunities and – as a result - quality of life and wellbeing. Infant mortality among girls 
and maternal mortality are high; many children and the aged live in poverty and 
insecurity (ibid). The cost of health care is a major factor in increasing household poverty 
and insecurity, particularly in a time of conflict. Poverty is however a social phenomenon:  
The livelihoods of the poor are largely determined by the ways in which and 
the extent to which their lives are intertwined with those of the rich and 
powerful – through various forms of economic, social, cultural and political 
interaction. These are the relationships of class and caste, which provide the 
basis and the ideological justification for exploitation and oppression, for 
social discrimination and exclusion, for degradation and deprivation, for 
bondage and indebtedness, as well as for employment and patronage, for 
social integration and the maintenance of the social order, for reverence and 
respect, and social identity. (ibid: 10) 
Nepal is a mosaic of ethnicities, languages and castes, having a unique and 
complex ethnic geography. The kingdom of Nepal was unified in the 18th century, under 
a dynasty that migrated from India in the centuries before. The many other ethnicities in 
Nepal, notably the indigenous people of mongoloid origin (Janajati) and more recent 
immigrants to the plains of the Terai from neighbouring Indian states (Madeshi), have 
been systematically excluded from the very idea of the Nepali nation, with many 
traditionally being denied citizenship (Hachhethu, 2003; Tiwari, 2007). The Janajati were 
traditionally Buddhist or animist in their belief systems, but have been „Hinduised‟ 
through exposure to a hegemonic Hindu culture that has been characterised as Nepali 
(Sharma, 2004). As a result many of the indigenous peoples of Nepal now consider 
themselves Hindu, but continue to practice many non-Hindu traditions. The Hindu caste 
system formalised discrimination against indigenous groups as well as against those 
who share ethnicity with the ruling Brahmin and Chhetri castes, but are considered of 
lower standing (Höfer, 1979). In Bardiya, for example, the district most impacted by 
disappearance (OHCHR, 2008) where 90% of victims are indigenous Tharu, indicators of 
exclusion can be seen in literacy rates which for the Tharu are half (17.5%) the rate 
among non-Tharu (Chhetri, 2005). The Tharu, as many indigenous groups in Nepal, 
have seen their livelihoods impacted in recent decades by dispossession from their 
historic lands by Hindu caste settlers, leaving many landless or enslaved as bonded 
labourers (Cox, 1990; Chhetri, 2005). Indigenous people and the lowest castes face life 
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expectancy, literacy and income far below the nation‟s meagre average (UNDP, 2009). 
The net result is that the majority of the population is excluded from certain parts of the 
economy and from politics. At the start of the 21st century the Brahmin and Chhetri 
castes, which constitute some 30% of the population of Nepal made up 87% of civil 
service staff (Battachan, 2006; see Table 20).   
In all communities women are further excluded increasing their vulnerability in all 
ethnic and caste groups. Land and property inheritance is patrilineal, women live with 
their husband‟s family and early marriage is common. Women‟s status in the family is 
traditionally subservient and can be precarious; they are expected to work and to 
produce sons and their value to the family lies largely in this. Women consistently fall 
behind men in educational achievement and skill development, often leaving them with 
few livelihood opportunities. Whilst when a husband dies in some indigenous groups it is 
traditional for a woman to marry her husband‟s younger brother, in high caste Hindu 
tradition, which has become a model for all ethnicities, remarriage brings shame to the 
family and is thus highly stigmatised: widowhood is considered “a state of social death” 
(Chakravarti, 2006: 82). As girls are considered an economic burden for whom a dowry 
will eventually have to be found, so boys and men are economic assets for a family and 
the greatest insurance for the future support of the old. The impacts of losing a member 
of the household in the conflict can thus not only have potentially devastating impacts 
socially and personally but for the poor may be a critical blow economically, if that person 
was a major contributor to the household‟s livelihood. The limited literature discussing 
the impacts of Nepal‟s conflict on its victims is discussed in Section 4.2.4.  
Mourning and death rituals in Nepal  
While most of the Missing are Hindu, minorities are Buddhist, Muslim and from 
„Hinduised‟ indigenous groups with animist traditions, notably the Tharu (see Table 1, 
p.157). Religious attitudes and ritual obligations shape views of death and the 
importance of human remains to families. Because of the diverse cultures in Nepal, there 
can be no single understanding of the mourning process; it will be a function of ethnicity, 
caste, economic and educational status, as well as the attitude of the concerned family 
and the circumstances of the disappearance.  While death rituals vary from caste to 
caste, and from region to region, there are some fundamental common customs and 
beliefs for which there will be few exceptions.  
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Most people in Nepal, as Hindus, burn the bodies of the dead. However, certain 
minorities such as Buddhists as well as some Janajati groups (including the Tharu), 
Muslims and Christians generally follow the ritual of burial. For many of the Janajati 
groups rituals will be a synthesis of tradition and mainstream Hindu belief which has 
been learnt in recent decades as the presence of the Nepali state and its Hindu culture 
has eroded traditional cultural approaches (Sharma, 1978). For example, in Tharu 
society whether a family will burn or bury the body of a relative is a function of their 
attitude to Hindu Nepali culture, which may be seen as modern and positive, or alien and 
colonising.14  
For Hindu Nepalis, the ritual of burning the body is a process which gives liberty 
to the soul and facilitates its passing to heaven (or hell): without the ritual the soul will 
wander, possibly as a ghost (Bennett, 1983). While it is vital to perform these rituals for 
the dead, it is crucial that the person be dead beyond a shadow of a doubt before the 
rituals are done. If the person later returns alive, that person and the family will not easily 
be accepted in society. The other reason that death rituals are not observed merely upon 
receiving news of the death, is that if at some point later, the body is retrieved, the rituals 
can never be repeated for the same person.  For this reason, only in cases where the 
news of death is absolutely certain, and it is known that the body will never be retrieved, 
is the kus ritual performed. This entails making an effigy of kus grass and burning it with 
some personal belongings of the dead person such as clothes or shoes.  An example of 
such a case would be if the family themselves, or someone they trusted, witnessed the 
body burned in a fire, or eaten by a wild animal, and all hope of one day getting part of 
the body back had gone. A Tharu community leader said during this study that for his 
community the kus ceremony could be performed only where a witness to the death was 
present; in this case the kus effigy would be buried according to traditional Tharu 
practice.15 Where there is no confirmation of death, Nepali law states that death will be 
presumed after 12 years of disappearance, based upon Hindu tradition.  
In Hindu tradition if the death has left a widow, older widows take the bangles 
from the newly widowed woman‟s arms, the glass beads from her neck, the mangalsutra, 
a black pearl on a thread around her neck, and smash them on a stone. They wash the 
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 Krishna Chaudhary, Founder of Conflict Victims‟ Committee, Bardiya (Personal 
communication).  
15
 Ibid. 
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red tika and sindhur (vermillion powder) from her forehead, which have defined her as a 
married woman, and thus begins her widowhood.   
The emotional and psychological impact of death and other impacts of the conflict 
in Nepal are perceived in the framework of traditional understandings. Nepali thinking 
distinguishes between the man (heart-mind) associated with emotional response, and 
dimaag (brain-mind), associated with thought (Kohrt and Harper, 2008).  A dysfunction of 
the man is not stigmatised, whereas a problem with dimaag indicates that someone is 
irrational or crazy and brings shame and loss of status to both individual and family.  A 
psychosocial intervention will address the man, and a psychiatric one the dimaag.  The 
majority of the population however has no access to any mental health facility: Kohrt and 
Harper (2008) report 1 clinical psychologist per 4.5 million population. Most Nepalis rely 
on traditional healers who are the most accessible of therapists and work according to 
local spiritual traditions.  
4.2.3 Nepal’s still-born transition and the Missing 
The Jana Andolan of April 2006 led to a cessation of hostilities between the CPN-M and 
the Nepali state as the king reinstated parliament, returning it to the control of the 
political parties, under Prime Minister G.P. Koirala. Direct talks followed between Koirala 
and Maoist leader Prachanda. In November 2006 the CPN-M and the Government 
signed a Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) formally ending the 10 year 
insurgency. Throughout this process the king remained sidelined, his power formally 
removed by parliament, and his popularity diminished by his efforts to crush the April 
movement. The CPN-M agreed to join an interim Government, and CPN-M fighters 
assembled in cantonments; a UN mission (United Nations Mission in Nepal, UNMIN) 
arrived in Nepal to monitor the arms and armies of both parties, and to assist in 
preparation for elections.   
In April 2007, the Maoists joined the interim Government, while elections 
foreseen for May were postponed as the terms of the transition were negotiated between 
the CPN-M leadership and the traditional parties. In December 2007, in an atmosphere 
of increasing ethnic violence in the country, the parliament agreed to abolish the 
monarchy and the Maoists rejoined the interim Government. Following two 
postponements, elections to the Constituent Assembly (CA) were eventually held in April 
2008 leading to the CPN-M becoming the largest party in the CA, forming a coalition 
Government with smaller parties with Prachanda, the Maoist leader, Prime Minister. In 
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May 2008 the CA declared Nepal a republic, and in July the first President was elected. 
The CA, which has a 2 year term, is both the parliament of Nepal and the body tasked 
with writing a new constitution. The Nepal field work of this study was undertaken during 
this year of Maoist government. One year later, in May 2009, the Maoist Government fell 
following the declaration by the President that its sacking of the army chief was 
unconstitutional. A coalition led by the two traditional parties who had led governments 
that fought the insurgency, the Nepali Congress (NC) and the Communist Party of Nepal 
- Unified Marxist Leninist (UML) emerged. Since then the transition and the peace 
process have been frozen with the legislature blocked by a stand-off between the 
Government and the CPN-M, who remain the largest party.  
The subtext of the entire transition is that of challenging the power of a narrow 
ethnic and caste elite, who defined Nepali identity in their own image for centuries. The 
concept of an inclusive „new Nepal‟, with institutions that represent all Nepalis, has 
become part of political consensus. However, there remain challenges to the transition 
and one of the greatest is that of justice for crimes committed during the conflict.  Both 
parties to the conflict have been responsible for violations of humanitarian and human 
rights law (including perpetrating disappearances), and it seems likely that responsibility 
for these offences lies at the very highest levels of the political and military structures of 
both the state and the CPN-M. Since the transition is being led by the very same people 
who are likely to be targeted by a judicial process (80% of CA members come from the 
three largest parties that fought the People‟s War), this will remain the greatest challenge 
of the transition. The Maoist-led Government published draft bills creating both a Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) and a Disappearance Commission and began 
modest public consultations on these mechanisms, but no progress has been made in 
the creation of these bodies, even some three years later.  
The only significant action that has been taken concerning disappearances has 
been the payment of Rs. 100,000 (approximately US$1,360) to families of the 
disappeared as „interim relief‟, spurred by judgements of a Supreme Court that has 
asserted its independence and confirmed the roe of the state in disappearances 
(Advocacy Forum, 2010a).16 
                                               
16
 Interim relief payments were initiated by a February 2008 cabinet decision of the Maoist led 
Government (International Crisis Group, 2010). 
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The Missing and the transition 
The issue of the Missing has assumed a central role in discussions of Nepal‟s transition. 
This is partly as a natural result of the very high emotions the phenomenon creates, but 
also because the Maoists, in the ascendant following the CA elections, see it as their 
issue: a majority of those missing (around 80%, see Section 6.1) were taken by the 
state, and the families of most of these are supporters of the CPN-M.  
Official rhetoric has acknowledged the missing issue since the start of the 
transition: the ceasefire code of conduct prepared by the seven party alliance (SPA) of 
constitutional parties and the CPN-M in May 2006 included a commitment to “..disclose, 
as soon as possible, the whereabouts of the citizens who have been disappeared” (Govt. 
of Nepal, 2006a: 17).  In June 2006 a one-man commission was formed to inquire into 
the status of 776 disappeared persons under a senior official of the Home Ministry, and 
this reported in July. Whilst it was claimed that over 100 persons were confirmed 
„released‟ or „killed in crossfire‟, the Nepal Army declined to cooperate and the major 
conclusion was that an „all powerful commission‟ was required to address the issue 
(Kantipur, 2006). The instruments of the peace agreement and interim constitution of 
2007 all include commitments to form a commission to investigate disappearances, 
identify perpetrators and provide relief to families of the disappeared (Govt. of Nepal, 
2006b, Govt. of Nepal, 2006c, Govt. of Nepal, 2007). The interim constitution of January 
2007 also made an apparent provision for pardon that represented the first evidence that 
those driving the transition were aware that judicial procedure may ultimately result.  
In August 2006 the Supreme Court took a stand on the issue and ordered a 
taskforce to investigate the disappearance of those detained by the state.  This taskforce 
reported in March 2007 (Supreme Court of Nepal, 2007a) and was followed by a strong 
decision on a group of 76 habeas corpus cases concerning the Missing (Supreme Court 
of Nepal, 2007b). For the first time an arm of the state confirmed that “arbitrary arrests, 
torture, killings and systematic and widespread disappearances were general practice” 
(ibid.) by the security forces during the conflict. The Court demanded that an 
„Investigation Commission‟ be created, that disappearance be criminalised and ordered 
that relief of Rs. 100,000 be paid to the families of those disappeared who were the 
subject of the decision.  
In August 2008 the Government published a draft bill to create a Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission (Government of Nepal, 2008). This provoked criticism from a 
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range of Nepali and international human rights actors who saw it as sanctioning amnesty 
and compromising the independence of the Commission (e.g. ICTJ, 2007). The bill had 
also been drawn up with minimal consultation with victims. It appears the mention of a 
TRC in the documents of the peace process was the result of the engagement of 
international actors, rather than having an indigenous origin,17 and it is not clear if there 
is political support for a TRC among the parties leading the transition. It would be 
unsurprising if support for a process that could lead to prosecutions was limited given 
that senior figures in the army, the traditional political parties and both the military and 
political hierarchy of the CPN-M are implicated in violations of the conflict. In November 
2008 the Government prepared and circulated a draft Act on Disappearance (Govt. of 
Nepal, 2008a). There was little consultation with victims over the content of the bill which 
criminalises disappearance retrospectively and creates a Disappearance Commission 
tasked with the job of investigating disappearances and determining guilt: cases will be 
referred by the Commission to the Attorney General. This bill is discussed in the light of 
the findings of this study in Chapter 6. The greatest obstacle to any action on the missing 
issue is the complete absence of political will among the parties leading the transition, all 
of which have either connections to military actors (namely the RNA and PLA) or political 
responsibility for actions that led to disappearances. Whilst their political agendas are 
entirely divergent, those most responsible for the violations discussed here, commanders 
of the RNA and PLA and their political masters during the conflict, have since early in the 
transition shared a commitment to impunity that is threatened by any action to 
investigate the violations of the conflict.18    
Civil society in Nepal has been active on the issue of disappearances as well as 
other violations committed during the conflict, led by a small group of national human 
rights agencies. The advocacy of such groups emphasises the ending of impunity 
through judicial process against perpetrators. Whilst such groups have had contact with 
families of the Missing in most cases such efforts are Kathmandu centred with victims 
playing little role.   
                                               
17
 Personal communication, international actor engaged in peace process.    
18
 One international actor involved in talks between the RNA and PLA immediately after the 
signing of the CPA confirmed that once it was clear that both parties shared a commitment to 
impunity, talks were able to continue without suspicion.  
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Families close to the CPN-M first established an association of families of the 
disappeared in Kathmandu during the conflict, with the support of the party.  This group, 
known as Sofad (Society for the families of those disappeared by the state) brought 
together families to campaign for the state to inform them of the whereabouts of relatives 
and to release them.  Sofad also acted as a channel for economic support from the CPN-
M to victim families. Soon after the end of the conflict family associations were 
established in other parts of the country, often independent of any political party and 
trying to represent the victims of both sides. These were typically established by victims 
themselves, usually without any political agenda to both provide peer support and to 
advocate for action to address their demands. A typical example is that of the Conflict 
Victims‟ Committee (CVC), established in Bardiya - the district worst affected by 
disappearances - in 2006 by a local schoolteacher. With some modest support from 
international and national NGOs CVC succeeded in mobilising almost all the families of 
the Missing in the district, organising protests and engaging with civil society in 
Kathmandu. Whilst all associations emphasise a campaigning agenda one of their most 
important roles has been to bring families with similar experiences together. In this way 
the family associations offer emotional and psychological support services to families of 
the disappeared. The family associations became a crucial platform for the participatory 
methodology of the study (see Chapter 5). 
As a Hindu state, with an emphasis on cremation on death, there is little tradition 
of exhumation or excavation of human remains, and no legal framework for such 
procedures. Despite this, some 29 exhumations of human remains have been made both 
during and after the conflict, organised by the Nepal Human Rights Commission (NHRC) 
and other agencies, but all using the same technical experts (Wasti et al., 2011). These 
have included the exhumation of 19 individuals, members of the CPN-M, allegedly killed 
in Dorombha in an „encounter‟ with the RNA in 2003 that ended ongoing peace talks. On 
exhumation, victims were found to have been shot and killed while handcuffed. Other 
high profile cases where exhumation was made have included a 15 year old girl 
apparently tortured to death inside an RNA camp (OHCHR, 2006: Advocacy Forum, 
2010), a journalist killed by the PLA while being detained and a group of five young men 
in Dhanusa district. NHRC has reportedly received a number of requests from families 
seeking assistance in investigating grave sites, but do not have the resources to do so. 
There remains no capacity within Nepal to either perform exhumations on a large scale 
or to perform DNA testing. Samples have been sent to India at a cost of INRs. 44,000 
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(approximately US$900) per test. NHRC is also beginning the collection of ante-mortem 
data for disappearance cases.  
4.2.4 A review of literature on Nepal’s transition 
There is rather little academic literature concerning Nepal‟s transitional process. Both 
Pasipanodya (2008) and Aguirre and Pietropaoli (2008) have written about the 
importance of ensuring that the delivery of economic and social justice as part of the 
transitional justice process, highlighting the rights of women and challenging an 
emphasis on civil and political rights. A large amount of „grey‟ literature has emerged 
from the human rights community as both international and local agencies report on 
violations that occurred during the conflict, advocate for process, primarily judicial, to 
address them and critique proposals from the authorities (e.g. Advocacy Forum and 
Human Rights Watch, 2008; ICTJ, 2007; OHCHR, 2007a). These have included explicit 
discussions of disappearances (e.g. INSEC, 2008; ICJ, 2009), but these emphasise 
judicial process to address the crime of disappearance and engage minimally with 
victims. An exception is a report by OHCHR (OHCHR, 2008) on disappearances in 
Bardiya district that discusses the socioeconomic impact on families of the violation.  
The most relevant literature for this study has come from agencies making 
empirical studies with victims and communities to understand their views of transition. 
One such study used largely quantitative methods to: “[u]nderstand the immediate needs 
and concerns of victims” and “[c]apture opinions and attitudes about specific transitional-
justice mechanisms” (ICTJ and Advocacy Forum, 2008). This suggests that punishing 
perpetrators was considered a priority by only 3% of respondents, while others prioritised 
compensation, education, basic need, health and employment. This study has however 
been criticised for using methodologies that reflect an external agenda of retributive 
justice, and emphasising civil and political rights over victims‟ priorities in terms of basic 
needs (Robins, 2009a). The issue of the relevance to victims in Nepal of the agenda 
articulated by human rights agencies is discussed in Section 9.1. 
Some literature has emerged discussing the impacts of the conflict on its victims, 
dominated by studies of the mental health impacts of violence (Tol et al., 2010), and 
notably with regard to specific populations (Shakya, 2011; Thapa and Hauff, 2005).  
Rather little has emerged that discusses victims‟ perceptions of the impact of conflict, 
however.  
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4.3 Timor-Leste 
4.3.1 Conflict analysis 
Timor-Leste (officially the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste) comprises the eastern 
half of the island of Timor and Oecussi-Ambeno, an exclave on the north-western side of 
the island, entirely bounded by Indonesian West Timor. The nation‟s borders were 
defined by its past as a colony of Portugal from the 16th century. 
Figure 5 A map of Timor-Leste showing its 13 districts. 
A disorderly end to Portuguese colonisation resulted from an effective abandonment of 
Timor by the Portuguese in 1975. Two major political parties emerged at this time:  
Fretilin (Frente Revolucionária de Timor-Leste Independente), a socialist and nationalist 
party that had established strong support in rural areas, and UDT (União Democrática 
Timorense), the party of the traditional elites who originally sought to remain a part of 
Portugal (Dunn, 1983). Following efforts by Fretilin to seize power in the Oecusse 
enclave in June, in August 1975 UDT attempted a coup in an effort to frustrate 
increasing support for Fretilin (ibid). Tens of Fretilin leaders were arrested and dozens 
killed, resulting in a 3 week conflict between UDT cadres and Fretilin commanded 
Timorese troops of the Portuguese army. By the end of September UDT was defeated 
and thousands fled to West Timor, leaving Fretilin in control. Total casualties in the 
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conflict were in the low thousands (Turner, 1992), and the first cases of persons missing 
in conflict and disappearances of those arrested by Fretilin and held in official prisons 
date from this period.  
On November 28 1975 Fretilin made a unilateral declaration of independence of 
the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste (Jolliffe, 1978) that was recognised by a handful 
of other nations but not by the important local players of Indonesia, Portugal or Australia. 
Indonesia responded by having UDT and other party leaders sign a declaration calling 
for integration with Indonesia. Indonesian forces invaded on 7 December 1975, 
bombarding the capital Dili, and fighting street battles with fighters of Falintil (Forças 
Armadas da Libertação Nacional de Timor-Leste), Fretilin‟s armed wing. By the end of 
the year there were 30,000 Indonesian troops in the country, and Fretilin / Falintil had 
fled to the hills from where they conducted guerrilla operations. Indonesia formalised its 
control, installing a provisional Government, followed by an „act of integration‟ in which 
Timor-Leste became the 27th province of the Republic of Indonesia. Whilst at this time 
Fretilin controlled much of the territory, over the next two years the use of aircraft and 
defoliants broke the back of the resistance, notably an Indonesian campaign of 
„encirclement and annihilation‟ in 1977 - 78 (Schwarz, 1994; CAVR, 2005: 3.12).  
Hundreds of thousands of civilians were forced into camps where they risked starvation, 
to deprive the fighters of logistical support (Taylor, 1991). During this time many of those 
Timorese who actively supported Fretilin were living in remote hill areas to escape 
Indonesian forces and Fretilin was forcing the population to move away from lowland 
areas controlled by the Indonesians. The Indonesian campaign dispersed families and 
led to many deaths from illness and hunger: many of those missing from this time died in 
this way rather than through direct military action. During this period there are also a 
significant number of cases of young children, particularly those of Falintil fighters, being 
taken by military personnel and other Indonesian officials and adopted into their families. 
Armed resistance continued over the next two decades but at a much reduced level. By 
the 1990s only a few hundred fighters remained, and the struggle for independence had 
become a clandestine movement based largely in urban areas. Throughout this period 
however the movement was targeted by Indonesian security forces, with regular arrests 
and disappearances from detention occurring (e.g. ETHRC, 1998). The Santa Cruz 
massacre, where several hundred were killed at a funeral at a Dili church in 1991 
(CAVR, 2006) is one example: the bodies of those who died were taken away by the 
security forces, and the families have no knowledge of what happened to their loved 
ones.   
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Suharto was forced from power in Indonesia in 1998 and in May 1999, following 
strong international pressure, Indonesia and Portugal announced a vote by the people of 
Timor-Leste, to be supervised by the UN, to choose between autonomy within Indonesia 
or independence. Whilst the referendum itself, on 30 August 1999, was generally calm, 
chaos erupted when the result, 78.5% in favour of independence, was reported (BBC, 
1999). Pro-Indonesian militias began attacking people in Dili and massacres were 
reported around the country, including the infamous church massacres in Liquiça and 
Suai, each resulting in the death of up to 200 people (OHCHR, 2000). In the latter case 
26 bodies were recovered and identified from a gravesite over the border in West Timor, 
but it is assumed that many more than this died but they remain missing. Some 300,000, 
around 30% of the population, were forced into camps in West Timor and around 75% of 
the population displaced. The violence was ended by the arrival of an Australian led 
international peace-keeping force on 20 September. A total of around 1,400 people are 
estimated to have been killed in the violence, and some 200 bodies recovered and 
identified: the remainder remain missing.19    
The Missing in Timor-Leste thus derive from three very distinct periods of 
violence: the internal conflict between Timorese political parties in 1975, the Indonesian 
invasion and occupation (and resistance to it) from 1975 to 1999, and the spasm of 
violence inspired by the Indonesian military both before and after the referendum of 
1999. The circumstances in which people went missing during the conflict of the 
Indonesian occupation are such that the total number missing remains unclear. The 
CAVR (Comissão de Acolhimento, Verdade e Reconciliação de Timor Leste, see 
Section 4.3.3) has estimated that between 1975 and 1999, some 18,600 were killed, and 
more than 100,000 died of hunger and illness, above the peacetime baseline, with many 
of these deaths occurring between 1975 and 1979 (CAVR, 2005: 7.2). The Missing will 
be found in both categories. A total of 835 disappearances were reported to CAVR 
during its data collection, and these are shown as a function of time in Figure 6. Whilst 
these are likely to represent only a small fraction of disappearances during the conflict, 
they show the pattern over time, with peaks in the first 10 years of the occupation and 
another in 1999.  
                                               
19
 Serious Crimes Investigation Team, 2009; personal communication.  
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Figure 6 Number of acts of disappearance reported to CAVR (Silva and Ball, 2006) 
However, these data exclude all those missing as a result of death through illness or 
hunger after separation from family members, which is likely to far outnumber 
disappearances following arrest: one study suggests in excess of 160,000 deaths from 
hunger and illness over the entire period of conflict (Figure 7, Silva and Ball, 2006).  
 
Figure 7 Estimated total number of deaths due to hunger and illness in Timor-Leste: data 
from CAVR Retrospective Mortality Survey. (Silva and Ball, 2006; the shaded line shows 
the margin of error, and the straight line an extrapolation from death rates in 1972-4.) 
An estimate made by cross-referencing the ICRC list of the Missing (see Section 7.1) 
used as a sampling frame for this study with other sources suggest that tens of 
thousands are missing. As such, the missing phenomenon represents one of the 
principal continuing impacts of the years of conflict for the nation as a whole. 
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Several victims‟ groups have been initiated in Timor-Leste for victims of the 1999 
violence, with an emphasis on the wives and mothers of the Missing and the dead. 
These groups serve to bring women together for support and to advocate for their needs. 
A group in Bobonaro district has small premises from where women run a business 
selling used clothes, providing both livelihood and a place where women can gather on a 
daily basis. In Dili, the 12 November Committee represents the families of those, mostly 
young men, missing from the Santa Cruz massacre of 1991. This group has good 
connection to political leaders and has sufficient resources to support a volunteer staff. 
They have led efforts to exhume the bodies of the Missing, with the first victims of the 
Santa Cruz massacre recovered and identified in 2009 (Blau and Fondebrider, 2010). 
4.3.2 Cultural aspects: Families, communities and spirits 
Timor-Leste‟s population stands at a little over 1 million (Govt. of Timor-Leste, 2010): 
72% of these live in rural areas, working largely in subsistence agriculture: around 80% 
of crop production is for self consumption (World Bank, 2010). More than a third of the 
population is desperately poor: 37% have an income below $1.25 per day including 
almost half of those living in rural areas (UNDP, 2006) and this has worsened since 2001 
(UN, 2009). Malnutrition remains a problem, with 43% of children under five underweight 
and 20% chronically malnourished (UNDP, 2006); a third of adult women are 
malnourished (UNICEF, 2003). In terms of human development, Timor-Leste ranks as 
the „worst performer‟ in East Asia and the Pacific, a direct result of more than two 
decades of Indonesian occupation. Food security remains a huge challenge, with many 
going short of food between November and February: 64% of families report food 
insecurity (UNDP, 2006). The poorest are households that have small landholdings and 
few or no livestock, and those with many children or elderly or other dependent relatives 
(ibid). The poorest half of the population has access to an average of less than 0.22 
hectares of land. One of the most important differences in human development 
achievement is that seen between men and women: earned income is estimated to be 
only one eighth that of men and 10% of households are female headed, partly as a result 
of the history of conflict (UNDP, 2002). Many widows however move to live with their 
husband‟s family as a way to ensure survival. Women have fewer opportunities to earn 
their own income, two-thirds are illiterate, only a minority participate in the labour force 
and they have little voice in their communities. Inequality remains high in Timor-Leste in 
comparison with neighbouring provinces of Indonesia, driven by the urban-rural divide: 
income in the poorest district, Lautem, is almost half that of the capital, Dili (ibid). Poverty 
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remains not just an impact of decades of conflict but the potential cause of future 
violence and instability (UN, 2006).  
The Timorese consist of a number of distinct ethnic groups, most of which are of 
mixed Malayo-Polynesian and Melanesian/Papuan descent, as well as small Chinese 
and Muslim communities. The diversity of the population is seen in the large number of 
languages spoken, in excess of 30 (Fox, 2001). As a result of the Portuguese presence 
a population of mixed Portuguese-Timorese origin exists, known as mestiços, who 
formed a traditional elite close to the colonial power (Weatherbee, 1966). The huge 
variety of Timor-Leste, ethnically, linguistically and culturally make it difficult to 
generalise, but efforts will be made here to identify the most general features of 
Timorese society. The traditional beliefs of the people of Timor are animistic, and many 
of these traditions remain, having implications for attitudes towards death and the rituals 
associated with it:  
Among the Timorese, this real life/non-physical life is translated into their view of 
the world, their cosmology and the world where they live [...], whereby the secular 
is inhabited by living things and the cosmos by the spirit and the ancestors. 
(Babo-Soares, 2004: 22). 
Since the Portuguese presence however, Timor-Leste has been nominally Roman 
Catholic and the role of the Church in the resistance to the Indonesian occupation 
strengthened its position. Timorese responses to issues that impact on both the sacred 
and the profane are now driven by a syncretised understanding of the world that mixes 
the Catholic and the animist (see below).     
Most Timorese live in villages, where traditional structures remain relevant to 
their lives. Those entrusted with spiritual matters, the lia nain, literally the „culture 
speakers‟, come from specific families and are in contact with the ancestors (Hohe and 
Nixon, 2003): they maintain ritual authority, including over the liurai, traditional former 
kings who maintain some political power. The structure of local secular and sacred 
hierarchies and the network of obligations between and within families creates a unified 
structure that traditionally represented both local governance and law (ibid.). In this 
sense structures of both governance and justice are “socio-cosmic” (ibid: 11), deeply 
embedded in the form that communities take and in shared beliefs of spiritual 
understandings arising from the importance of acting in accordance with the wishes of 
the ancestors. The most important part of local social organisation is the uma lulik 
 121 
 
(sacred house), which links an individual to his extended family and his ancestors (Hicks, 
2004). Socio-cultural aspects of Timorese societies are interdependent, refuting efforts to 
separate the profane and the sacred, the legal and the social. A council of elders will 
traditionally have been chosen on the basis of a mix of hereditary rights and selection by 
senior male members of the community. Such hierarchies were used by both the 
Community Reconciliation Process of Timor-Leste‟s Truth Commission (see Section 
4.3.3) and in informal reconciliation efforts at village level (Babo-Soares, 2004). 
Timor-Leste remains a highly patriarchal society, reflected most visibly in the 
widespread practice of polygamy, and the fact that on marriage a woman moves into the 
home of her husband‟s family. Despite a constitution that guarantees women‟s rights and 
equality in all spheres, traditionally only men can own property and this culture persists in 
rural areas, ensuring that women remain dependent on men. Illiteracy is widespread, 
particularly among women of whom it is estimated 70% are illiterate.  The family is at the 
heart of life in Timor, with strong networks among families that can be highly supportive. 
Marriage is the relationship not just between two individuals but between two families 
(Hohe and Nixon, 2003). The family can offer support, emotionally and financially, to 
women whose husbands are dead or missing. However, some families remain 
dysfunctional and domestic violence continues at high levels: a 2002 survey found that 
43% of women respondents had experienced some form of domestic violence in the 
previous year (Ward, 2005).  
Limited studies have been made of the mental health of the population of Timor-
Leste, which is presumed to be highly impacted by the high levels of violence over 24 
years.  A study in 2000 found a prevalence of PTSD of 34% (Modvig et al., 2000), while 
one in 2008 found levels of 1.5% and noted that single, unemployed women are at a 
higher risk of PTSD (Silove et al., 2008). While there is a Government mental health 
service operating at some level in every district centre, in practice this is difficult for many 
in rural areas to access, and even in Dili services remain limited.  
With estimates that as many as one third of Timor-Leste‟s population has died 
since the Indonesian invasion (Kiernan, 2003; Staveteig, 2007), for many Timorese 
death has become something with which they have too often been confronted. Whilst 
90% of East Timorese claim to be Catholic, almost all continue to hold traditional beliefs, 
including that a spirit must be laid to rest after death, through burial or the offering of 
sacrifices; otherwise it may become a „wandering soul‟ (Hicks, 2004). Where someone 
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has died a „bad death‟, i.e. an unnatural one, the spirit will seek vengeance on the family 
and the village: in this sense the issue is one for the community and not just the relatives 
of the dead:  
A society, either an individual or a community, is required to recognise its 
hun, its forebears, its lineage and its clan‟s origin, because these elements 
represent the „source‟, the trunk of life. [...] It is a concept that embraces 
maun-alin (elder-younger siblings), lineage, clan, kin; rai; the land one stands 
on; uma, the house one lives in; mouris (life), the future one seeks to 
achieve; and rate, the graveyard of one‟s kin. (Babo-Soares, 2004: 22-23) 
During the 24 years of terror under the Indonesians, large numbers of the dead were not 
put to rest according to tradition (Rawnsley, 2004): in some cases bodies were taken by 
those responsible for killings, in many others people died while they were in the 
mountains and separated from families. Following the end of the conflict, at all levels of 
society families sought to retrieve remains of relatives to make appropriate ritual, in 
some cases exhuming bodies where they had been buried by comrades or family 
members.20 President (then Foreign Minister) Jose Ramos Horta exhumed the body of 
one of four sisters who died during the violence of the occupation in 2002:  
We knew where she had been buried. The local people buried her. When 
they saw her killed they knew it was my sister. They wrapped her properly, 
dressed her and ever since they have kept a guard on her grave. (Ramos-
Horta, quoted in The Press, 2008) 
Two of his brothers remain missing:  
We still don't know where they are. We don't know where they were killed, 
how they were killed. We know they were killed in 1977. (ibid) 
In the years since independence bodies of victims of the conflict have continued to be 
discovered, both by accident and design: in some neighbourhoods of Dili construction 
invariably reveals the corpses of such victims (e.g. Associated Press, 2010).   
                                               
20
 F-FDTL, the Timorese armed forces and successor to the Falintil resistance made efforts to 
exhume known resistance dead soon after its formation for reburial in a martyrs‟ cemetery 
(Private communication, F-FDTL officers.).  
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CAVR confirmed “a cause of continuing deep anguish to relatives and friends is 
that the victim‟s remains have never been recovered” (CAVR, 2005: 7.2: 9). The 
dilemmas faced by the families of the Missing are illustrated by the story of a veteran of 
the Falintil resistance movement, Lu-Olo, whose family assumed he was dead since they 
hadn‟t seen him for 24 years and held a funeral rite. When he returned in 1999 they 
assumed he was a „wandering spirit‟ and found it hard to reconcile his presence among 
them (Rawnsley, 2004). For the women of the group Rate Laek („no grave‟) whose 
husbands were taken during the violence of 1999, they have little doubt their husbands 
are dead, but the fact that they have no bodies to bury and have been unable to perform 
the rituals their culture requires is a great sorrow (da Silva, 2002): 
[W]e cannot begin to inquire into the truth of what happened until the 
mourning is finished. And mourning does not end until the bodies are 
properly buried and the spirits of the dead are able to be at rest. Now in East 
Timor we have passed the initial time of mourning; some refugees need to 
bring home the bodies of their dead to their traditional places. (Isabel 
Amaral-Guterres, quoted in Rawnsley, 2004: 13) 
Beyond those whose fate or grave is unknown, are those who are buried but away from 
traditional burial grounds where family members cannot visit. In such cases arising from 
the conflict exhumation and secondary burial has become common, such that relatives 
can have „proper‟ graves (Field, 2005).  
4.3.3 Transitional justice in Timor-Leste: Looking forward or looking back?  
Whilst initially put in place by the international community, the development of 
transitional justice mechanisms in Timor-Leste have occurred subject to the tension of 
two divergent agendas. The leadership of the country, composed largely of those who 
led the resistance to Indonesia, has emphasised reconciliation, „social justice‟ and 
development over judicial process, with the overriding priority of ensuring good relations 
with Indonesia:  
We have to see what we can do, not what we wish to do. Now we need 
reconciliation and we have to think of socio-economic rather than formal 
justice. That is our priority. (Xanana Gusmão, while President, 16 December 
2005.) 
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The country‟s security will be shaken if an international tribunal is going to be 
established in the country and the relationship between Indonesia and Timor-
Leste will be distanced. (President Jose Ramos Horta, Radio Timor-Leste, 
12 April 2010). 
Gusmão has stated that a widened program of prosecutions could take years, cause 
violence in Timor-Leste and set back democratic consolidation in both Timor-Leste and 
Indonesia (ICG, 2006). He has also said that he is concerned by the “non-critical 
absorption of (universal) standards” (Gusmão, 2000) by the nation; an explicit assertion 
that local needs that trump such global standards. In contrast, the human rights 
community, both within Timor-Leste and outside, have insisted on the need for an 
international judicial mechanism to counter perceived commitments to maintaining 
impunity:  
The best alternative to a revived and strengthened serious crimes process 
would be for the Security Council to implement the recommendation of the 
CoE report - to create an ad hoc international criminal tribunal for Timor-
Leste, to be located in a third State. [...] This position is widely supported by 
Timor-Leste‟s citizens, especially by the Church, several political parties and 
civil society. (International Federation for East Timor, letter to the UN Security 
Council, Feb. 18th 2009.) 
Assertions from both the leadership and the human rights community that the people of 
Timor-Leste are in agreement with their respective positions appear to be unsupported, 
and remarkably little empirical work has been done to understand victims‟ needs of 
transition.   
Transitional mechanisms in Timor-Leste were created with little consultation with 
ordinary people or with victims of the 24 year conflict. Both the serious crimes process 
and CAVR were created by a UN administration with no democratic mandate and 
accommodated in Constitutional arrangements once a Timorese Government was 
formed.21 The goals of the process appear to have reflected a global discourse of truth 
                                               
21
 The establishment of CAVR was preceded by a „national consultation‟ exercise that targeted 
community representatives, NGOs, and other actors, including political parties and groups 
involved with justice and reconciliation issues, but this was limited in scale and scope and made 
no effort to meet ordinary victims of conflict. 
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and reconciliation, with a role in principle for judicial process alongside it. In practice, 
judicial process has been extremely limited, with no effort made to prosecute those 
responsible for violations committed before 1999. Judicial process has been restricted to 
the hybrid UN Special Panels for Serious Crimes (Katzenstein, 2003) that have 
convicted 84 persons of offences related to the violence of 1999 (ICTJ, 2006), but has 
seen those most culpable seek refuge in Indonesia. In recent years Presidential pardons 
and commutations of sentences have seen almost all those convicted and jailed by the 
Special Panels released (SSR Monitor, 2011). In Indonesia an Ad Hoc Human Rights 
Court for East Timor has been widely seen as a device to avoid genuine process 
(Sarmento, 2005), and has not led to convictions.  
The CAVR was established by UNTAET (UN Transitional Administration in East 
Timor) in January 2002. The name of the commission reflected its three roles: the search 
for truth, reconciliation and the return from Indonesia of those displaced following the 
violence of 1999. Its remit covered the entire conflict period beginning with the 
Portuguese revolution of April 1974 and ending in October 1999. CAVR submitted its 
report (“Chega!”; CAVR, 2005) in October 2005, having collected 7,669 statements, and 
conducted more than 1,000 interviews (ibid: 20) in an effort to write a history of the 
conflict. The principal avenue for CAVR to promote reconciliation was through the 
Community Reconciliation Process (CRP), which aimed to address less serious crimes 
through a grassroots process that adapted restorative indigenous practice. Community 
hearings were led by a panel of community leaders in which victims and perpetrators 
spoke about the events and the panel brokered an agreement that would lead to 
reconciliation (Babo-Soares, 2004). This could involve community service, apologies or 
reparations. The CRP dealt only with non serious crimes, emphasising those from 1999, 
and offers a model for a restorative transitional justice that is rooted in the communities it 
aims to serve. Whilst CAVR conducted a very modest urgent reparations programme on 
the basis of aiding the most vulnerable, its broader proposals for reparations remain 
unimplemented. In January 2006 then President Xanana Gusmão publicly rejected the 
CAVR recommendations that the investigation of crimes against humanity in Timor-Leste 
continue and for a broader serious crimes investigation to cover 1974-1999. Since the 
CAVR‟s report was submitted to the Parliament in late 2005, Parliament has declined 
either to debate it, or act on its recommendations.  
The Commission of Truth and Friendship Indonesia-Timor-Leste (CTF) was 
created in August 2005 by the Governments of Indonesia and Timor-Leste with a 
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mandate to find the „conclusive truth‟ (CTF Final Report, 2008), of the events of 1999. It 
was widely perceived as an effort by both Governments to address the many criticisms 
of continuing impunity for perpetrators of violations (ICTJ, 2008), without challenging 
their shared political aims of avoiding prosecutions. The CTF, the world‟s first bi-national 
truth commission, reported in March 2008, but its findings had little impact on victims 
since it had no participatory elements and little outreach.  
Little discussed in the literature is the „valorisation‟ programme that has led to 
tens of thousands of veterans of the liberation struggle, both military and civilian, 
receiving medals since late 2006 (World Bank, 2007), making it the one transitional 
mechanism that has directly impacted the greatest number of people. Smaller numbers 
have received compensation payments and generous pensions. Despite the position of 
the nation‟s leaders, issues of social justice and development have constituted only a 
marginal part of the agenda of the formal mechanisms of transitional justice. 
4.3.4 A review of the literature on Timor-Leste’s transition 
The transition in Timor-Leste has produced a substantial literature, with a large number 
of studies focussing on the transitional justice process, and CAVR in particular. The 
range of literature well represents current perspectives and approaches to transitional 
justice, with few empirical studies or approaches that engage directly with victims. Most 
studies use methodologies that are based either on the literature that has emerged from 
the transition (such as the CAVR report), or on direct personal experience of the 
transitional mechanisms by practitioners. Much of the literature explores the balance 
between prosecutorial justice and reconciliation, and implications for state building (e.g. 
Kingston, 2006; Huang and Gunn, 2004). Typically they laud the truth-telling process as 
necessary and mourn the lack of accountability mechanisms, while some have noted the 
lack of interaction with ordinary Timorese that efforts at statebuilding have had (Brown, 
2009). 
CAVR has been the topic of many studies, the majority authored by those who 
worked with the Commission (e.g. Ximenes, 2004; Babo-Soares, 2004; Larke, 2009; 
Kent, 2005; Schenk, 2005). Much of the literature focuses on the potential of CAVR for 
healing and reconciliation, for victims and others, to emerge from the truth-telling process 
and this is often generalised to a healing of the nation that fosters state building (Huang 
and Gunn, 2004). This emphasis leads to a focus in the literature on the CRP as the 
restorative component of CAVR, providing both truth and reconciliation at the community 
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level. However, the one study that has investigated the healing impact of CAVR on 
victims (Silove and Zwi, 2006) describes claims of both personal and social healing as 
„contentious‟, while another concludes that it is impunity that most threatens personal 
healing (Le Touze, Silove and Zwi, 2005). Both studies collected data from CAVR 
personnel rather than from victims directly. The broader literature from other contexts 
provides evidence that such “exposure therapy” (Silove and Zwi, 2006: 1223; Kaminer et 
al., 2001) is largely not an important part of healing. The only literature on CAVR that 
comes from Timorese who did not work with the Commission is from La‟o Hamutuk, a 
Timorese NGO (La‟o Hamutuk, 2003). It is perhaps the only source that clearly states 
the CAVR model of truth and reconciliation as foreign in origin: “many key staff, all 
funding, and the basic structure and methodology come from overseas. [...] it has relied 
heavily on international consultants, advisors, and leadership.” (ibid: 1) Despite the 
cooption of elements of indigenous process in the CRP, the basic philosophy of the 
Commission was imported, a fact that is either ignored or denied in much literature.  
A number of studies have reviewed the judicial processes that have occurred to 
address the crimes of Timor‟s conflict, much of it highly critical, notably of the serious 
crimes process (Cohen, 2006; Reiger and Wierda, 2006). The weakness of 
accountability for serious crimes during Timor-Leste‟s conflict has prompted a range of 
literature from rights agencies (Amnesty International, 2009; JSMP, 2002; La‟o Hamutuk, 
2009), critiquing the limited process in Timor and the almost complete lack of it in 
Indonesia. Some have engaged with the very divergent views of justice held at the 
grassroots in Timor, notably arising from indigenous forms of justice, and encouraging 
that this be considered in any judicial or statebuilding process (Grenfell, 2009; Hohe, 
2003; Senier, 2008).  
Empirical studies of Timor‟s transition have been rare, and none has sampled 
either victims or the general population to allow a representative study. Pigou (2004) 
used semi-structured focus group discussions in several districts of the country to 
understand views of the transition, including with purposively sampled victims active in 
local associations. The conclusions of the study were that participants prioritised truth 
and prosecutions of perpetrators, an agenda that coincides with that of the agency that 
funded the study. Devereux and Kent (2008), who also worked with CAVR, evaluate the 
performance of the CRP as well as the process and product (i.e. the report) of the 
Commission. They confirm that victims of serious crimes remain dissatisfied by the lack 
of any process relevant to their cases and make the valuable point that victims continue 
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to emphasise economic issues and so reparations must remain on the agenda if a 
“survivor centred approach” (Hamber, 1996) is to be claimed. The most extensive 
empirical studies with victims have been those made by Kent (2004, 2008), who also 
worked with CAVR, of the CRP and the broader transitional process. These involved 
interviews with those who had engaged in the CRP, both perpetrators and victims, and 
others, and is notably more critical of the process than authors who viewed it solely from 
their positions as staff of CAVR. Kent‟s most recent work (2010) represents an effort to 
create a „thicker‟ understanding (McEvoy, 2008) of the dynamics of transition in Timor-
Leste, exploring the political nature of the narratives that are elaborated and constructed 
as part of a transitional justice process and their impact on ordinary Timorese victims. It 
does this by linking such everyday perspectives to the national and international actors 
steering that process, and can be considered a major contribution to a victim-centred 
approach to transition, both in Timor and beyond.  
Whilst there has been a range of studies of Timor-Leste‟s transition, the vast 
majority constrain the scope of investigation to the stated aims of the mechanisms 
created and investigate the impact of those mechanisms on the individuals who have 
interacted with them. Such studies are unable to challenge the goals of transition with 
perspectives from non-elites or make any statement about the views of the majority of 
the population, or of victims, who have not interacted with either CAVR or other 
mechanisms. Few are able to adopt the cultural and social viewpoint of ordinary 
Timorese or to query the relevance of the concept of a truth commission. The communal 
violence of 2006 that saw the disintegration of much of the security forces (UN, 2006), 
and the continuing instability that has followed, is evidence that statebuilding has failed in 
important aspects. This has largely not yet been addressed in the transitional justice 
literature despite statebuilding and peacebuilding being explicit aims of the mechanisms 
created over the last decade. This study aims to address this deficit, taking a victim 
oriented view of the process and not presupposing that the goals set for the process 
coincide with the priorities of victims.   
4.4 Nepal and Timor-Leste: Comparing the two contexts 
Whilst superficially the two contexts appear rather different in terms of history and the 
status of their transitional justice processes, in terms of the situation of victims there are 
remarkable similarities. Here, those correspondences are reviewed, considering both the 
political level and the everyday worlds of victims.   
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In this chapter the two contexts have been discussed in terms of the socio-
economic and cultural background in which conflict and disappearance occurred. Both 
Nepal and Timor-Leste are characterised by poverty and marginalisation which served to 
both provoke and prolong conflict and exacerbated the impact of violations. In both 
contexts traditional understandings, of religion and spirituality, of family dynamics and 
the subservience of women play a role in how communities respond to the impact of 
political violence. In Nepal longstanding exclusion on the basis of ethnicity and caste has 
both defined the nation‟s social and economic dynamics and exacerbated the violence, 
both structural and direct, to which the marginalised have been subject. The response to 
the histories of violence in the two states has been similar: elite led processes reference 
a global discourse of rights, but political agendas that seek to minimise prosecutorial 
process determine how that process unfolds. In Timor-Leste a ten year transition has 
been a laboratory for contemporary concepts of transitional justice, led by a truth 
commission that put the metaphor of truth as healing, in the tradition of the South African 
TRC, at the heart of its work and referenced traditional restorative process. In Nepal the 
same universalist discourse has been frustrated by political stalemate and a desire for 
politicians and senior combatants on both sides to minimise the chance of any retributive 
process. In both contexts political expediency has driven which mechanisms are created 
and, in Nepal‟s case, has ensured no significant process at all. Victims‟ agendas remain 
as marginalised as victims themselves in both contexts, largely unheard in the vigorous 
debate between rights organisations and politicans.       
The ten years of transition in Timor-Leste have led to a small number of 
prosecutions, a much vaunted truth and reconciliation process and the world‟s first bi-
national truth commission. That the transition has taken this course is a result of the 
decisions of the small number of persons who constitute the leadership of the state, 
supported by an array of international advisors. They determined that a broad process of 
prosecutions, inevitably targeting those at senior levels of the Indonesian Government 
and security forces, would not be in the best interests of Timor-Leste. (It is also possible 
that those close to Fretilin and Falintil during the conflict are concerned that judicial 
process may also target them and their erstwhile colleagues, many now in senior roles.) 
This position is contested by those articulating the global human rights discourse, who 
argue that retributive justice and an end to impunity are essential for the country to move 
beyond its violent past. This remains however a normative statement, with little evidence 
to support it and no empirical data to confirm assertions that victims or the general 
population do indeed prioritise judicial process. Transitional process in Timor-Leste is not 
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evidence-based, but has been driven by largely political decisions of the leadership, with 
little mandate for such action.  
That a process emphasising reconciliation was prioritised in Timor-Leste was 
justified by a need to go beyond the purely retributive, and the leadership has 
emphasised development, social justice and „looking to the future‟. This approach 
chimes with restorative approaches that have increasingly become part of transitional 
justice (Leebaw, 2003; Llewellyn and Howse, 1999) and the Community Reconciliation 
Process has been lauded as both restorative and based in indigenous tradition (Babo-
Soares, 2004; Zifcak, 2005; Ximenes, 2004). It seems likely however that reconciliation 
as a goal, and perhaps as the principal goal, of Timor-Leste‟s transitional justice process 
is prompted less as a considered position of the Timorese leadership than a 
convenience that coincides with and justifies their pragmatic approach to avoiding 
prosecutions.  
In Nepal, the transition is being led by those who fought the war, with the 
traditional parties and the Maoists alternating in coalition Governments since the 2008 
elections and both aware of their unreformed military constituencies (the Nepal Amy and 
the People‟s Liberation Army, respectively). As such there is a quite explicit constraint on 
the process that militates against prosecutions in the short term. In Nepal one sees the 
same polarisation of attitudes toward transitional process as in Timor-Leste, with the 
authorities choosing to emphasise compensation over judicial process, and a human 
rights community with many allies internationally demanding that retribution provide the 
driving logic of the process. This sterile debate has resulted in no process at all in the 
five years since the end of Nepal‟s conflict, abetted by a political stand-off that threatens 
the entire peace process. The presence in Nepal of a vigorous civil society and a 
powerful donor community that has put human rights and accountability high on its 
agenda has prevented political elites from proposing the reconciliation led process that 
has unfolded in Timor.  From the perspective of the current political impasse it is difficult 
to see a way forward that both satisfies the expectations of those supporting the rights-
based development of the „new Nepal‟ and avoids legislators and minsters condemning 
themselves to prosecution. Nepal is a classic test of the utility of the discourse of 
transitional justice in advancing peace and justice (in its broadest understanding), 
without violating the norms that a global rights regime imposes. It can thus be seen that 
the political constraints on the two processes have different sources. In Timor-Leste the 
domestic leadership seeks to avoid antagonising a powerful neighbour, while in Nepal 
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there is tension between an elite instinct for self-preservation (on both sides of the 
conflict) and the expectations of the human rights agenda. The net result of these 
constraints is similar however: as in Timor-Leste, there is unlikely to be a broad process 
of prosecutions in Nepal in the short or even medium term and any truth process is likely 
to be highly constrained.  
Beyond elite agendas 
Even though the two transitions studies here played out in very different ways, the 
processes that occurred have one very clear similarity: all come exclusively from elites. 
In Timor-Leste, the „statebuilding‟ process that drove the creation of the UN courts and 
CAVR was a UN-led process:  
The UN Administrator is nominated by the Secretary- General with little or no 
consultation with those who are to be administered. […] The question 
remains open how the UN can exercise fair governance with absolute 
powers in societies recovering from war and oppression. (Sergio Vieira de 
Mello, quoted in Beauvais, 2001: 1101) 
The UN administration‟s nod to political participation was through the creation of a 15 
person National Consultative Council containing the leaders of the resistance, other 
political parties and a representative of the Church, later expanded to a 36 person East 
Timorese National Council. It will be argued here that in addition to the explicitly UN 
driven processes, such as the Serious Crimes Process, CAVR was itself both created 
according to an imported model and steered by foreigners and consultation with non-
elites was minimal (Section 7.5). 
 In Nepal, the discourse of transitional justice is driven by external donors and 
rights agencies, national and international: this study will determine what resonance 
there is between this agenda, largely ignored by Government, and that of victims. 
Consultation with victims and the general population has taken the form of donor-
supported visits of Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction personnel, constituting 
meetings of a few hours, to a handful of regional headquarters (UN General Assembly, 
2009). Human rights agencies have also organised their own consultations (e.g. ICTJ 
and Advocacy Forum, 2008), but these appear to have had little impact on policymakers. 
The limited process that has occurred has been determined by the succession of 
governments since 2008, led by the parties to the conflict. These have attempting to 
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prioritise those efforts that can serve as instruments of political patronage, such as relief 
payments (Advocacy Forum, 2010A) and postpone or abandon those elements linked to 
truth and justice that might compromise the impunity of those in Government. The lack of 
investigation has been explicitly linked to political power:  
Such failures are due at least in part to the continued sway of the army and 
Maoist forces, and to police knowledge that the Nepal army (NA) and political 
party officials, including Maoist officials, are unlikely to co-operate with 
investigations. (The Guardian, 2010).  
The political constraints that limit transitional process arise because those in 
power are able to impose their own agenda. Likewise those who articulate the rights 
discourse are largely indigenous elites, who have benefitted from the education that 
gives access to it, or foreigners. Thus, the entire debate around transitional justice is one 
conducted among elites that excludes ordinary people, particularly the rural majority in 
both states. This study is premised on the assumption that victims have a particular 
stake in transitional justice processes and post-conflict recovery more generally (see 
Section 2.1). Yet, in the decade of process in Timor-Leste, neither victims nor the 
population have been consulted at any level concerning their goals for transition. 
Similarly, in Nepal, consultation with victims has to date been cursory. It remains the 
most common practice globally that such process is elite led and this has led to a 
narrowing of the transitional agenda, creating process that is violation and perpetrator 
centred, rather than victim-centred.  
The impact in Timor-Leste of the decade of transitional process on victims 
generally and families of the Missing in particular remains unclear. This study seeks to 
use empirical data from both contexts to understand what victim goals for transitional 
process are, and in Timor-Leste to understand the extent to which the mechanisms that 
have constituted the transitional justice process have satisfied those goals. This research 
is premised on learning from the ten year transitional justice process in Timor-Leste in 
ways that can inform the development of a victim-centred approach to addressing the 
issue of missing persons in Nepal and in other contexts. The methodology through which 
this is done is outlined in the following chapter.  
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Chapter 5 Research methodology: A critically 
engaged research 
This chapter describes the methodology of this study which builds on an Action 
Research modality, aiming to constitute not just an academic inquiry but a process that 
impacts on both the community of victims who are its collaborators and on decision 
makers in the concerned contexts. For the victims of conflict whose organisations drive 
the research the study aims to be empowering, providing a route for the agenda of the 
otherwise marginalised to reach the authorities in their respective states. The study also 
aims to be emancipatory in the sense that the research provides a tool, the report of the 
research findings, around which victims and their associations can mobilise, supporting 
victim agency. The study aims to challenge thinking on the addressing of legacies of 
violence that originates with global elites by making visible perspectives that come from 
below, from those most impacted by that violence. It seeks to let families of the Missing 
define their priorities in their preferred language and compares and contrasts that 
agenda with the discourses that drive current global practice.   
This chapter begins with a discussion of the dearth of empiricism in contemporary 
research and practice in transitional justice and the limited efforts to engage with those 
most impacted by political violence. Participatory approaches are briefly reviewed and 
the critical ethnography of this study introduced, with an emphasis on the participatory 
research design that drives it. The research design and more formal elements are then 
discussed, including the research methods used. The ethical considerations of a study 
working with a highly vulnerable population are reviewed and then an overview 
presented of the implementation of the study in the two research contexts.  
5.1 Participatory ethnography as a tool for change 
To see responses to gross violations driven by the expectations of those most affected 
by them demands an empirical and an ethnographic approach to reach an understanding 
of how victims and communities are changed by conflict. Such an approach necessitates 
empirical work of a highly interdisciplinary nature and an understanding of the role of the 
so-called „primary‟ institutions of the family and community that hold the key to recovery 
from such extreme events. Ethnography provides the best route to accessing insider 
perspectives and “permits us to transcend some of the parochialism inherent in our 
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ostensibly universal theories” (Schatzberg, 2009: 183). Ethnography necessarily 
emphasises the local and the particular, revealing the empirical complexity that can 
demonstrate the inadequacy of approaches that seek to be global in their scope. The 
human rights community interprets responses to gross violations through a 
predominantly legal lens, and so has developed methodologies for collecting victim and 
witness testimony (e.g. OHCHR, 2008a), but has neglected ways of understanding the 
broader impact on and needs of affected communities and individual victims. Indeed, in 
post-conflict contexts the assertion of a rights-based agenda has often taken precedence 
over needs that victims may articulate that fall outside the typical remit of a human rights 
response. In the development context participatory approaches have been successful in 
not only understanding phenomena (and human needs) from a grassroots viewpoint, but 
in developing solutions to address them (e.g. Chambers, 1994): such approaches have 
not however been widely used in conflict and post-conflict contexts.  
Here, a methodology is presented that allows a comprehensive approach to the 
needs of victims of conflict and through them an understanding of the global impact of 
conflict on a population or particular subset of a population. In this study that subset is a 
group of victims of a particular violation, disappearance. This methodology allows the 
researcher to work with victims to understand their needs holistically, contextualised in 
everyday life, and issues arising in families and communities that can have a huge 
impact on victims, but fall beyond the remit of a rights driven transitional justice 
approach. Above all, it allows the voices of victims to contribute to the debate about 
dealing with the past in post-conflict contexts. Scott has written of the „hidden transcripts‟ 
(1990) that the weak use beyond direct observation by those with power: it is the aim of 
this research to access such marginal discourses. The research is necessarily 
consultative, but aims more than this to be participatory. Whilst the methodology 
presented here certainly does not replace the mobilisation of victims to represent 
themselves (Section 10.2), it does allow for a process that engages victims and their 
organisations in a way that not only allows their voices to be heard and identifies local 
resources, but gives those organisations a concrete advocacy tool to increase their 
effectiveness. From an ethical perspective, this approach to research not only accesses 
victims in highly appropriate ways, but seeks to „leave something behind‟ in terms of 
fostering action that can address victim needs.  
In development, both in research and practice, participatory approaches have 
become increasingly orthodox. They aim not only to understand development issues 
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from the viewpoint of those most affected but also to develop responses from within 
affected communities:  
[P]articipatory research focuses on a process of sequential reflection and 
action, carried out with and by local people rather than on them. Local 
knowledge and perspectives are not only acknowledged but form the basis 
for research and planning. (Cornwall and Jewkes, 1995: 1667)  
Participatory research aims to shift the locus of power from the researcher towards the 
researched.  Whilst participatory research can be merely consultative, in its deeper form 
it involves the researcher and the researched working together in a process of mutual 
learning. Participation has been framed as part of „rights-based approaches‟, where 
participation itself is seen as a right, and participatory process as restoring agency to the 
traditionally disempowered (e.g. DFID, 2002; Cornwall, 2002). Such thinking, about 
rights rather than needs, demands that one consider who is included and excluded from 
such participatory processes and can challenge traditional hierarchies within 
communities to tackle social exclusion. These participatory processes however tend to 
confine the role of the research subjects to the generation of data, following the research 
design with which they are presented: the extent of the agency of the research subjects 
in the research project is highly constrained. Action Research approaches can address 
this issue, by allowing the researcher to be a facilitator, rather than a director of the 
research. Such participation thus echoes the need for transitional process to be more 
inclusive and can act to initiate such modes of action. 
In post-conflict contexts, there are many barriers to effective research: potential 
research subjects are traumatised, physical access can be compromised, and sampling 
strategies complicated. Fear and suspicion make the gaining of the trust of respondents 
potentially problematic.  Divided societies complicate “emotional access”, that is “...the 
ability of the researcher to gain social acceptance within the community and gain access 
to the rich data that the respondents themselves hold.” (Bowd, 2008: 129). One way to 
address these challenges is through a “composite approach” (Barakat et al., 2002): using 
a combination of methods including the ethnographic, participatory rural appraisal (PRA), 
observation and surveys to overcome the constraints of research in a conflict or post-
conflict environment. However, using participatory methods such as PRA in a highly 
divided society is problematic: „community‟ can often be held together by the weakest of 
ties and subject to the divisions of the conflict, and social structures damaged by 
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violence. In contrast to the development context, in human rights and transitional justice 
participatory methods are problematic in an environment where rights are being violated, 
since this can create security risks for those victims seen to speak out. As such human 
rights work in conflict has largely remained something that is done by specialists on 
behalf of victims. In contexts where security issues are less salient, a strategy of 
mobilisation is often employed where victims themselves organise, or are organised, for 
advocacy: this study will discuss the possibilities of mobilisation as a tactic to permit 
victims‟ perspectives to impact on transitional justice processes and as part of a research 
methodology.  
Significant empirical work has been done with populations affected by conflict 
and violations, including the exploration of relevant methodologies, from a transitional 
justice viewpoint. Pham and Vinck have proposed an “evidence based transitional 
justice” (2007: 231), developing what aims to be a comprehensive approach to empirical 
research with populations emerging from conflict. This has the express intention of 
impacting the development and assessment of transitional justice mechanisms, derived 
from the significant practical experience of the Human Rights Centre at the University of 
California, Berkeley.22 Pham and Vinck have identified participation of the community 
being researched as essential, both in order to challenge international prescriptive 
tendencies and to ensure that voices from the grassroots are heard. Such consultative 
processes are the first step towards challenging top-down process with perspectives 
„from below‟. Such an approach has been articulated as “transitional justice from the 
bottom up” (McEvoy and McGregor, 2008) and a need to “…explore ways in which [...] 
institutions of transitional justice can broaden ownership and encourage the participation 
of those who have been most directly affected by the conflict”. (McEvoy and McGregor, 
2008: 5, emphasis in original) The participatory methodology used here aims to also 
provide support to mobilisation of victims that can sustain victim input to such process 
and lead to a victim-centred transitional justice (Section 3.2). The frame for most studies 
that have emerged from the transitional justice discourse is to understand what a society 
can do in response to crimes of the past, rather than asking victims what their needs are 
of a transitional process. Recovery from conflict and social reconstruction are only 
possible if the transformative impact of conflict on those most affected can be 
understood: this demands a broader approach. Here, I aim to avoid imposing any 
                                               
22 See the numerous surveys conducted by the Human Rights Center and the International Center for 
Transitional Justice. See also Biro et al. (2004); Vinck and Pham (2010). 
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external agenda on the research, but to let those most affected by conflict and violations 
define their own needs as individuals and as communities.  
The ethnography of this study aims not just to understand victim perspectives but 
also to produce knowledge that can serve those victims by providing tools around which 
they can mobilise and that can be used to advocate for the addressing of their needs. It 
is political in that it seeks to challenge approaches to victims that emerge from narrow 
and unrepresentative elites, either national or international, that marginalise the views of 
those most affected. It thus seeks to be a critical ethnography, that is a “conventional 
ethnography with a political purpose” (Thomas, 1993: 4). An explicit aim of the research 
is to empower victims, and this drives the Action Research component. This study thus 
aims not to be a dispassionate study of a disempowered group in the anthropological 
tradition, but to actively engage with the „subjects‟ of the research (Scheper-Hughes, 
1995). This is a natural reprise of a previous role of the researcher when working with 
these communities, and seeks to place the research in the young tradition of “critically 
engaged activist research” (Speed, 2006). The research seeks to contribute by 
addressing the politics of knowledge production in post-conflict societies and to 
“decolonise” (ibid.) the relationship between the research and the researched. Rather 
than seeking to avoid the tensions inherent in ethnographic research on human rights, 
such collaborative research merges activism and cultural critique, making them a 
productive part of the process. I begin from the understanding both that there is no such 
thing as “human rights „in the abstract‟” (Goodale, 2007: 25), and that “non-elites [...] are 
very often important human rights theorists” (ibid). A component of this is to give weight 
to indigenous concepts of importance to ordinary victims, even where they fail to find 
resonance in the normative frameworks of rights or law that transitional justice 
traditionally seeks to use. The research is intended wherever possible as an exercise in 
knowledge production on the terms of the researched, with victims and their 
organisations determining what was studied, and how, and what was done with the 
output. As an activist collaborator and facilitator, the researcher can enable the research, 
ensure it is disseminated to decision makers locally and use the data collected for his 
own academic purposes. Whilst an unequal power relationship between the researcher 
and researched persists, and ethical dilemmas remain (Section 5.3), the process aims to 
serve victims on their own terms. The long-term relationship between the researcher and 
victims‟ associations amounted to a prolonged process of negotiation of the obligations 
of the researcher, in analogy to the concept of “iterative consent” (Mackenize et al., 
2007), ensuring accountability to the researched.  
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The research agenda articulated here emerged from years of direct contact with 
victims, and a desire to see victims contribute to the transitional agenda. In both 
research contexts, since the end of the conflict victims, often from marginalised 
communities in rural areas, have become increasingly frustrated at their inability to 
influence the transitional agenda and at being represented by elites from the capital 
remote from their own lives. This research aims to exploit the mutuality of the research 
agenda and the desire of victims for dissemination of their needs. This co-dependence 
allows a deep understanding of both the problems victims face, and their resources and 
strengths.  
The study was rooted in a participatory Action Research approach (Rappaport, 
1970; Rhaman, 1993) with associations of families of the Missing. These associations 
represent victims, most often on a local district basis; they are known and trusted by the 
families of the Missing, and thus constitute a route to engagement with victims and an 
understanding of their agendas The family associations are groups of victims with 
relatives disappeared by the state or other parties to conflict who have come together to 
support each-other and to advocate for an addressing of the needs that arise as a result 
of having a missing family member. The research agenda is driven by the concept that 
victims best know their needs and how they should be articulated. As such, the research 
design and conceptualisation process was executed in a participatory way with 
associations of families of the Missing in Nepal and Timor-Leste. The associations, 
together with individual families who are their members, determined the goals of the 
research process and the methodology. This was done over a period of several months 
in both research contexts through a process of continuous interaction with family 
associations. The association leadership led the process but involved ordinary members 
of the association, both in their offices and through trips to the field made by the 
researcher with association leaders. This was essentially an emancipatory approach to 
participation, with the research driven by the researched. In Timor-Leste the fact that few 
victims‟ groups exist reduced the interactivity of the research process with a smaller 
number of victims and associations steering the participatory element of the study. 
The output of this process of consultation with victims was that the research 
would have a significant advocacy dimension, would be ethnographic, and that the family 
would be the unit of analysis.  Families wanted their needs to be communicated to 
authorities and advocacy can attempt to do this. Ethically, this engagement with family 
associations helped to address many issues (see Section 5.3) and facilitated access to 
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families, through the construction of an ethical relationship with research subjects. The 
advocacy approach allows the addressing of the issue of consent, by ensuring that 
families are supportive of the research and can potentially benefit from it. The 
associations participated in the research as a community of victims and following 
finalisation of the research design were partners in its implementation with the 
associations, their leadership and members acting as gatekeepers and mediators with 
families (Section 5.2.3). They briefed family members on the nature of the research and 
assisted in the building of trust between the researcher and the researched.  
The family is the unit of analysis: the nature of disappearance is such that it 
impacts families, rather than communities or individuals alone. In both Nepal and Timor 
the family is the principal unit of social organisation and is the most natural way to 
approach the issue. It was decided that whilst a qualitative methodology would be used, 
efforts would be made to ensure that the sampling was representative of all victims to 
validate the advocacy component and permit quantitative statements. The study 
emphasised the goals of transition, rather than the specific mechanisms (such as trials, 
Truth Commissions etc.), motivated by the lack of knowledge of potential mechanisms by 
victims and by the philosophy of the study that individual families would determine their 
own priorities in terms of needs. It was however possible to test attitudes to particular 
approaches, such as compensation, prosecutions and amnesty.   
At the completion of the research the results were discussed with victims and 
associations, both to demonstrate that their goals for the study had been met and also as 
a member checking (Cresswell and Miller, 2000) exercise (Section A4.5). The final 
research reports, produced together with the associations, allowed the dissemination of 
the results as a tool of advocacy. In both contexts the research results were published in 
relevant local languages by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and 
publicly launched in conjunction with senior members of the Government (Section A4.5) 
in the presence of family associations (NepalNews, 2009; AlertNet, 2010). The 
collaboration with the ICRC brought several benefits to the research in addition to 
permitting publication of the results and allowing access to elites in Government and civil 
society. The additional resources that became available to what was otherwise a 
graduate degree study were invaluable, including use of vehicles that provided access to 
remote areas that would otherwise not have been reached. This is essential to the 
sampling strategy of the study, in which a random sample is chosen: without having 
access to all families such an approach is compromised. Emotional access (see above) 
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was also eased through the association with ICRC, since it was known by a significant 
fraction of families met as perhaps the only actor that has maintained direct contact with 
victims since the time of the violation (in many cases) up to the present day.     
5.2 Research methods and implementation 
5.2.1 Research methods 
The research methods used in this investigation were chosen to optimise the utility of the 
data collected, and in particular to mix methods to increase the possibility of effective 
triangulation, given the various challenges to reliability and validity that may be present.  
As a result a range of different methods were used and these are described here. All 
these methods describe data collection from families of the Missing, since most data was 
in this category. The final section discusses data collection from elites. Details of 
interviews and focus groups are tabulated in Appendix III.  
Semi-structured interviews 
Interviews provide the opportunity for subjects to present information on their own terms: 
an interview combines structure with flexibility. For a study such as this one it is an ideal 
technique to allow families of the disappeared to tell their stories and articulate their 
needs on their own terms. The interview is semi-structured, following a format prepared 
iteratively with family associations during the first weeks of the collaboration. The 
iterative process is crucial to ensuring that the priorities of families are prominent in the 
interview and that culturally specific elements, often initially invisible to outsiders, are 
included. The „script‟ for this interview was used as a guideline: the course of questioning 
was determined by the responses of the interviewee, and this used as a framework upon 
which a discussion with the families was hung, with the family determining the issues of 
greatest interest to them. A typical interview lasted around 90 minutes. The interview 
began with a general discussion of the circumstances of the family, the role of the 
disappeared person within it, and the nature of the disappearance. Families were then 
asked an open question: “What action would you like to see taken in response to the 
disappearance?” This allowed families to identify what they saw as their priorities, 
whether it be an answer concerning the fate, economic support, prosecution or 
something else. More detailed questioning concerning the various potential needs of 
families then followed this. Interviews often became a discussion with the entire 
extended family. This was positive, not only for the support it offers during what might be 
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an upsetting discussion, but also because it gives an insight into family dynamics, much 
like a focus group. The perception of needs has gender dependence: women will very 
often be most sensitive to economic needs, and needs of children, while men will be 
more likely to articulate political needs. Within a „family focus group‟ these dynamics can 
be explicitly probed. Traditional hierarchies would often mean that a certain member of 
the family (typically the father or the eldest son) would be presented as the principal 
interviewee. Since wives, particularly younger ones, were most likely to be impacted by 
social stigma where possible they were spoken to in private or with other wives of the 
disappeared, so as to best understand the social and family pressures to which they may 
be subject.  
Focus group discussions 
A focus group is essentially a group interview, with each participant given the chance to 
express himself or herself, but with the additional dynamic of inter-group discussion. The 
questions used to initiate discussion were very open, inviting participants to choose, and 
then discuss, the greatest problems they were facing as a result of the disappearance of 
their relative, with the ensuing discussion permitting detailed attitudes to emerge.  The 
same script as used for the interviews drove such discussions. For individuals who may 
feel vulnerable a focus group can create an environment that is more secure for the 
expression of feelings, particularly where all members feel some solidarity. The most 
striking success of this technique was when wives of the disappeared in Nepal were 
invited to discuss their problems, and chose issues in the family and community that 
have not previously been widely articulated by conflict victims, and that were not heard in 
mixed or family groups (Section 6.2.3).  
Participant observation 
The traditional ethnographic method of participant observation was also used throughout 
the contact the researcher had with families of the disappeared.  Given that in the two 
contexts the researcher met more than 300 families over a period of 2 years, as well as 
leaders of family associations repeatedly, there was an opportunity to collect a large 
volume of data.  In particular, participant observation was an additional tool for 
triangulation, since it allowed the possibility to confirm or refute the verbal data gathered 
in interviews and focus groups discussions. During interviews, focus groups and 
throughout field visits field notes were taken of observations of participants and their 
environment that formed part of the data analysed.   
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Understanding elite attitudes  
In both contexts, elite attitudes to transitional justice processes are a matter of public 
record. In Timor-Leste mechanisms are largely complete and there is both extensive 
documentation of those processes through the CAVR and CTF reports and trial records 
as well as an extensive commentary from the media, academics and concerned national 
and international agencies. The attitudes of public figures, such as the Prime Minister 
and the President, are also widely recorded. As such, in Timor-Leste there was little 
need to meet such figures to understand motivations and perceptions in relation to 
transitional justice process, and as a result few interviews were made. Most references 
in this thesis will thus be to publicly available documents.  
In Nepal the situation is more complex since there has been no process of 
substance. Whilst political parties have committed themselves to the documents of the 
peace process (that include explicit transitional justice mechanisms) in practice all 
political actors are choosing either to distance themselves from those commitments or 
decline to discuss them publicly. As such, there was some value in meeting senior 
political actors to understand their perspectives. It was also necessary to understand 
what drives advocates of the rights discourse whose emphasis was hugely divergent 
from the priorities of the victim families met in this research. As a result senior figures 
from national and international rights agencies were met in Kathmandu and asked to 
comment on the results of this study in relation to their agency‟s priorities. This drove the 
analysis of Section 9.1. Political figures were also met to understand their rationale and 
perspectives concerning transitional justice processes. The Action Research outlook in 
both contexts also demanded that contact with political and rights actors was used as an 
opportunity to disseminate the results of this study (even while it was ongoing) and to 
encourage these decision makers to consider the attitudes of victims.  
Validity  
Whilst validity has traditionally been discussed with reference to quantitative analyses, it 
remains a relevant measure with which to understand the extent to which qualitative 
research is plausible, credible and trustworthy (Johnson, 1997). A significant literature 
has discussed the controversies arising (e.g. Whittemore, Chase & Mandle, 2001) even 
though many qualitative researchers perceive understandings of validity to be inherently 
positivist (Golafshani, 2003). In this study a range of approaches are taken to ensure 
validity and these include the use of low-inference descriptors (most notably direct 
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quotes from participants), both data and method triangulation, participatory methods and 
participant feedback after initial analysis. Underlying all of these approaches is a desire 
to maintain a commitment to reflexivity, “an awareness of the researcher's contribution to 
the construction of meanings throughout the research process” (Nightingale and 
Cromby, 1999: 228). Issues of both personal and epistemological reflexivity are eased 
considerably by the methodology foregrounding the views of victims, which encourages 
the researcher to background his own personal views. This approach appears vindicated 
since, despite the researcher‟s long engagement with both contexts, in both case studies 
extremely important new priorities were revealed by the methodology here that had 
remained unexposed by the less rigorous approaches that defined his previous work with 
families of the Missing.  
The descriptive validity (Maxwell, 1992) of the data, the extent to which it truly 
represents what was said by participants, is confirmed here through the extensive use of 
verbatim quotations from the data. Interpretive validity (Johnson, 1997), in which one 
seeks to demonstrate that the meanings assigned to the words of participants are 
accurate, is confirmed in this study through not just the feedback of participants, but 
through their active participation in the presentation of results. When the data were 
published in the two contexts, families of the Missing were involved and enthusiastically 
welcomed the published reports as representative of their own needs.  
Issues of internal validity refer to the degree to which any observed relationship is 
causal. In this study such issues are minimised since it implicitly assumes a causal 
relationship between the transitional process and the addressing of needs: everything 
that impacts upon the addressing of family needs is considered part of the „transitional 
process‟, and so the causal relationship is necessarily true. In practice, data collection 
will demand a study of all factors and if one that is not traditionally part of transitional 
mechanisms becomes important this can be flagged. This will be particularly relevant 
where there are variables present in one context that impact on the analysis that are 
absent in the other.   
External validity refers to the extent to which studies in any one case study are 
generalisable (or transferable) to others. Because the generalisation here will be 
analytical (i.e. through theory) rather than statistical, the limits of this will to some extent 
become apparent in the data. For example, the needs of families (theoretical proposition 
one, Section 1.4) will never be identical in different contexts, due to cultural artefacts, but 
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if they are very similar, then the generalisation of the proposition is favoured. Similarly, in 
the more difficult generalisation concerning proposition three, given that the transitional 
mechanisms concerned will be very different in each individual case study, the 
replication logic will be less compelling. Again however, the data should be able to reveal 
how and why needs were addressed in one case and not the other: this should inform 
the extent to which what we are seeing is an intrinsic consequence of the mechanisms 
concerned, or deriving from other variables. 
5.2.2 Sampling and representation 
Different perceived needs exist in rural and urban, rich and poor families, and between 
families with significant contact with human rights agencies and those without. As such a 
sampling procedure was developed to reduce biases from preferential selection of 
certain types of victim. The aim was to ensure a representative sample of victims was 
met, constituting the use of a quantitative strategy within a qualitative analysis: 
emblematic of a „composite approach‟ (Barakat et al., 2002). The sampling frame used 
for the study, in both contexts, is the list of persons missing as a result of the conflict, 
drawn up by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). In both Nepal and 
Timor, the ICRC has been working in a neutral and independent fashion to protect and 
assist victims of conflict since the early years of the conflicts and has enjoyed 
unprecedented access to all areas. 23 The lists used had been compiled both during the 
conflicts and in the years following their end, when a systematic effort had been made to 
collect all cases of missing persons. A selection of districts in each context was made 
that permitted the worst affected districts to be included, whilst also ensuring a spread by 
region, geography, ethnicity and perpetrator. Within these districts a random selection 
was made, using a random number generator to choose entries in the district wise lists. 
150 and 160 families of the Missing were met in Timor-Leste and Nepal respectively, 
corresponding to 6% and 13% of listed missing persons. Details of the sampling and a 
profile of the respondents are summarised in Section 6.1 (Nepal) and Section 7.1 (Timor-
Leste).  
To minimise bias in the sampling it was clear that families must be visited, rather 
than allowing some self-selection by research subjects through an invitation to a 
meeting. This is in contrast to the typical sampling strategies of human rights oriented 
                                               
23
 In Timor-Leste, ICRC was working from 1981 and in Nepal from 1999.   
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studies, where purposive sampling is most often used to select victims who are 
accessible, such as in capitals or other urban centres, or who are mobilised and thus 
known to rights agencies (e.g. Pigou, 2004; Advocacy Forum and Human Rights Watch, 
2008). Such strategies are highly unrepresentative and thus biasing (Robins, 2009a). 
The extent of the resulting bias is shown by the variation in attitudes (and expressed 
needs) between such groups and typical victims from rural areas (Sections 6.2 and 7.2). 
In each district where data was gathered 40 missing persons were selected from the 
ICRC list. As many of these were then visited for interview as was possible in the time 
available for data collection; in most cases significantly less than 40 were collected. 
Cases were typically collected in a group of villages (VDCs in Nepal24, sukus in Timor-
Leste), such that the cases taken came from a range of environments in terms of 
remoteness, minimising the bias arising from choosing certain areas within a district over 
any others.  In practice it was found that family needs within a district were a far stronger 
function of the type of case (in terms of perpetrator, date of disappearance, family 
member missing etc) than they were on which village or group of villages the case 
occurred in.    
Focus group participants were selected by the family associations or community 
leaders who had organised them and as such were not representative: as a result focus 
group data are not used to make quantitative statements. This did allow however the 
construction of groups of peers and enabled the creation of an environment where the 
disempowered, notably women, felt free to talk.  
5.2.3 Implementation 
In both contexts the research was carried out in similar fashion, with a period of 
developing an interview instrument in an iterative way with family associations, followed 
by months of data gathering. The participatory element was integrated from the start of 
the research, with contact being made with family associations and efforts made to 
determine how they felt the research could aid them. In both cases, advocacy with the 
authorities was identified as the families‟ priority and from that point the researcher 
worked with associations to advance that goal, with the research a collaborative 
exercise. 
                                               
24
 Village Development Committees.  
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Families were met for interview, most often with a member of a family 
association. The aim of the research, and in particular its advocacy goal, was explained 
to families with the assistance of the family association members, and their consent 
sought for participation in and recording of the interview and focus groups, subject to the 
maintenance of the confidentiality of the participants.  Consent to record was refused on 
two occasions, where notes were taken by hand. In only two cases did families decline to 
be interviewed.25 The recording of the interview or focus group discussion was then 
translated into English from the original language by a research assistant and 
transcribed for analysis. The texts emerging from the translation and transcription 
process were analysed together with the researcher‟s field notes of all interviews and 
focus groups, by the researcher himself. These texts were iteratively coded for analysis 
by both frequency of topic data and for selection of relevant text segments. Some 
months after the research, the report of the findings was published and the results taken 
back to family associations for discussion.  The impact of the research on policy in the 
two states is discussed in Section A4.5. 
The collaboration with the ICRC was valuable in terms of aiding access to 
victims, both physical and otherwise, and in permitting an outlet for dissemination of the 
research findings that satisfied victims‟ desire to see the authorities informed of their 
needs. The ICRC provided vehicles for field work and financial support that allowed this 
project to have a far greater scope than would have otherwise been possible. Use of the 
ICRC lists and access to the most remote parts of the two contexts permitted a 
representative sample of victims to be met. The ICRC gave additional credibility to efforts 
to advocate with the authorities on the basis of the research results, far beyond that of a 
graduate student; as an institution the ICRC took on board the implications of the data in 
those contexts studied and more broadly for its work with the Missing.            
Nepal  
Following the 2-month participatory research design phase, data collection took place 
over a 4-month period (June – September) in 2008. The vast majority of families were 
visited in their homes, and some (in Kathmandu) at their work places. The logistical 
challenges were considerable: in some areas families could only be reached by walking 
                                               
25
 These two families were in Dili, Timor-Leste, with relatives missing from the violence of 1999. 
They had been repeatedly interviewed by rights agencies seeking their testimony and were 
frustrated at the lack of results of this contact. 
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for days, or by travelling by motorbike or bicycle. The researcher led all interviews and 
focus groups. A research assistant, whose role was to interpret both linguistically and 
culturally, accompanied the researcher in almost all interviews. Interviews were 
conducted in Nepali, Tharu and Maithili26 languages, and so assistants were drawn from 
the appropriate communities, with women used where possible. All focus groups 
contained or were accompanied by a member of the family association that had assisted 
in its organisation, and a minority of interviews with families also included a family 
association representative. 
 The ICRC report was published in Nepali and English in May 2009 (ICRC, 2009) 
and launched in a ceremony in Kathmandu in which the Chair of the Constituent 
Assembly Human Rights Committee formally received the report on behalf of the 
Government (NepalNews, 2009). Representatives of all family associations who had 
taken part in the research joined the ceremony and gave moving testimony on the impact 
of disappearance on them and their families.   
 
Timor-Leste 
The research was conducted over a 5 month period (May – September, 2009). The 
study was somewhat less participatory than that in Nepal as a result of the fact that only 
two of the districts visited had an active Family Association. Families were largely visited 
in their homes, and focus groups organised by both the family associations and local 
community leaders in highly impacted areas. Interviews were conducted in Tetun (the 
most widely spoken language of the country, spoken by the researcher), Portuguese and 
Fatuluku (the language of the eastern district of Los Palos), with a female research 
assistant whose brother had been missing since 1983 following arrest by Indonesian 
authorities. Most interviews were made without the presence of a family association 
representative.  
 The ICRC report of the research findings was published in May 2010 in English, 
Tetun, Indonesian and Portuguese (ICRC, 2010a), with the report presented to the 
Foreign Minister of Timor-Leste in a public launch ceremony that was also attended by 
                                               
26
 Tharu is the language of the indigenous Tharu people who constitute the largest single 
indigenous group in the plains of Nepal; Maithili is one of the languages of the Madeshi 
community of the plains, people considered to be of recent Indian origin.   
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the Chair of the Parliamentary committee drafting legislation to address the Missing 
issue (see Appendix IV).   
5.3 Ethical issues  
Despite populations in both the developing world and in regions affected by conflict 
having increasingly been the subject of social science research there remains a 
perception that ethical issues of such research remain under explored (e.g. Jacobsen 
and Landau, 2003). A suggestion has been made that research into others‟ suffering can 
only be justified if alleviating that suffering is an explicit objective (Turton, 1996). In most 
cases of research in and after conflict this will not be the case and researchers must 
seek justifications for their work from the wider context.  Here a general discussion of the 
ethics of this study will be made, and justifications sought for the methodologies chosen 
in terms of their being no negative impact on the subjects of the study. In most cases 
respondents are poor, of low formal educational attainment, often women and from 
socially marginalised ethnic or caste groups. They are also people who have survived 
the traumatising effect of conflict, live in an environment that may still be highly divided 
and are being questioned about the traumatic issue of a missing relative. Such research 
subjects are vulnerable in many ways, and there are significant ethical issues to be 
addressed. The reactions of families to the study, which reveal their understanding of the 
ethical and practical context of the research, are discussed in the relevant analysis 
chapters.  
The most immediate concern in areas emerging from conflict is the physical 
security of those being interviewed.  In an area of contested control (e.g. in areas of rural 
Nepal that remain under de facto Maoist control) it can be potentially compromising for 
someone to be seen even talking to a foreigner, so such issues must be understood 
even before moving to the field. The engagement with family associations permitted the 
situation in any area to be understood and precautions taken, such as inviting a family 
member to be interviewed outside their community.  
Social science research demands that subjects understand the terms in which 
they participate in research and that they give informed consent to those terms. 
However, in contexts in conflict in developing states, relationships between the 
researcher and the researched are likely to be asymmetric (Long and Long, 1992).  To 
find what have been called “routes to accountability” (Brown et al., 2004), the 
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consideration of ethics thus has to go beyond the terrain of confidentiality, consent, and 
risk/benefit considerations: in these cases, ethics is as much about being attentive to a 
collective morality that resonates in the context as to do with respect for the individual 
rights of the subject.  As such, the best approach is one that prioritises an understanding 
of the context and its local mores, and one which attempts to be as participatory as 
possible, in the sense that local people, and the peers of those being researched 
wherever possible, provide the logic for the form of contact with subjects. In this research 
the main tool to ensure an informed and participatory approach is the relationship that 
was built with associations of families of the Missing. As self-organised groups of 
families, these associations are able to provide introductions to research subjects and to 
act as a mediator between the researcher and the researched. Those leading family 
associations share culture and status, in almost all its forms (economic, ethnic, caste, 
social) with their members, but are often somewhat better educated. They are thus able 
to understand the nature of the research and the demands made on the researched in a 
way that places them well to explain it to other families. The concrete issues to be 
understood and consented to by all subjects include confidentiality and the anonymous 
transmission of statements they give. It also had to be understood that the research did 
not aim to benefit its subjects, other than through the advocacy that will result. In practice 
subjects were told that the interview was being conducted and recorded such that „their 
words can be taken to those in Government and their needs made clear‟. This was 
effective shorthand for the process of research and advocacy and was understood and 
consented to by all respondents, with the exception of two who did not consent to the 
interview being recorded.  
Interviewing those who have lived through conflict about their experiences is 
necessarily highly invasive. This is particularly true where, as in this study, the 
psychological impact of events is under explicit investigation. Whilst there is a literature 
on working with traumatised victims of conflict from a therapeutic viewpoint, there is little 
written on how researchers without an agenda to intervene therapeutically should 
proceed. Some researchers “believe that with skilful and sensitive interviewing, subjects 
actually benefit from talking openly about their experiences” (Bell, 2001: 185), and there 
is some quantitative data to support this (Newman and Kaloupek, 2004), largely 
regarding the emergence of new insights as a result of subjects‟ participation. Negative 
effects of trauma victims participating in research have also been found: there is a 
danger that having reopened the trauma, the researcher can cause emotional distress 
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and then leave the subject in an environment that is unsympathetic (Bell, 2001; Newman 
and Kaloupek, 2004): 
This second injury occurs when the victim perceives rejection or a lack of 
anticipated support from his/her family or society which leads to the sense of 
helplessness. Another component of second traumatisation is the failure to 
allow the telling of the story, the giving of testimony, which leads to the failure 
to recognise one‟s own strengths and restore a sense of control over one‟s 
own life. (Ilic, 2004: 380)  
However, most literature emphasises the retraumatisation potential of public truth telling 
(e.g. Broneus, 2008; Ilic, 2004), particularly in judicial settings, a very different 
experience from this research. Retraumatisation is most likely to occur in those persons 
showing symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) (Kammerer and Mazelis, 
2006), but it is important to understand that having a disappeared relative is not a 
pathology (Boss, 2004), and that the vast majority of families live with no clinical 
symptoms of PTSD.  
Smyth (2001) draws attention to the timing of interventions with the traumatised: 
meeting subjects too soon after traumatic experience may report early shock and denial, 
in contrast to the true impact of trauma. In this study the most recent violations occurred 
at least 2 years previous to contact with victims and the vast majority significantly before 
this (see Figure 4 and Figure 10). Bell (2001) suggests that interviews should be made in 
the company of peers and that efforts should be made to provide support for subjects 
following interviews. In the contexts of this research however little professional 
therapeutic service is available and peer support must be relied on. Efforts were 
therefore made to create the most supportive environment possible for those telling their 
stories. Wherever possible, interviews were made either in a family context or in a group 
of peers. Those individuals and families being interviewed were met only after confirming 
with the family association that they were not considered to be psychologically 
vulnerable. On the basis of the experience of the research it is believed that, using the 
protocols described for selecting participants and conducting interviews, the emotional 
distress experienced by participants during this research is minimal risk.27  
                                               
27 Minimal risk is defined as the probability that harm or discomfort anticipated in the research are 
not greater in and of themselves than those ordinarily encountered in daily life or during the 
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Social science research has traditionally adopted a very Northern „primacy of the 
individual‟ approach and considered the individual as the most appropriate unit of study. 
This focus has practical implications for researchers when seeking informed consent 
from individuals located in traditional and highly deferential communities. In this study 
these problems will be lessened somewhat by the fact that the family is the unit of study, 
itself a more natural approach in these contexts. It became clear during data collection 
that hierarchy within the family impacts on the ability of some, notably women and 
especially wives of the Missing, to talk freely. In response to this wherever possible 
women were met in peer groups and focus groups with other women. The quality of the 
data gained in such environments reveal the need to create space for the disempowered 
to talk freely, independent of the constraints of local and traditional hierarchy.    
A challenge to researchers working with poor and vulnerable populations is 
ensuring that the relationship between subject and researcher is understood. There are 
many contexts in which a researcher may seek to reward research subjects or try to „give 
something back‟ to those assisting the research. This has clear dangers: research will 
always be transactional in some sense, and if there is ambiguity about what research 
subjects receive in exchange for participation this can lead to unrealistic expectations 
and disillusion, and potential bias. Most foreigners meeting conflict victims are working 
for aid agencies and as such, despite efforts to ensure his role is understood, a 
researcher may be thought of in the same terms. The greatest defence against this was 
ensuring that those leading Associations of Families of the Missing are able to explain to 
families the exact role and limitations of the research. The advocacy approach taken in 
collaboration with family associations allows a clear understanding of the role of the 
researcher to be communicated to research subjects. 
The emancipatory component of the research sought to enhance victim agency in 
a range of arenas, from the household to national policy level, in an effort to ensure that 
the entire research exercise was characterised by an empowerment agenda. This is a 
natural ethical aim of the study given that it is driven by a perception that victim agency is 
both deprioritised in most transitional justice processes. The greatest potential for 
                                                                                                                                            
performance of routine physical or psychological examinations and tests (National Commission 
for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research, 1978). 
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empowerment lay with those most marginalised, most often women. At the village level, 
the research represented the first time that some wives of the Missing had been spoken 
to by an outsider, reflecting patriarchal imperatives that a male head of household will 
always represent a victim family. The empowering aspect of such contact should not be 
over-estimated, but permitting such a woman to make contact with a family association 
and to assert her independence from her father-in-law for example, can be 
transformative. In some communities groups of women were found who had forged 
solidarity through regular contact and sharing of their issues, but had no outlet or means 
to address these: the research served to connect such women to a family association 
and potentially to the broader community of victims. Similarly, bringing together women 
in a community on the basis of their shared victimhood who had not either perceived or 
exercised that solidarity is a route to both empowerment and mobilisation. The 
importance of such collective action was seen in Timor, where the difference emotionally 
and psychologically between organised female victims and those who remained isolated 
was extreme (Section 7.3). In Nepal one consequence of the close work in some districts 
with the family associations was that the male leadership was confronted, through the 
interviews of the study, with the issue of the lack of women‟s representation. At the 
national level, the study sought explicitly to increase victim agency through 
empowerment of the family associations. In both contexts, the published reports were 
intended to be a tool that family associations could use to assert an agenda that deviated 
from that of the agencies that purported to represent victims, while the launch of the 
study was a rare opportunity for victims to speak on their own terms to a national 
audience (including the media).  Reflections on the overall impact of the study, including 
empowerment perspectives, are made in Section A4.5.   
5.4 Summary  
The research methodology allows the needs of families of the Missing to be understood 
in a contextually rooted way, whilst simultaneously serving families and their 
organisations. The participatory element that drove the interaction with families, in Nepal 
more than in Timor-Leste, permitted a relationship to be built with the family associations 
over a period of months. This both created trust with families and their organisations and 
as a result increased the quality of the data collected. More than this, the participatory 
approach was empowering for family associations, giving access to the expertise of the 
researcher, without which it would have remained a challenge for families to produce a 
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study of their needs that would carry weight with the authorities and potential donors. 
The resulting reports, published in a range of local languages in both contexts, are 
something around which families and their associations have been able to advocate. 
This study has begun to allow rights agencies and the authorities in the concerned states 
to appreciate a victims‟ agenda that has for the years since the end of conflict remained 
largely invisible.   
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Chapter 6 Needs of families of the Missing in 
Nepal: Still seeking a process 
For victims‟ views to be considered in the formulation of policies to address the legacy of 
past violence requires an engagement with victims. Here, the understanding of the 
needs of families of the Missing in Nepal that emerged from the participatory research 
process described in Chapter 5 is discussed. The chapter begins with a profile of the 
victims met for the study and then both qualitatively and quantitatively the results of the 
research are summarised in terms of the needs of families, according to the priorities 
defined by families themselves. The agenda of victims is then compared with the 
process and mechanisms envisaged by the Government, although in practice this 
process remains largely stalled. The implications of these needs for transitional justice 
mechanisms, and peacebuilding more generally, in Nepal and elsewhere are addressed 
in Chapter 8 and Chapter 9.   
6.1 A profile of the victims                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
This study aims to understand the needs of families of the Missing in Nepal as they 
themselves perceive them some 2 years after the end of armed conflict. The sampling 
frame used for this study is a list drawn up by the International Committee of the Red 
Cross (ICRC) of 1,227 persons missing as a result of the conflict (ICRC, 2008), compiled 
during ICRC‟s presence in Nepal since 1998, through visits to rural communities and 
from statements made by families who visited ICRC‟s offices. A selection of 10 of 
Nepal‟s 75 districts was made that enabled the worst affected districts to be included, 
whilst also ensuring a spread by region, geography (plains, hills, mountains), ethnicity 
and alleged perpetrator (state, Maoist).28 These 10 districts account for 43% of those on 
the ICRC list.  Within these districts a random selection was made, and families visited in 
their homes.   
Eighty-six families were interviewed, the vast majority with the family as a unit. 
Younger wives of the Missing were met alone or in peer groups so as to understand 
potentially problematic gender dynamics within families and communities. Interviews 
typically lasted around 90 minutes and were semi-structured, based on a 7 page script 
                                               
28
 The 10 districts visited were: Banke, Bardiya, Bhaktapur, Dhading, Dhanusa, Gorkha, 
Kathmandu, Lalitpur, Rolpa and Siraha. 
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that had been developed in conjunction with family associations over a 2 month period 
prior to the research (Appendix  I). Families were invited to prioritise needs relating to the 
disappearance through a series of open questions, and then probed about specific 
elements of those needs. Additionally, 10 focus groups containing a total of 74 relatives 
of the Missing were conducted with peer groups selected by family associations; these 
included groups of wives of the Missing, members of particular ethnic groups, and 
groups defined by the perpetrator of disappearance. The research was conducted over a 
six month period two years after the end of the conflict in a period (April - September 
2008) when a Maoist led Government was in office. Disappearances discussed here 
took place between two and twelve years prior to the study, and on average five years 
before (see Figure 4).  
A minority of the Missing are educated and urban (a significant number of 
students are among those missing) but most come from rural peasant backgrounds.  As 
a result, many families of the Missing are of low educational level, illiterate and poor. The 
Missing are predominantly younger males (see Table 3 and Figure 8) with the result that 
families have been deprived of breadwinners and women of husbands, often with young 
children to support, reducing economic security. The janajati, peoples considered 
indigenous to Nepal, were successfully mobilised by the Maoists and thus became more 
vulnerable to becoming casualties of the conflict.  The janajati of both the hills and Terai 
are among the most excluded and poorest of the people of Nepal and the conflict 
reduced further their ability to cope both as communities and as individual victims of the 
conflict.  In the Terai, the Tharu (see Section 4.2) were victimised by the forces of the 
state to the extent that in Bardiya district they constitute approximately 80% of those 
Missing (CVC, 2007), despite barely being a majority in the district. In the central and 
eastern Terai the Madeshi population29 constitutes a majority of the Missing. As a result 
of the ethnic and gender composition of the Missing, the typical interviewee is a rural 
woman of low educational level from an indigenous ethnic group. 
The sampling used in this study, and described above, aims to be representative 
of all families of the Missing. Here, the profile of those interviewed is described. The 
tables below show a breakdown of the sample in terms of ethnicity of the missing 
person, gender, status (civilian, combatant etc.), religion, the year they went missing, 
                                               
29
 The Madeshi are persons considered to be of recent Indian origin, living largely in the Terai, 
who constitute about 35% of Nepal‟s population (Sinha, 2009). 
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perpetrator and the relationship of the principal interviewee to the missing person. The 
ethnic profile shows the high number of janajati and Madeshis, as well as a significant 
number of higher castes, largely senior CPN-M cadres and students taken from 
Kathmandu (Table 1). 
 
 
 
Table 1 Ethnic and caste composition of 
the families met for the study. 
 
 
 
 
The perpetrators responsible for the person becoming Missing are shown in Table 2.  
The two cases where the perpetrator is unknown consist of one where a young man 
working away from home disappeared in a zone of conflict and one where a man was 
abducted by individuals known to have worked with both the CPN-M and the security 
forces.   
 
male female 
Missing person 79 7 
Principal 
interviewee 
33 53 
Table 3 Gender of the missing person and the principal interviewee. 
Ethnic group Number 
Hindu high castes [Brahmin 
/ Chhetri] 
21 
Dalit 7 
Plains indigenous [Tharu] 28 
Madeshi  
Hindu 12 
Muslim 2 
Hill indigenous  
[Magar, Chepang, 
Tamang, Gurung] 
16 
Perpetrator Number 
State  71 
CPN-M 13 
Perpetrator unknown 2 
Table 2 Perpetrators responsible for the 
person being Missing. 
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The age distribution of the Missing peaks for those aged 15 – 30 years (Figure 8).  
Given that the vast majority of the Missing are male (Table 3), this has the effect of 
depriving families of those who are at their most economically valuable, resulting in often 
extreme challenges to livelihood. Most of these young men were married (86% of all the 
Missing were married), and many had fathered children who were young at the time of 
disappearance.  Nine of the Missing are under 18 years of age, more than 10% of the 
sample, largely teenagers taken by the security forces. 
The status of the missing person, notably in relation to the parties to the conflict, 
is subject to some uncertainty and that presented here is based on what was reported by 
the family (Table 4). The family members of missing security force personnel included in 
this sample are those of a policeman taken by the CPN-M and an off-duty (Tharu) RNA 
soldier made missing by the RNA in Bardiya.  
 
Civilian 53 
Security forces 2 
CPN-M member or 
supporter 
25 
PLA fighter 2 
Table 4 Status of the missing person. 
 
 
Wife 28 
Brother / sister 17 
Son / daughter 14 
Mother 11 
Husband 3 
Other 4 
Table 5 The relationship of the principal 
interviewee to the missing person. 
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Figure 8 Age of the Missing at the time they went missing. 
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The number of missing in each year of the conflict represents a history of the 
intensity of the conflict, Figure 9. The average time passed since the person went 
missing was more than 5 years at the time of field work. 
6.2 Needs of families of the Missing  
This section will discuss the needs that emerge from the study of families. Whilst this is 
to some extent steered by the literature reviewed in Section 2.3, it derives largely from 
what families reported.  The discussion is organised to review the following topics: the 
need to know the fate of the Missing; the need for human remains; emotional and 
psychosocial impacts; economic needs; justice and accountability; reparation, relief and 
compensation; and institutional reform and attitude towards the state. Whilst this 
structure is imposed, it represents a logic driven by what families said and how they 
spoke about their needs, informed by the literature discussed in previous chapters.    
The response of families to the study varied; some were angry that many 
agencies had collected data from them, but no action had been taken. In the majority of 
cases however, particularly in rural areas, family members were grateful that an interest 
was being taken in their issues, and understood the advocacy goal of the research: 
“Through you our voice reaches the Government and the work starts as soon as 
possible.” (Wife of missing man, Kathmandu.) During interviews families were asked 
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Figure 9 Year in which the person went missing. 
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about human rights, with none outside the leadership of the family associations having 
any good idea what rights were:  
We hear people on the radio talking about these things. But nobody has 
come and told us about our rights. We don‟t have any concept of human 
rights. (Sister-in-law of man disappeared by the state, Rolpa.)  
For the majority of those met in this study the fact that they have rights, to redress, to 
justice and to reparation, plays no part in the formulation of their demands in response to 
their victimhood.  
Needs of victim families are not static. As the understanding of the fate of loved 
ones has changed over the years of the conflict and as the peace process has 
developed, so needs have evolved. This study represents a „snapshot‟ of those needs at 
a particular time.  The first question asked during the interviews was an open question 
about the family‟s priorities. Three types of response emerged far more frequently than 
others as needs:  
- An answer about the fate of the disappeared, the truth: „Is he dead or 
alive?‟ (mentioned by 64% of families).  
- Economic support: „compensation‟, or a demand for privileges 
regarding education, medical treatment and jobs for family members 
(62%).  
- Justice, in terms of the punishment of those responsible (29%).  
For most families the truth regarding the fate of their missing relative and economic 
support are of the highest priority, with justice being seen as less so. On asking families 
if they would like to see someone punished, the vast majority said they would: thus this 
represents a hierarchy of relative priorities, rather than a set of alternatives. There were 
differences in priorities between more politicised and educated urban families, and poor 
rural families, most notably concerning justice.  The most dramatic divergence of opinion 
concerning relative priorities can be seen when comparing responses from families in the 
capital, Kathmandu, with those from Bardiya, the latter being an example of an 
overwhelmingly rural peasant victim population (Table 6). 
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Kathmandu Bardiya 
Answer regarding fate 0.85 0.70 
Economic support 0.38 0.60 
Justice 0.69 0.07 
Table 6 Fraction of families mentioning priorities in response to a general question. 
Rural families emphasise the economic almost as much as the need for an answer, while 
their alienation from the law and lack of understanding of judicial process leads them to 
dismiss prosecutions. A similar dependence is seen by gender, with women emphasising 
the economic and need for an answer over the judicial, while men prioritise all three 
needs approximately equally. There appears to be a strong dependence of the 
perception of needs on the extent of the marginalisation of the family: those most 
marginalised are most likely to prioritise basic needs over judicial process.  
6.2.1 Need to know the fate of the Missing 
It‟s ok if they give us truth now, then the other things will follow. The first 
thing is finding out. […] The first thing is the truth and then comes the matter 
of justice. (Focus group participant, Gorkha.)  
Knowing the fate of the Missing was a priority for many families, with 80% of families met 
demonstrating a degree of ambiguity about what had happened to their missing loved 
one:  
I haven‟t made any rituals. I still wear the symbols of marriage. I wear them 
because I haven‟t seen him dead: maybe he is alive somewhere. (Wife of 
disappeared man, Bardiya.) 
For families of the Missing, due to the lack of clarity over their fate, the death of their 
loved one is something almost impossible to admit to themselves. This can disrupt the 
normal grieving process and may lead to arrested grief or atypical reactions, known as 
„complicated grief‟ (Blaauw and Lahteenmaki, 2002). This phenomenon can best be 
understood in terms of ambiguous loss (see Section 2.3). Among families of the Missing 
in Nepal, around 20% accept that their relative is dead, in some cases because there is 
evidence of death from witnesses or other sources. The majority of families however live 
in a state of ambiguity about the fate of their loved one.  Most maintain hope, even after 
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many years, that their loved one will return. The time that has passed has reduced hope, 
but has not extinguished it: 
My heart says she is still alive, but it has been a long time, I don‟t have any 
news so sometimes I think she may have been killed. Now slowly my hopes 
are breaking down. But there is still hope. (Mother of missing girl, Bardiya.) 
For families to move on, to conduct rituals and to look to the future rather than the 
past they need an answer. An answer concerning the fate must be something that 
convinces the family beyond all doubt that their missing relative is dead.  One way of 
doing this is for the authorities to give families all the details of what happened to their 
loved one:  
If they are no longer alive, we have to be informed when and where they 
were killed. [...] We will not remain quiet just by getting information that that 
they died. They have to win our confidence before saying that „your person 
died‟. We have to be informed when, where, on which command, in which 
barrack our dear ones were killed. (Focus group participant, Gorkha.)  
In a minority of cases there is some information about the fate.  For many of those 
arrested by the security forces, notably in Bardiya, some days after the arrest 
announcements were made on Radio Nepal that the individual had been killed in an 
encounter between Maoist forces and the RNA. However, remains were never returned 
to families, or any other official confirmation given and the fact that these stories were 
clearly false reduced their credibility in the families‟ eyes. Such perceived deceit by the 
state, in addition to the taking of loved ones, contributes to a breakdown in trust between 
the state and families of the Missing. In many cases perpetrated by the CPN-M 
announcements were made or notices posted about the death of the missing person; in 
some cases local people saw the body but the family were unable to retrieve it. Even in 
such cases however, families maintain a faint hope that their loved one may be alive:  
The Maoists pasted pamphlets saying they had killed him at the border of 
Rasuwa, Sindhupalchwok and Nuwakot. […] On the basis of the pamphlet 
the Maoists had distributed we performed the death rituals even though we 
could not bring back his body. […] We are 95% sure that he would not come 
back, though deep in our hearts we still have a small hope. (Brother of 
missing man, Kathmandu.)  
 163 
 
Families are reluctant to accept these narratives since without evidence, they are merely 
stories: without evidence, the story of death is unacceptable and so families contrive 
different conclusions, notably that the Missing are alive somewhere.  
Many families made great efforts to learn what had happened to their loved ones, 
despite the risks associated with this during the conflict. This often involved spending 
significant amounts of money, supporting friends and family to travel. In most of the 
cultures of Nepal traditional healers are consulted who, through supernatural means, can 
give hope to families about what has happened to the Missing:  
I went to a Tharu guruwa and Indian baba.30 According to them he is still 
alive abroad. The Tharu guruwa showed in the mirror my husband walking 
through the jungle and mountains, and the Indian Baba told me he is in 
another country. (Wife of missing Tharu man, Bardiya.) 
Others, particularly those from indigenous groups, have told of contact with the spirits of 
the disappeared, often in dreams, which have reassured them their loved one is alive.   
I dreamt him once. I felt him talking to me. He was telling me he stays 
wherever he works. I haven‟t been troubled by his spirit. Our traditional god 
troubles us if something goes wrong with a family member but it hasn‟t done 
anything so far. That makes us believe he is still alive. (Mother of missing 
Tharu boy, Bardiya.)  
For many families of the Missing in Nepal as in Timor (see Section 7.2.3) such access to 
the spirit world is very real and can significantly impact on their understanding of the fate 
of their loved one. It can also permit an understanding grounded in their culture of the 
repeated dreams that often result from a disappearance and can concretely impact on 
perceptions of ambiguity.  However, for families to move on, to conduct rituals and to 
look to the future rather than the past they need an answer that convinces them beyond 
all doubt that their missing relative is dead.     
6.2.2 Need for human remains 
There appears to be a basic need to see the bodies of the dead (Boss, 2004): the rituals 
around death break down its denial, permit grief and promote detachment (Boss, 2002). 
                                               
30
 Guruwa and baba are mystics from the Tharu animist and Indian Hindu traditions, respectively.  
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Across the diverse religious traditions of Nepal there is unanimity among families in their 
need to satisfy religious obligations: they need either the body or absolute evidence of 
death in order to complete rituals. A dilemma for the families of the disappeared is that 
without a body they have no proof of death and so the body is not only required for 
religious ritual, but becomes that proof. Especially for families that are illiterate a 
document cannot communicate something as important as the death of a relative: 85% 
of families met sought to retrieve the body:   
This [the body] serves as proof that he is dead. Therefore, we need the dead 
body: even a bone can convince us that he is no longer alive. We also have 
to perform our rituals on the basis of it. We need a sign of proof of his death. 
(Brother of missing man, Gorkha.)  
The other element that drives the need for a body is a desire to see the appropriate 
rituals done:  
There is nothing else that can satisfy the family; it‟s difficult because 
according to the Hindu religion we have to do the death ceremony and it‟s 
important as we do it every year. If we don‟t do it then there is a belief that 
the spirit of the dead will always trouble the family. (Brother of missing man, 
Kathmandu) 
In more traditional cultures, death rituals are not just desirable but a social obligation and 
having failed to perform them can result in families of the Missing being stigmatised in 
their community.  
Many families have a belief that they will be able to identify the body, often 
through clothes or documents, or through a belief that they will somehow „know‟ their 
loved one. This apparent naiveté confirms the “constitutive weakness” (Ricoeur, 2004: 
181) of testimony and memory, in contrast to the documentary proof of scientific 
identification. Experience of exhumation processes elsewhere however suggests that 
only a comprehensive process of exhumation and scientific identification is likely to 
satisfy family demands. Families‟ distrust of the state extends to a lack of confidence in 
any remains that might be returned to them and they themselves propose two potential 
solutions to this problem. One is to trust tests, such as of DNA, that some families are 
aware of. It should be understood however that this technology is unknown to most 
families and can gain credence only through the affirmation of respected outsiders. The 
 165 
 
alternative is that a „chain of truth‟ could be established that would link the arrest, often 
witnessed by the family, to the body in the ground that has been exhumed:   
If the security personnel who were responsible for the killing give us detailed 
information, mentioning the date and place of killing and the place where 
they have buried the body […], there is a room for trust. Yes, we need the 
chain of truth; we have to be provided with the detailed information including 
who were the police responsible for the arrest. We won‟t believe in any 
bones brought by the authorities. (Brother of missing man, Gorkha) 
This emphasises the type of truth that families demand. The truth of Truth Commissions, 
i.e. the historical truth of the conflict, is of little interest to families. They and their 
community know how they have suffered and they don‟t value a written public truth that 
will anyway be remote and inaccessible to most of them. They seek a private truth that 
tells them what happened to loved ones, and if they are dead, how they died (see 
Section 8.2). 
Whilst processes do exist whereby burials and other rituals can be done using a 
substitute for the body (see Section 4.2.2), these can only be done where death is 
confirmed, and are thus not relevant for most families met. Whilst a small minority may 
be satisfied with appropriate information from the authorities, for most families a process 
of exhumation and identification is seen as absolutely necessary 
6.2.3 Emotional and psychosocial impact and needs 
Sometimes we laugh out of crying and at other times we cry out of laughing. 
(Wife of missing man, Gorkha) 
The „therapeutic ethic‟ (Colvin, 2002) that drives much transitional justice process is 
rooted in an understanding that violations traumatise victims, and that truth is healing for 
those so affected: the emergence of truth then fosters reconciliation. In this study there is 
little evidence that trauma, at least in its Western understanding, is relevant for most 
families met. Families of the Missing are mostly found to suffer from normal emotional 
distress, rather than psychiatric disorders. In many family members the disappearance 
gave rise to repeated thoughts and dreams about the disappeared, disturbed sleep and 
sudden feelings of anxiety: 55% of those met described such symptoms. This 
generalised anxiety disorder was the most common syndrome encountered, together 
with expression of extreme emotional pain, and appears to allow the problems facing 
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most families to be discriminated from post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD).  Whereas 
PTSD is linked to a specific event of trauma, the anxiety expressed by families was 
about the disappeared person, rather than the event of disappearance: i.e. consistent 
with ambiguous loss.  
We had to undergo mental torture throughout these ten years. As I 
mentioned earlier the pain of disappearance is more intense than that of 
death. We waited and waited hoping that he would come back. We have 
always been lingering between hope and doubt as to whether he would 
return or not. My mother has not been able to sleep properly even one night 
from the time the incident happened. (Brother of missing man, Gorkha.)  
Families also described hypervigilance, as well as sleeping problems:  
Sometimes I have a shock of fear. I think this is a problem that all families of 
the disappeared have experienced. I suddenly wake up and don‟t feel 
myself, I have a very strange feeling. At night when I think he may be no 
more, I have a different feeling. It‟s like this because sometimes we are 
hopeful.  In the daytime and at night the feelings are different. Sometimes it 
is so hard to sleep thinking about him.  (Wife of missing student leader, 
Kathmandu.)  
Repeated dreams of the Missing are also interpreted as evidence that the 
missing person is still alive, and even that his spirit is communicating (see Section 6.2.1).  
Women described dreams where they see their disappeared relative, often in a position 
of suffering: this appears to be an unconscious expression of guilt at no longer being 
able to fulfil their traditional role as a mother or wife and provide for their missing man. 
Thirty-six per cent of those met, largely women, talked of how their mental capacity has 
been impaired as a result of the disappearance: 
Yes, it has affected my daily life a lot. When I try to do something I forget 
what I have to do; I forget so many things I have to do on daily basis. If I am 
working and talking with people then I forget about the pain but the rest of 
the time it‟s the same. (Wife of missing man, Dhading.)  
These respondents appear to be discussing an impact on what Nepalis would call the 
dimaag (brain-mind, see Section 4.2.2), although this wasn‟t necessarily the language 
that was used. There were also reports of family members drinking excessively as a 
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response to disappearance, another reaction that is associated with a problem with the 
dimaag (Kohrt and Harper, 2008), and also stigmatised. This is evidence that what would 
be seen as mental illness by Nepalis can be induced by disappearance, i.e. impact on 
ability to function ascribed to the disappearance itself.  
Twenty-seven per cent of family members, the vast majority of them women, 
complained of chronic physical symptoms that they ascribed to the disappearance, most 
often as a result of the constant tension and anxiety, and understood as somatic:  
Whenever I go to check up my health, the doctor tells me that I have been 
suffering from chinta rog [my worries are my disease]. […] My son has also 
been suffering from the same disease, the disease created by worry. [..] He 
has given me medicine to sleep. (Wife of missing man, Gorkha.) 
In three cases families described individuals suffering from mental illness that was seen 
as a consequence of disappearance, consistent with a pathology that was wholly or 
largely incapacitating, perhaps consistent with clinical depression. 
My mother became mentally ill since he [her husband] was taken. She is 
scared to meet or talk to people and talks alone to herself. […] She mumbles 
that they will come to take you after killing your father.  […] Now she doesn‟t 
even want to see people.  […] She doesn‟t talk to anybody in the house and 
becomes aggressive when people come near. (Man from Bardiya whose 
father is missing.)  
Gender, family and community 
The joint family, in which sons stay with their parents and wives join the family home of 
their husband on marriage, is the building block of Nepali society and can offer great 
support, economically and emotionally. However, the family can also become the 
greatest single stressor if individuals are alienated from it. In such a household there are 
power relationships, dominated by older men and with younger wives at the bottom of 
the hierarchy, expected to be subservient to their mother-in-law. Since a woman‟s 
relationship to her in-laws is defined through her husband, where the fate of a man is 
ambiguous, the relationship of his wife to his family will also be uncertain. In many cases, 
the wife of a man who is missing will often be perceived as seeking an opportunity to 
leave the family, typically through elopement with another man, an act considered a 
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betrayal both of her in-laws‟ family and of her husband. This often leads to the 
stigmatisation of wives of the disappeared:  
My in-laws call me very bad things such as prostitute, witch, widow, etc in 
front of my children when they see me around. (Focus group participant, 
Bardiya.)  
In some cases the wife is blamed for the disappearance:  
The mothers in law in such households think that the son disappeared 
because the daughter in law was alachin ko [thought to bring ill-fate to the 
family]. (Focus group participant, Kathmandu.)  
Thus, a wife of a missing man may be trapped within a family that resents her presence, 
but does not want her to leave due to the social stigma that would result. Economically a 
woman may be perceived as bringing nothing to the family, but being another mouth to 
feed. Leaving the house is an option, but often she would be expected to leave her 
children behind:  
The relationship with my relatives and in-laws has been ruined. They see me 
as someone else‟s daughter, so I am an outsider and relations continue to 
get worse. […] Sometimes I feel like leaving the house, but because of the 
love I have for my children, I cannot go. (Wife of disappeared man, Dhading.) 
The net result of this web of obligation and resentment can often be an environment of 
extreme difficulty for such women.  Of the interviews made with wives, 32% reported that 
they had problems in the family and 12.5% of these had extreme problems. Economic 
independence both gives the opportunity to make a free decision to stay or leave and 
increases a wife‟s status within the family. Assistance that families have received to date, 
whether from the state or elsewhere, has always targeted the head of the household and 
as such fails to address the issues of wives of the Missing. Women suffering from such 
impacts within the family seek to see their value to the family increased and their status 
within it raised.  
Most of the families of the disappeared live in rural areas, in villages where 
families are part of a dense network of social relations. Having a relative disappear can 
challenge those relations. The issues that lead to women being stigmatised in the family 
can also lead to problems in the community. Notably, the ambiguity over a women‟s 
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marital status, her persistence in wearing the symbols of marriage and the impression 
that the wives of the disappeared are somehow predatory in their search for a new 
husband:  
The relations with community members are not good. When I go to ask for 
something from anybody, others say there may be some illicit relations with 
me and therefore nobody comes to help me anymore because I am still 
young. (Wife of disappeared man, Siraha.)  
18% of all women interviewed, and 28% of all wives of the disappeared said that they 
had problems in their community.  One saw the solution to these problems as being a 
resolution of the ambiguity of their status, by the authorities giving a proper answer 
regarding their husbands‟ fate; this would resolve the confusion over identity, with a 
woman presently being neither a wife nor a widow. 
Problems faced in family and community by women are a demonstration of how 
ambiguous loss impacts on identity and challenges the meaning given to disappearance. 
One woman reported being a victim of the extreme identity confusion of being subject to 
sexual advances by her father-in-law. In any context ambiguous loss provokes anxiety 
about the roles of those left behind, but in the cultures of Nepal the very strict 
understanding of an individual‟s place in the family and community provoke greater 
challenges: the problems seen are not just psychological and emotional, but deeply 
social in nature. Nepali societies define women‟s roles narrowly, notably as dutiful 
daughter, faithful wife or mourning widow, and the wives of the disappeared confound 
these categories by being without their husbands but continuing to wear the visible signs 
of marriage. Identity becomes a problem psychologically because identity is a relational 
concept, defined through social interaction. The greatest problems arise where a 
woman‟s view of her identity conflicts with that of the family or community who consider 
her a widow who must behave and dress as such, where the wife is unable to admit the 
death of her husband as long as there is no evidence for it.  Such women are often 
considered sexually available because they do not dress or behave as widows. Issues 
concerning the reconstruction of meaning and identity in the face of ambiguous loss are 
discussed in Section 9.2.  
Twelve per cent of all families met reported that they had significant or extreme 
problems with their community, included cases where families were receiving threats. 
For many of those with relatives disappeared by the Maoists, the greatest impact is their 
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continued displacement from their home village: half of all such families met remain 
displaced. Families of those made missing by the state had become victims of anti-
Maoist sentiment in some communities:  
In a way, you can say that the people in the village give us much more 
torture than the army and the police. We feel more pressure from the village. 
(Focus group participant, Gorkha.)  
Some of this exclusion has ceased with the end of the conflict and the success of the 
CPN-M in the Constituent Assembly elections in April 2008. However the divisions of the 
conflict persist, with families being stigmatised because of their perceived association 
with the Maoists. The community was often unsympathetic to the special nature of the 
suffering of the families, and in particular assumed that they had been guilty of Maoist 
activity:  
People don‟t let us drink or bring water from their hand pump. Other kids and 
people beat my children when I am not in the house. We beg for food or 
clothes and pay later on. Water is a big problem. My kids come from school 
and wait for me to give water. They can‟t go to the other house even though 
they are thirsty. (Wife of missing man, Bardiya.)  
Half of all families met reported no problems with their community, while 26% reported 
that there had been problems in the past, notably during the conflict, but that there were 
none now. Of those families that were involved politically with the CPN-M, 72% had 
suffered problems with the community at some point. 
Resilience and coping mechanisms 
The impact of disappearance will be the sum of the emotional, psychological, cultural 
and social effects discussed here, subject to the resources of individuals and 
communities to cope. In this study there is evidence that most individuals show sufficient 
resilience to not suffer from significant disability as a result of their problems, i.e. they 
continue to function relatively well despite their suffering. This indicates the need for 
psychosocial interventions to aim to support and promote such resilience. The most 
discussed coping mechanism was to share problems with someone, emphasised by the 
very positive response of those who had regular contact with a family association, since 
it solves the major problem of having access to someone who not only understands but 
shares your problem:  
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Yes, we do share our problems with those with the same problems but we 
never share with those who have a husband. We never share our problems 
with our elders or relatives because we don‟t want to give them pain and 
trouble, we only share with friends. The main thing is that the one who is 
suffering, only they can feel it. (Wife of disappeared man, Kathmandu.)  
However, almost half reported that there was no-one in the family or community with 
whom they could talk. This reveals the dilemma of those who find themselves isolated 
with no-one who can understand their problems, and the fact that those facing problems 
within their families or communities are those most likely to be isolated. There is 
evidence that having contact with a family association can reduce the levels of problems 
women see. For problems in both family and community the rate of serious or extreme 
problems is significantly less among those who have contact with a family association, 
suggesting that involvement with an association ameliorates such issues. One common 
and effective coping mechanism for those whose loved ones were made missing by the 
state was political engagement. As with a family association this provides solidarity with 
the like-minded which brings family members into contact with others who share the 
beliefs of their loved ones and who appreciate the family‟s sacrifice. This facilitates the 
construction of positive meaning as a response to the disappearance.  
The most common negative coping mechanism was repeated thoughts about the 
Missing, often becoming an obsession with continuing to search for the missing person. 
In some cases the loss became the central feature around which all aspects of life were 
organised, with many elements of healthy functioning suspended, threatening relations 
with family and others.  
6.2.4 Economic needs 
I still can‟t control myself when I remember those times, when I had 2 sons 
and a daughter-in-law with me. I had a happy family. Can you imagine, now I 
beg in the village? I became a beggar when once I had everything in the 
house and 2 earning sons. (Mother of two missing sons, Bardiya.)  
Ninety-three per cent of the disappeared are men, the traditional breadwinners in Nepali 
society, and most of these are of an age where their economic contribution to the family 
is crucial. Eighty-one per cent of disappeared men were married and 71% of these 
disappeared between 18 and 35 years of age, with the result that families have been 
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deprived of breadwinners and women of husbands, often with young children to support, 
reducing their economic security. Data from the worst affected district, Bardiya, suggests 
that 92% of families of the Missing are dependent upon either working their own land, or 
labouring for others (CVC, 2008). Where land or labour is the principal source of income, 
loss of the people who provide the labour for both reduces livelihood. Many female 
headed families were met where daily agricultural labour is the only source of income.  
We really lack household necessities since my husband is not here. I can 
buy rice or school things if I earn 50 rupees from labour.  I have great 
difficulty to manage everything for the house and the children. I borrow 
money from others to pay my children‟s school fees and for uniforms and 
books, but lots of time we go without. My husband was fulfilling our every 
need. I don‟t have a capacity like he had. I am alone to take care of 
everything now.  I have some 1/2 katha31 of land but it doesn‟t give good 
food because there is no fertilizer. I can‟t buy with what I earn. If my husband 
was here, this land wouldn‟t be dry. I go to work in other‟s houses to get 
food. (Wife of missing man, Bardiya.)   
As a result, many of the needs discussed here are the same as those of the poorest in 
Nepal, whatever the reason for their poverty. Families defined necessities as food, 
medical treatment and the education of children: more than 80% of families met were 
unable to afford all of these (Table 7).  
Economic security status Fraction 
Not mentioned 0.22 
Moderate 
    - unable to afford some necessities 
0.59 
Serious 
    - unable to afford many necessities 
0.19 
Extreme 
    - reducing to begging for food 
0.04 
Table 7 Summary of the economic status of families of the Missing met in 
interviews. 
Many families have spent significant sums of money that they can ill afford 
searching for their missing loved ones. Where someone had been taken by Maoists, 
local cadres often demanded money from families as a ransom, even though this rarely 
resulted in the release of the abductee. Most families take on debt in order to support 
                                               
31
 In Nepal, 1 katha = 130.2 m
2
.  
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their families; 69% confirmed that they were in debt. The most extreme cases are where 
families are left with no economically active individual to provide support, notably older 
people who have no children to support them, or women heading households who have 
little capacity to earn a living: 4% had to beg to eat.  
Lots of time I sleep without food. I just drink water and sleep. I can‟t go to 
beg at night so I have no choice.  (Mother of two disappeared sons, Bardiya.)  
For most families the greatest sacrifices they have to make concern health care and 
education. Where a family member is sick, money must be borrowed, or land mortgaged 
or sold in order to pay for treatment. Primary schooling at a Government school is free in 
principle, but parents have to fund uniforms, books and usually „fees‟ that are demanded 
by teachers. One woman in Siraha decided it was better for her children to help with the 
animals than to send them to school:  
I have no money to send my children to boarding school since it may cost 
some five hundred rupees only for school fees besides uniform, stationery 
and other things, and as the teachers in the Government school don't come 
to school every day and don't teach the students well, so nobody wishes to 
send their children to Government schools. [...] Therefore, I think it‟s better to 
send the children to pasture for grazing the buffalo and goats than to send 
them to study in the Government school. None of the children is studying in 
school. [...] As I have nothing to educate them, everyone is working to 
maintain our livelihood. (Wife of missing man, Siraha, mother of four, aged 5 
to 16) 
The individual who disappeared would often have worked to support the family, notably 
his parents, throughout his life and this concept often underlies the need for long-term 
support. “In a family in Nepal, loss of your son means loss of pension.” (Father of 
missing man, Dhanusa.) The solution as far as families are concerned is to give them a 
sustainable way to pay for the necessities of life. This could mean that the Government 
guarantees education and health care for families of the disappeared, or that families are 
given jobs that guarantee an income that will permit them economic security for the 
future. 
A few families have received support from NGOs, mostly non-food items given on 
a needs basis where agencies came across such victims. The most comprehensive 
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financial assistance to families of the Missing however has been given by the CPN-M to 
families of those made missing by the state as apparent compensation for their loss, as 
well as payments to cover certain expenses such as medical treatment. Whilst this may 
represent the Maoist party attempting to use the memory of the People‟s War to maintain 
its support among its traditional base, such payments have been crucially important for 
many poor families. Several tens of family members of the Missing have also been 
employed in Government Ministries and associated offices under the control of the CPN-
M since the formation of the interim Government, as well as in private businesses in 
Kathmandu, as a result of the intervention of Sofad, the Maoist family association. All of 
the assistance facilitated in this way however excluded victims of the CPN-M. In the 
period following the field research, relief payments of Rs. 100,000 (US$1,300) were 
made to many families from the Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction (see Section 
6.2.6).  
In many of the discussions with families, they made clear that they did not 
envisage compensation or reparation consisting of a single payment, but of long term 
support in specific areas, including support for medical expenses and education for the 
children of the Missing: “Many conflict victims don‟t want money or compensation but 
guarantees for the future of their children.” (Brother of missing man, Banke.)  In some 
instances it was explicitly articulated that they expected that the families of the Missing 
should be given jobs by the authorities, so as to guarantee livelihoods.  
As we have no source of income, the Government should give us 
employment. How long can we manage with daily labour that is always 
uncertain? We have to stay idle and face problems feeding ourselves when 
we cannot find any work. So, the Government should manage our food and 
shelter. (Daughter-in-law of missing man, Bardiya.)  
Whilst most rural Nepalis have little contact with the formal state, the issue of 
land is one where ownership documentation has become very important. Land and 
property constitute the most pressing administrative issues as a result of the uncertain 
and undocumented fate of their disappeared relatives, and were mentioned by 14% of 
those met:  
Although the land is not in my father's name it is difficult to transfer the land 
into our name because the land should be transferred first to my father's 
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name and then to our names according to the law. So, it is very difficult due 
to lack of a death certificate. (Son of disappeared man from Siraha.)  
6.2.5 Justice and accountability 
When asked what justice meant to them, families replied as shown in Table 8. Although 
it is not a priority for most, a majority of families seek prosecutorial justice. Many 
however see justice in terms other than retribution. There is also an understanding 
among a minority of a need to end impunity, as an example for the future. 
 
 
 
Table 8 Meaning of justice for families. 
Families were asked who should be prosecuted, and the results are shown in Table 9.   
 
fraction 
Direct perpetrator 0.65 
Informers 0.29 
Those who gave orders 0.19 
Politicians 0.13 
Table 9 Whom families believe should be punished. 
In Bardiya, where informers were very widely used, informers are those most favoured to 
be prosecuted, even though most are unlikely to have committed any criminal offence. 
Victims of both sides made the point that prosecuting lower level actors would not satisfy 
them; some emphasised that responsibility was political, and went to the very highest 
level, on both sides. Some families have filed cases with courts or police stations with 
the help of human rights organisations, but most have no understanding of the 
processes involved. Preferences concerning judicial process were driven by a desire that 
it was accessible to victims: families sought that process should ideally be local and 
there was no interest in an international process. Families believed that the pre-transition 
Nepali legal system was not capable of trying the perpetrators of disappearances, but 
there was agreement that with „new laws‟ an appropriate domestic judicial process was 
possible. Whilst this was based on little understanding of the legal system, it does 
Meaning of justice fraction 
prosecution 0.54 
compensation 0.45 
truth / an answer 0.31 
acknowledgement 0.07 
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represent some faith on the part of the victims that justice is possible for them in a „new 
Nepal‟, given the appropriate transformation of existing institutions.  
The Government‟s initial draft Truth and Reconciliation Commission Bill (Govt. of 
Nepal, 2008) included a broad amnesty for perpetrators, but 69% of families rejected 
amnesty. One woman explicitly linked a lack of judicial process to what might be 
considered „healing‟ of victims:  
The truth about the facts should be clarified, but the perpetrators should not 
be given amnesty. If they are given amnesty, the mentality of the victim 
families will remain as it is, so amnesty should not be given. (Wife of 
disappeared man, Siraha)   
Thirty-one per cent could envisage amnesty, but more than half of these believed that it 
must be conditional, only being granted to lower ranks who were following orders, or 
subject to the demand that the truth about the disappeared be revealed. Amnesty was 
far more favoured among victims of the Maoists than victims of the state, perhaps 
reflecting the low expectations of prosecution among the former at the time of the 
research.   
6.2.6 Reparation, relief and compensation 
Reparation as a word was almost never used by families, even though the concept was 
well understood by some:  
Paying compensation means an admission of wrongdoing even if there is no 
direct admission of the truth. Indeed, paying compensation means the state 
is paying the fine [for its wrongdoing]. (Brother of disappeared man, Gorkha.)  
Families expressed the view that the most reparative act of the authorities responsible is 
to reveal the truth about the disappeared, but the consistent use of the term 
compensation reflected the concurrent priority of economic support. There is a concern 
among families that payments of compensation are somehow designed to distract 
families from pursuing the truth about their loved ones. 74% of families said they would 
not accept compensation if it preceded the truth, in the spirit of reparations. For all 
families there is a dilemma between the need to feed themselves now, the need to know 
the truth before any compensation or reparations can be accepted, and the very idea of 
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putting a value on the life of the disappeared by accepting money from the authorities.  A 
number of families resolved this dichotomy through the concept of relief. 
If they give us 1 lakh [100,000] Rupees as relief then I will take it, if they say 
it is compensation then there is no way I am taking it. (Wife of disappeared 
man, Dhading.)  
This view appears to have driven the naming of Government payments in the months 
following this study as interim relief (see Section 6.2.4). In this way families can address 
their immediate needs, without sending a message to the authorities that they believe 
the issue of the disappearance is closed. For some compensation was not an acceptable 
alternative to the return of their loved one, and in this sense the most reparative act of 
the authorities was perceived to be an answer and the return of remains.   
In a number of communities, where the missing issue goes beyond individual 
families and affects the community as a whole, families were asked about community 
reparations.  This concept was universally received negatively. They claimed that 
families had suffered, and thus families should be compensated, believing that the idea 
of community reparations was a trick of the Government to spend less money on a 
compensation policy, by providing schools or other infrastructure to which the community 
had a right. The leader of the Bardiya family association, 80% of whose members are 
Tharu, articulated political demands arising from the victimisation of the Tharu people, as 
reparative:  
If the government declared the Tharu as the worst affected race in the entire 
nation in the course of the Peoples‟ War that would be a great relief the 
Tharu people. The state could give them first priority in government 
opportunities in the district. [...] In this context, the state could declare the 
Tharu as a special ethnic group so that these people would feel relief [...] if 
the state wants to give reparation to the Tharu, we would say that we need a 
Tharu State. If the state wants to give reparation to the district, we would 
propose that the Tharu people should be entitled first priority in every sector. 
(Leader of Bardiya family association, personal interview, Sept. 2008.)  
The logic of such an approach is that the Tharu were so targeted during the conflict that 
the authorities should compensate them as a community, by supporting those cultural 
elements that define them as a community.  
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Truth-telling and acknowledgement  
Whilst the particular truth of what happened to a family‟s missing loved one is considered 
crucial to families, more general truth-telling forms a rather small part of the demands of 
families. Families are well aware of how they suffered in the conflict, believe this was 
well known throughout the country,32 and did not seek it to be validated by any truth 
seeking process. Reparation, whilst potentially providing material compensation to 
victims, is primarily about acknowledgment of what has happened and the responsibility 
for it. Families, particularly those that are politically engaged, have a burning desire to 
see the sacrifice of their loved ones acknowledged: 
[T]he government has to recognise the contribution of these families in 
bringing change in the country. [...] The dead have to be declared as martyrs 
and a trust can be established in their names. Money is not everything; it 
comes today and it will be finished tomorrow; respect is something important.  
(Brother of disappeared man, Gorkha.)  
Seven per cent said that they felt the disappeared had been acknowledged, through 
payment of compensation or a judgement of the Supreme Court and 42% of relatives of 
victims of the state said that they had received acknowledgement from the CPN-M. Many 
families use the language of martyrdom to describe the status they want to see accorded 
to their missing relative (despite the ambiguity of their loss), and this is also partly linked 
to compensation. This attitude arises partly from the experience of having seen previous 
martyrs, notably of the Jana Andolan of April 2006, acknowledged and their families 
financially compensated. 
Unofficial efforts to memorialise the disappeared are under way, demonstrating 
the enthusiasm of communities to see such acknowledgement. The families met during 
this study mentioned their need for memorials to the disappeared, most seeking a local 
memorial. In one district in the plains for example a statue is being constructed of five 
local students who were arrested by the security forces during the conflict and remain 
missing: the junction it sits in has been renamed Martyr‟s Crossroad.  Families prioritise 
local memorials to the Missing and the public sanctioning of the status of the victims, 
                                               
32
 Whilst no studies have been made, it is likely that the scale and type of violations committed 
during the war, particularly by state forces, are not in fact well known in Kathmandu or elsewhere 
beyond affected districts.   
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believing that the Government should commit itself to commemorating the Missing. In 
this way families seek a central affirmation of locally held opinions of the Missing that 
may well be highly contested elsewhere (see Section  9.2). 
6.2.7 Institutional reform and attitude to the state 
An essential component of reparation is satisfaction, notably giving families assurances 
of non-repetition of the offence (de Greiff, 2008).  Half of all families believe they will 
never be able to trust the state, while 40% believe that this trust could be built:  
There should be change in the army's character and the soldiers who 
committed crimes should be punished. There should be a reform in the 
military. (Brother of disappeared man, Siraha.) 
In Bardiya, as discussed in Section 6.2.6, some families see the devolution of political 
power to the Tharu, in exactly the spirit of federalism which will define the new 
dispensation in the country, as a route to guaranteeing non-repetition. This contrasts with 
a legalistic conception where prosecutions, institutional reform and „rule of law‟ constitute 
such guarantees. 
There remain differences in perceptions among the victims of each side in the 
conflict, reflecting the divisions that remain: 71% of victims of the state believe that the 
Government will address the issue of the disappeared while only 22% of victims of the 
Maoists share that view.  If the issue of disappearances is not addressed, a majority of 
the victims of the state say they would react: half would take part in a political movement, 
while a significant minority (15%) say they would be prepared to launch a rebellion with 
the use of arms, even against their own party: 
The Government has to understand our grievances and it has to respect our 
dignity. If the government of this twenty first century does not understand our 
problem, the counter-revolution will take place. (Brother of disappeared man, 
Gorkha.) 
Given that many of these families are cadres of the Maoist party, the implications for the 
future of the peace process of ignoring the needs of such victims should not be under-
estimated. 
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6.3 Nepal’s still-born transition  
The transition from conflict to peace in Nepal has been steered by national elites, notably 
the political parties and the civil service, with significant input from international advisors 
and the donor community. As part of this study such elites, including political leaders, 
Ministers, UN functionaries and Nepali civil society were met to understand their 
respective visions for post-conflict Nepal. Here, the mechanisms proposed by those 
leading the transition, notably a TRC and a Disappearance Commission, are discussed 
in the light of needs expressed by victims. In Chapter 7 and Chapter 8 the contrast 
between the agenda of elites and that of victims, and the deficit in addressing the needs 
of families of the Missing, are analysed. Here, an emphasis will be placed on a critique of 
the planned Disappearance Commission, on the basis of the needs articulated by 
families.  
A principal reason for the lack of any transitional process has been the political 
stalemate that has seen the first Maoist led Government deposed, the peace process 
stalled and the entire transition jeopardised. Without stability it is unlikely that a 
transitional justice process can be initiated. However, the greatest long-term challenge to 
a comprehensive transitional justice process is the reluctance of political actors to see 
action that might lead to judicial process related to their roles during the insurgency and 
this has led to reluctance to initiate any process. This is particularly true of senior Nepali 
Congress figures, in power during the time of greatest violations and perceived as close 
to the army. The CPN-M and its leadership had direct command responsibility for its 
armed forces, the People‟s Liberation Army, and remain reluctant to see party cadres 
implicated in violations, despite pressure from the party grassroots to act on state 
perpetrated disappearances. The human rights community in Nepal has exacerbated the 
fears of those in power of any transitional process by emphasising an agenda for 
transition in which primacy is given to the need for prosecutions and all other goals of 
transition made subservient. Even where a Disappearance Commission is created, 
families remain cynical of its prospects as a result of the history of commissions of 
inquiry in Nepal which have historically been subject to political interference and seen 
their recommendations routinely ignored. 
The draft Disappearance Bill, first published in 2008, proposed a Commission of 
Inquiry into Disappearances with a remit to investigate disappearances during the 
insurgency, identify perpetrators and recommend reparations to victims (Ministry of 
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Peace and Reconstruction, 2008). However, the Commission (which is slated to contain 
no victims‟ representative) falls short of addressing the needs expressed by the families 
in this study in many ways. The Commission will inform a family if it is learnt that the 
disappeared person is dead, but is not mandated to pass on any other details; the bill 
makes no mention of a capacity for exhumation and identification of human remains, and 
so it is unclear if any such programme is envisaged. The Commission will inform the 
family if death is confirmed (Ibid: Chapter 5: 38), but will not satisfy families‟ need to 
know as many details as possible concerning the disappearance. Whilst the bill foresees 
prosecutions, sentences can be reduced or waived subject to cooperation with the 
Commission; this appears to be an effort to introduce an amnesty procedure, rejected by 
most families. There is no scope for the Commission to grant a missing person a legal 
status such that property can be transferred in their absence. The reparation process 
outlined includes payment of compensation and free education, which will be welcomed 
by families, but health care support limited to a „check-up‟. For those who are not 
economically active these provisions offer little hope for an escape from poverty and for 
others are unlikely to ensure livelihoods; there is no mention of the value of 
compensation, nor concerning the payment of pensions. There is no scope for 
acknowledgement or formal apology, no mention of memorialisation and none of 
psychosocial support. These provisions resemble more a compensation procedure than 
one of comprehensive reparations. There is no scope for action concerning informers 
and others within communities divided by the conflict where legal action is likely to be 
impossible. The Commission has no defined presence outside Kathmandu, and it is it 
unclear how victims would make contact with the Commission. The Commission would 
appear therefore to represent very much the institutional, centralised approach to 
transitional justice and appears to be both remote from victims and unlikely to address 
the breadth of their needs. The further implications of this study for transitional justice 
process in Nepal are discussed in Chapter 7 and Chapter 8.   
6.4 Summary: Victims’ agendas for transitional justice  
The needs of families of the disappeared in Nepal are dominated by a need for the truth 
about the fate of loved ones, access to human remains where they are dead and 
economic support to ensure livelihood. The most visible conflict with dominant narratives 
around transitional justice, in Nepal and globally, is the relatively low priority victims give 
to both judicial process and truth-telling. Whilst they seek justice, this is not considered 
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an immediate need, and is interpreted in broader terms than prosecutions. Truth-telling 
of the sort that emerges from a truth commission was also not prioritised: families sought 
a private truth about their loved one, rather than a public truth about the conflict. The 
issue of reconciliation was little mentioned explicitly; where it was families expressed 
feelings of being excluded and stigmatised because of their perceived role in the conflict. 
An addressing of such divisions demands a local process, centred on the community, 
rather than a truth commission based in far away Kathmandu. With exceptions, most 
families are largely at peace with neighbours, blaming a remote state for violations, 
rather than individuals or communities they know, challenging a discourse that puts 
reconciliation at its centre. Many of the needs discussed, and indeed the general impact 
of disappearance, emerge from the unique social and cultural position of affected 
communities, indicating that approaches that do not consider the context in which victims 
live will be unlikely to meet their needs.  
Not knowing the fate of missing loved ones has left many family members 
suffering significant emotional and psychological problems, including sleep disturbance, 
somatism and generalised anxiety order. The most extreme impacts however are social 
in nature, where wives of the disappeared have experienced loss of status within the 
family and identity issues in the community resulting in stigmatisation. This serves to 
confirm that within the marginalised communities that were most affected by conflict, 
women are further disempowered by disappearance. The positive role that family 
associations have played in supporting those affected by disappearance, suggests that 
solidarity and sharing is a crucial coping mechanism. This is consistent with the 
ambiguous loss model that sees the social reconstruction of meaning and identity as a 
prerequisite to living with the ambiguity of loss (Robins, 2010a). Beyond their own 
organisations and communities, victims have little or no access to medical facilities or 
other psychosocial support. Many of the impacts of ambiguity, such as being unable to 
perform the expected rituals for the dead, demand not only that families receive an 
answer concerning the fate, but also that they have access to human remains through a 
comprehensive process of investigation, exhumation and identification.  
It is unsurprising that economic needs are emphasised, given the profile of many 
victims as the poorest and most marginalised in a highly unequal state. Families seek 
not a simple payment of compensation, but livelihood guarantees that will allow them to 
feed and educate their families in perpetuity, restoring the economic security that their 
missing breadwinner enabled. In this sense, reparation can be understood as filling the 
 183 
 
economic role of the disappeared. Reparation should also mean addressing the health 
issues, notably the psychological impacts that have arisen as a direct result of 
disappearance. The long-term marginalisation by the state of many communities that 
were also most impacted by the conflict leads to demands for recognition. These arise 
initially as a response to their victimisation, through demands for memorialisation, martyr 
status for the dead and compensation. Recognition however is also seen as giving a 
place in the nation to those long denied it, a goal for which many families believe their 
loved ones have given their lives. The behaviour of the state and local elites in rural 
areas during the conflict was a continuation of how the disempowered have always been 
treated in Nepal. As a result the demands of victims go to the heart of the goals of 
transition, demanding that the „new Nepal‟ that emerges is inclusive and representative.  
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Chapter 7 Timor-Leste’s transition and the 
Missing: A victim-centred evaluation  
While Nepal‟s transition is in negotiation, Timor-Leste has seen a decade of transitional 
justice mechanisms that are now largely complete. The transition has been shaped by 
both local elites and the international community, and whilst not directly constrained by 
the departed Indonesians, their interests have nevertheless had significant influence. 
Timor-Leste emerged from conflict with no institutions and few other resources and the 
UN both governed the state in the years immediately after the chaos of 1999 and created 
the most important transitional justice mechanisms. As a result, the mechanisms created 
reflect recent global practice in prioritising the rhetoric of truth, justice and reconciliation 
as the principal goals of the transitional justice process. This study with families of the 
Missing in Timor-Leste aims to understand the needs of families a decade after the end 
of conflict, in the light of the transitional mechanisms that have been created. Whilst this 
research cannot replace a longitudinal study that could evaluate impact on victim needs 
of the decade of transitional process, it can understand current needs that remain unmet 
and attitudes towards that process: as a result the impact of that process can be inferred. 
As such, the study represents a victim-centred evaluation of Timor-Leste‟s transitional 
justice process, allowing victims to articulate both their unmet needs and their attitudes 
towards the mechanisms that have unfolded over the previous ten years.  
This chapter begins with profiles of the Missing and their families met for the 
study. The needs of families that emerge from the study are then reviewed, including a 
discussion of the dependence of those needs on when persons went missing, made 
possible by the length of time over which disappearance occurred. Attitudes of the 
families of the Missing to the principal transitional justice mechanisms are then explicitly 
discussed, and the relevance of the mechanisms reviewed in the light of articulated 
needs. 
7.1 A profile of the victims 
The sampling frame used for this study is a list of 2,452 persons missing as a result of 
the conflict between 1975 and 1999 and collected since 1979 by the International 
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). This included persons killed but whose bodies had 
not been retrieved by families, those missing following arrest by either Indonesian forces 
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or Timorese parties, and those who had become separated from families and not seen 
again, notably when populations were fleeing in the mountains. This dataset was the 
result of families of the missing visiting ICRC offices and of ICRC delegates meeting 
families in extensive movement in all areas of the country over a 30 year period (see 
Figure 10). A selection of four districts was made, including those with the greatest 
numbers of Missing, districts from east and west, urban and rural. The study was 
conducted in Bobonaro, Dili, Los Palos and Manatuto districts (see Figure 5), and within 
these districts cases were selected at random from the ICRC list and the families of 
victims visited in their homes. A total of 69 families were interviewed and additionally 81 
relatives of victims met in 9 focus groups organised by victims‟ organisations (in Dili and 
Bobonaro), and by local community leaders (in Manatuto).   
 
Figure 10 Number of Missing in Timor-Leste by perpetrator and year for families 
interviewed during the study. 
Figure 10 shows the 69 missing cases where families were interviewed for this study, as 
a function of perpetrator and year of disappearance,33 where the perpetrator is as 
reported by the family. This figure tells the story of the conflict in terms of the numbers 
missing. The early years of the conflict were the most devastating, with many killed and 
                                               
33
 Here, cases where disappearance followed separation from families while displaced have been 
considered as Indonesian perpetrated.  
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separated from their families as a significant fraction of the population was displaced into 
the hills and pursued by Indonesian forces, resulting in families being dispersed and 
separated. With the effective victory of the Indonesians over the armed resistance in the 
early 1980s, the number of persons going missing fell substantially. There is a small 
spike in 1991 as a result of the Santa Cruz massacre and then a large peak around the 
violence of 1999 and the popular consultation.  Missing cases are dominated by those 
perpetrated by the Indonesians and Timorese allies, such as the Hansip militias and 
militias responsible for much of the violence of 1999. Ninety-three per cent of those 
cases where families were met were Indonesian perpetrated. Timorese perpetrated 
cases consist of persons made missing by armed or political cadres of Falintil and 
Fretilin, and one case where a civilian member of the clandestine network was allegedly 
responsible. Figure 10 shows that these occurred largely in the early years of the 
conflict.  
Perpetrator 
Number met 
in this study 
Indonesian34 64 
Timorese (Fretilin / Failintil) 5 
Table 10 Perpetrating authority responsible for the person being Missing. 
The age of the Missing at the time of disappearance is shown, for those whose 
families were interviewed, in Figure 11. The distribution peaks for those aged 15 - 30 
years.  As in Nepal, given that the vast majority of the Missing are male (Table 11), this 
has the effect of depriving families of those who are at their most economically valuable, 
resulting in often extreme challenges to livelihood. That a significant number of the 
Missing are women and children reflects the nature of the conflict in Timor, where in 
many cases civilians were actively targeted at points in the conflict, by both sides. 
Disappearances early in the conflict, when attacks dispersed families, were as likely to 
lead to women and children becoming missing as adult men. Twenty-three per cent of all 
the Missing from those families met were under 18 years of age when they went missing. 
Some of these were children taken by Indonesian troops, either to aid military units in 
menial tasks (as Tenaga Bantuan Operasi35 or TBOs) or to be adopted by families in 
                                               
34
 This includes one case where a man disappeared while being held by Fretilin when Indonesian 
forces overran the area.  
35
 Indonesian, literally „staff assisting operations‟. Individuals were taken as TBOs of all ages, but 
many were young boys in principal at least 12 years old, but sometimes younger (van Klinken, 
2008).  
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Indonesia. The gender of the missing person and the principal interviewee are shown in 
Table 11. From the families interviewed 9% of the Missing are women and an additional 
3% of families are missing both male and female relatives.  Among families interviewed 
the principal (or sometimes sole) interviewee was evenly mixed between genders; 74% 
of the Missing were married and 67% had children.  
 
 
Figure 11 Age of the Missing in Timor-Leste at the time of disappearance for the 
sample interviewed in this study. 
 
 
male female 
family 
group 
Missing person 61 6 2 
Principal 
interviewee 
34 31 4 
Table 11 Gender of the missing person and of the principal interviewee. 
During interviews an effort was made to understand the role in the conflict of the 
persons missing, and this is recorded in Table 12. It should be noted however that 
families may not have been fully aware of the nature of the missing person‟s role in the 
resistance, and that since significant payments have been made to veterans and their 
families there is evidence that some families may be exaggerating the nature of the 
missing person‟s role. Table 13 shows the relation of the principal interviewee, or the 
closest relative in the family group, to the missing person.  
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Wife 17 
Brother / sister 15 
Son / daughter 11 
Mother 6 
Father 12 
Entire family 
missing 
1 
Other 6 
 
7.2 Needs of victim families 
This section will discuss the needs that emerge from the study. The organisation of this 
material derives largely from the priorities articulated in the data, informed by the 
literature reviewed in Section 2.3. The topics discussed include economic needs; 
recognition, acknowledgement and reparation; and the fate of the Missing, which in 
Timor is linked to spiritual issues and the recovery of human remains. Sections are 
devoted to ambiguous loss, and emotional and psychosocial impacts, and the time 
dependence of these is discussed, exploiting the 25 year period over which 
disappearances occurred. A victim-centred evaluation is then made of the various 
transitional justice mechanisms that have occurred, using the data to determine the 
extent to which these processes addressed victims‟ perceived needs.  
Needs vary from family to family, and are a function of when and how the person 
went missing, the role the person played in the family, the economic and educational 
status of the family and of many other factors. Needs also evolve over time: in the 
sample of families met the time since disappearance ranges from 10 to 34 years, and 
thus permits an explicit test of how needs change with time (see Section 7.4). It is also 
seen that public discourse about the conflict impacts upon families‟ perception of their 
needs. Those whose loved ones were taken during the violence of 1999 have seen 
widespread discussion about the violations that occurred then and about the issue of 
judicial process in particular. As such, families of victims from 1999 who have been 
exposed to this discourse (and not all have) are much more likely to discuss the issue of 
justice than families of those missing from earlier in the conflict where judicial issues 
Civilian 21 
Resistance fighter 14 
Political cadre 19 
TBO minor 4 
Indonesian militia 2 
Table 12 Status of the missing person. Table 13 The relationship of the principal 
interviewee to the missing person. 
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have never been on the public agenda. Underlying all of these issues however are those 
needs with which families are confronted on a daily basis.  
The needs of victim families emerged from an initial open question about 
priorities, with those most dominant being the needs for economic support, for 
recognition, for truth about the fate and access to the body.  
Need Fraction 
Economic support 0.61 
Recognition / memorial 0.30 
Truth about fate  0.30 
Access to body 0.16 
Justice / punishment 0.10 
Table 14 Needs expressed by families in semi-structured interviews. 
As in Nepal, there is a dramatic difference in needs expressed by families in the capital 
and those elsewhere (Table 15): almost 3 times as many families outside Dili as in the 
capital expressed economic needs, while in Dili 4 times as many families demanded an 
answer about the fate as did those in rural areas. In Dili 31% of cases arose from the 
Santa Cruz massacre, where ambiguity about the fate of the Missing may remain high, 
compared to cases of those lost in the mountains following the Indonesian invasion, for 
example, who are presumed to have died. It is also likely that these data reflect the 
disempowerment of many victims in the countryside: they cannot conceive that they will 
ever receive an answer or a body and so have resigned themselves to moving on, in 
contrast to those in Dili who understand their rights and make demands as a result.  
Need 
Families expressing this need, 
fraction 
Dili districts 
Economic support 0.25 0.73 
Recognition / memorial 0.44 0.25 
Truth about fate  0.69 0.18 
Access to body 0.06 0.20 
Justice / punishment 0.19 0.08 
Table 15 Difference in needs expressed between Dili and rural districts. 
A small minority of families, 7%, articulated no needs; they have accepted the death of 
their loved ones, have made appropriate ritual even where the body has not been 
accessed and have received recognition and in some cases economic support from the 
Government.  
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7.2.1 Economic needs 
The single priority expressed by the greatest number of families (61%) was that for 
economic support. It is not immediately clear however as to the extent to which this is 
related to the missing person, rather than being what one would hear from asking the 
population at large about such needs. Whilst many families have had the opportunity to 
develop mechanisms to cope with the loss of loved ones, those who lost husbands and 
fathers in 1999 are still struggling to make ends meet, with many women heading 
households containing younger children. 
I'm 64, I don't have any more strength to do all that. I stay home, looking 
after my house. We are three in the house, an aunt of mine who is old - I'm 
taking care of her, my daughter and another girl. I don't have any man in the 
house, no husband or brother. When we don't have a man in the house of 
course we have to do everything even though you are old and sick, you have 
to survive, to live. (Focus group participant, Bobonaro.) 
Where women are left heading households they must find ways to feed themselves, 
most often continuing to try to farm, despite the challenges involved. The economic 
priorities expressed by families were for food, education of children and support to 
enable appropriate rituals to be made for the dead and missing from the conflict. In many 
cases the sole reason rituals have not been done is the expense of feeding those who 
must be invited to the ceremony and of construction of a grave. 
I am not able to do the ritual ceremony, and so we are still waiting. It‟s also 
difficult to find our daily food. We were only able to bury him but we did not 
make his ceremony because we don‟t have the capacity and also lack food. 
(Wife of missing man who recently exhumed a body she believes to be her 
husband, Lautem.)    
Victims living in poverty share the needs of all Timor‟s poor. In some cases families are 
also burdened with other impacts of the conflict, such as the children of other relatives 
who died:  
Yes, since the death of my brother, his three children - the two older ones 
are staying with my sister in law and we all contribute to look after them. The 
young one is with me since the father has gone and I take full responsibility 
for his life even though I am a widow. I have to struggle to find food for both 
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of us. [...] It is very hard to cope with three children going to school. There is 
never enough money and many times I cannot satisfy them, you know what 
kids are like. If they ask to buy this or that and I can‟t afford it. To get food is 
very hard, food is hard to buy for them… We are living in a house in poor 
condition… (Wife of man killed in 1999, Bobonaro.)  
Where education is no longer affordable, children are sent to work to contribute in any 
way they can to the family income.  
Since the end of the conflict policies have been elaborated providing potential 
support for families of conflict victims, both through payments and pensions for veterans 
and from the social assistance programme of the Ministry of Social Solidarity (MSS).  Of 
families met 6.5% had received compensation as part of the valorisation process, and 
13% were receiving pensions: these are discussed in more detail in Section 7.5. It is 
worth noting that whilst such payments have a dual role, representing both recognition 
and economic support, it is for the latter than poor families most value them. These 
payments had mostly begun rather recently, typically in the 6 months prior to the 
research being undertaken, more than a decade after the end of conflict. The main 
planks of economic support that could constitute a reparations programme emerge from 
the needs expressed here:  
Support to children of the Missing in education, such as scholarships, 
particularly at the secondary and higher levels; 
Assistance to female headed households and others unable to ensure their 
own livelihood, both in terms of economic support to address urgent needs, 
such as housing and food, but also income generation schemes that can 
ensure livelihood in the long term.  
7.2.2 Recognition, acknowledgement and reparation 
Almost one third of families mentioned the need for recognition of the sacrifice of the 
family as a priority (Table 14): 
For those that have been gone a long time, we as a family, we're asking the 
authorities that this father of ours no matter what, whether he is dead or 
alive, he has to have some value for what he gave, therefore if the 
Government cares, it will look after us today or in the future… We don't 
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demand high payment, it's up to the Government to think why this person 
died. If the person died to defend his sovereignty he needs recognition from 
the Government. (Children of missing man, Dili.)  
Table 16 shows families‟ understanding of recognition, with families seeing many of their 
needs as part of the acknowledgement process, most commonly understood as 
economic support. 
Understanding of recognition fraction 
Compensation / economic support 0.50 
The truth regarding fate or  
access to body 
0.27 
Medal 0.20 
Memorial 0.17 
Acknowledgement /  
public truth about what happened 
0.07 
Table 16 Understanding of recognition for families of the Missing 
Families did however see a dilemma in accepting money as something to repair the loss 
of a son or father. Such payments are unable to fill the economic gap left by the loss of a 
man who would have supported the family for a lifetime, and are certainly not considered 
something that can take the place of a loved one. Others see compensation as 
honouring the memory of the dead, and even serving as a memorial to them. Local 
leaders saw their entire community as victimised and as a result seek a reparative 
process that targets the community, rather than individual families. Potential reparations 
schemes are discussed further in Section 8.4 The dilemma for any reparations scheme 
is how to support victims without being seen to exclude the many others living in abject 
poverty who are not victims of the conflict, and this necessarily demands that a 
reparations process must consider its relationship to livelihood and development 
programmes. 
Whilst some saw reparation as a literal repair of the surviving family, 
psychologically and economically, many saw a need for public recognition, i.e. symbolic 
reparation, using the symbols they see as acknowledging the family‟s sacrifice. The 
medals that many have received have been largely welcomed (see Section 7.5), but the 
lack of a specific veterans‟ category for those missing fails to recognise the number of 
families where relatives are not known to be dead, since this denies the family‟s 
ambiguity:  
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A while ago they called us to receive the medals but I refused because they 
put my father in a group of dead people, which he is not. He is not in this 
category yet, because we are uncertain whether he is dead or alive. I gave 
them suggestions about my father's case, I cannot tell that my father is dead, 
nor that he is alive because there is no clear evidence. In case you don't 
accept what I'm saying, sorry but I cannot accept the medals. At present I 
refuse to receive the medals. If one day I know for a fact that my father is 
dead, then I'll accept the medals. (Son of missing man, Dili.)  
Whilst almost half (45%) of all families met have received a medal as part of the ongoing 
valorisation process, and 13% pension payments, there remains no mechanism to 
acknowledge the many who were not active in the resistance to Indonesia, who died or 
are missing as a result of the conflict. When explicitly asked, 69% of families sought a 
memorial to the missing and the dead, something shared by many who lost relatives in 
the conflict, but particularly important where there is no body: 
Firstly, [we need] something that can't fade with time: a monument that will 
stay, for those who died in order to always be remembered by everyone, 
[including the] next generation. Secondly, if the state seeks to help by giving 
something for me, of course I will take it. Just like if they think to give some 
pension for all the parents who have lost their sons, then of course I will take 
it. (Father of missing man, Dili.) 
It is remarkable that while those who are missing as a result of the Santa Cruz massacre 
of November 1991 have become a significant component of the narrative of national 
liberation (and families have received medals) there remains no memorial to them. This 
remains a key demand of the 12 November family association. Whilst a national 
memorial to those who died fighting with Falintil is under construction, accommodating 
the resting places of hundreds of fallen fighters, for many this is too far from their 
community to be relevant, and it excludes the civilian dead. Local efforts at 
memorialisation are underway in some areas, but victims seek support from the 
authorities both financially and to ensure a component of official recognition of the dead 
and Missing.  
The study revealed the extent to which attitudes to the leadership have been 
shaped by feelings that victims and those who fought for freedom have been betrayed:  
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I want to tell the government, they need to pay attention to the widows, those 
whose relatives died; they can give us rice with some money. If they want to 
give, it must be quick so we can start to build the grave. So, the family will 
feel proud that their relatives died for this beloved nation.  All those people 
can go around with their cars, they use luxury cars, but for those who died 
and whose remains are unclear still suffer. (Sister of missing man, 
Manatuto.)  
Victims of the conflict compared their treatment with those displaced by the violence of 
2006, suggesting that they perceive there is a hierarchy of victimhood in the country:  
Why did the Government attend to the crisis of 2006 so urgently, especially 
those that packed their stuff and ran to join others as IDPs? Those people 
were not affected by that but they simply packed all their belongings and 
joined the IDPs and not just that, but they also had good treatment from the 
Government. We felt like those from 1975 till 1999 didn't have any value. 
(Focus group participant, Bobonaro.) 
The CAVR final report proposed a reparations scheme that targeted the most 
vulnerable victims (including the disabled, widows and children) and stated that 
Indonesia should bear a „significant proportion‟ of the costs. (This element of engaging 
those most responsible for violations was mentioned by very few families met.) The 
proposal included scholarships for affected children, support and rehabilitation for the 
most vulnerable individuals and for highly affected communities, and a programme of 
memorialisation. Whilst this proposal is not inconsistent with the demands of the families 
of the Missing, its implementation was vetoed by the President at the time the CAVR 
report was presented to him.  
7.2.3 The fate of the Missing, human remains and spiritual needs 
Table 17 shows the perception of the fate of the Missing by families.  A majority of 
families met believe that their loved one is dead mostly as a result of the time that has 
passed since disappearance. In some cases death was confirmed by the family having 
witnessed the killing themselves, as in some militia killings in 1999 where bodies were 
then removed, or where a relative died while families were fleeing in the mountains, but 
the body left where it fell. Most families however have received no information about the 
fate of loved ones and have been unable to access the body of the missing person. 30% 
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of families still seek the truth about the fate of the missing, and remain living with 
ambiguity about whether loved ones are alive or dead.  
For me, I am not yet sure regarding my missing son; I can't say that he is 
dead because I have not buried the body, or alive because my child doesn‟t 
stay with me; I can't say anything about my son's whereabouts. What I know 
is my son went to school and never returned home. (Father of young man 
missing from the Santa Cruz incident, Dili.)  
Perception of fate fraction 
Alive 0.03 
Ambiguous 0.15 
Ambiguous, probably dead 0.15 
Presumed dead 0.54 
Seen killed, body not retrieved 0.05 
Seen killed, body retrieved36 0.05 
Table 17 Family perception of the fate of the Missing. 
That families know, or believe, that a loved one is dead does not however mean that 
they have no needs; in many cases they have been unable to do rituals and still seek to 
retrieve the body. 
A third of families met have been living with ambiguity for between 10 and 35 
years.  Families find themselves torn between wanting to believe their loved ones are 
alive and facing the fact that after so long they are not coming back. Families are literally 
stuck: trapped in the conflict period when the uncertainty of war meant one didn‟t know if 
a family member would survive the day or not. This ambiguity was often demonstrated 
by families who in a single phrase could assume that the Missing was both dead and 
alive.  
I wonder if he is still alive somewhere, like my son said before. But if he is 
dead we never had any signs or dreams that tell us he is dead, it‟s strange… 
We pray, we are still praying for his return and may God help him wherever 
he is. (Mother of missing man, Dili.)  
A number of families reported the sort of myths that are common in contexts where many 
are missing, and that sustain hopes of return. In Timor-Leste these mostly centred on the 
                                               
36
 These persons are not missing by the definitions of Section 1.1, consisting of cases where a 
body has been recovered recently or where data has been incorrectly included in the ICRC list.  
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possibility that the Indonesian authorities have taken the Missing to remote islands 
elsewhere in the archipelago. In some cases the impact of the ambiguity of their loss 
remains severe, even decades after disappearance. Parents of young boys taken by 
Indonesian soldiers presumed their children to still be alive in Indonesia, and in one case 
had a single contact years after he was taken that could then not be pursued. The 
understanding that a missing loved one is dead has often come as a result of the time 
they have been missing or as a result of contact with the spirit, in dreams or otherwise, 
that is perceived as confirming death. Many of these families have performed the 
appropriate traditional rituals, often using a substitute body (see Section 4.3.2) where 
they do not have access to the remains of those missing; in other cases families lack the 
financial capacity to make such rituals. Even where death is assumed however, most 
families see access to human remains as very important. The need for an answer leads 
families to make demands of their own Government and of perpetrators, primarily the 
Indonesian authorities. Families seek their Government to cooperate with the 
Indonesians to reveal the truth about the missing and to aid in the return of human 
remains.   
A message from us, the families of the missing; we want that the Timorese 
and Indonesian governments should sit together to find a solution for those 
who are missing or died during Indonesian occupation up to the 
independence of Timor-Leste. (Brother of missing man, Dili.)  
A number of families were met, notably with relatives missing who were fighting with 
Falintil, who believe that some cases can be addressed using information that is 
available within Timor-Leste, from ex-comrades in Falintil.  
7.3 Psychosocial and emotional impact  
The medicalisation of trauma that has driven responses in many societies emerging from 
mass violence (Pupavac, 2005) has not occurred in Timor due to the lack of victim 
access to such discourses, since facilities and expertise have not reached rural areas. 
As a result most victims do not speak of post-traumatic stress or even trauma, but of 
much more local understandings, such as hanoin barak (Tetun, literally „thinking too 
much‟, a term indicating anxiety or intrusive sadness, Silove et al., 2008). A number of 
families used this phrase to describe their emotional state:  
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Her [mother of the Missing] life is very sad. She always feels sad when she 
goes to the fields. She thinks too much. Her illness is that sometimes she 
thinks too much, she can get a headache.  (Brother of missing man, 
Bobonaro.)  
It also appears that some of the emotional and psychological issues arising from what a 
Western approach would consider trauma and loss are ascribed to the action of spirits. 
Here a family member talks of life „having no movement‟, something that could describe 
the stasis often implied by ambiguous loss (Boss, 2006): this is blamed on the spirits, 
and specifically on the lack of a proper burial for the missing person:  
Our life was not running on from that time until now because since his loss 
we were suffering. We raised chickens, pigs and all animals but they always 
died because of his spirit. The spirit of the victim made our life have no 
movement. Maybe he [the spirit] sits alone and thinks, „you get a good place 
to live but I am suffering‟. As a result I do not have anything, including 
money, in my life. (Son of missing man, Lautem.)  
The families met demonstrated a range of symptoms associated both with the impact of 
trauma and of ambiguous loss, including sadness, depression, sleep disturbance and 
dreams of the missing, anxiety and hypervigilance; during interviews there was evidence 
of avoidance in some families. Thirty-eight per cent mentioned one of the symptoms or 
phenomena discussed here, but given the reluctance with which families talked of such 
issues, it likely that this represents significant under-reporting. The most commonly 
mentioned emotional impact of having a missing relative was sadness, reported in 11% 
of interviews. In most cases this did not appear to impact significantly on function, but 
permeated much of life. In 5% of interviews families spoke explicitly of depression, most 
often when a family member had been treated for mental illness:  
She looked for my missing father but never found him.  My mother was so 
depressed, she died from mental depression, she was not too old when she 
died.  (Daughter of missing man, Manatuto.)  
A common impact of disappearance was dreaming of the missing person. This was 
almost universally considered to be a manifestation or visit of the spirit of the missing 
person (see below).  Somatism was reported in 6.5% of interviews: family members in 
many cases understood that the stress of losing a loved one were responsible for 
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sickness, explicitly making a connection between physical symptoms and the mental 
anguish they were suffering.  
In some families, women, particularly wives of the Missing, were seen to have 
problems with their communities, echoing issues observed in Nepal (Section 6.2.3). Both 
family and community resent the fact that they do not dress as expected as widows. 
Issues over their identity in a society where women‟s roles are narrowly defined can be 
problematic: 
[When asked if she is a widow] I will say that I don‟t know about the life of my 
husband but I know that he is going to school. This is the information from 
the Indonesian government and some of the leaders. I do not know about the 
death of my husband or any other information beside his going to school. […] 
I do not know the opinion of the community but I, his wife, do not know [his 
fate].  (Wife of missing man, Lautem; this group was taken away by 
helicopter in 1976, with Indonesian authorities reporting they were leaving for 
military training.)  
Rituals and spiritual implications 
Timorese cultural conceptions include a spirit world that is as real and present as the 
physical world.  After someone‟s death it will be unsurprising to the family if they have 
contact with the spirit. This will often be through dreams, but can also occur more 
explicitly, for example through the spirit possessing a family member or other physical 
manifestations. During one interview of this study the younger brother of a missing youth 
became possessed by his spirit, beginning to shake and sweat heavily and able to pass 
on messages from the dead brother. A lack of contact from a spirit may be taken as 
evidence that the missing person is still alive, and so unable to communicate spiritually. 
Of the families met, more than half had had contact with the spirit of the Missing; in 60% 
of cases this was through dreams, while 23% had a waking experience of the spirit, 
either through possession of a living person or some other manifestation. For 10% of 
families who had previously had contact with the spirit this ceased once rituals had been 
done, with the assumption that the spirit was then at peace. The implication of this 
understanding of the spirits is that mechanisms to address the missing issue do not only 
serve the living, but are perceived as serving the dead, through allowing the spirits to 
rest in peace. The most important cultural element of the expressed needs was the 
performance of rituals that permit the spirits of the missing to rest: the consequences of 
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not making rituals for the dead were believed to be the potential sickness and death of 
family members, and instances of both were reported during interviews: 
Because they [the spirits] take over the place we cannot keep any animals 
because many died and only a few of us were left alive. For this reason we 
always get sick, we cannot domesticate our animals properly and we cannot 
live in peace, because the spirits are too strong. […] [They are the spirits of] 
those who died without knowing where they are buried. […] You know us 
Timorese, how we deal with the spirits. We know they died, but just think we 
did not get to bury them, and they died disgracefully, because we were not 
able to do any rituals; that is why they always come to disturb our family. 
(Brother of missing man, Bobonaro.)  
For Timorese families a malign spirit is the most negative potential impact of a missing 
relative; where the missing person is believed to be dead rituals can be made even in the 
absence of body, but for those who remain ambiguous about the fate of a loved one 
such rituals cannot be done.  
Our custom is like this: if we forget him, his spirit will always come but after 
we think of him and make his ceremony to bury him we believe that his spirit 
will never come again because he has found his place. (Brother of missing 
boy, Lautem.)  
In Timor-Leste, addressing the issue of those who died or are missing in the 
conflict means not only addressing the needs of the families but also the demands of the 
spirits. For some families met the peace of the nation is dependent upon this, with recent 
violence in the country perceived as arising from the many spirits of the conflict dead still 
not at rest. 
If the authorities do not do anything to address [the issue of the missing], 
many people will suffer again, because I believe that something else might 
happen: like a tragedy for the Nation. Let us face it, in 2006 what happened? 
In 2008, on the 11th of February the President was shot… and for those of 
us who believe in the spirits, the understanding was that this land is holy or 
sacred. So all I am asking for the authorities to follow up quickly in order to 
stop any other tragedy happening to this country. […] Still they take no 
action. I have told them, for whoever rules this nation, if we have done 
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nothing for them [the spirits], they will always shake up this country. (Father 
of missing man, Dili.) 
Information about the fate of the Missing and the location of human remains can 
be found using indigenous approaches, both through local spiritualists and from the 
spirits themselves. One woman met received information from the spirit of her husband 
about the bodies her family had recently exhumed, while others talked of traditional 
techniques that can be used to confirm the identity of exhumed remains. One implication 
of spirits visiting family members is that they can themselves pass information, and in 
some cases spirits can tell what has happened to them, and this can serve to reduce 
ambiguity about the loss and allow the family to understand what happened to loved 
ones. One family were convinced not only of their son‟s death but also of the location of 
his remains, since the spirit of their son had described in detail how he died. Another 
spirit reported that he had been dropped from a helicopter.   
Almost 90% of those met reported that they sought to receive the remains of 
missing loved ones. The need for a body is motivated not only by a desire to end 
ambiguity and perform ritual but by the need to acknowledge and recognise the 
contribution the dead are perceived to have made to the struggle for independence. This 
was also demonstrated by the need for a grave, a place where families could come to 
remember the dead and missing.  
7.3.1 Justice 
While justice, in a retributive sense, has been at the heart of much discussion about 
Timor-Leste‟s transition, few efforts have been made to understand what victims seek. In 
this study 10% of families mentioned retributive justice as a priority, and when asked 
explicitly about the need for prosecutions, only a minority sought them. For most families 
justice is perceived as receiving an answer regarding the fate, the return of remains, or 
recognition and compensation (Table 18), a reframing of the issue into the terms they 
prioritise.  
Meaning of justice Fraction 
Answer regarding fate /  
Return of human remains 
0.45 
Acknowledgment / recognition 0.32 
Prosecution 0.27 
Compensation 0.18 
Table 18 What families regard as the meaning of justice. 
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Whilst many families of those missing from 1999 maintain a fierce commitment to seeing 
justice done, these constituted only 15% of the sample, and in rural areas those families 
who have not had contact with mobilised victims or human rights agencies do not 
articulate judicial needs. A broader understanding of justice than the purely retributive 
was seen in statements families made using terms such as „social justice‟, echoing the 
rhetoric of the leadership, to describe their goals. When asked explicitly about the need 
for prosecutions a majority said either that this was not useful, not possible or a decision 
should be left to political leaders. One of the dominant attitudes towards justice was an 
understanding that ordinary people (ema ki‟ik, „small people‟) have little to say on the 
matter, seeing it as business for their leaders. A majority saw the deaths and 
disappearance as a „consequence of war‟:  
Like I said before, let it [justice] go because that was a consequence we 
faced of wanting independence, so many of us had to give their lives for it; 
it‟s all in the past now. They had reason to defend their nation, their integrity, 
as well as us here; we did the same, so just leave it to the past, it‟s all over 
now and let's face the future. The main thing we ask is to tell the truth: what 
have they done to them, to give clear information that we took them away. 
Here we ask to stop, we don't want any punishment, it's enough. The 
process is very long, let's see that whoever was responsible, he might have 
family and children, in case justice goes ahead, what will happen to his 
family? The best way is to finish with it, no punishment. (Mother of missing 
man, Dili.)  
A significant minority (40%) however, notably families of victims from 1999, felt judicial 
process to be important:  
Now, we have independence we want to investigate and ask why you killed 
Timorese people that looked for food to eat. You can tell us why you shot 
unarmed people. If they died because they were both shooting, that is no 
problem, but they had no gun. They were civilians that wanted to find food to 
eat. Both my father and my sister were killed, including him [the Missing], but 
we did not find him. (Brother of missing man, Lautem.) 
Another group that saw the need for prosecutions were the victims of Fretilin, who feel 
they and the crimes committed against their family members, have been forgotten in a 
process dominated by narratives of Indonesian violations (see Section 7.5):  
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I would like to talk about justice; we can see that we look more into pro-
autonomy37 people, while pro-independence people also made crimes so I 
can see there is no justice. Every time we blamed pro-autonomy people but 
pro-independence people were also wrong. Is there justice for them or not? 
We're looking more into pro-integrationist cases instead of ours. (Focus 
group participant, Bobonaro.)  
Families‟ attitudes to the limited judicial process that has occurred are discussed in 
Section 7.5. 
7.3.2 Reconciliation 
The conflict in Timor was not simply between a foreign army and native resistance but 
included intimate enmities between Timorese political parties, factional fighting within 
Fretilin and significant numbers of Timorese fighting on behalf of the Indonesians against 
their own compatriots. Despite this however, a need for reconciliation, or needs linked to 
problems with or between communities were articulated by no-one met. When asked all 
reported that relations within the community were unproblematic. The dominant narrative 
of the conflict remains that of an enemy outside the country, either Indonesians or 
Timorese militia who have fled, and the truth-telling process has not changed this. This 
study confirmed the extent to which Timorese were engaged in supporting the 
occupation, and that for most this is not an issue today:  
When the conflict began, I was a soldier. I was a member of the Portuguese 
military and turned into an Indonesian soldier; it was just a change of 
uniform. (Brother of man disappeared by Indonesian forces, Dili.)  
There is no problem in this community; the civilian defence units [Hansip, an 
Indonesian militia raised locally in Timor-Leste] included my own uncle 
because he is my mother's brother. We are from one family. (Son of Falintil 
fighter missing in action, Lautem.)  
The limited support for judicial process among the victims is also evidence that a mood 
of reconciliation, if not forgiveness, characterises responses. Perhaps the principal 
                                               
37
 Autonomy within Indonesia was the alternative to independence offered in the popular 
consultation of 1999 and whose advocates were responsible for the death and destruction that 
followed it.   
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exception to this arose in families of those who became victims in 1999, in which 
violence was often perpetrated by neighbours who were militia members. In many cases 
those responsible for killings and disappearances fled to Indonesia, and thus are not 
present to incite conflict in the community: families still seek justice and prosecutions of 
these individuals. Whilst the Community Reconciliation Programme (CRP) of CAVR was 
praised by some as a tool of reconciliation, the fact that rather few families met had any 
contact with it and that it did not engage with either serious crimes or cases prior to 
1999, suggests that it is not responsible for current attitudes (see Section 7.5).  
7.4 The time dependence of needs 
The dataset collected in this study permits an investigation of the dependence of family 
needs on time passed since disappearance, as a result of the fact that persons went 
missing over a period of 24 years. Here, variables have been plotted as a function of 
when the person went missing. The data have been divided into periods that contain a 
sufficient number of families that a statistically meaningful statement can be made: this 
leads to an uneven binning in time, owing to the uneven distribution of missing cases. 
For these plots the vertical error bars represent the statistical uncertainty on the 
measurement, arising from the limited number of families in each data bin. Figure 12 
shows the fraction of families believing that their missing loved one is dead, as a function 
of when he went missing. It appears to show for most of the data a significant trend that 
the longer someone is missing the more likely the family will believe him to be dead. 
Conversely, the number of families who feel ambiguity about the fate of the Missing 
decreases with time. The data point corresponding to those missing from 1999 is 
anomalous however. Similarly, in Figure 13 the fraction of families that have made some 
sort of ritual for their loved one is shown as a function of when he went missing. 
For those missing in 1999, 86% of families have made rituals for the Missing, 
contradicting the trend. That the families of those missing from 1999 are more likely to 
believe that the Missing are dead can be understood as a result of the collective nature 
of the experience of the violence of 1999. The violence impacted the entire country and it 
is widely understood that many died, constituting a shared experience where 
communities reinforce the belief of families that loved ones are dead. Additionally, the 
events of 1999 have been given far more attention in post-conflict Timor-Leste than the 
earlier deaths and disappearances were, and families are well aware that when taken by 
the militia people were killed, even if bodies have not been found. This is in contrast to 
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the experience of those whose loved ones are missing from earlier phases of conflict 
where little information was available and it was quite conceivable that relatives were 
alive elsewhere, or held by the Indonesians. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 12 Fraction of families believing their loved one to be dead as a 
function of date of disappearance. 
 
Figure 13 Fraction of families having done some ritual for their missing loved 
one, as a function of date of disappearance. 
 
 
 
 
1975 - 77 1978 1979 1980-81 1982-84 1985-98 1999
0.00
0.10
0.20
0.30
0.40
0.50
0.60
0.70
0.80
0.90
1.00
1975 - 77 1978 1979 1980-81 1982-84 1985-98 1999
0.00
0.10
0.20
0.30
0.40
0.50
0.60
0.70
0.80
0.90
1.00
 206 
 
7.5 Attitudes to transitional justice mechanisms 
All those met were explicitly asked about the mechanisms of transitional justice that had 
taken place in the country, namely judicial process, CAVR and the valorisation process. 
In many cases however, mechanisms were not known by families of victims. Indeed the 
first conclusion to be drawn is that whatever the aim of those processes they did not 
impact significantly on victims of the conflict.  
Victims’ attitudes to judicial processes 
Whilst hardly any families knew of the limited judicial processes that had taken place, 
some were aware of the Indonesian efforts to try those guilty of crimes in 1999, and 
families of the victims of the violence of 1999 were highly critical. Families knew a little 
more of the trials resulting from the serious crimes process in Timor-Leste; however 
these latter concerned only a minority of families (those who lost loved ones in 1999). 
There is a perception that the issue of justice for victims emphasises the events of 1999, 
over the more widespread violations of the preceding years: 
[...] there is no justice for the people that died in 1975. Justice is only for the 
people that died in 1999. (Father of missing man, Lautem.)  
This interest in trials was further diminished by the fact that no family was met whose 
case had been heard by the courts in Timor, reflecting that more than 600 deaths in the 
violence of 1999 have not been investigated (Reiger and Wierda, 2006). Despite the 
many words that have been written about justice and the limited process of trials, the 
dominant attitude of most families of victims is one of ignorance: they are largely 
unaware of what judicial process has taken place, despite a vociferous minority for whom 
justice is extremely important.  
A woman whose husband had been killed in 1999 reported that forensic experts 
from Serious Crimes took away artefacts from a well where her husband‟s body is 
presumed to lie, including her husband‟s wedding ring, some years before, but that she 
had heard nothing since. In general those few families who discussed the Serious 
Crimes process saw it as remote, understood little about it and received little information 
about the process. 
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Victims’ attitudes to CAVR 
The most powerful initial finding of this study is how little people know of CAVR, despite 
its extensive outreach and significant presence throughout the country.  A majority (65%) 
claimed to know something about the Commission and a minority (11%) had given 
statements; two families met had seen CRP (Community Reconciliation Process) 
sessions. However when probing the views of families on the work of CAVR, it is clear 
that knowledge of it, even among those who claimed to be aware of its work, was 
actually rather scant: half of those who said they knew of CAVR had no opinion of its 
work. The two families who had attended CRP sessions did not know that these were 
part of CAVR. Because of the direct potential benefit to families, many had sought 
contact with the Veterans‟ Commissions, and a significant fraction of those met either 
confused these with CAVR, or had little idea that they were distinct. Beyond the limited 
number involved in victims‟ groups, none had seen the report of CAVR, but some had 
heard something about it on the radio.  
Did family  
know CAVR?38 
Fraction 
Dili Lautem Bobonaro Manatuto Total 
Not known - 0.28 0.11 0.53 0.27 
Know vaguely 0.38 0.50 0.44 0.20 0.42 
Know well 0.62 0.22 0.44 0.27 0.33 
Table 19 Did family know CAVR? (As function of district.) 
A deeply ethnographic study with families in two aldeias reported that 3.5% 
(Nanu, Kovalima) and 43.7% (Sarelari, Lautem) had heard of CAVR (Grenfell et al, 
2008), respectively. The difference in these two figures suggests that there is some 
geographical dependence upon knowledge of CAVR, and this is supported by the data of 
this study (Table 19). 
Whilst half of those met were insufficiently informed to have an opinion of CAVR, a 
quarter believed that CAVR had produced no results. 7% believed that CAVR had led to 
their receiving a medal or pension. Others considered CAVR biased against victims of 
Fretilin, or that it brought back the pain of their loss; 9% believed that its work was good, 
                                               
38
 „Know vaguely‟ indicates that families had heard mention of CAVR on the radio, while „not 
known‟ meant they had no idea what it was; „know well‟ indicates that families knew something of 
the CAVR mandate.  
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or that it did what it was able to. Opinions of CAVR were dominated by two attitudes: 
first, that the Commission had not been interested in meeting victim families, and 
second, that the Commission had produced no results for families. That only 13% had 
met with CAVR reinforces a widely shared perception among families that no-one in 
authority cares about what happened to victims or the condition they now find 
themselves in. The greatest complaint about CAVR was that it had done nothing for 
victims. Many families believe that CAVR had failed them because they have received 
nothing (no reparations or recognition), as a result of the CAVR process. This is of 
course due to either a misunderstanding of the CAVR mandate or of the process that 
has delayed the implementation of the recommendations of the CAVR final report (such 
as the reparations process): most families are simply unaware of such issues.   
CAVR did a good job in taking data but the result of publication seems like 
just to bring back the wound and the pain as some people have been able to 
forget but this information is like bringing the pain back again. No reparation 
has been received until now, there is no legal basis for reparation either; it 
should be on their recommendation with regard to reparation based on the 
needs of the family. (Brother of missing man, Dili.)  
There was a perception among victims of Fretilin that CAVR focussed on Indonesian 
violations and deliberately avoided those families who were victims of the resistance:  
We have waited for CAVR for a long time but they have not come here yet, 
they just passed by. They have not visited us to talk more seriously with us, 
to find the root of problems to put these people in prison. [...] No, they 
haven‟t visited us, you are the first visitor who asked us about the missing.  
CAVR visited others; we are the only ones that they did not come to visit. 
(Son of man killed by Fretilin with two other family members, Manatuto.)  
In one community in coastal Manatuto that was highly impacted by Fretilin raids, with 
many killed, families claimed that CAVR had talked only with those who had been with 
Falintil in the hills, in fact those responsible for violations, and as such had learnt little of 
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the truth of that period.39 Others see this as an intrinsic bias in the process that reduces 
its value by seeking to blame Indonesia rather than Timorese:  
I see that CAVR is not good because those who spoke and those who 
interviewed, these people only spoke out about some things and didn‟t 
release other information. They only spoke out about the things that made 
them look good and sometimes they added stories that made us mad, not to 
make us feel comfortable because they made up many stories. They told 
false stories, I do not believe that a person would say that I have killed 
someone and then it‟s impossible to say what he has done. Who has the 
courage to tell the truth, that he killed people? I don‟t believe it. Fretilin 
supporters who surrendered and died, one question: who killed them? Will 
he tell the truth? All of the mistakes were blamed on Indonesia. (Father of 
missing youth, Dili.)  
One man who had been jailed by Fretilin in 1975 (and seen many others not survive 
detention) asked why those responsible are not brought to justice, since they remain in 
Timor today. 
Rather few families met were familiar with the mechanisms of CAVR‟s 
reconciliation work, but those who were aware were highly complementary about the 
Community Reconciliation Programme:  
CAVR did a good job because they have resolved a case down there; a 
person who was a victim. I went there to participate, a priest from Manatuto 
also came and we were on the biti bo‟ot [big mat] where all the traditional 
elders speak, it went well. [...] My aunt who lives down there, she was a 
victim; a priest from Manatuto came here with the elderly to sit on the biti 
bo‟ot and distribute money. Until today, the victim receives money. But she 
was a victim of Timorese where a man who lives up there threatened her, no 
violation, a verbal violation only. They have resolved it, there is peace 
between them, and a celebration was conducted for the process. (Sister of 
missing man, Manatuto.) 
                                               
39
 Examining the CAVR report, the scale of the violence by Fretilin and the massive casualties in 
this area reported by the community and its leaders are nowhere mentioned.   
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Such tributes represent a real success in the concerned communities. However, the 
framing of the CRP process to deal only with non serious crimes prevents it from aiding 
with cases of the dead and missing, and on the evidence of this study, the CRP was 
accessed by rather few victims.40 In general it was seen that families did not have 
problems with those in their community linked to violations and the data of this study 
suggest that reconciliation within communities is largely accomplished. (It is also clear 
that in many communities issues that predate the conflict, as well as some that arose 
during Indonesian times, continue to bitterly divide some communities and serve as 
potential triggers to future violence.) Given the fact that the CRP did not address the 
issue of the missing or the dead, and that its coverage was far from complete, it seems 
likely that such reconciliation has been either spontaneous or made through community 
level initiatives. An exception concerns families of victims from 1999 who are aware that 
perpetrators known to them remain in Indonesia, apparently immune from any judicial 
process. More general attitudes to Indonesia, again with the exception of 1999 victims, 
also appear to be dominated by acceptance and a commitment to coexistence.   
One family linked the work of CAVR to their issues with the spirits of the dead 
and considered that the work of CAVR was dangerous precisely because discussing the 
dead where spirits have not been placated can be dangerous:  
We are mentioning their name here, sometimes we could all get sick in the 
future because their spirits have been silent but the government always 
comes and disturbs us to mention their name. It means that we can get sick. 
[…] When CAVR had not yet come here in the past we had no problem, but 
when CAVR asked us to register all of their names, we faced many 
problems. It can happen, because they are dead. (Son of missing man, 
Lautem.)  
Issues around the relevance of a truth process centred on the capital in a traditional rural 
society are discussed in Section 8.2.   
                                               
40
 It has been reported that CAVR engaged 3-4% of the population in CRP hearings (Burgess, 
2006), and the fraction of families met in this study who had attended hearings is consistent with 
this.   
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Victims’ attitudes toward the valorisation process 
45% of those families met had received a medal, and 13% were receiving a pension as a 
result of the Veterans‟ Commissions. The large scale awarding of medals through the 
Veterans‟ Commissions has been a huge success. The medals are considered valuable 
and important by most families:  
Yes we are happy [with the medals and pension], it means a history of my 
father's sacrifice to help free the country; although he is not here with us but 
this is something that honours him. (Children of missing man, Dili.)  
If we receive it [a medal], we will consider we have received the body of my 
father. (Daughter of missing man, Lautem.)  
In addition to the medal itself many families talked with some pride of the award 
ceremonies where senior members of the leadership had given them the medals. The 
awarding of medals appears to be something hugely popular with recipients whilst being 
quite affordable for the authorities (at least in comparison with the pension scheme or a 
comprehensive reparations process). It can thus very reasonably be considered the most 
successful mechanism in attempting to address a need of the families of the dead and 
missing. As with any process this important to families, there was much complaint and 
query about it: indeed this only serves to emphasise the importance families ascribe to it. 
No families were met who did not know how or where to register their loved ones, 
demonstrating that where a mechanism is perceived as meeting a need, rural victims will 
find ways to access it, in contrast to CAVR. Complaints about valorisation centred on 
obstacles to registration and the failure following registration of recognition to come. For 
families met the greatest complaint remains that valorisation is only for veterans and that 
many of the dead and missing are not in that category but still deserve to be 
remembered for their sacrifice:  
...all the veterans and those who are missing are just the same. Both gave 
themselves for this country. Why do the veterans get the subsidy but those 
who are missing cannot get it? (Focus group participant, Bobonaro.)  
Support from family and community 
In contrast to a remote transitional justice process that gave victims little, families talked 
of how they had found support locally, in their family and community.  For some their 
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Catholic faith was a mechanism that helped them to cope, both privately and through the 
intervention of priests, who provided both emotional and often very practical support:  
The one who helped in consoling my mother was the priest. This priest finally 
supported my eldest brother to go to school in Fatumaca. Later, a priest 
came and supported one of my siblings to go to school in Maubisse. (Son of 
missing man, Dili.)   
Within communities victims found solidarity and support from their peers, most often 
those who shared their experiences: 
We the combatants, we the ones who still remain alive in the village since 
1975 until now, for us things are the same. We are a small number of people 
and families, we never leave each other, we never fight with each other but 
we actually support each other and we love each other. (Man missing many 
relatives, Bobonaro.) 
Not only did families talk of this support, but in many cases it was visible when they were 
met to discuss the impact of disappearance. The research duplicated what families 
themselves had been doing since the violence of the conflict: talking with each-other to 
give meaning to the extreme events they had experienced. When groups of victims were 
met this became apparent: mothers would share their sorrow and their ambiguity and 
this, building on long traditions of talking and sharing, represented the most local and 
effective support mechanisms to which families had access. The family associations 
represented the formalisation of such processes, the principal reason they were so 
effective.  
7.6 Summary and conclusions: Questioning the relevance to 
victims of the transitional justice process 
This study reveals a gap between the stated goals of the transitional process that has 
occurred over the last decade in Timor-Leste and the needs of victims. Transitional 
mechanisms emphasised a process of truth and reconciliation, while judicial process was 
largely neglected. However, despite the leadership‟s emphasis in rhetoric of issues of 
„social justice‟, that are echoed by many of the victims met, such approaches have been 
absent from efforts to address Timor‟s legacy of violence. There has notably been no 
reparations process that could offer both economic support and recognition, while the 
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success of the valorisation process reveals the importance to victims of such an 
approach. As the centrepiece of the transitional justice process CAVR promised truth 
and reconciliation. The evidence of this study is that it was largely irrelevant to victims of 
serious crimes. Only a small minority of families met had any contact with CAVR during 
its work, as might be expected given the challenge of addressing more than 100,000 
deaths, even where some 8,000 submissions were received from among the country‟s 
population of almost one million. The product of the Commission is a report that remains 
largely inaccessible to the ordinary people of Timor-Leste both physically since copies 
have not reached villages and due to widespread illiteracy.41 Narratives of „healing‟ as 
emerging from the public presentation of truth fail to resonate with most victims for the 
simple reason that very few of them engaged with any stage of the CAVR process.    
Memories of the conflict have for most of those affected not been recounted as 
part of the transitional justice process and what comfort victims have found has come 
from support in family and community. The cathartic metaphor of a truth commission 
does not resonate with a family that is confronted daily with the unmet basic needs that 
arise as a result of the loss of a husband or a son. More than this, the truth that CAVR 
delivers is a public truth, an act of historiography that does not coincide with the truth that 
victims seek. The victims of conflict know how they and their families suffered: they 
expressed no need for this experience to be validated through integration in an official 
report. Firstly, victims sought a very private truth, they wanted to know what had 
happened to dead and missing loved ones, and sought to satisfy cultural demands for 
bodies and rituals. Secondly, they wanted recognition of their suffering, through receipt 
of official sanction of their loved one‟s sacrifice, either through medals, compensation, or 
memorials. For example, it remains a mystery to the families of those missing as a result 
of the Santa Cruz massacre of 1991, why no memorial to the event yet exists. Their 
family members‟ lives have become a part of the liberation narrative that sustains Timor-
Leste‟s sometimes fragile sense of nationhood and yet families still have no place they 
can mourn their loved ones, or confirm the value of their loved one‟s sacrifice.   
Reconciliation was to be delivered through the CRP, but was constrained to 
dealing with less serious crimes and almost exclusively with the events of 1999. Whilst it 
engaged rather few of the victims of the conflict, those met who had engaged with the 
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CRP found it valuable for their communities. This study suggests that the people of 
Timor-Leste are largely reconciled, with little mention of problems within or between 
communities, with even attitudes towards Indonesia reflecting an acceptance that 
coexistence is necessary and that the long years of conflict should not determine future 
relations. It remains unclear however to what extent this can be credited to the CRP, 
given victims‟ unfamiliarity with it. Only family members of those killed in the violence of 
1999, either by Indonesians or Timorese who remain in Indonesia, prioritise judicial 
process. In this sense the position of the leadership in not prioritising prosecutions 
coincides far better with victims‟ views than human rights advocates who see 
accountability as a principal goal of the transitional justice process. Despite the CAVR 
process being well accessed by elites, where reconciliation has clearly failed is among 
the leadership itself, where splits that date back to the era of the Indonesian invasion 
have been blamed for sustaining the policy decisions that drove the 2006 violence both 
within and between the various security forces (Aarons, 2006; UN, 2006). 
The finding of this study that judicial process is not a priority for most victims 
directly contradicts other studies (Pigou, 2004; Kingston, 2006). This likely arises from 
the difference in the victims accessed and emphasises the importance when 
generalising from such studies of ensuring that samples are representative. This study 
shows that urban victims have very different agendas from those in rural areas. Similarly, 
victims who have had contact with CAVR or with rights agencies, or have been mobilised 
through victims‟ groups, will demand very different things from more isolated victims. As 
a result any study that uses existing networks of victims is likely to reflect a much more 
empowered community of victims, familiar with the rights discourse. For the vast majority 
of those met here, there is little perception that they have rights, or can make demands: 
they maintain a deferential attitude to Government.   
The single most important issue to families is the economic one, and the failure of 
any element of the transitional justice process to address this represents its greatest 
failure in the eyes of victims. CAVR was unusual among Truth Commissions in that it 
devoted attention to the social and economic consequences of the Indonesian invasion, 
notably through what it describes as policies of “displacement and famine” (CAVR, 2005: 
7.3). Indeed, the CAVR report notes that far more deaths arose from hunger and disease 
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than from the direct action of the security forces.42 Despite this however, CAVR‟s 
recommendation of a broad reparation process was rejected by the Government, and 
there has been no acknowledgment of the economic consequences of victimhood on 
families. The priority that families give to economic support and official recognition is 
seen in their response to the process of valorisation that has given both 
acknowledgement and livelihood support. What remains to be done is to ensure a similar 
process for those civilians who became victims of the conflict.      
A success of the CAVR process was that it exposed the truth of the conflict in its 
complexities and cruelties, focussing on the violence of the entire 24 year period and 
ensuring that crimes of the Timorese „resistance‟ were also emphasised. Questions 
remain however about the extent to which the most difficult truths have really been 
integrated into the national narrative, and how much contact with such truth-telling rural 
people have. The victims of the liberation movement remain distraught at the lack of 
recognition of their suffering. Whilst the very visible valorisation process has been 
welcomed, it of course excludes those who became victims of Fretilin or Falintil. In this 
sense the construction of a narrative of the conflict as one characterised exclusively by 
an Indonesian brutalisation of Timor-Leste has not been challenged by the transitional 
process, and is perhaps the account that most suits the leadership. 
The greatest implication for the future of the state of a remote transitional justice 
process is the alienation of victims from those who govern them. An apparent refusal by 
successive Governments to view the legacy of the conflict through the eyes of its victims, 
who still largely live in poverty in rural areas, poses a potential threat to continued 
stability. Many veterans were met during this study, few in number and ageing but deeply 
disaffected with the performance of the heroes of the resistance who now hold office. 
Such sentiment, combined with the continuing inability of the regime to ensure the 
livelihood of a youthful population can create an explosive mixture with the ability to 
ensure violence in the future.  Division has also been seen among victims, with some 
resenting the greater attention, both judicially and otherwise, given to victims of the 1999 
violence and envious of the generous payments made to those displaced in 2006. This 
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highlights one danger of seeking a reparative process that does not appear inclusive to 
victims.  
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Chapter 8 Addressing the needs of families of the 
Missing: A critique of current practice in 
transition 
This chapter uses the data from Nepal and Timor-Leste to examine how effectively 
contemporary approaches to transitional justice address the needs of families of the 
Missing. It begins by considering the research questions and supporting theoretical 
propositions and discussing how the data address these. The chapter then considers the 
goals and mechanisms of typical transitional justice processes, how these map onto the 
needs articulated by families in both primary contexts and what constrains them in more 
effectively meeting needs.  
An effort is made here to engage with the mechanisms that typify transitional 
justice and with the needs articulated by the families of the Missing in this study, with the 
intention of identifying conceptual and practical gaps, as shown in the previous chapters. 
In the low income states studied, the priorities of victims are economic and concerned 
with the fate of the Missing and retrieval of remains (Chapter 6 and Chapter 7). The 
relevance of Timor-Leste‟s Truth Commission to such needs is examined in the light of 
victims‟ perceptions and this extended to a questioning of the ethos that underlies such 
processes. The low priority with which victims view prosecutorial process is contrasted 
with the emphasis on retribution in transitional justice discourse, and the legalism of the 
rights approach critiqued. The theory and practice of reparations is discussed in light of 
the data of the study, with an emphasis on the priority of victims for reparative measures 
that are principally economic and on the gendered aspects of reparations. Victims‟ need 
for reparation in those areas that are largely neglected by contemporary transitional 
justice process, including the psychosocial and in terms of answers concerning the 
Missing and human remains, are discussed in Section 9.2.  
8.1 Addressing the needs of families of the Missing 
This section addresses the two components of the research question, namely, outlining 
the needs of the families of the Missing and the effectiveness with which they are 
addressed by transitional justice process.  
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Theoretical proposition one summarises needs as consisting of: answers, human 
remains, resources, truth and justice, and support; in both contexts this is seen as an 
accurate summary of needs:  
 Answers refer to the need for a definitive addressing of the question of 
the fate of the Missing, primarily whether he is dead or alive, but also the 
need for details of how he died and where his remains are.  
 Human remains refer to the need for the body of the Missing, seen by 
many as the only definitive answer and the only way to permit rituals to 
be performed. The way in which this is articulated by families implies that 
a process of exhumation and identification is required.  
 Truth and justice overlap strongly with the need for an answer and a 
body. Truth for families means primarily an answer about the fate and the 
body is the most favoured way of confirming that truth. Truth as a history 
of conflict of the sort produced by a Truth Commission was largely not 
mentioned by families. Justice was seen not primarily as the prosecution 
of perpetrators, but in broader terms, including both answers about the 
Missing and a „social justice‟ in which the families of the Missing are 
provided with livelihood and the loss or sacrifice of the Missing is 
recognised.  
 Resources refer to the need for economic or livelihood support, to both 
replace the economic contribution of the Missing, and in the light of 
widespread poverty in both contexts, raising the issue of transitional 
justice as addressing issues of livelihood and development..  
 Support refers to issues of rehabilitation, relief and compensation, i.e. 
economic and livelihood support, but also to broader aid with coping with 
the impact of disappearance and the overall impacts of conflict. This 
includes support for very local processes, such as creating communities 
of victims that can help each-other, as well as addressing stigmatisation 
in family and community.  
The needs outlined above were, in Timor-Leste, largely not addressed by the 
mechanisms of transitional justice that are for the most part complete and, in Nepal, did 
not appear likely to be addressed by the mechanisms under consideration. This can be 
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understood by considering the other theoretical propositions. Proposition two claims that 
transitional justice mechanisms are created subject to the balance of political forces, and 
that victims play little role in this. Whilst victims are indeed seen to have played almost 
no role in the development of transitional mechanisms in either context (Chapter 7 and 
Chapter 8), the „politics‟ in both scenarios is more complex than might be imagined. In 
Timor-Leste the leadership determined the overall direction of the process and this 
emphasised „truth and reconciliation‟ rather than prosecutorial justice or reparative 
process. This decision was driven by a political desire to ensure good relations with 
Indonesia and a perception that pursuing those perpetrators that were accessible to the 
Timorese authorities was not in the broader national interest. Similarly the lack of any 
significant reparations process for victims appears to be sustained by a wish to promote 
a narrative of the conflict in which all Timorese are heroes, rather than victims, and in 
which evidence of Timorese culpability is ignored. In Nepal, the political successors of 
the parties to the conflict are driving the transition and seek to minimise retributive 
process. They are however under strong international pressure to embrace a narrative of 
„truth and reconciliation‟ and are ultimately likely to do so in some sense. This agenda is 
driven by foreigners and national elites and is attempting to impose a narrative on the 
transition consistent with current global orthodoxy, despite its lack of resonance with 
victim agendas. In this sense, transitional justice in both Nepal and Timor-Leste is 
subject not just to a national political agenda but restricted by a broader global discourse 
(Section 8.2).  
In Nepal this led to the commitment to a Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
being written into the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (Govt. of Nepal, 2006c), despite 
there being no apparent commitment to it from the parties signing the CPA. Interviews 
with those involved in the development of the CPA suggest that the proposal for a TRC 
came directly from foreigners engaged with the process, with some actors tracing its 
inclusion directly to a highly placed advisor to the process being of South African origin.43  
It appears that not only were the Nepali political actors (from the mainstream parties and 
CPN-M) not emphasising such a mechanism but they may well have not understood 
what it was at the time they committed to such a process. The net result since has been 
no interest from any of the parties in transitional justice mechanisms beyond those, such 
as relief payments, that can be used as instruments of political patronage. Despite a 
continuing commitment of foreign donors and agencies to transitional justice, or at least 
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their vision of it, political deadlock has ensured that it has been a priority for almost no 
domestic constituency beyond victims themselves. This reveals the dangers of 
attempting to drive such a process externally and the importance of both engaging 
victims in the process and of letting indigenous agendas dominate, even at the risk of 
bucking dominant global discourses.  
In Timor-Leste the CAVR was largely an instrument of international rather than 
Timorese will and even today the leadership maintains scepticism towards judicial 
process in particular and efforts to address the past in general. This has been 
demonstrated through the bringing into government of those closely linked to the 
Indonesian authorities prior to 1999, and through Presidential pardons and 
commutations of sentences of the few convicted by the Special Panels. The process of 
drafting a law to address issues of reparation and the Missing, observed by the 
researcher during his advocacy with the Timorese authorities in 2009 - 10, has revealed 
the extent to which this remains a process that not only excludes victims but actually 
ensures that decisions are made by very few. The legislation currently before a 
Parliamentary Committee has been written, translated and adapted into a relevant legal 
framework (i.e. a Portuguese one) by a series of foreign consultants. The draft has, at 
the time of writing, received rather little examination from Timorese. Whilst a 
Parliamentary Committee is discussing the legislation, it is clear that the two most 
important political figures, the President and Prime Minister, will have a veto on any new 
law. This is in effect a dictatorship by charisma, in which all authority is vested in the 
credibility of the two „paramount‟ leaders, marginalising not just victims but also the 
Parliamentary process. This has implications for the legitimacy of both the process and 
the authorities themselves.  
The lack of a significant reparations process, or the prospect of one, in either 
context is linked to the findings concerning proposition three, that rights based 
approaches emphasise civil and political issues at the expense of the social and 
economic. This is confirmed by the study, with the priority given by families to economic 
issues failing to be reflected in mechanisms created or issues discussed in either 
context. The fourth proposition, that mechanisms are more likely to address victim needs 
when victims participate in their creation appears to be strongly favoured by the data of 
this study, but cannot claim to be demonstrated. This is discussed in detail in Section 
10.2.  
 221 
 
In the rest of this chapter the results of the study are analysed in the light of these 
propositions and of the research question more generally. The principal mechanisms of 
contemporary transitional justice (truth commissions, trials, reparations processes) are 
discussed and critiqued in the light of the data.  
8.2 Truth Commissions: Challenging the therapeutic ethic 
This section emphasises the context, Timor-Leste, where a Truth Commission (CAVR) 
has reported. As the centrepiece of the transitional justice process in Timor-Leste, CAVR 
promised truth and reconciliation, very much in what has become the mainstream of 
transitional justice, with the trope of „truth as healing‟ (Section 4.3.3) driving the process. 
Here the data from victims is used to make a victim-centred evaluation of the CAVR 
process.  
The evidence of this study is that both the process and product of the 
Commission were largely irrelevant to victims. Victims‟ distance from transitional process 
was driven by both the lack of physical access that ordinary, largely rural, Timorese had 
to the mechanisms, and by the lack of resonance between their needs and CAVR‟s 
goals. Despite the decentralised Community Reconciliation Process (CRP) and the 
district level offices of CAVR, only a small minority of victims had any contact with CAVR 
during its work, revealing the challenge of addressing more than 100,000 deaths, even 
where some 8,000 submissions were received. The product of the Commission is a 
report that remains largely inaccessible to the ordinary people of Timor-Leste both 
physically and due to widespread illiteracy.44 Narratives of personal „healing‟ as 
emerging from the public presentation of truth fail to resonate with victims for the simple 
reason that few of them engaged with any stage of the CAVR process. Memories of the 
conflict have, for most of those affected, not been recounted as part of the transitional 
justice process; the cathartic metaphor of a truth commission lacks meaning for a family 
that is confronted daily with the unmet basic needs that arise as a result of the loss of a 
husband or a son. More than this, the truth that CAVR delivers is a public truth, an act of 
historiography that does not coincide with what victims seek. Victims of conflict know 
how they and their families suffered: they expressed no need for this experience to be 
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validated through integration in a remote official report.45 First, victims sought a very 
private truth, they wanted to know what had happened to dead and missing loved ones, 
and sought to satisfy cultural demands for bodies and rituals. Second, they wanted 
recognition of their suffering, visible integration into political memory (Section 9.2), 
through receipt of official sanction of their loved one‟s sacrifice, either through medals, 
compensation, or memorials. As such, it is not only the degree of engagement of CAVR 
with victims that led to the failure to address victims‟ needs, but also the quality of that 
engagement.  
Reconciliation was to be delivered through the CRP, but was constrained to 
dealing with less serious crimes and almost exclusively with the events of 1999. This 
study suggests that the people of Timor-Leste are largely reconciled, with little mention 
of problems within or between communities, and attitudes towards Indonesia reflecting 
an acceptance that coexistence is necessary and that the long years of conflict should 
not determine future relations. It seems unlikely however that this can be credited to the 
CRP, given victims‟ unfamiliarity with it. Despite the CAVR process being well accessed 
by elites, where reconciliation has clearly failed is among the leadership itself, where 
splits that date back to the era of the Indonesian invasion have been blamed for 
sustaining the policy decisions that drove the 2006 violence both within and between the 
security forces (Aarons, 2006; UN, 2006). 
The challenges of communicating the work of the Commission in a dispersed and 
rural society like Timor-Leste‟s denied CAVR the performative element (Andrews, 2003) 
that is crucial to institutionalising the truth claims of victims through public truth-telling. 
Whilst the CRP worked well in the communities where it was used, there was no 
equivalent on a national stage. As a result the social goal of reconnecting victims and 
society has failed, with no “societal consensus” (Humphrey, 2003) emerging from it. The 
observation that most of the population have had no contact with either the work or final 
report of CAVR also questions the ability of Truth Commissions to meet their national 
and societal goals in rural low income states, where populations are isolated and 
inaccessible. It seems highly unlikely that the national goal of reconciliation can be 
achieved through the work of such a Commission in these circumstances. In Nepal 
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similar challenges will face any such commission. A truth commission also has a political 
role that confers legitimacy on the state through public acceptance of the commission‟s 
work and final report (ibid). A danger for the future of Timor-Leste is that this goal for 
CAVR remains unmet. The issues arising from the nation‟s legacy of violence continue to 
alienate victims from their rulers. 
The evidence of the data is that in a society where identity is largely constructed 
locally, such processes can only work locally, and that a truly participatory national 
memory project would always have been impossible in a society as disparate as that of 
Timor. The victims‟ groups interviewed in this study have been initiating the construction 
of local memorials and constructing their own histories through talking. This continues 
long traditions among rural communities of story-telling and appears to be a more 
valuable coping mechanism than public testimony (Section 7.5): 
The psychologically healing process of testifying or telling one‟s story is not 
dependent upon the content of the story (as lawyers tend to assert) but 
rather on the environment and the process of the actual re-telling. (Hamber, 
1996: 5)  
Truth Commissions operate through the continuing objectification of the victim to support 
the broader aims of the state. It is not clear that the victim who is the central performer in 
the exercise benefits. Most victims in Timor-Leste remain as publicly silenced now as 
during the conflict, despite the fetishisation of the testimony that did emerge during the 
CAVR process. Victims need to overcome objectification and become subjects in their 
own right, which demands their mobilisation and empowerment (Section 10.2), a process 
that has only recently begun in Timor-Leste on a national scale.46  
Meanings given to the violence to which people were subject are intimately linked 
to local perspectives and emerge as a unique product of the social and symbolic worlds 
they occupy. This is revealed most clearly in the importance assigned in Timor-Leste to 
spiritual issues, an area where a global discourse of rights and reconciliation can make 
no contribution. There is no evidence that a Western therapeutic approach has any 
relevance in providing healing for those who suffered from violence. Critiques of trauma 
as a culturally constructed pathology that cannot be generalised (Summerfield, 2004; 
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Mezey & Robbins, 2001; von Peter, 2008) are echoed in indigenous Timorese responses 
to mass violence through interactions with the supernatural and a demand for addressing 
of spiritual needs (Section 7.2.3). CAVR as an exercise in therapy failed victims due both 
to the inability of most victims to engage with it, and to its articulation of a Western 
therapeutic ethos that did not address local needs.  
Challenging truth as healing 
This section uses the evidence from both Timor and Nepal to make more general 
critiques of the concept of the Truth Commission from the perspective of victims of 
political violence. Whilst the “global paradigm of redemptive memory” (Shaw, 2008: 183) 
in transitional truth-telling processes has come “to appear „natural‟ and „universal‟” (ibid), 
the value of this approach has been subject to rather few empirical tests. The data of this 
study challenges the therapeutic power of testimony for both individuals and nations 
(Colvin, 2003). Whilst others have questioned the link between truth and individual and 
societal healing (Humphrey, 2003; Daly, 2008; Wilson, 2001) this is the first to note that 
victims have simply been unable to be a part of a truth process, as well as pointing to its 
apparent conceptual irrelevance to them. This raises questions about the mechanism by 
which victim testimony heals a nation that remain obscure (Avruch, 2010). It seems clear 
however that where a population is unaware of a process, that process cannot contribute 
significantly to societal healing. The families of the Missing met in Nepal and Timor 
talked very little of healing. Such needs were most concretely expressed when 
discussing health impacts, mental, physical and somatic; the healing victim families most 
require is access to healthcare, support within their family and community, and an end to 
ambiguity (Section 8.4): the term recovery seems more appropriate to characterise their 
demands. More than this, the structural violence of poverty and inequality, as articulated 
in both Nepal and Timor-Leste, is likely to remain an obstacle to recovery for many in 
poor and unequal societies.  
In contrast to Timor-Leste, in many transitional contexts individual victims are 
exposed to a discourse of trauma, where it drives approaches to psychosocial work (e.g. 
Ager, 1997, de Jong et al., 2001; Pupavac, 2005). For individual victims it is unclear that 
this is entirely positive (Summerfield, 1999; Eisenbruch, 1991): imposing the frame of 
trauma on victims implies a diagnosis of PTSD and a consequent need for „therapy‟, in 
contrast to potentially more relevant and local understandings of how they might respond 
to the impact of victimisation. Additionally, the therapeutic ethos implies that once truth 
has been told and its performative role is complete, the victim (like the nation) will be 
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cured (Colvin, 2003). In practice, such testimony can as often be damaging as 
therapeutic (Silove et al., 2006; de Ridder, 1997) and after victims have disappeared 
from the national stage that a Truth Commission provides their suffering continues. The 
data of this study strongly suggest that what the families of the Missing most need is to 
be able to reconstruct meaning and identity in a social way, in their own communities 
(Robins, 2010a), and that this is best done in peer groups at a very local level, rather 
than on a national and very public stage (Section 8.4). The importance of storytelling in 
building solidarity among victims that emerges in Timor and in attitudes to victims‟ 
groups of those met in Nepal (Section 6.2.3) is confirmed elsewhere (Colvin, 2003). A 
Truth Commission necessarily individualises victims in ways which divorce them both 
from their communities (membership of which was very often the reason they became 
victims) and from the political and other motivations of the violence to which they were 
subject (Mamdani, 2002).  
Western approaches emphasise narrative as legitimating victimhood and the 
Truth Commission depends upon it, as all testimony based approaches must. In the 
highly unequal societies studied here, not only have we seen a Truth Commission where 
the giving of such testimony was denied the majority of victims, but entire communities of 
victims who are denied any narrative at all. The poor and disempowered, and even more 
so those marginalised within such groups, have little voice because it is denied them by 
the power structures to which they are subject. This has led the effort here to understand 
victims‟ worlds experientially, and to construct a bridge to narrative that is a requirement 
of both academic and human rights discourse. However, for victims to gain agency, and 
voice their own agendas, requires them to bring an experiential approach to advocacy. 
This demands that they participate on their own terms in national debates through 
mobilisation, rather than being constrained to give testimony whose form is defined by 
others with the greatest access to written and other formal narratives. This gives an 
insight into the real goal of a Truth Commission, that is the transformation of traumatic 
memory into therapeutic history (Colvin, 2003). This is the social engineering goal of 
such mechanisms and the way that victims‟ testimony, legitimated by their suffering, is 
seen to create new narratives for states to build their legitimacy upon. The Truth 
Commission thus serves as part of a political economy of memory after violence, and 
this is discussed further in Section 9.2.  
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8.3 Beyond retribution: legalism in transitional justice 
Law remains the dominant discourse of transitional justice, despite the fruitful 
engagement of a diverse range of disciplines with the issues at its core. As a result, 
transitional justice has been accused of having become “overdominated by a narrow 
legalistic lens” (McEvoy, 2007: 412) that has led to a „thin‟ transitional justice that is 
institutionalised and driven by legal processes (McEvoy and McGregor, 2008). This 
echoes broader critiques of legalism in other fields:     
[L]egalism [...] has led to the construction of rigid systems of formal 
definitions.  [...] This procedure has served to isolate law completely from the 
social context in which it exists. (Shklar, 1986: 2)  
Here the impact of the predominance of law as a tool to address violent pasts will be 
explored on the basis of the everyday experience of victims that emerges from the data 
of this study. The evidence of the data is that such practice has little relevance to those 
most affected by violations and as a result diminishes the ability of transitional justice to 
address many of its aims. Legalism serves to both narrow the goals of transitional justice 
and to exclude ordinary victims from participation in its development. Here the discourse 
of transitional justice in the contexts studied is examined to understand the impact of this 
legalism, with an emphasis on the process in Nepal.   
Individual prosecution has become the overwhelming emphasis in the practice of 
transitional justice, credited with the ability to deliver on a large range of goals (e.g. 
Aukerman, 2002; Teitel, 2003) despite the lack of empirical support for such claims. In 
Nepal and Timor-Leste both national and international agencies advocating for action in 
response to violations committed during the conflict give primacy to judicial mechanisms, 
and advocacy has centred on „ending impunity‟, rather than defining justice more 
broadly. A study of recent publications of Nepali human rights agencies concerning the 
transition confirms this emphasis: in one (Advocacy Forum and Human Rights Watch, 
2008) the eight „key recommendations‟ all revolve around prosecution, criminalisation 
and ending impunity; of the 10 recommendations in a second (INSEC, 2008), whilst 
some engage with the mechanics of preventing disappearance, most concern 
prosecutions and none concern the families of those who have disappeared. Both 
documents understand justice in a narrow prosecutorial way; they are analyses that are 
perpetrator and violation centred, rather than victim and needs centred. Non-
prosecutorial processes, such as the proposed TRC, are seen as a way to name and 
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thus prosecute perpetrators, with other roles considered secondary (Advocacy Forum 
and Human Rights Watch, 2008). This represents an international trend in approaches to 
transition in which an international justice project is privileged over the goals of those 
most affected by the events of the conflict and indeed the broader needs of the nation. A 
senior foreign human rights worker at a UN agency in Kathmandu deflected criticism of 
the lack of an engagement with victims by saying that he was in Nepal “to see 
perpetrators sent to prison”.47  
In Timor similar priorities have been advanced by rights activists but have been 
opposed by a leadership who, for their own reasons, seek non-judicial approaches to 
transition (Section 4.3.3). In both primary contexts law has traditionally been seen by 
victims at best as remote and inaccessible and at worst as a tool of the powerful used 
against the weak. Legal process is poorly understood by victims,48 who retain an 
awareness and affinity with local and traditional judicial systems that they can 
comprehend, even where they express the logic of local power relations (Hohe, 2003; 
Grenfell, 2009). In Nepal, those who sought judicial process prioritised a local process on 
the understanding that it would be accessible. This reveals the irrelevance to most 
victims of the ongoing campaign for an international judicial process in Timor-Leste 
(ANTI, 2008): if such a tribunal were initiated, victims are likely to be barely aware of it 
without a very substantial dissemination campaign. Alienation from such processes has 
been noted in other contexts where remote international tribunals have taken place (Sieff 
and Vinjamuri, 2002; MacMahon and Forsythe, 2008).   
The legal lens superimposes upon the complexity of post-conflict societies a 
single dominant approach to transition that claims unique importance to the society as a 
whole, despite the massive diversity of ways in which the conflict was experienced. It 
implies that the impact of a conflict born of exclusion, oppression and grossly unequal 
distributions of power and resources (as in Nepal) can be addressed largely by a judicial 
process. More than this it homogenises the many complex and varied demands of 
victims, arising from their unique experiences of the conflict, into something that can 
readily be addressed by central institutions rather than through solutions that emerge 
from victims‟ communities. Mamdani talks of “the multiple faces of justice - criminal, 
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human rights organisations did so (ICTJ and Advocacy Forum, 2008).  
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political and social” (2009: 470), and this echoes the broader concept of justice that 
victims articulate. The principal risk for victims of the constant emphasis of prosecutions 
is the marginalisation of basic needs, and the diversion of resources of all types to the 
judicial agenda.  
Victims‟ representatives emphasise not only that basic needs are a priority, but 
their satisfaction is seen as a prerequisite to victims being able to campaign for (legal) 
justice: 
For instance, [an HR agency] works in providing legal support. In the course 
of it, they frequently invite victims for interactions. The victims are tired of 
taking part in these meetings; they complain that they cannot participate in 
meetings, abandoning their work, since they get nothing to eat in the evening 
if they do not work in the day. But [the agency] does not have any programs 
to support the livelihoods of the people. [...] To me, it seems that if we could 
make [the wife of a disappeared man] earn her food and clothes she would 
go to Gulariya [district HQ] to chant slogans. If she does not have food to eat, 
she will have to confine herself to the struggle to feed herself. [...] If your 
stomach is empty, how can you sing a song? Therefore, I am of the opinion 
that only the people who have enough to eat and wear can be involved in 
politics. (Personal interview with leader of CVC Bardiya, Kathmandu, 
September 2008, discussing the typical female relative of the Missing.) 
This study reveals that prosecutions are not a priority of victims, at least in states where 
other needs remain urgent. The data of this study support claims that legalism prioritises 
prosecution far more highly than victims themselves, that it institutionalises transitional 
justice, distancing mechanisms from those most impacted by violations, and „dilutes‟ its 
content by translating issues that are embedded in a context into narrow legal 
representations. The prevalence of legalism has resulted in debates in transitional justice 
being centred on the extent to which retributive justice is possible, in the light of a need 
for peace to be sustained (e.g. Snyder and Vinjamuri, 2004), despite the potential lack of 
priority to victims of such process. An emphasis on law and the legal skews debates in 
directions led by lawyers and human rights workers, rather than by victims of violations, 
or even by the broader needs of societies emerging from conflict. Legalism has been 
accompanied by an institutionalisation of transitional justice process, where the creation 
of state or supra-state bodies, including tribunals and truth commissions, is seen as its 
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core role. The data from both Nepal and Timor-Leste reveal the remoteness of such 
institutions from both victims and their concerns. Such institutions serve to distance 
transitional justice process and “to see victims or violence-affected communities as 
constituencies which must be managed rather than citizens to whom they must be 
accountable.” (McEvoy, 2007: 424) This study demonstrates the limits of such 
institutions in achieving even the narrowest goals of transitional justice and the extent to 
which they reinforce ownership of the process by the state and elites. The people of 
Nepal and Timor-Leste, and in particular the most marginalised in those states, live in 
worlds where local institutions, including the primary institutions of family and community, 
are more relevant to all aspects of their lives than those of the state in a remote capital.  
Whilst transitional justice seeks to address legacies of violence and bring 
perpetrators to account, it also seeks to legitimate new regimes, establish stability and 
justify the compromises made by those leading transition. Law can become a crucial 
instrument in that justification even when it is the agenda of a narrow political class that 
drives it:  “While law can be a tool for regulating violence and exposing abuses of power, 
law is also utilized to obfuscate and legitimate abuses of power” (Leebaw, 2008: 95) 
Much of transitional justice is about the making of political decisions, ostensibly to 
optimise the transition to peace, but inevitably subject to the interests of those leading 
transition. Legalism permits the political agendas of elites to take precedence over the 
needs of victims, in particular where demands that can be characterised as the seeking 
of social and economic rights are concerned. In highly unequal states such demands 
challenge the existing social order and a legalist discourse that emphasises the civil and 
political can serve the powerful, by blunting such claims. This is discussed in detail in 
Section 9.1. 
Legalism also serves to translate „thick‟ issues, deeply embedded in the history 
and culture of a context, into „thin‟ legal representations. This facilitates a mimetic 
approach, allowing external experts to present prescriptive solutions derived from other 
contexts as solutions to the dilemmas of transition. The data from victims in Timor-Leste 
have shown that such approaches, driven by an abstract discourse of rights, fail to 
address the principal needs of victims, largely as a result of their being divorced from the 
social basis of those needs. Legalism is articulated through a rights discourse that is 
seen as emphasising justice claims precisely because of its base in law and claims to 
universality. It is however this very universality that reduces the capacity of law to 
address needs that emerge from a very specific and local set of circumstances. For a 
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victim-centred approach, normative criteria and universalist rights claims are rejected as 
the sole basis for addressing needs in favour of what victims perceive will aid most in 
their recovery from the impact of the violation: “The question is whether this particular 
claim to justice actually contributes to the remaking of the world, or whether the rights-
thinking implied actually distorts the nature of social and individual suffering” (Hastrup, 
2003: 310).  
The focus of this study on addressing human suffering suggests that a narrow 
legal approach is not sufficient to enable victims‟ recovery from the impact of violations 
(Chapter 7 and Chapter 8), and that a broader understanding is required (see Section 
10.3.3). Constraining approaches to violations using the language of rights limits both the 
range of solutions that can be considered and ensures that agency in the process rests 
largely with those, rights workers and other experts, who have greatest access to the 
language and mechanisms of rights and law, denying ownership of such process to 
victims (see Section 9.1). The “seduction of legalism” (McEvoy, 2007) also restricts the 
range of questions that are asked of transitional justice, and it is this which ensures that 
many of the victim needs articulated here are not considered a part of the practice of 
transitional justice. The proposed corrective to legalism in transitional justice is to put the 
needs of victims at the centre of the process, to challenge legalism. This is essentially a 
framing of the question who (or what) is transitional justice for, and has led to 
approaches, such as this one, advocating for a transitional justice „from below‟ (McEvoy 
and McGregor, 2008). The victim-centred approach is elaborated more completely in 
Section 10.2. 
8.4 Reparations: Needs, rights and the disempowered 
For the families met in this study reparations are the most concrete manifestation of the 
mechanisms of transitional justice that otherwise often remain invisible and intangible to 
victims. Addressing any of the needs expressed by families is reparative, and the 
emphasis on restoring both livelihood and well-being resonates with theoretical ideas of 
reparation as repair of the damage of the violation. Families‟ reparative needs are to 
„undo‟ the violation, even though disappearance is necessarily irreparable: “Through 
reparation, the person can continue her life, look forward to the future and be back again 
as she used to be.” (Wife of Missing man, Liquiça, Timor-Leste): the articulation of needs 
constitutes an appeal for rehabilitation. (What rehabilitation means in this context, 
psychologically and socially, is discussed in Section 9.2). This section discusses the 
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implications of the results of this study for reparations policy, driven by the needs of 
families but also engaging with the implications of reparations for the broader socio-
political context.  
Political violence renders its victims powerless and the impacts of disappearance 
on family members demonstrate their disempowerment, politically, socially and even 
over their own emotional state. Violations are accompanied by rhetoric of 
dehumanisation and aim to undermine social ties and relationships in the communities 
that are its targets. Disappearance inscribes on the communities blighted by it that they 
are beyond society, with the unforgettability of the Missing serving to constantly reinforce 
their liminality. Reparations are thus intimately linked to repairing traumatisation, both 
individual and collective, and rebuilding the relationship between victims and the state. 
Reparation is linked to issues of memory and acknowledgement that operate at multiple 
levels between the individual and the state, a consequence of the social meaning that 
political violence carries. The data indicate that victims require affirmation of their own 
understandings of the violation and seek processes that permit the social reconstruction 
of meaning and identity that are challenged by disappearance (see Section 9.2). The 
individual and social need for the disappeared and their families to be valued, in an 
explicit challenging of the dehumanisation implicit in the violation, leads to families‟ 
demands for symbolic reparations such as memorials and the granting of official status. 
These in turn have a societal role, acknowledging crimes of the past and setting norms 
for the future. Affected communities in both Nepal and Timor-Leste see many of the 
impacts of victimhood deepened by issues of structural violence and inequality, and 
these lead to demands for approaches beyond the purely restitutive: they seek 
transformative approaches that can address the marginalisation that both facilitated 
violations and magnified their impact. The study reveals that needs are highly individual: 
whilst some victims have coped well with the impact of disappearance and are living 
lives as they did before the violation, others are massively impacted, by for example 
disabling mental illness or poverty. This emphasises the role of approaches which are 
needs-based, driven by vulnerability rather than the nature of the violation.  
There is a range of thinking as to what defines and constitutes reparations. 
Garvey (1999) has suggested that reparations are to address material harm, whereas 
moral harm must be addressed by penance. The restorative justice paradigm sees 
reparation as that which returns to balance the relationship between victim and 
perpetrator (Section 1.2). Others suggest that reparations are whatever victims feel is 
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required to make amends (van Boven, 1996),49 and this is the understanding that 
emerges from the narratives of the families of the Missing, that reparation is “a 
fundamental stage in the progressive rehabilitation of the ... victim” that “provides the 
tools for mending a victim to a whole and integrated person” (Chinweizu, 1993, no 
numbering). „Integration‟ articulates the need of victims that emerged from this study to 
be a part of family, community and nation and confirms that reparation is intrinsically 
social. 
Families‟ needs emerging from the data include disconnectedness, a distancing 
from both community and state, and disempowerment (Section 2.3), with families having 
no mastery of their livelihood, the bodies of their loved ones, or even their own emotional 
state. Empowerment is seen as regaining agency in their lives. The data challenge a 
perception of „moral harm‟: families see material, emotional and social harms arising 
from disappearance, but there was for example no mention of apology in the data. The 
absence of an awareness of moral harm may be why prosecutions of individual 
perpetrators are not so highly prioritised, even though many scholars believe impunity to 
be in conflict with understandings of reparation (van Boven, 1996). Beyond the material 
impacts of disappearance, the harms that families perceived were less moral than social: 
the value of victims, and that of the disappeared, as part of their community and nation 
had been undermined by the violation: “...this father of ours no matter what, whether he 
is dead or alive, he has to have some value for what he gave.” (Children of missing man, 
Dili, Timor-Leste) Families sought the restoration of worth through what was largely 
articulated as recognition and acknowledgment. This is consistent with what other 
victims of gross violations have reported, where one of their most urgent needs is to 
refute the efforts of the state to deny their having any value: “Violence against individuals 
for political reasons tells victims how others value (or devalue) them as human beings; it 
communicates to them their place in society.” (Hamber: 2009: 23) The tools of 
reparation, such as compensation, memorials and other forms of recognition are 
mechanisms to communicate this worth. This is also relevant to affected communities, 
notably in Nepal where indigenous ethnic groups were targeted as part of an historical 
process of devaluation and exclusion, leading to communal demands for reparation.  
                                               
49
 The van Boven principles include medical, psychological and social assistance, and support as 
reparation; they also discuss the potential for providing satisfaction to victims through disclosure 
of the truth after an official and thorough investigation. This maps very well onto the range of 
needs of reparation and indeed more generally, expressed by the families of the Missing.   
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Individual perpetrators played little role in families‟ expectations. Since the 
perpetrator was most often a state, victims saw the concerned individuals as merely an 
instrument and responsibility lying with the state. Even where disappearance was 
perpetrated by a non-state actor, victims saw the state as responsible for reparation, 
suggesting little role for direct perpetrators and contradicting approaches to reparation 
where individual perpetrator engagement is demanded. Such attitudes may also be 
driven by an understanding that only the state has the capacity to address the needs 
victims articulate, both in terms of resources and in delivering officially sanctioned 
acknowledgement. The result was that families sought the state to demonstrate that 
they, and the Missing, had value through processes of compensation and recognition.  
The addressing of economic and other material needs is seen in the literature as 
a less important role of reparations (e.g. Minow, 1999) while for the families met in this 
study it often constituted their main priority. Recovery is the best way to summarise what 
they see as the goal of reparation, dominated by the restoration of livelihood, but 
encompassing aims that include healing, rehabilitation and closure. The urgency of 
economic needs expressed by victims, the scale of victimhood in both contexts and the 
lack of judicial process suggests that reparations are best delivered by bodies decoupled 
from retributive process. This challenges understandings of reparations as a rights based 
project linked to the delivery of truth and justice, and serves to demonstrate how this 
normatively driven discourse conflicts both with victim needs and with the political 
realities of transition.  
Reparations serve not only to address the needs of victims but also have broader 
socio-political goals. Summerfield, a psychiatrist, considers these broader aims as 
“mending holes in the social fabric” (1995: no numbering). Whilst individual reparations 
are designed to give private redress they also serve public policy: the evidence of this 
study is that many of the private goals of victims demand public actions by the state, to 
deliver the collectively understood recognition and acknowledgement that will restore the 
place of both the direct victim and his family to the social and historical fabric. Families 
see several mechanisms that can deliver this recognition, including compensation, 
valorisation50 and memorialisation, as well as the issues of an answer, a body and a 
                                               
50
 Whilst the word valorisation is a translation from the Portuguese valorisaun, used in Timor-
Leste, it communicates very well the concept of public recognition of suffering in a cause that is 
so important to many of the families met. 
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grave. All of these can be delivered in ways that magnify the social aspect. In Timor-
Leste for example, the senior leadership was involved in ceremonies to award medals to 
the dead and Missing in a highly visible way as well as the interring of the bodies of dead 
„heroes‟ on national holidays. Memorialisation is discussed further in Section 9.2. Such 
symbolic recognition and acknowledgement serves to construct political memory 
(Ricoeur, 2004), serving as a bridge from individual memory to the collective and as 
“vehicles for the intergenerational transmission of historical memory” (Hamber, 1998: 4). 
The socio-political role of reparations is to challenge the denial of past crimes and 
demonstrate that a new regime both recognises violations of the past and is committed 
to the respect of human rights in the future. Public condemnation of violations and 
acknowledgement of their victims affirms a society‟s values (Shelton, 1999) and serves 
as a boundary marking exercise. Given the legalist orientation of much of the literature 
on reparations in transition, the task of „norm-setting‟ for societies emerging from mass 
violence is primarily assigned to retributive measures, notably trials. In the rural societies 
studied here however it seems likely that a decentralised approach, such as can be 
facilitated by local memorials, valorisation ceremonies and payments to families, will 
have greater impact on a society than a trial in the capital that is inaccessible to most. A 
positive consequence of a victim-centred approach is that it is natural that the processes 
that most impact victims will, where they are visible to all, have the greatest impact on 
others too, enhancing the socio-political impact. In both contexts studied it is also clear 
that the lack of acknowledgement and other reparative measures has alienated victims 
and their communities from their rulers, reducing their legitimacy in the eyes of victims. 
This serves as confirmation that reparations legitimate those leading societies in 
transition, a key component of peacebuilding (Section 2.1). 
The idea of reparations as restitution is troubling to those from the poorest 
communities most likely to be victims of conflict who do not seek a return to the poverty 
and inequality that preceded the conflict:  
[Reparations] aim to recompense for loss [...] but also to reintegrate the 
marginalized and isolated into society in order to allow them to be part of 
rebuilding the country. They aim to build and replace burnt-out buildings and 
destroyed infrastructure but also to create the conditions for poor 
communities to prosper, not simply to resume their poverty (Roht-Arriaza,  
2003-4: 157).  
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This confronts the idea of reparative justice as exclusively rectificatory rather than also 
distributive (Mani, 2002), and that reparations should seek to address only the 
consequences rather than the causes of conflict. The data of this study reveal that many 
communities most impacted by conflict connect the exclusion and structural violence to 
which they have historically been subject to the violations of the conflict itself: 
marginalisation enabled violations. Since social exclusion enabled violations and 
worsened their impact, they see no logic in a process that addresses the direct impact of 
disappearance but not the structural violence in which it was embedded. This approach 
drives efforts to both provide reparation to impacted communities and to link such efforts 
to economic development. This also serves to direct reparative efforts to recovery, not 
just of individuals but of affected communities.     
In Nepal the targeting of certain indigenous communities during the conflict leads 
naturally to communal demands for reparation. Community reparations to the indigenous 
serve both to address the impacts of the conflict and to „undo‟ their exclusion, blurring 
the division between reparation for violence of the conflict and that for historic structural 
violence. Such reparation should ideally embrace minority representation in the 
institutions of the state, including governance structures and the security forces, and is 
seen to demand the remaking of those institutions such that non-repetition of violations 
can be guaranteed:  
Special rights should be given to the Tharu people for the suppression they 
were subjected to. The state can preserve and promote their ethnic identity; 
it can also introduce special policies in order to make the provisions to allow 
the Tharu people to enter into positions in various government and other 
organisations. The state can build a museum in order to preserve our culture. 
(Leader of Bardiya Family Association, personal interview, Sept. 2008)     
Here the community leader also identifies a museum as a goal, confirming that 
challenging past histories is key to the recovery of the Tharu people and also a role of 
reparation. Beyond this he made explicitly political demands, in the context of the ethnic 
federalism that is likely to define the „new Nepal‟:  
We want a Tharu State. [...] There were political reasons behind the conflict. 
[...] Therefore, politics should solve the problems behind the conflict. For all 
this, giving an autonomous state to the Tharu people is the best way of 
solving the problems; they would manage their affairs on their own. (ibid.)  
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This demonstrates how the needs of communities for reparation can serve to drive 
progressive transformation of the Nepali state, addressing not just what enabled 
violations, but to change the social relations and exclusion that led to conflict. In this 
sense reparation, particularly at the community level, can serve a broader socio-political 
role. Experience of such community reparation process is limited, but there are 
precedents, in Peru and Guatemala (Viaene, 2010):  
[T]he content of reparations policies should, first, affirm the commonality of 
members of indigenous groups as citizens and holders of basic human 
rights. It should also affirm their condition as members of sub-state groups 
with distinct cultures and/or communal forms of life. (Rubio-Marin, Paz y Paz 
Bailey & Guillerot, 2009: 1) 
Beyond ethnically defined groups, communities were met in both Nepal and Timor-Leste 
who because of their location and other factors were subject to extreme violence by one 
or more parties to conflict. Such communities can be targeted for reparations in terms of 
infrastructure and services, where they perceive this as recognition for their suffering: 
“...we lack many things: no clinic, no good school, no clean water, no toilet and sanitation 
[...] We want the government to pay us attention.” (Xefe suku in Manatuto, Timor-Leste, 
personal interview, July 2009). As for individual victims this concerns the need to be 
valued by the state.  
The melding of reparations and development assistance has been dismissed by 
some as confusing the message that reparations serve as restitution for violations, while 
all citizens have a right to seeing their basic needs met (de Greiff, 2008; Roht-Arriaza, 
2003-4; OHCHR, 2008). Such thinking however fails to recognise the reality that many 
low income transitional states, including Nepal and Timor-Leste, are simply unable to 
meet their obligations to their citizens. More than this, those living in extreme poverty are 
generally victims of the inequalities and structural violence that gave rise to conflict, if not 
of the direct violence that is privileged by the rights discourse (Section 9.1). In this study 
we see that victims in practice do not care if assistance is called „reparation‟, 
„development assistance‟ or „social assistance‟, their priority is to see children fed and 
educated and they understand that the state can do this as rectification for both the 
impact of the conflict and a history of exclusion, on the basis of need, as long as those 
violations are also acknowledged by the state. A victim-centred approach, at least in the 
two contexts studied, implies that vulnerability can be an explicit indicator in determining 
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if and how particular victims are provided with reparation. Whilst wealthy victims should 
receive the same symbolic reparation as all, those elements with an economic 
component benefit from being needs-based. Community reparations are feasible in 
those many cases where ethnicity or caste has led to exclusion, and particularly for the 
most marginalised, such as women, to support them and their organisations. Collective 
reparations in the form of livelihood programmes can target women in conflict affected 
communities, enhancing family incomes as well as serving to empower women in 
families and communities. Ensuring that vulnerability is a criterion for receiving 
reparations alongside victimhood ensures that states where the scale of victimhood is 
massive can formulate an affordable reparations scheme whilst simultaneously ensuring 
that this is perceived as fair by victims and the broader community.  
Victims in both contexts emphasise the importance of financial compensation as 
reparation. Money is seen as an optimal form of reparation because it both serves as 
acknowledgement of victimhood and addresses some of victims‟ many other needs. 
“Victims see it [compensation] (quite correctly) as a judgment by the state on the worth of 
their claim and their status as victim” (Maguire & Shapland, 1997: 218). Compensation 
serves to deliver recognition in a way that is both visible and quantifiable, to the state, 
the victim and to the victim‟s community. One of the largest challenges for a reparations 
scheme that will necessarily generalise is the addressing of the great range of needs of 
victims and, in this sense, the best reparation from a victim‟s view is something that is 
enabling. This drives some of the families‟ focus on financial compensation, since it can 
address many needs and gives victims themselves agency in choosing which needs to 
address. It is also seen that it is traditional in cultures such as those of Nepal that 
compensation is paid when wrong is done: compensation is understood as an admission 
of responsibility because it is a tradition of the culture.  
Many victims saw dilemmas in taking money as compensation for the death and 
disappearance of loved ones (Section 6.2.6). The fact that many victims in both Nepal 
and Timor-Leste found payments too little confirms the modest literature from other 
contexts (Danieli, 2006). However, most of those met in Timor and Nepal could not 
afford the gesture of declining payments offered, given that for many they were a 
necessity to meet basic needs: 
No-one can return our son. Therefore, we have to accept whatever amount 
we are offered to as compensation though nothing, no amount of money can 
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really compensate for our missing relative.  (Father of missing man, Gorkha, 
Nepal)  
The literature observes that the relationship between the legal remedy and reparations 
are crucial for a payment to have positive meaning, with the perception that without 
justice, money is „dirty‟, or „blood money‟ (Hamber, 2009). For the families of the Missing 
this was seen to be true, but in the data of this study justice was perceived as the 
receiving of an answer, rather than prosecution. This echoes statements in other 
contexts where families saw compensation as breaking their connection with the Missing 
making them their „executioners‟ (Suarez-Orozco, 1991), which in Nepal prompted the 
demand for „relief‟, rather than „compensation‟. In this sense a victim-centred approach 
can increase the effectiveness of reparation, even through something as simple as how 
a payment is defined. The limits of the role that money can play for the families of the 
Missing means that all efforts should be made to resist political attempts to present 
payment of compensation as closure: compensation can constitute only one component 
of a broader reparative process. 
Victims‟ poverty threatens their ability to access health services and education for 
children since such services always come with a cost that is significant for the poorest. 
Addressing health needs, which are created or exacerbated by victimhood, can be 
considered rehabilitative and fits naturally into a reparative framework. In all societies it is 
usual to give those injured in the service of the state, notably soldiers, preferential 
access to certain services. (Indeed, families of victims of the state in Nepal compared 
their situation with the families of members of the security forces killed in the conflict, 
who were receiving pensions and other services.) The extent to which reparations can 
include the civilian victims in such a scheme will depend upon the political narratives that 
emerge after conflict. If such narratives can encompass the privileging of those who have 
suffered in violence, then it can become natural to extend such preferential access to 
them. Where victimhood is very extensive however, this can have cost implications or 
simply overwhelm the limited services of low income states. Issues will also arise about 
the privileging of victims above others in the community with greater needs, and this 
prompts the proposal that reparations can be combined with social assistance using 
vulnerability criteria (see above).   
Whereas traditionally reparations have targeted the head of household, a victim-
centred transitional justice can challenge the assumption of congruent interests among 
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all family members. In this sense, reparation can serve a much larger agenda than 
merely acknowledging affected families, by challenging gender inequalities:  
When reparations are thought of as part of a political project of (re)creating a 
more legitimate, democratic and inclusive political order, rather than of 
reverting to a broken past, they open a window of opportunity – even if small 
– for women to endorse forms of reparations that depart from settled 
practices and norms that are so frequently part of pre-existing gender 
hierarchies. (Rubio-Marin and de Greiff, 2007: 325) 
Payments can be made to the wives of the Missing, and whilst it is likely that money 
would be taken from them by family members, it can be paid as a regular pension that 
would serve to raise their status in the household and reduce stigmatisation. 
8.5 Summary: Victims’ needs and transitional justice process 
This chapter has examined the needs of victims articulated in the data of this study and 
compared them, in Timor-Leste, with what has been delivered by transitional justice 
mechanisms and, in Nepal, with both what the global discourse promises and planned 
mechanisms. Transitional justice process has failed to begin to address the bulk of 
needs presented by families of the Missing. In both contexts mechanisms have followed 
global norms through the initiation of processes dominated by Truth and Reconciliation 
Commissions and trials. In neither context does a broad reparations process that would 
most satisfy victim demands appear likely to occur. In Timor-Leste, such a reparations 
process, as recommended in the CAVR report, has been vetoed by the nation‟s leaders 
and judicial process remains highly compromised owing to a lack of commitment to such 
processes in both Indonesia and Timor-Leste.  
The impact of disappearance on families is profound and in both Nepal and 
Timor-Leste families affirmed a similar set of needs. Families of the Missing and their 
communities are impacted on a range of levels, including the emotional, social and 
material. Families‟ needs can be summarised by the demand for rehabilitation: an 
addressing of the physical and psychological impacts of disappearance and support to 
meet basic needs. In both contexts prosecutorial agendas have dominated discussion of 
transitional justice mechanisms, despite retributive process being far from the priority of 
the victims met. This reflects a legalism in transitional justice globally that is seen to 
place less emphasis on the priorities that victims express than on the norms that emerge 
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from the human rights discourse. As a result institutional mechanisms, such as trials and 
truth commissions are preferred to more reparative approaches or those that are rooted 
in victims‟ and communities‟ experience of the impact of conflict.  
Data from Timor-Leste demonstrates that the needs of families of the Missing fail 
to coincide with what a truth commission is tasked to deliver: families seek an answer 
about their loved one, rather than a history of the conflict. In Timor-Leste, CAVR was 
remote from and irrelevant to most victims, who have had no access to either its process 
or final report. Rather, the truth families sought was a private truth concerning the fate 
and remains of missing loved ones. The evidence of the data does not support the 
understanding that victim trauma is best addressed by public testimony, or even that it 
would be positive for most victims. The victim-centred evaluation of the transitional 
justice process in Timor-Leste that this study constitutes strongly suggests that in 
traditional and rural societies like those of Timor, centrally led national processes to 
address issues of truth and memory will struggle to address people‟s needs. Among 
victims‟ groups and in communities those most impacted by disappearance are coping 
not through the giving of public testimony, but in sharing their experience with peers in 
ways that resonate with traditional ways of dealing with adversity.  
Addressing any of the needs of families is reparative and a broad understanding 
of a reparations process that includes economic support as well as recognition and 
acknowledgment could address their needs. The reparative agenda that emerges from 
families is one of recovery: addressing the global impacts of disappearance including the 
economic, health impacts and social stigmatisation. Families of the Missing saw 
reparations as challenging the dehumanisation of the Missing and the devaluing of their 
families and communities that accompanies political violence. Families wanted the state 
to affirm their value through compensation payments that would both permit the 
satisfaction of basic needs and through memorials that grant the Missing a place in 
collective memory. Women are seen to suffer from social impacts of the disappearance 
of husbands that arise because of their patriarchal societies: reparations can challenge 
the inequalities that lead to such impacts.  In so doing such an approach can serve to 
drive a transitional justice that not only addresses the consequences of conflict, but is 
truly transformative and seeks to also address its causes.  
The greatest impact of disappearance is ambiguity over the fate of the Missing 
and this drives families‟ needs for both an answer and access to human remains. 
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Exhumation is a prerequisite for families to recover remains of loved ones, but in neither 
context is this occurring systematically. In both contexts traditional attitudes lead to 
needs arising from the spiritual obligations families feel to the Missing, notably for 
exhumation and for ritual. This demonstrates how reparation can only be defined on the 
terms of the needs expressed by victims, it is not sufficient to assume that the fact of 
violation itself can automatically lead to appropriate reparative measures. The result of 
this insight is that the context of victimhood, including the cultural and social worlds in 
which victims live, is a crucial ingredient in creating a victim-centred transitional justice. 
The implications of context for a victim-centred approach, and the needs of families not 
addressed by contemporary transitional justice process, are discussed in the following 
chapter.   
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Chapter 9 Beyond prescriptive approaches: 
contextualising a victim-centred transitional 
justice  
I don‟t know anything about Peru, we are Nepali. (Wife of missing man, 
Bardiya, commenting on a presentation from a human rights organisation)  
The previous chapter compared the data concerning the needs of families with the 
mechanisms that have come to characterise transitional justice praxis. Significant gaps 
are seen in the ability of such mechanisms to address the needs of victims. This chapter 
outlines how and why transitional justice process fails victims, highlighting the elites who 
steer such process and the content and constraints their agendas articulate. It then 
discusses those needs that are not targeted by contemporary transitional justice 
process, notably issues of the psychological and social, and proposes that they be 
explicitly included in the purview of transitional justice. Chapter 10 then lays out a 
conceptual framework for a transitional justice process that would be steered by the 
needs of victims.  
States in transition seeking to address legacies of violence and conflict are 
encouraged to turn to an international community with expertise and funding to support 
processes of transitional justice that follow global mimetic practice. The evidence of this 
study is that the global transitional justice discourse, prioritising trials and national truth 
processes, fails to address the most important needs of families of the Missing, as well 
as other victims, and as a result threatens sustainable peacebuilding. Here, it will be will 
argued that the needs that victims express demand an approach that is derived not from 
a universal model, but one that is rooted in the culture and context in which victims live. 
Those needs with which families of the Missing are confronted that are most acute are a 
product of the local and particular circumstances in which disappearances occurred and 
in which the dynamics of conflict were immersed and that continue to inform social 
relations at all levels. This drives those topics discussed here, that are most prioritised by 
victims met (ambiguity, memory, exhumation, the spirits), and yet are most marginal to 
mainstream transitional justice practice.  
In this chapter the data of this study will be used to argue for a contextualised 
approach to transitional justice that seeks not just to tailor such process to the particular 
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circumstances of each context and conflict, but a process that emerges from the 
everyday social world in which victimhood occurs, rather than from an abstract global 
discourse. The victim-centred approach for which this thesis advocates aims to ensure 
that transitional justice mechanisms spring from the needs of victims and their 
communities, where possible as an initiative of those communities. A contextual 
approach to victimhood that emphasises the local and particular requires that emotional 
and psychosocial issues that can be the greatest reminders of the experience of political 
violence must be placed at the centre of efforts to address its legacy. The practicalities of 
such a process are discussed in Chapter 10. The ambiguity of disappearance is linked 
with the trauma of conflict and victimhood more generally and the memory of what 
conflict means and what identities it imposes. To address these issues in individuals, 
families and communities implies the remaking of the meanings and identities that 
conflict creates. This demands that victim communities be given a place in collective 
memory denied them by their victimhood and that their own perceptions of repair be 
privileged. For victims in Timor this notably means that the spiritual demands through 
which they express their trauma be considered a valid and legitimate claim of the 
transitional process. Similarly, the ambiguity of families who are still waiting for news of 
missing loved ones must be considered a principal impact of disappearance that 
transitional justice must address. This leads to the putting centre stage of psychosocial 
approaches, as mechanisms of transitional justice.      
This chapter seeks to understand how and why transitional justice praxis fails to 
address the needs of families of the Missing and to indicate routes and approaches that 
can build victim-centred process. It begins by exploring how the global rights discourse 
interacts with victims and, suggests that in Nepal the rights discourse is an intrinsically 
elite approach that marginalises victims and their agendas. The psychosocial 
implications of a victim-centred approach are then investigated, focussing on issues 
relating to truth about the fate of the Missing, exhumation and human remains. An effort 
is made to demonstrate the connection between the needs of victim communities and 
the broader memory politics that underpins much of transitional justice process. Finally, 
the implication for transitional justice process in traditional societies is discussed. Such 
contexts have little concept of individual rights and are wedded to spiritual traditions that 
inform both individual and collective understandings far more than the liberal frameworks 
that have driven Western approaches to victimhood. The dynamic of the collision 
between rights approaches and indigenous tradition is used to demonstrate the 
importance of the local in such contexts.  
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9.1 Transitional justice as an elite discourse: Human rights 
practice after conflict, between the global and the local 
The stark mismatch between the needs and priorities of families of the Missing and the 
agenda being promoted by agencies advocating for transitional justice is one of the main 
findings of this study. Here, an effort is made to understand why this gap is so great, 
using the data from Nepal, and noting the class and political perspectives of both typical 
victims and those who work with rights agencies.  
One clear finding of this study is that rights language is rarely used by those who 
became victims of the long histories of conflict, in either context. Claims making by 
victims is driven by needs, defined in both absolute and relative terms, and rooted in 
their everyday lives. In many cases the needs articulated emerged wholly or partly from 
distinct cultural factors, such as local spiritual understandings or expressions of 
patriarchal hierarchies, which can only be understood when contextualised. This 
suggests that culture exists empirically and logically prior to rights in the contexts studied 
here, and that ontologically culture trumps rights in the eyes of those who are the subject 
of this study. The data give rise to a number of distinct critiques of the rights discourse 
that will be explored here; firstly that it can reinforce existing power relations rather than 
challenge them; secondly that it constructs its subjects on terms other than their own; 
thirdly that it prioritises particular rights, marginalising those of most importance to the 
poor of the global South, and finally through a critique of the individualism of rights. At 
the heart of this discussion is the understanding that in seeking an analysis that derives 
from the local and particular, from the everyday lives of victims, agency in allowing 
victims to choose their own forms of both expression and action is crucial.  
The human rights discourse, from which transitional justice derives, is now truly 
global, both in its stated universality and in the range of states that claim to enforce 
rights.  However human rights has globalised together with other sets of norms, including 
a broad range of liberal, and sometimes neo-liberal, tenets (Rajagopal, 2003). In the 
developing world a discourse of development, rights and liberal democracy has become 
truly hegemonic, with international donors, NGOs and most governments claiming to 
ascribe to what are broadly perceived as universal values. These have entered 
mainstream work in post-conflict contexts through the rhetoric of the „liberal peace‟ (e.g. 
Paris, 2004; Richmond and Franks, 2009). The practice of human rights however 
remains far from universal: „on the ground‟ human rights is a transnational discourse that 
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must compete with local political and other imperatives. As a result, the study of the 
practice of human rights is necessarily discursive; to understand how the global rights 
discourse impacts in particular places upon human actors, given the webs of political and 
social relationships in which it must operate (Goodale, 2007).   
In contemporary Nepal, post-conflict efforts to create transitional justice 
mechanisms continue to be elite led and to marginalise victims and their agendas, and to 
be dominated by a narrow legalism that neglects the priorities of victims (Section 8.3). 
This study appears to confirm that the idea and meaning of rights in this transitional 
context is a product of the conjunction of victims with needs and a global discourse 
articulated by elites. However, the norms that emerge and drive the agenda of rights 
agencies and those advocating for transitional justice refer far more to priorities internal 
to the discourse itself than to the needs or agenda of victims, largely because one is 
articulated by the powerful and one by the powerless:  
[H]uman rights is not a product of social relations but immanent in them, 
internal to their very expression [...] rights are positioned at the conjuncture 
of the two fields of the social: agency and power. (Wilson, 1997: 14) 
In Nepal a liberal discourse, combining ideas of democracy, rights and development, has 
become hegemonic as a result of the priorities and resources of international agencies 
and the willing cooption of national elites who have benefitted from an association with it, 
through access to funds and careers. The ideologies and institutions of development 
have come to be understood as the definition of modernity (Pigg, 1996) even though 
these were created entirely upon the basis of elite understandings of what a Nepali was 
and should be (Armbrecht, 2009). For the indigenous, those both most marginalised and 
most impacted by disappearance, the conflation of this modernising agenda of rights and 
development with a Nepali culture defined by and in the image of elites created a 
pressure that actively served to erode indigenous culture (Pigg, 1996). Because the 
liberal principles on which the democratic post-1990 state was founded did not challenge 
the extreme inequalities that existed, indigenous people and others remained excluded. 
This issue reflects a deeper fault line in the global human rights project that from its 
inception elevated individual rights over group rights. 
In the data of this research and other studies (Mario-Rubin and de Greiff, 2007; 
Advocacy Forum and Human Rights Watch, 2008), victims of conflict prioritise 
livelihoods and the economic well-being of their families. It has been observed that in 
 247 
 
transitional justice advocacy in Nepal, despite the clear evidence that they are a priority 
for victims, social and economic rights have taken second place to civil and political 
rights. In principle, there is “interdependence and indivisibility” (UN, 1998) of all rights, 
but in both the global rights discourse and in praxis (in Nepal, Timor-Leste and 
elsewhere), social, economic and cultural rights are far less emphasised. This represents 
an international trend in approaches to transition, what might be called the judicialisation 
of transition, in which an external legalism is privileged over the goals of those most 
affected by the events of the conflict. This legalism is discussed in Section 8.3 and can 
be seen in the attitudes observed in rights workers in Kathmandu. When a senior 
national human rights agency worker in Kathmandu was asked about the continuing 
legal emphasis of his work despite victims‟ expressed needs, he replied that “sometimes 
simple people do not know what they should want.” (Private interview, 2008) The 
retributive roots of transitional justice and narrow agenda of its practitioners continue to 
prevent the emergence of a practice that can deliver a broader justice after conflict that 
includes addressing the social injustice that led to conflict. In the long term, sustainable 
solutions to the livelihood deficit seen among both victims of the conflict and many other 
sections of Nepal‟s population will involve both economic development and the 
confrontation of structural inequalities in terms of social and economic exclusion. In 
contemporary Nepal, the claiming of social and economic rights, which demands both 
effective representation and redistribution, such as land reform, amounts to a challenge 
to the social, economic and political order of the pre-transition state.  Whilst in rhetoric 
this is accepted at the political level, civil society generally and human rights agencies in 
particular, dominated by economic, ethnic and political elites, have proved themselves 
unable or unwilling to articulate the economic and social needs of victims and to 
challenge entrenched hierarchies that ensure most remain poor. Those with elite 
backgrounds who lead rights agencies have internalised liberal agendas that do not 
prioritise the transformation of the state that is required to address the needs of victims.   
Ignatieff has written that “Human rights matter because they help people to help 
themselves. They protect their agency.” (2003: 57) This study suggests that in a post-
conflict transition in an unequal society the human rights discourse can be used to do 
just the opposite: indigenous victims are denied agency by elites using the discourse of 
human rights. For the indigenous villagers of rural Nepal who became the victims of 
conflict human rights is a discourse that comes „from above‟ and is largely disseminated 
by members of elites who have traditionally benefited from the historic exclusion of the 
indigenous (and others). As a result of the narrowness of the transitional justice agenda 
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that emerges, its emancipatory potential is highly constrained: it seeks to address the 
violations of the conflict, but defines these in a limited way and seeks remedies that 
emerge from a legalistic analysis.  It makes no effort to address the unequal social 
relations that led to the conflict, and more than this the human rights discourse itself 
appears to act to maintain and enforce the most fundamental power relations within 
Nepali society. This appears to confirm what has been written about the limits of rights 
as an instrument of emancipation in unequal societies:  
[rights] may become ... a regulatory discourse, a means of obstructing or co-
opting more radical political demands [...] The point is that rights converge 
with powers of social stratification and lines of social demarcation in ways 
that extend as often as attenuate these powers and lines. (Brown, 1995: 98) 
The first priority for transitional process in Nepal to challenge such constraints is to seek 
to broaden it beyond the legalistic to include those elements, notably the social and 
economic, which challenge the social injustice that led to conflict.  
To describe the interaction of the global human rights discourse with ordinary 
victims as a simple binary or dialectical relationship between the global and the local is to 
simplify the situation. In practice we see that human rights are constructed through a 
complex and layered process. The global discourse is instantiated through the actions of 
international actors and national human rights agencies working in the capital, while 
contact with the victims themselves is mediated by staff in regional offices and 
representatives of victims. In this way the human rights discourse filters down to victims 
who know nothing of rights and articulate their demands in terms of needs, which are 
translated into rights-based language for the consumption of those higher up the chain. 
The true desires of victims are sublimated into a rights-centred discourse regardless of 
how relevant it may be to what is actually being articulated. This study supports the 
contention that relationships between those who represent the human rights discourse in 
the developing world and excluded victims of violations can have embedded within them 
power relations of a colonial character (Spivak, 2004): elites who have access to the 
discourse import skewed power relations into the practice of human rights. This both 
dismisses communities of rural victims as a site of production of human rights, in favour 
of concepts imported from the capital and ultimately from the West, and renders certain 
forms of violence, notably that inherent in local power relations, such as that between 
landlords and tenant farmers, invisible to the discourse. This happens as a result of only 
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certain parts of society having the skills and access that enable them to speak the 
language of donors; the result is that funds are steered only to those who have 
internalised the legalism of the rights discourse. Table 20 summarises ethnic and caste 
representation in some areas relevant to the articulation of rights in Nepal, demonstrating 
the extent of exclusion: whilst no data exist for national rights agencies, anecdotally it is 
worse than for the international agencies shown here. Challenging elite control of the 
transitional discussion in Government and civil society demands replacing tokenistic and 
instrumentalising attitudes to the incorporation of victim perspectives with genuine 
participation.   
 
Nepal, % 
(Census, 2001) 
International 
agencies, %51 
Civil service, %52 
Hill Brahmin, 
Chhetri and Newar 
36.4 65.6 95.7 
Hill dalit 7.9 3.6 0 
Hill janajati 21.9 22.6 
0.5 
Terai janajati 9.8 2.5 
Madeshi53 27.8 5.2 3.7 
Table 20 Representation of various ethnic and caste groups in international agencies and 
the civil service in Nepal. The first column shows the fraction present in the country, and 
the final two columns the over-representation of Brahmin, Chhetri and Newars and the 
under-representation of Janajatis, Dalit and Madeshi communities. 
Confining transitional justice to a politics of rights under liberal political institutions 
in which existing power relationships are enshrined, ties any process to the system that 
produced those power relations. Systems of domination, that include iniquitous property 
relations and the systematic exclusion of those most impacted both by inequality and 
conflict (such as the indigenous), must be challenged in any transitional process by 
recognising the agency of those victimised and challenging power structures that 
embody the relations that led to conflict. 
                                               
51
 (SIAG, 2008) 
52 Gazetted Third Class (Section Officer) employees passed in the examinations taken by Public 
Service Commission 2000-2001 (Battachan, 2006).  
53
 Including Muslims. 
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Examining rights from the perspective of actual struggles makes it possible 
for analysis to transcend accepted normative parameters of human rights 
debates, question conceptual categories and expand the range of claims that 
are validated as rights. (Nyamu-Musembi, 2005: 31)  
Expanding the range of claims made means challenging the legalism of elites, such that 
social and economic needs of victims can be considered valid, rights-based demands of 
transitional justice. Beginning with deeper consultation with affected communities, rights 
agencies should be working to build capabilities to enable indigenous victims to take part 
as equals in decision making. If those who purport to represent victims are unable to do 
this, then it is highly unlikely that the transitional process for which they are advocating 
will be at all inclusive. Mobilisation of victims must be supported on the basis of their own 
agendas and not subject to their sanctioning by local and international elites. As a result 
of the power relations that permeate the practice of human rights in a highly unequal 
society such as Nepal it is problematic to consider the rights discourse as the sole 
legitimate driver of transitional justice. Whilst human rights remains a tool of strategy and 
mobilisation for oppressed groups seeking justice after conflict, victims‟ organisations 
offer an alternative route, in which victims themselves have full agency, free of agendas 
set by elites and less constrained by traditional power relations to use the language of 
rights or not. Such locally-grown, „non human rights‟ efforts to both address the issues 
arising from conflict and to fight for political and social change in the system that led to 
conflict can provide unique input to create transitional justice process that can give space 
to the agendas of victims.  
9.2 Ambiguity, memory and trauma: Psychosocial intervention 
as transitional justice 
Transitional justice in general and the normative aspects of reparations in particular have 
largely excluded health despite the van Boven principles specifically including medical 
and psychological care (van Boven, 1996). Health, and in particular mental health, is 
intricately related to the socio-political fabric of a society (Das and Kleinman, 2000) and 
has implications for both the recovery of communities from conflict and peacebuilding 
more generally. The data of this study suggest that for many victims the emotional and 
psychological sequelae of disappearance are its greatest impact. Here, an analysis of 
that impact will be presented, with an emphasis on ambiguous loss as a diagnostic lens. 
An argument is developed that for such victims, individually and collectively, 
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rehabilitation is the most important element of reparation and in this sense psychosocial 
intervention is transitional justice. The psychosocial is here assumed to cover the 
breadth of emotional, psychological and spiritual needs expressed by victims. As such it 
includes a discussion of the need for answers and human remains of the Missing that 
demand programmes of exhumation and identification, and a discussion of the demands 
of memory, individual, collective and societal, made by families of the Missing. 
Addressing psychosocial needs: ambiguous loss 
The disappearance of bodies through political repression creates an 
ontological uncertainty among survivors [...] The disappeared person inhabits 
the threshold between being dead but also potentially still alive, and the 
families of the disappeared can find themselves psychologically preoccupied 
with the same existential space. (Hamber, 2009: 81)  
The data of this study allow the dominant psychological phenomena mentioned by 
families to be discriminated from PTSD: whereas PTSD is linked to a specific event of 
trauma, the anxiety expressed by families was about the missing person, rather than the 
event of his disappearance. Ambiguous loss (Boss, 2006) occurs where a family 
member is psychologically present, but physically absent, and is an explicitly relational 
perspective, which differs from individualised trauma approaches such as that of PTSD, 
in that it characterises the stress as external and ongoing (Section 2.3). Ambiguous loss 
is a model that has been developed to understand the impact of unresolved loss and 
shape interventions. It discusses therapeutic approaches in terms of recursive 
guidelines, dominated by the need to find meaning and construct new identities where 
these have been challenged by such loss (ibid). The model has been developed 
however in a largely Western context, and this represents the first test of the model in a 
non-Western context (Robins, 2010a), predominantly discussing the data from Nepal 
and emphasising wives of the Missing for whom ambiguous loss has the greatest impact.  
Much of the need for an answer concerning the disappeared appears to be an 
attempt to give meaning to the ambiguity of loss. Families sought not just an answer, but 
an explanation of what happened to their loved one and to know why their relative was 
taken. Meaning is constructed relationally, and is best achieved through interaction with 
others in the same position: wives of the disappeared found most value in talking with 
other wives and rather few valued talking within the family. This is because many 
challenges faced are social problems within the family or community and this 
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emphasises that the type of social space in which meaning is constructed is crucial, 
revealing the value of associations of families of the disappeared. The positive impact of 
such contact is consistent with the understanding that through such interaction victims 
develop resilience, echoing reports of families of the 9/11 victims (Boss, 2006). One 
notable difference from the New York City experience is the meeting in peer groups, for 
example wives with wives, rather than in family groups, reflecting the hierarchies that 
exist within Nepali and Timorese families. Another common and effective coping 
mechanism was political engagement, bringing family members into contact with others 
who share the beliefs of their loved one and allowing positive meaning to be constructed. 
Such „active‟ coping strategies (Colic-Peisker and Tilbury, 2003) allow families to directly 
challenge those responsible for their victimhood (Hollander, 1997). The spirit world and 
dreams, like the fantasies of contact with the disappeared reported in other contexts 
(Boss, 2006), can also very powerfully influence the meaning given to disappearance in 
both Timor and Nepal.   
In any context ambiguous loss provokes anxiety about the roles of those left 
behind, but in the cultures of Nepal the very strict understandings of an individual‟s place 
in the family and community provoke greater challenges: the problems seen are not just 
psychological and emotional, but deeply social in nature, arising from community and 
family attitudes (e.g. Section 6.2.3). Identity becomes a problem psychologically because 
identity is a relational concept, defined through social interaction. The greatest problems 
arise where a woman‟s view of her identity conflicts with that of the family or community 
who consider her a widow who must behave and dress as such, where the wife is unable 
to admit the death of her husband as long as there is no evidence for it. For many 
families in Nepal once a son has disappeared the relationship of his wife to the family is 
ambiguous. The “intentional reconstruction” of roles and boundaries required to 
overcome such ambiguity within families cannot be done on the terms of the wives of the 
disappeared (Boss, 2006: 120), because of power relations within families. For most 
wives of the disappeared the reconstruction of identity takes place largely outside the 
family, through contacts with other wives of the disappeared, using narrative methods, 
analogous to those of family therapy:  
Telling and listening to stories in interaction with others who suffer the same 
ambiguous loss sets the stage for one‟s identity to be relationally expressed 
through the symbolic interaction of language, rituals and cultural, gendered, 
and generational patterns of coping and adaptation. (Boss, 2006: 129) 
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Such contact aids in (re)constructing identity, but can also challenge the isolation and 
disconnection that many wives feel; talking with peers builds on traditions of sharing and 
story-telling among women in many communities. This emphasises the importance of 
spaces where family member‟s identities and roles are understood, such as family 
associations where wives can meet together. The greatest challenges to addressing 
identity issues arising from ambiguous loss come from the narrow definition of women‟s 
roles and assumptions made about the death of the disappeared.  As such, any 
intervention must ideally go beyond the impacted family and address the views of the 
community concerning gender and the ambiguity of the fate of the disappeared.  
In Nepal ambiguity arises not only over the fate of the disappeared, but also over 
the relationship of the wife to the family. Ambivalence can thus arise both in attitudes 
towards the disappeared, and in the conflicted feelings of family members towards the 
wife. Symptoms of the stress of ambivalence are depression and anxiety and these are 
seen in the families of the disappeared, notably wives. A solution to the ambiguity (and 
the subsequent ambivalence) is invariably seen as being an „answer‟, something that 
would bring closure and confirm a wife‟s role as wife or widow. During the research 
efforts to suggest to families that they could move on with their lives without an answer 
was angrily rejected, even though many were doing exactly this, revealing that ambiguity 
and heightened ambivalence need not be problematic. Experience in Timor-Leste and 
elsewhere shows that even in the long-term only a small minority of families of the 
disappeared are likely to ever receive a satisfactory answer concerning the fate of their 
loved one.  For most of the families, it is a fact that “closure is a myth” (Boss, 2004: 560). 
This then begs the question, if closure will never come, what should families do? The 
approach of the ambiguous loss model is to seek meaning despite the absence of 
information and ongoing ambiguity, and find ways to live well despite not knowing (Boss, 
2007). Normalizing ambiguity and the resulting ambivalence primarily means 
acknowledging it (Boss, 2006): resilience comes from recognizing ambivalent feelings 
and managing them. For families of the Missing this implies accepting that that their 
relationship to the wife of the disappeared, and indeed to the missing person 
themselves, will remain ambiguous and understanding the conflicted emotions that 
generates. Normalizing this ambivalence remains one of the greatest challenges families 
face.   
Revising attachment means learning to live with the ambiguous loss of a close 
attachment.  A number of families and communities constructed tributes: even though 
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few families accepted the death of the disappeared many were keen to see memorials of 
a type that typically honour the dead. Such tributes are a way both of revising attachment 
and normalizing the ambivalence that families felt: in a culture where convention made 
formal death rituals impossible, such memorials are one of the few ways this can be 
done. Families in Bardiya, Nepal are conducting traditional prayer ceremonies, and 
building commemorative roadside resting places (chautara) and hand pumps to serve 
the community that record the names of the Missing. Another example is the demand of 
families that their loved ones be recognised as „martyrs‟, even while denying that death 
is proven, challenging attachment with a status that continues to value the disappeared 
highly. This normalises ambiguity, both honouring the missing and allowing hope for their 
return to remain, and puts memorialisation at the centre of psychosocial needs. It has 
been suggested that the somatic symptoms many wives display, although involuntary, 
may represent a continued connection to the disappeared:  
Sickness ... related to political violence represents a refusal to break ties with 
the person who was killed or disappeared. [...] such refusal circumvents the 
goals of disappearance or death, which is to wipe out a person‟s existence. 
The women thus embody the acts perpetrated against their husbands. 
(Green, 1999: 117, discussing widows of Guatemala‟s violencia.) 
The body is seen as demonstration of a continued attachment to the disappeared, and 
revising attachment as the solution to ill-health. Somatism may also be a way for women, 
whose pain is poorly understood, to manifest the impact of disappearance in a way that 
renders their suffering socially meaningful. A phenomenon that emphasised this 
approach in Nepal was where women had acknowledged that their husband was likely 
dead, but persisted in wearing the symbols of marriage (bangles, sindhur powder in the 
hair) as a protest with two aims: one to establish their right in the community to wear 
such symbols as long as death was not proved, and another to demonstrate to the 
authorities that they were still awaiting an answer. This appears to be a way for women 
to reclaim the symbols that most demonstrate their need for closure from being used 
against them; a move from despair to protest using symbols of attachment to the 
disappeared.  
Hope, like almost all aspirations in Nepali and Timorese society, is relational. 
Families of the disappeared expressed hopes beyond their missing loved one: they 
talked of hopes for their children and their wider families and hopes for continued peace. 
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Indeed, this could serve as a definition of resilience for the families, the ability to have 
realistic hopes for the future despite the ambiguity of their loss.  The families of the 
disappeared in Nepal used the word hope most often to refer to the return of the 
disappeared; although most had little hope, almost all (80%) had some. Therapeutically, 
the goal would appear to be not to disabuse families of such hope, however unrealistic, 
but to ensure that they are also sustained by other hopes. Because of the extreme 
poverty and hardship many live in, families expressed hopes that their children would be 
well fed and would be able to study, often accompanied by demands for compensation 
or relief payments; others had hopes that their children would be able to support them in 
their old age. The greatest barrier to realistic hopes was an obsession with closure, with 
searching for the disappeared above all else. A number of families or individuals had 
been unable to create goals that went beyond the disappearance, and for some their 
lives revolved entirely around it, with no route to new hopes. 
Ambiguous loss appears to be generally applicable to Nepali families of the 
disappeared: the need to find meaning and reconstruct identity has been found to be 
directly relevant to the challenges faced by families. Whilst the time that has passed has 
reduced ambiguity among families of the Missing in Timor-Leste, where ambiguity 
persists, the ambiguous loss model also seems to well describe its impact on family 
members. Many of the principal issues Nepali families discussed are comprehensible in 
the light of these understandings: in addition to symptoms of identity confusion, conflicts 
between social and individual understandings of meaning and identity were seen to be a 
dominant source of stress. Since the understanding of disappearance is constructed 
socially within family and community, so its impact must be understood in the same 
terms, and interventions initiated at the multiple levels of individual, family and 
community. What also emerges from this study is that many individuals and families 
have been able to live well despite ambiguity by finding locally relevant ways to 
reconstruct meaning and identity. Those who have coped least well have become fixated 
with the ambiguity of their loss and with seeking closure: this strongly suggests that 
human rights led interventions with families of the disappeared that emphasise truth over 
all other aspects can be potentially damaging by reinforcing such negative coping.    
Foregrounding ambiguity as both the source of individual and family stress and 
as the target of intervention has dramatic implications for work with families of the 
Missing. Whilst many individuals and families can live well despite ambiguity, those who 
have coped least well have become fixated with the ambiguity of their loss and obsessed 
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with seeking closure. Human rights interventions with families of the Missing have 
habitually emphasised issues of „truth and justice‟ despite the fact that for the families of 
the Missing “closure is a myth” (Boss, 2004: 560), both because the majority will never 
receive an answer concerning their loved one, as demonstrated by Timorese families 
who are still waiting after some 35 years, and because even if an answer and a body are 
received the psychological impacts continue. Interventions driven by a search for 
„closure‟ or for „truth‟ focus attention on ending ambiguity, rather than living well despite 
it, and can of themselves construct meanings that are both negative and that encourage 
the worst types of coping. Such emphases militate against a coming to terms with 
ambiguity and, at their worst, can serve to valorise the trauma of ambiguity where closing 
emotional wounds is perceived as betraying the Missing. The data of this study suggest 
that interventions with families of the Missing that emphasise truth over all other aspects 
can be potentially damaging by reinforcing such negative coping. The broader 
conclusion of this study is that rights-based interventions will necessarily have impacts, 
positive or negative, on the psychosocial well-being of family members and as a result it 
may be necessary for all interventions to accommodate psychosocial expertise.  
Exhumation and identification as reparation 
Here, the implications for victims of both the “political trauma” (Hamber, 2009) of 
disappearance, and the emotional and psychological aspects are discussed as they 
impact on the need for exhumation and return of human remains to families. Implicit in 
this discussion is the understanding of the body as both a social body, a symbol for 
thinking about relationships between the family, society and culture, and a body politic, 
an artefact of social and political control (Scheper-Hughes and Lock, 1987).    
An end to the ambiguity that defines the relationship of a family with a missing 
loved one drives the need for an „answer‟ that is simultaneously an emotional and 
psychosocial need, and a broader socio-political need for recognition. The data of this 
study show that for most families the body is the most effective answer, and even where 
the fact of death can be accepted without human remains, the body is sought for ritual 
purposes. The resolution of ambiguity, most obviously through exhumation, creates new 
identities for both the missing person and their family, and gives new meanings 
emotionally, socially and politically to the disappearance. The most extreme example of 
this is in the traditional cultures of Timor, where appropriate burial of the body and the 
rituals around interment are perceived to impact on the spirit of the dead in a way that for 
the family fundamentally remakes their world. In a more Western understanding, the 
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uncertainty and ambivalence that families feel is resolved by such a concretisation of the 
fate of the Missing. Socially, the concept of the Missing is not well understood and so 
ambiguity increases the disconnection between families and communities that is created 
by a family becoming victims of political violence. Exhumation serves to resolve this 
detachment, permitting both the family and the Missing (now simply dead) to resume 
their places in society. “Community includes both the living and the dead: manipulation of 
the dead affects relations with the living” (Verdery, 1999: 108) An end to ambiguity also 
empowers the family of the Missing by challenging the powerlessness that 
disappearance confirms in all aspects of their lives. 
At the socio-political level, disappearance aims not just to kill and ensure bodies 
are not found, but to dehumanise both its victims and their communities. Thus, in Nepal 
for example all those disappeared by the state were „terrorists‟ and thus not deserving of 
a grave or a place in memory. Exhumation concerns the challenging of the assumption 
that the Missing and their families have no value, and the process of exhumation serves 
to demonstrate that value, and is thus intrinsically reparative. As part of a reparations 
process this can accompany other value giving mechanisms, such as the granting of a 
certain status („martyr‟, for example) and memorialisation. The recognition that a family 
seeks from exhumation thus operates at various levels. Firstly they seek to recognise 
their dead themselves and many families felt that they would visually recognise the body 
of their loved one regardless of its condition. This recognition restores the missing 
person to the realm of experience, beyond the null identity of the disappeared. It also 
returns „ownership‟ of the loved one who was taken from them, allowing the dead to take 
their place physically, in a family grave for example, as well as psychologically and 
spiritually. In both Nepal and Timor-Leste the dead are unable to assume their proper 
place without appropriate ritual. In Timor, for the dead to satisfy their role as ancestors 
with great implications for the well-being of both the family and wider community, 
requires that the rituals of death be performed. In contrast to some families of the 
disappeared in Argentina who opposed exhumations in order that “their spirit ... can 
never be buried and forgotten” (de Bonafini, 1989, quoted in Robben, 2000: 93), families 
in Timor and Nepal insisted on exhumations and reburial (or other ritual), precisely so 
that the spirit could rest. This serves to demonstrate that the meaning of exhumation is 
contingent upon the cultural context in which it occurs.  
The second form of recognition that families seek is social, within family and 
community, primarily because their identity is often contingent upon the fate of the 
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Missing, particularly in the highly collective societies studied here. Once the Missing is 
known to be dead, the wife of the Missing becomes a widow, a mother becomes 
childless and so on. Since identity is constructed socially, exhumation creates identity as 
it concretises the fate of the (no longer) Missing and removes the ambivalence that 
ambiguity creates. The ritual, such as reburial, that can follow exhumation is a way of 
making a public statement about the death and aiding both social and individual 
construction of meaning. The final identity that exhumation remakes is political: restoring 
a place in memory for the Missing, both individual and collective. It affirms family 
narratives and gives the Missing a place in historical memory. This is the traditional 
understanding of reparations as something that both „repairs‟ victims and allows society 
to confront the truth of the past and construct new narratives on which to build the future. 
These are a direct attempt to challenge the discourse of perpetrators around denial of 
the disappearance and to confront the lies that so often accompany political violence. As 
such violence threatens identities, erodes social relations and devalues both individuals 
and communities politically, so exhumation can reconstitute meanings and identities that 
undo that damage. Truth and prosecutorial justice that can be an important consequence 
of exhumations also contribute to these processes. Exhumation makes the violations of 
the conflict visible, and the body it produces can be made to serve a range of agendas, 
including both healing the wounds of conflict and the instigation of new cycles of 
violence. “The concept of „the body‟ too is always caught in a deployment of power. The 
„body‟ is always already a biopolitical body” (Agamben, 1998: 187), and this is perhaps 
truer of a dead body than a live one. Whilst reparations can aid recovery of victims of 
conflict, it should not be forgotten that reparation is necessarily political, subject not only 
to decisions about who reparations address and how, but how any reparative act is 
interpreted. In Timor-Leste the exhumations and reburials that have taken place serve to 
eulogise the resistance, and the present government that has assumed their mantle. 
Exhumations in Bosnia of the dead from previous wars aided the creation of nationalist 
history that helped initiate the conflict of the 1990s (Verdery, 1999). This resulted in 
deaths that are today the subject of exhumations (Wagner, 2008).  
The principal challenges to comprehensive programmes of exhumation and 
identification in Nepal and Timor-Leste are a lack of both resources and political will. 
Whilst the use of technology in the process of exhumation and identification of the 
Missing, notably DNA, has become standard in the last two decades as a result of 
processes in the Balkans (Wagner, 2008), it is extremely expensive. There also remains 
a gap between the job such technology can do and the understanding of it among the 
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families of the Missing in traditional societies. In the absence of such technologies, a 
victim-centred approach may find that families choose to use accessible and affordable 
techniques from their own culture. Here the issues arising from this are discussed.    
Families in Timor talked of indigenous spiritual techniques that would enable 
traditional healers to identify the body of a loved one through contact with the spirit of the 
dead, even when bones were comingled with those of others: 
If there were two or more people together [in the same grave], we will speak 
many ritual words and mention the name of the person that we looking for, 
such us: „Kandido are you there?‟. Even though he is dead when we go 
there, we should call or mention his name. When we mention his name 
among many bodies, we will get the symbol or signal from one body.  This 
tells us that this is his or her body. […] the spirit can show itself. (Wife of 
Missing man, Timor-Leste; author‟s emphasis) 
This echoed work with the Missing in Vietnam: 
[T]he [exhumation] mission usually begins with a communication with the 
missing dead to ask for the location of their bodies before the costly trip to 
the site is initiated. The communication is done by traditional magical means 
and requires mediation by certain ritual specialists. (Kwon, 2008: 44) 
In this sense the Missing are perceived as actors, “vital partners” (ibid), in the actions 
concerning their future. In Timor, one family talked of techniques redolent of DNA testing, 
where a traditional healer would pour the blood of family members onto bones found and 
the reaction would confirm or deny their family connection. This appears to be a 
demonstration of the dynamism of tradition as it „learns‟ from science.  
The logic of a victim-centred approach is that victims will drive reparative 
processes, such as exhumations, which most concern them. In the absence of scientific 
techniques they will seek their own solutions, as they are doing in both Nepal and Timor-
Leste. This is unproblematic as long as the conclusions and results of such indigenous 
process are not challenged by techniques, potentially Western scientific ones, which can 
also claim families‟ confidence. In Timor-Leste, efforts to exhume the victims of the 
Santa Cruz massacre have already encountered such conflicts. In one case the body of 
a victim of the Santa Cruz massacre long thought by a family to be their relative was 
shown by DNA testing to not be: the concerned family decided the test was wrong and 
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remained unshaken in their belief that it was the remains of their relative. The same 
foreign forensic team has been confronted with evidence concerning the location of 
remains that have been passed to families by the spirits of the Missing. The forensic 
team has been reluctant to commit resources based on evidence in which it had no 
confidence, while families were perplexed at their refusal to act on information which 
they believed to be beyond doubt. Such questions will haunt any process that mixes 
traditional and scientific approaches, and represents a genuine dilemma in efforts to let 
families lead such processes whilst also using relevant technologies where they are 
available.        
Memorialisation: The political economy of memory 
Why do they just recognise the living and forget the dead? They forgot all the 
dead now. (Father of missing man, Lautem, Timor-Leste.) 
The politics of death is at work in a time of transition as much as at the time when the 
disappeared were taken and killed. Just as during conflict sovereign power demonstrates 
itself through the ability to let live or make die (Agamben, 2005), so in a time of transition 
the right to memorialise is contested as the right to possess the memory of the death and 
define how it will be remembered. Memory after violence, both individual and collective, 
concerns the representation of the events that led to disappearance and death, and 
construction of narratives that will determine both how those most affected will live and 
what history will be written about those who died. Here, the implications of the data for 
the politics of memory will be discussed. This will focus on how and why victims seek 
certain forms of recognition and memorialisation, including their psychosocial 
motivations, and how this constitutes part of a contested politics of memory after conflict.  
  Memory is about recognition, largely socially, of what has happened and who it 
has happened to: the recognition of who has suffered and how, and ultimately who is a 
victim. Taylor (1994) has claimed that identity is shaped by recognition and that 
recognition underlies conflicts over identity, even that it is a basic human need. This 
serves to emphasise the role of recognition in societies emerging from conflict in 
establishing sustainable peace. The model of ambiguous loss indicates that the 
meanings families give to disappearance are crucial to their ability to cope with it and are 
constructed relationally, through social interaction in family and community (Berger and 
Luckmann, 1966). Memory is “the means by which the coherence of our identity and our 
history is constructed and sustained” (Terdiman, 1993: vii) and similarly emerges from 
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the representations ascribed to disappearance by both the larger community and the 
state (Halbwachs and Coser, 1992). „Collective memory‟ is here understood as “the 
selective reconstruction and appropriation of aspects of the past” (Wood, 1999: 2) that 
serve as the „social frameworks‟ (Halbwachs and Coser, 1992) onto which personal 
recollections are woven.  As such, all collective memory emerges subject to the 
expression of a social group or power to organise representations of the past in their own 
interest. For their families, remembering the disappeared is an act of resistance against 
perpetrators, redeeming the humanity of the Missing: to memorialise is to reckon with 
invisibility, and this is perhaps what drives families‟ needs to see the names of the 
Missing on a memorial:  
A monument is something that stays forever [...] words fly away but whatever 
is written will stay. Today people talk about it but if nothing is written nothing 
will remain and all will be forgotten. (Sister of missing man, Dili, Timor-Leste.) 
The ambiguity of disappearance demands that families revise attachment to the Missing 
and one effective means is through memorials, which honour them without necessarily 
formalising the acceptance of death. Winter (1998) describes normal mourning as 
leading to recovery, which he sees as simultaneous with forgetting. This is one way of 
understanding the trauma of disappearance, since normal grief is interrupted and 
forgetting is hugely challenging, given the need to keep the memory of the disappeared 
alive. Memorials, and other rituals, offer one way to do this:   
Ritual here is a means of forgetting, as much as of commemoration, and war 
memorials, with their material representation of names and losses, are there 
to help in the necessary art of forgetting. (Winter, 1998: 115) 
Ironically, this may explain why families need to see the name of their loved one 
memorialised; this is a step towards the forgetting that is a part of normal mourning 
denied by disappearance. Žižek discusses the forgetting of trauma in the context of 
Lacanian psychology:  
The true choice apropos of historical trauma is not the one between 
remembering or forgetting them: traumas we are not ready or able to 
remember haunt us all the more forcefully. We should therefore accept the 
paradox that, in order to really forget an event, we must first summon up the 
strength to remember it properly. In order to account for this paradox, we 
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should bear in mind that the opposite of existence is not nonexistence, but 
insistence: that which does not exist, continues to insist. (Žižek, 2002: 22, 
emphasis in original).  
This appears to be relevant for both families of the Missing dealing with personal trauma, 
for whom the non-existence of the Missing is most definitely insistent, and for states, 
attempting to address the collective trauma of a violent past.  
In the politically charged atmosphere of a state emerging from conflict, memory 
itself is contested, as demonstrated in the data, the “absent presence of violence” (Bell, 
2009: 347) driving the social dynamics of memory. There is a “political economy of 
memory” (Küchler and Melion, 1991: 30) in which memory is sanctioned by power and 
politically deployed. Victims‟ needs for memorialisation are to invest their understanding 
of disappearance with powerful and culturally salient meanings that can affirm the value 
of the Missing and their experience of disappearance. Much of the field of transitional 
justice, reparations and truth-telling as much as trials and exhumations, is nothing but 
memory politics, driven by a search for truth but inevitably finding a range of truths. 
Memory is the product of social contestation, manipulated by “political entrepreneurs” 
(Tilly, McAdam and Tarrow, 2003: 34) to prolong conflict or to end it. Victims of violence 
however are the most heavily invested in memory, precisely because their resilience in 
the light of their experience can depend on affirmation of their own understanding of 
events (Section 9.2). This study has shown how whether a missing relative is a hero or a 
terrorist, a martyr or a victim, determines how both the disappeared and their families are 
perceived and in turn how they perceive themselves. The data of this study show both 
the range of victim agendas, often bitterly polarised according to the divisions of the 
conflict, and how they are instrumentalised or ignored by those driving the transition.  
Memorialisation of the dead after conflict has been conceptualised by Judith 
Butler as distinguishing between persons who are „grievable‟, whose lives are seen to 
matter and to be worthy of grief after death, and those who are not (Butler, 2009). This 
allows a connection to be made between those marginalised in life, from disempowered 
communities who are most likely to become victims of conflict, and those ungrieved in 
death. An argument can be made that only by giving such people a value in life can they 
have a value in death. The norm-setting role of reparations is thus not only to address 
the value of those who died in conflict, but of those who remain poor and wretched who 
survived the conflict: “grievability is a presupposition for the life that matters” (ibid: 14). 
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Like all reparative acts, memorialisation primarily concerns the assigning of value to 
victims and their experience. 
The links between individual memory and political memory (Assman, 2008) 
become clear in the testimony of families of the Missing. The „liberation struggle‟ against 
Indonesia has become the founding myth of the Timor-Leste state. A narrative has been 
constructed of a war in which the resistance was both glorious and unanimous, in which 
all Timorese were victims of an external aggressor (e.g. Rei, 2007). For a missing family 
member to be a part of that myth validates the suffering of the family and gives meaning 
to their sacrifice.  
[W]e need this [memorial] built so that one day we can explain to our 
children, generation to generation, so they know what happened and to 
transmit the messages to their children that their grandparents died because 
of the struggle for independence. (Brother of missing man, Bobonaro, Timor-
Leste) 
War myths “serve multiple functions including the creation of meaning out of 
suffering” (Hutchinson, 2009: 415): this meaning can be a crucial aid to resilience of 
families of victims. Interviews with families of those disappeared by the Indonesians 
revealed how valuable this narrative is to them, particularly where this has been 
reinforced by concrete reparations such as a medal or pension (Section 7.2.2). Those 
who became the victims of the resistance however feel victimised a second time by the 
lack of political memory of missing loved ones. Their experience has not only been 
ignored but the dehumanisation necessary for them to have been killed or disappeared 
appears vindicated. It is less the impunity that threatens such families‟ well-being, than 
the denial that anything untoward ever happened, apparently confirming the 
dehumanisation of the disappearance.  
We just feel pain in our heart because, for example, if I am a founder [of 
Fretilin] then my followers kill me, what do you think of that? The leaders 
should know about this, or did my father do something wrong? (Man whose 
father and three other relatives were executed by Fretilin, Manatuto, Timor-
Leste)  
In Nepal, the contestation over interpretation of the conflict between Maoists and 
the traditional political parties continues, polarised between opposing rhetorics of 
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„terrorism‟ and „people‟s war‟. The dominant official language of Government is currently 
one of all victims being equal, reflecting the political balance that exists between the 
parties to the conflict. No official memorialisation is ongoing beyond the martyrs of the 
2006 „people‟s movement‟, a victory shared by both sides. At the local level memory 
politics is vibrant, with victims of the state constructing memorials with Maoist support, 
and reinforcing narratives of resistance that feed into ongoing political struggles at both 
central and local level. The CPN-M both claim and recognise the Missing through 
recording their names in public places (Figure 14) and giving annotated photographs of 
the Missing to families.  
For the Maoist party the People‟s War was fed by sacrifice, and a culture of 
martyrdom encouraged that saw memorialisation as a political tool. A Maoist publication 
elaborated: “The people who commemorate the martyrs have developed a new culture in 
which martyrs‟ doors and pillars are created, martyrs‟ photos are exhibited and villages, 
hamlets, companies, battalions and brigades are named with martyrs‟ names.” 
(Janaawaj, 2003: 50-51, quoted in Lecomte-Tilouine, 2006: 53). The walls of the office of 
Sofad, the Maoist association of families of the Missing, in Kathmandu were entirely 
Figure 14 A ‘Martyrs’ gate’ built by the CPN-M in Bardiya district, Nepal, 
including the names of the dead and the Missing; the lack of discrimination 
between these two categories has angered families of the Missing. 
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covered with photos of the disappeared, both a secular shrine to the Missing and a place 
where families could come together and remember collectively. This confirms the 
understanding that collective, and in particular political, memory is performative: it comes 
into existence through specific kinds of memorial activity (Wood, 1999). Whilst these are 
typically elite led, one important role of victims‟ groups is to construct memory, and thus 
meaning and value, at a local level and on victims‟ terms (see Section 6.2.3), especially 
relevant where national efforts in the capital are remote and inaccessible. Contestation 
also occurs within those groups associated with one side of the struggle: a result of the 
Maoist eulogisation of martyrdom, particularly since the end of the war, has been that the 
CPN-M has considered the Missing as martyrs, denying the ambiguity of their fate, both 
because martyrs are perceived as more valuable to their cause, and because 
confronting the Missing issue would demand disappearances they had perpetrated be 
examined. 
Contestation takes place not only among elites but also between victims and 
within communities. In Nepal at the grassroots victims are polarised by their efforts to 
advance their own narratives and in many areas this prevents families of the Missing 
working together across the perpetrator divide. A positive narrative about someone 
disappeared by the state is perceived to require the discrediting of the narrative of 
someone taken by the Maoists. This zero sum is reinforced by the active engagement of 
political parties. Such political language provides a framework around which victims can 
make their demands of memory: the CPN-M has recognised those disappeared by the 
state as martyrs and families are encouraged to demand the same acknowledgment 
from the state. In Timor-Leste, the dominance of a single narrative has left the families of 
those whose victimhood falls outside it with little recourse: victims of the resistance have 
no political representation and appear reluctant to challenge the myths of the conflict and 
this has an emotional impact. Where the hegemonic narrative fails to encompass 
families‟ memory, the telling and re-telling of stories in family and community becomes a 
crucial coping mechanism (Section 7.3) in support of the construction of local memory 
(Osiel, 1997).      
Memory of the dead in the traditional societies studied here differs from that in 
Western cultures in the important aspect that whilst the body of the Missing is absent, 
the spirit of the dead may well be present. This serves to emphasise that memory works 
at several levels. For the family, and maybe the community, the spirit presence keeps 
the memory of the loved one alive but is negatively perceived since the spirit should be 
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„at rest‟. What families seek in terms of memorialisation is the sanctioning of their 
experience of disappearance by the state through a public and state funded memorial. 
Families‟ understanding of the spirit world is such that many also see a connection 
between such public memorialisation and the apparently private world of a relative‟s 
spirit:  
Up to now the spirits will not have peace or rest, if we don't do anything 
concrete […] We all know that the spirits do not need much but only a 
memorial with all the names of the missing written down. (Father of missing 
man, Dili, Timor-Leste.)  
This serves to demonstrate the very strong connections between memory and meaning 
constructed locally and that at the public level: collective memory reshapes meanings at 
the level of the family and individual and this is what drives families‟ need for formal 
recognition, with memorialisation a principal route to this.  
9.3 Contextualising approaches to legacies of violence in 
traditional societies: Indigenous approaches and the 
spiritual  
This study has shown that approaches to legacies of political violence that derive entirely 
or largely from Western understandings fail to address the needs of victims in traditional 
societies. Here, the implications for transitional justice, and broader recovery for families 
of the Missing, of the spiritual aspects of culture will be considered, with an emphasis on 
Timor. In both Nepal and Timor-Leste conflict largely occurred in rural areas and the 
most affected are those with little historic engagement with the institutions of the state. 
This is revealed in the data through the lack of enthusiasm to seek solutions through 
those institutions, such as courts and truth commissions. In such communities traditional 
leaders and spiritualists have long been involved in conflict resolution, reconciliation and 
local judicial process (Hohe and Nixon, 2003; Bellamy, 2009), playing roles that coincide 
with those foreseen for transitional justice mechanisms. In practice, these local 
approaches substitute for national processes that have either not occurred or have failed 
to reach most victims. Rooted as they are in their communities, such processes have as 
their ultimate goal the maintenance of social stability, an aim shared with post-war 
recovery and peacebuilding. At the heart of this approach is an understanding that local 
institutions, such as family, community, traditional governance and traditional healers, 
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are far more relevant to recovery and social reconstruction than the formal institutions 
that globalised discourses and the international community seek to establish.  
The discussion here will emphasise how trauma, as a collective experience, 
dictates how communities in Timor-Leste perceive the role both of the spirits in 
addressing its impact, and how the human rights discourse constructs the subjects of 
violations in a way add odds with such understandings.   
Trauma and the collective in traditional spiritualism  
The data from Timor demonstrate both the importance of the role of the spirits of the 
Missing as actors in recovery from conflict, and the highly collective nature of the trauma 
of disappearance The majority of families expressed concerns about the spiritual 
implications of disappearance, including impacts on animals, agriculture and the health 
of family members, where ritual demands are not satisfied. The data show that spirit 
manifestations are collectively experienced, confirming that the experience of pain and 
suffering is fundamentally social in nature (Good et al. 1994), even more so when it is 
the result of political violence that targets a community. That such historically constituted 
pain is experienced socially serves to confirm the role of the spirits for affected 
communities. This demands that intervention to address trauma target not individual 
relatives of the Missing but families and communities, with ill-health considered primarily 
a social phenomenon:  
[Ritual] is the only way to solve the problem. If this is not done babies will get 
sick and the community will be unable to stay in peace, it will make 
problems. (Interview with a traditional spiritualist [lia nain] in Timor-Leste, 
discussing how to address the problem of the Missing.)  
Ceremonies of interment or cremation of the bodies of the Missing, or an 
equivalent ritual with a substitute body, aim to restore order: “the rites of passage not 
only remove the corpse and the dead soul from the secular world and fixes them firmly in 
the sacred, but also separates lineage kin ties from the sacred world and restores the 
living to secular life.” (Rawnsley, 2004: 6, discussing Timor-Leste) These are social 
events that serve as highly visible collective rituals that address community needs. There 
is evidence in the literature (Field, 2004; Cole, 2004) and in the data of this study that the 
effectiveness of such ritual derives from its performative nature, echoing the mechanism 
of truth commissions but using the language of spirit not catharsis and operating in a 
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local social space rather than that of a state institution. Such social healing is directly 
related to the construction of collective memory in a community, with ritual reducing pain 
by drawing it into a process of producing and reconstructing memories (Cole, 2004). 
Memory links individuals (both living and dead) with wider social narratives: rituals can 
address both the spiritual manifestations reported by families of the Missing as well as 
individual physical and somatic ailments:  
[H]is spirit was appearing and made problems before we did the ritual, but 
there were no problems again with his spirit after we did the ritual. […] His 
spirit also will not be angry with us because we have sent him to the spirit of 
our grandfathers through the traditional process. (Uncle of Missing man, 
Timor-Leste)   
He [the spirit] was screaming in the night-time and we got sick. Therefore, we 
took his shirt and made his ritual. The traditional elders [lia nain] came 
together to make the funeral ceremony. He came and showed himself 
through the scream. We did not find him, but we found some blood: it means 
that he was already dead. [...] The blood appeared suddenly on the road in 
front of my house. I was surprised at the time and I said to myself that he 
was already dead. We put his shirt with flowers to bury him. […] His spirit 
was silent once we did the ritual. We did not hear his voice after the ritual 
process. (Son of Missing man, Timor-Leste.)   
In Timor, the lia nain, the elders who deal with spiritual issues, mediate between the 
community and the spirit world and lead ritual. These rituals were desired by families not 
out of a blind adherence to tradition, but pragmatically, because they produce the 
desired result. Field describes the impact of such rituals in Timor as “providing 
opportunities for reducing anxiety and for incorporation into the social body that sees 
such rituals as necessary” (2004: 340), a statement of the fact that individual healing 
results from the social role ritual plays. This is implied by ambiguous loss theory which 
sees the (social) construction of meaning and identity as a way of countering the 
negative impact of ambiguity, which in Timor was less about the fate of the Missing than 
about the spirit itself. The quotations from families clearly demonstrate the extent to 
which the spirit world can create powerful meanings for families. The appearance of 
blood following the ritual is seen as confirming the death of the Missing, resolving 
ambiguity and opening routes, again spiritual, to the addressing of the psychic impact of 
death. In a traditional society such meanings can be constructed though ritual rather than 
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through Western approaches requiring the verbalisation that „counselling‟ demands: for 
traditional peoples the performance of ritual resonates far more than narrative. Beyond 
this, there is the connection between ritual and what anthropologists have called 
„anxiety‟, where ritual is used to address something otherwise out of control of a family 
(Homans, 1941), reducing the lack of mastery over a situation where a relative is 
missing. One crucial element of ritual is that it restores agency to families of the Missing. 
The experience of disappearance is one of a loss of mastery over important aspects of 
life: funerary ritual is something steered by families that restores their control over 
aspects linked to their dead relative, whilst simultaneously restoring order spiritually and 
cosmically, in a way that is socially affirmed. Issues of agency are discussed further in 
Section 10.2. 
Ritual after death or disappearance may also have a critical role in the fostering 
of solidarity in communities divided by conflict. Funerary rituals in Timor, even in normal 
times, foster socialising and confirm family and other alliances. Funerary feasts have no 
social distinctions or invitations and are thus events in which anyone in any way 
connected with the deceased can participate (Field, 2004). As such their potential role in 
reconstructing communities riven by the impact of political violence is clear. Ritual 
permits community to both return to a past that preceded the disruption of conflict and 
rebuild links degraded by the experience of violence through the extension and 
reassertion of social networks. In contrast with remote processes that purport to 
reconcile, these events embedded in the social fabric and traditions of communities can 
serve to bridge divisions created by times of conflict in ways that emerge naturally from 
shared values. Field observed in a community in Dili that, following the conflict: “[t]hrough 
participation in rituals [...] residents contributed to and shared in psychosocial recovery” 
(2004: 346). 
The data also suggest that the recognition families seek through a place in 
political or historic memory (Section 9.2) is linked to the addressing of the trauma of 
disappearance. That Timorese sacred tradition is linked to memory is clear from the 
imperative that ancestors should be buried in the clan graveyard in order to satisfy their 
spiritual role, in practice providing a place where families can remember their dead. The 
construction of graves according to traditional prescription remakes space socially, 
healing individuals and communities. As for other aspects of ritual, this memorialisation 
restores the Missing to their „proper‟ place, both physically and psychically, and permits a 
spiritual harmony that ensures prosperity and good health for all. Traditionally, such 
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memorialisation accompanies burial and can become especially important where 
funerary ritual is impossible or substitute rituals must be performed. Half of the families of 
the Missing met in Timor had made rituals and graves, burying a substitute for the body 
in the absence of human remains. Similarly, annual rituals on the anniversaries of events 
that led to mass disappearance or killing, such as the Santa Cruz massacre (see Section 
4.3.1) serve to air both collective grief and to express solidarity with families of the dead 
and Missing.  
In summary, where pain is said to “unmake” the world (Scarry, 1985), the 
addressing of the impact of disappearance requires a remaking of the social fabric in 
which victims live. In traditional societies ritual provides a framework from which both 
meaning and memory can be constructed from events taking place in social spaces that 
heal the traumas of disappearance. In contrast to Western approaches to trauma, based 
on verbal expression of experience, traditional societies will use rituals that have a 
performative component serving to create meanings socially. The implications for 
interventions with families of the Missing are clear: where remains cannot be recovered 
local processes that permit the social addressing of trauma must be facilitated. In Timor-
Leste and indigenous Nepali communities this demands the performance of rituals 
rooted in tradition that permit the healing of trauma in both impacted individuals and their 
communities.  
Human rights as fetish: Where globalised discourse meets indigenous 
tradition 
An ethnography such as this is that is able to challenge the culturally based assumptions 
that drive discourses such as that of human rights. Many of those met in this study do 
not share ideas of political causation with Western social science and as a result 
challenge the epistemologies with which we approach how disappearance can be 
addressed. This section will explore the implications of traditional beliefs in which the 
spirits of the dead play a far larger role in the lives of families of the Missing than any 
other actor, including the authorities. It asks what implications this has for practice with 
such victims.  
It is a fundamental assumption of social science that there are objective causes 
of social phenomena and that understanding these is a principal aim of such science. 
Transitional justice and human rights more generally are constructed on the 
understanding that changes in law and behaviour impact on people in certain ways. An 
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alternative understanding of political causality is that which emerges from a religious or 
spiritual outlook in which consequences flow from sin or virtue or, as in the case of Timor 
and the indigenous people of Nepal, from the actions of spirits. Many families met for this 
study prioritise an addressing of spiritual needs above all others:   
We raised chickens, pigs and all animals but they always died because of his 
spirit. The spirit of the victim made our life have no movement. Maybe he [the 
spirit] sits alone and thinks, „you get a good place to live but I am suffering‟. 
As a result I do not have anything, including money, in my life.  (Son of 
missing man, Lautem, Timor-Leste.) 
Rural Timorese see their lives as not just influenced but determined in many ways by 
spirits, whose actions can in turn be impacted by human behaviour, notably by the 
correct performance of ritual. The problems caused by a malign spirit can be addressed 
by performing relevant ritual, with or without the body of the Missing (Section 7.2.3). In 
contrast, rights activists see a route to change in the lives of victims through the 
discourse of rights, which promises truth, justice and reparation, through the action of the 
authorities.  
The history of modernity is seen as one of human liberation from false beliefs and 
fetishisms and human rights emerges directly from this tradition. The traditional Timorese 
confronted with human rights discourse is told that she should abandon her belief in the 
agency of the spirits that have long sustained her community and rather pursue the legal 
and political routes to action that underlie modern, and Western, notions of political 
causality. Modernity seeks to free the indigenous subject from her thrall to the fetish of 
the spirit and realise the true character of human agency and emancipation. However, 
what appears quite natural to someone immersed in the Western tradition has huge 
implications for the indigenous subject. Modernity constructs her not as a member of a 
community, linked to family, clan and ancestors through blood and spirit, but as an 
autonomous agent whose humanity alone, independent of the very things which define 
her identity and create life‟s meanings for her, determines what she can be. The 
radicalism of this agenda is consistently under-estimated by those who advocate it, for 
whom the „naturalness‟ of individual rights is self-evident. The apparent success of the 
rights discourse in low income contexts such as Nepal and Timor-Leste is testament 
both to the fact that it is disseminated by power and well resourced (Section 9.1) and that 
the persistence of understandings that are resistant to it are largely invisible.   
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The collision between the modernity of individual rights and traditions of ancestral 
ritual seen in this study echoes the missionary encounter between Christianity and the 
non-Western „primitive‟ (Keane, 2007). Victims of conflict are being asked to see agency 
not in rites, spirits and the bodies of the Missing as they have traditionally believed, but in 
the concept of rights and bodies of law. The concept of redemption in abstract notions of 
truth and justice is redolent of missionary claims that agency lies not in fetish and ritual 
but in the power of a Christian god. Despite the emancipatory implication of the rights 
discourse, in practice in Timor-Leste and Nepal rights are something claimed by others 
on behalf of victims (Section 9.1): rights are used not to give agency to victims, but to 
persuade them to place trust in the discourse and its practitioners. Fetishism is 
concerned with the difference between subjects and objects: missionary Christianity‟s 
contempt of fetish was most exercised by the ascription of agency to non-human 
subjects (Keane, 2007), in the same way as are contemporary discourses of secular 
modernity. And yet it is clear that human rights practice with rural victims in both Nepal 
and Timor-Leste objectifies victims, and in this sense can itself be seen as a fetish, 
ascribing agency to ordinary people whilst actually denying it to them, echoing the very 
critiques of fetish by missionaries:  
By ascribing agency to things that in truth lack it, they thereby deny, perhaps 
even rob, the agency of those who properly possess it. (Keane, 2007: 180-
181, writing of a Dutch missionary view of „primitives‟ in Indonesia.) 
There are also analogies in the conflict over narrative between missionaries and ritualists 
and those seen in the interaction of the rights discourse with rural Timorese. The power 
of ritual language lies in words and acts, while both the missionary and the rights activist 
seek to enable the agency that lies not in the words of their texts, but in the ideas those 
words express. However, the language of rights becomes for many a form of words 
emptied of political or other contextual context, as seen in the repetition of demands of 
mobilised victims in Timor-Leste for an international tribunal, despite the lack of a clear 
idea as to what that was. Modernity in both its religious and secular forms has shifted 
attention from practices to belief, to sets of propositions that command assent (Asad, 
1993).  
This analysis does not aim to disparage rights as having no role in addressing the 
needs of families of the Missing in traditional societies. Claims to rights are some of the 
very few claims that the marginalised feel able to make of power. However, it is a 
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concern that the language of rights appears to be an effective tool to reinforce existing 
social relations and to empower external and Western discourses that are articulated by 
voices of power, and ultimately to objectify victims. The data demonstrate that much of 
the populations of both Nepal and Timor-Leste live an essentially pre-modern life, not 
only in terms of the lack of realisation of individual rights but also in their relationship with 
the state. Whilst both have modern norm-based liberal democratic regimes in their 
capitals, many live in communities where the state has little presence and that remain 
largely clan based, where ritual and other community obligations are pre-eminent. In 
such a society the rule of law, that constitutes a central focus of rights and transitional 
justice is simply less relevant. In such contexts a state-based discourse such as human 
rights will always have both limited appeal and value: in many cases the state is in no 
position to enforce such rights. This serves as a basis for defining approaches to 
legacies of violence that are rooted in such communities and the addressing of needs 
that spring from traditional understandings of the world. It promises a transitional justice 
that values local agency and tradition: this is discussed further in Chapter 10.  
9.4 Summary and conclusions 
Using the critique of existing transitional justice practice of Chapter 8 as a starting point, 
this chapter has attempted to consider those needs articulated by victims that remain 
neglected by contemporary praxis, driven by the philosophy of a victim-centred 
approach. The goal is to contextualise the needs expressed by families of the Missing, to 
understand how the most acute needs arise as a direct response to the impact of 
disappearance in a particular social and cultural environment. The aim has been not 
merely to identify unaddressed needs, but to understand why as a global practice 
transitional justice has the focus it has. This focus is seen to arise not only from the 
legalism of the rights discourse discussed in Section 8.3, but also because it is a 
discourse both more accessible and more useful to elites in urban centres than to the 
marginalised communities who are over represented among the victims met in this study. 
The practice of human rights after conflict reflects a liberal bias both in how it is 
articulated globally and how it is instantiated in particular contexts. As a result, in both 
Nepal and Timor-Leste transitional justice practice largely ignores the social, economic 
and cultural whilst emphasising those elements that least threaten existing socio-
economic hierarchies, namely issues of truth and judicial process. Whilst transitional 
justice has always perceived judicial process as the most sensitive issue in terms of 
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individual accountability, it neglects that social and economic issues have the greatest 
potential to upset existing social relations. This becomes even more true when the 
economic and social origins of conflict such as those in Nepal are considered.     
The remainder of the chapter attempted to understand the nature of the local and 
particular needs that dominate victim agendas in the two contexts. Psychosocial impacts 
have been understood through the ambiguous loss model, and this serves to 
demonstrate that families seek the reconstruction of meaning and identity that is 
challenged by the ambiguity of disappearance. This resonates with what families 
demanded of the state, in terms of acknowledgement and recognition that can challenge 
the goals of political violence that deny disappearance and give no value to victims, or to 
their families and communities. Psychosocial impacts were seen to range from disabling 
mental illness to stigmatisation in family and community. Such impacts are considered 
beyond the remit of transitional justice in both contexts, and are largely absent from the 
broader transitional justice debate. Interventions rooted in the communities in which 
victims live can address such needs, but this demands approaches that focus on the 
grassroots and challenge the legalistic and institutional bias that characterises 
transitional justice discourse in both Nepal and Timor-Leste.  
Families in both contexts demonstrated that a need for answers and for the 
bodies of the Missing was their priority, as well as recognition of the suffering of the 
family and of the sacrifice of the Missing. These needs were understood in terms of 
meaning and identity at both a local level, i.e. for families and communities, and 
concerning their broader national consequences and drivers. Both exhumations and 
processes of memorialisation construct particular meanings that families value and are 
literally reparative, at the family, community and national levels. This shows the link 
between a need to find truths that create local meanings and the norm-setting role of 
reparations on the national stage, where an acknowledgement of what has happened 
and a recognition of those damaged by violations of conflict sets norms for the post-
conflict state (see Section 10.3.3) 
The other element that links both exhumation and reparation, and the local and 
the national, is memory, which serves as an arena of contestation in which meaning is 
assigned to the violations of the conflict. The demands of memory made by victims are 
clear: they seek acknowledgement of their suffering and the assigning of value to their 
missing relative, through memorials, compensation or the granting of a status that 
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confirms that value.  Whilst all such measures can serve political or other agendas, 
permitting memorialisation of all victims regardless of perpetrator permits an even-
handed approach that maximises the recognition of those who suffered and thus of a 
comprehensive coming to terms with the past. When such process is on the terms of 
victims it impacts not at the national level like a trial or a truth commission, but in the 
communities in which victims live: as such it is far more accessible. Chapter 10 will 
pursue this and conceptualise a victim-centred approach, not only in terms of its impact 
on victims, but also as to how it can allow societies to better deal with legacies of 
violence and move on after conflict.   
The topics addressed here reveal that all of the elements that families most value 
in addressing the impacts of disappearance are linked to a need for structural change, 
for an addressing of the inequalities and disempowerment that underlay violations. 
Psychosocial needs are rooted in addressing the need for both victims and their families 
to be valued socially and by the state: a explicit demand that marginalised by challenged 
and the Missing be considered grievable. The same issue drives demands for an end to 
the ambiguity of loss and for a body and a grave. The power of global discourses serves 
to marginalise traditional understandings of both trauma and how violations are 
addressed. Whilst the local elites who articulate liberal modernity use the language of 
rights and PTSD, indigenous understandings see the mental and emotional impacts of 
disappearance as both collective and spiritually driven, and challenge the very idea of 
agency in law and government. A victim-centred approach thus has two implications: 
firstly, to challenge existing power relations and seek a socially transformative process 
after conflict and, two, to privilege everyday understandings that are marginal to current 
approaches to transitional justice. Concrete proposals to address these issues are 
discussed in the following chapter.    
The emphasis on the local and the particular discussed the nature of the 
traditional societies investigated here, with an emphasis on the spiritual issues that were 
primary for many families and the irrelevance to them of much of what underlies the 
rights discourse. Families whose identity has always been defined by their place in a 
community and whose points of reference are issues of clan and the ancestors will 
struggle to see the resonance of the priorities of transitional justice as it is globally 
articulated. Individual rights and the secular modernity in which they are rooted are not 
concepts that such families will readily grasp, and the data show that they rather make 
demands that echo their own relationships, not to a remote state that has never served 
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them, but to pre-modern understandings of obligation to family and community. Part of 
that obligation is to the spirits of the ancestors and many of the Missing are considered 
by family members not to be individual victims of violations, but spirits whose 
dishonouring has very concrete implications for the health and welfare of the family and 
the wider clan.  For such families‟ agendas to impact on a transitional justice process it 
must not only be consultative, but must operate in the same social spaces as the 
impacts it seeks to address. The following chapter pursues this direction, conceptualising 
a victim-centred transitional justice that begins from the preoccupations of victims to 
construct mechanisms that can operate on a national basis, but driven from the 
grassroots.  
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Chapter 10 Towards victim-centred transitional 
justice 
This study reveals a gap between the goals of transitional justice in both theory and 
practice and the needs of families of the Missing, emblematic of conflict victims in those 
two states. Victims‟ greatest concerns are issues that are either invisible to the 
discourses that drive such process, for example spiritual matters or social issues 
embedded in the daily lives of victims, or are simply not prioritised, as is seen with issues 
related to livelihood and human remains. The data suggest that current approaches to 
the development of mechanisms to address legacies of violence are largely incapable of 
advancing the agendas of the poor and the marginal who are most often the victims of 
contemporary conflict. This failure has implications not only for the success of the 
transitional justice process, but also for the broader transition and for sustainable peace. 
This study seeks to address this deficit by proposing victim-centred transitional justice to 
address both the needs of those most impacted by violations and the broader issues that 
drive conflict. In this chapter such an approach is conceptualised, advocating a 
transitional justice steered by what victims seek for recovery from the impact of violations 
and ultimately to be evaluated according to its success in meeting such needs. This 
requires a refocusing of such praxis to include the psychosocial, the economic and 
elements, such as the spiritual, that derive not from universal discourse but from the 
everyday lives of victims. This chapter encompasses a dilemma between the pursuit of a 
novel approach to addressing violations - the victim-centred, grassroots driven process 
advocated here - and a pragmatic aim of incrementally improving current practice. Here, 
a victim-centred vision of transitional justice is presented, whilst an engagement with 
ongoing processes in Nepal and Timor-Leste and proposals for concrete action that 
could serve to address victims‟ needs in those states are discussed in Appendix IV.  
Whilst here victim-centred process is discussed in terms of transitional justice 
and broader responses to violations, it is not simply a way to make transitional justice do 
„more‟, but is a paradigm intended to construct bottom-up approaches to peacebuilding 
and post-war recovery more generally (Section 2.1). Indeed, assuming a victim 
perspective serves to demonstrate the artifice of separating such disciplines when 
prioritising a people-centred approach rather than a state-centred one. Victim-centred 
process can challenge hegemonic approaches rooted in liberal agendas that have ill-
served communities such as those met in Timor-Leste, challenging a top-down, 
 278 
 
prescriptive approach to transition as well as many of the assumptions of what 
constitutes the „liberal peace‟. Whilst the demands of such process are broad, a victim-
centred approach aims not to expand the demands on, and expense of, dedicated 
institutional processes, but to replace them with a participatory framework that can 
catalyse broader political processes that deliver on victims‟ goals. A victim-centred 
approach makes the politics of transitional justice explicit by highlighting the 
transformative nature of victims‟ demands and undercuts partisan threats to peace by 
privileging subaltern priorities.     
This chapter begins with a discussion of the importance of methodology in 
understanding victims‟ views: if a process is to be steered by the agenda of victims it is 
crucial that accurate and representative understandings emerge from efforts to study 
victim views. The relationship between needs and rights as approaches to understanding 
and addressing impacts of mass violence are discussed, with an emphasis on how they 
relate to the local and the global, the particular and the universal. Victim-centred process 
is conceptualised in terms of emphasising empowerment: mobilisation of victims is 
perceived as a way of driving such process „from below‟ and a route not only to 
overcoming the failures of representation, but to challenge the subordination of 
transitional justice to political agendas, including liberal ones, and to maximise its 
transformative potential. The possible divergence between the needs of victims and 
those of the wider society are then discussed, and victim-centred process presented as 
positively impacting on issues of legitimacy and governance in post-conflict states.  
10.1 Understanding victim agendas: The importance of method 
For all work with victims of political violence human rights has become a hegemonic 
discourse, providing what has been called the “dominant emancipatory vocabulary” 
(Kennedy, 2004: 9). In the contexts examined here however, human rights has become 
a language that is far from emancipatory in practice (Section 9.1): rights praxis is centred 
on the violation, rather than harms suffered, considering the victim primarily as the object 
of a violation rather than a subject in her own right (Section 9.1). The culture of rights 
practice in both Nepal and Timor-Leste remains driven by such factors, with truth and 
justice the normative priorities of interventions, resulting in a rights practice that is 
concerned far more with the ends of accessing victim testimony than the means by 
which this is done. The net result is a positivistic and thin human rights that emphasises 
legal remedies, most notably prosecutions, and that has few tools to engage with victims 
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in understanding both the contextual harm that has resulted from the violation and any 
needs victims may have that are beyond the frame of the typical rights intervention. 
Research in human rights has successfully transcended these limits, engaging with 
methodologies more common in anthropology or sociology and in so doing dramatically 
broadening the understandings and potential of rights-based interventions (Section 1.2). 
On the basis of the data of this study however, such approaches have not significantly 
impacted on rights praxis after conflict of either national or international agencies in the 
contexts investigated. A victim-centred practice seeks to move beyond perceiving victims 
as primarily a source of testimony and towards a practice where an engagement with 
victims permits the broadest response to the highly contextual impacts of a violation.  
The most fundamental critique that this analysis makes of contemporary 
transitional justice process is its lack of an evidence base. In parallel with much research 
in the field, practice has remained largely non-empirical (van der Merwe, Baxter & 
Chapman, 2009), driven normatively rather than on the basis of data collected. 
Additionally, transitional justice has been perceived as a set of institutional mechanisms, 
and research largely restricted to examinations of such mechanisms, neglecting the 
many other processes occurring at a local or community level that remain invisible to 
outsiders. An example of this is the little attention that victims‟ groups have received (see 
Section 3.2), despite this study suggesting that they are a principal coping mechanism 
for many, far more important to victims than the institutional processes that are the 
subject of most studies. As long as the transitional justice „tool-kit‟ contains a small and 
non-extensible set of mechanisms (trials, truth commissions, reparations) contexts 
emerging from violent pasts will be examined through the lens of these approaches, 
leading to a “tendency to over-attribute [impacts] to mechanisms rather than a complex 
social reality” (Hamber, 2007: 3) The data of this study suggest that communities 
emerging from violence have both a far larger range of needs and a larger range of 
resources to address those needs than has been imagined by those steering transitional 
justice interventions.    
Empirical work to understand the needs of victims in transition or to gauge the 
impact of transitional justice process on them is rare (Section 3.4.2). When such studies 
are done, they are often methodologically limited, and examples that contradict the 
results of this research, suggesting that victims prioritise truth and prosecutions, can be 
found from both Nepal and Timor-Leste (ICTJ and Advocacy Forum, 2008; Pigou, 2004; 
Kingston, 2006). These appear to be the result of the purposive sampling of respondents 
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largely from among activists who were unrepresentative of the victim population (Robins, 
2009a), demonstrating the importance of method in attempting to understand victims‟ 
views. Observing this lack of reflexivity has driven the methodology here: using an 
ethnographic approach which demanded immersion in victim communities, combined 
with representative sampling and active victim participation, allowed stories to emerge 
which have not otherwise been told in either context (Chapter 5). It remains a dilemma 
for practitioners, as for researchers, to represent the „other‟ of the global South whilst 
simultaneously talking of the need to counter marginalisation (e.g. Kapoor, 2004; 
Madlingozi, 2010). This study has attempted to allow the voices of victims to be heard 
through its participatory element, with the aim of advancing empowerment and 
mobilisation on the terms of victims themselves. Moving away from positivism to the 
treatment of knowledge as a social product and towards research as a process of 
empowerment leads to such studies having a direct political implication. It not only 
grounds an approach to transition in the everyday lives of the marginalised but it drives 
transitional process away from efforts to enforce a status quo and towards a politically 
transformative practice that responds to human needs. Whilst this thesis represents only 
a modest exploration of such possibilities, it is hoped that it shows the potential of such 
approaches.  
The concrete steps required to enable victims to be heard on their own terms 
emerge from the data concerning family associations. Such victims‟ groups are seen to 
not only address victims‟ urgent needs, for support and the construction of meaning from 
their experience, but also serve to mobilise victims to challenge their powerlessness. 
Perhaps the only documented case of such a mobilisation, on victims‟ terms, is that of 
the Khulumani support group in South Africa, where an effort to empower victims around 
the TRC process turned into a social movement with goals that demand social 
transformation (Madlingozi, 2010). This demonstrates that when victims of conflict 
represent themselves the agenda that emerges is qualitatively different from what has 
become the „transitional justice agenda‟. Khulumani‟s initial interaction with victims is on 
the basis of needs (ibid: 8) and this has driven its work to move beyond a narrow focus 
on violations of the conflict to broader issues of social justice, with an emphasis on 
empowerment and „active citizenship‟. The philosophy of Khulumani is that of “refusing 
representation” (ibid: 14), rejecting how experts and others see victims and their needs, 
and how they ultimately produce victims, in favour of victim agency. Whilst Khulumani, 
as a product of its time and place, cannot be a model for victims everywhere, it does 
demonstrate how victim mobilisation can challenge what have become conventional 
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ways of „doing‟ transitional justice and of speaking for victims. The challenges of 
mobilisation are discussed further in Section 10.3.1. 
10.2 Needs and rights, the local and the global 
The needs prioritised by the respondents of this study in both contexts fail to resonate 
with the preoccupations of rights activists. Victims are constructed as subjects of rights 
talk in ways that serve to almost entirely deny the subjectivity that victims construct of 
themselves. While victims are members of families and communities, with a range of 
social and spiritual connections to the Missing and significant resources at their disposal, 
rights discourse constructs the families of the Missing as atomised individuals passively 
waiting for justice to be done and truth revealed, in remote institutions in the capital. 
Within their communities relatives of the Missing have a complex set of identities of 
which „victim‟ is only one, navigating constantly between agency and a passivity often 
prescribed by their social position. This lack of victim agency emerged from their ongoing 
marginalisation, both as victims of conflict and as members of ethnic, caste and gender 
groups that have long been disempowered. Marginalisation was in turn reinforced by 
elite led human rights engagements with their issues, in which transitional justice 
discourse does not see families‟ homes and villages as sites for the assertion of rights, 
but rather that human rights after conflict are instantiated exclusively in elite spaces on 
the terms of those familiar with its language. There is no human rights in the vernacular 
(Merry, 2006) in such communities, where the impacts of violations are expressed as 
needs.  
The data suggest several motivations for ensuring that needs, defined by victims 
themselves from within their culture and context and therefore necessarily local and 
particular, are a part of approaches to address legacies of violence. One is to ensure that 
the range of needs articulated by victims that go beyond rights are considered valid 
claims of transition; the second is to challenge narrow rights agendas, emerging from 
elites and rooted in current global practice, that prioritise civil and political rights over and 
above the priorities (such as the social and economic) of those most impacted by 
violations; third, the agency of victims in any process can best be ensured by using the 
language and concepts that victims themselves use: for victims to be mobilised to be 
actors in transition, their own agendas must be privileged.  
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Families of the Missing articulated a range of needs, dominated by social and 
economic challenges, the need for an answer concerning the fate of the Missing, and 
access to their remains; issues of memory, emotion, and the spiritual were hugely 
important to many. Whilst some of these demands can be framed in terms of rights 
claims, many do not fit the expectations of what transitional justice attempts to deliver. 
Where rights talk was used with reference to the families of the Missing it was seen that 
civil and political rights dominated discussion of both rights activists and decision 
makers, in contrast to victims‟ priorities. Rooting approaches in victims‟ needs rather 
than in the rights discourse can most readily challenge such narrow agendas and the 
leading role that experts play, and reveal the gap between a liberal rights-based 
approach and what victims seek. The range of needs articulated by families in Nepal and 
Timor-Leste resonated with theories of need in which intermediate needs, for food, 
shelter, identity, recognition and autonomy, are recognisably universal, but which are 
expressed through satisfiers that are highly contingent (see Section 2.2.4). Whilst there 
is potential for a bottom-up universalism to be constructed around intermediate needs, 
the way in which these are addressed in any particular context must be highly local: this 
is demonstrated in the data where local social and spiritual demands are key for many. 
The addressing of such needs challenges a discourse dependent exclusively upon rights 
and demand an emphasis on the local, rather than a universalising globalism.   
An example of impacts of violations that occur in the social spaces of family and 
community can be seen by considering the wives of the Missing in Nepal. Structural 
violence against women is exacerbated as a direct result of violations committed against 
a man through whom a woman‟s relationships to both family and community are defined. 
Gender is always enmeshed in a nexus of discursive practices, including the legal, 
political and social. Transitional justice, with its roots in rights and law, has always 
preferentially sought to address the legal while acknowledging the political discourse 
around its practice. The social remains however an area where transitional justice 
appears to fear to tread; a peculiarity that resonates with feminist discourse that has long 
seen the distinction between the public and the private as serving to depoliticise the 
domestic space (Giles and Hyndman, 2004). Prioritising needs alongside rights as a 
driver of action to address the impact of violations highlights the failures of a rights 
discourse largely blind to such power relations.  
The most fundamental criticism of a needs approach is that, in contrast to rights, 
needs have no explicit philosophical foundation through which to prioritise agency. 
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These data challenge this understanding: human rights as practised in the contexts 
studied here appear to sustain as much as challenge power, and whilst using the 
language of agency actually deny it to many victims. The existence of rights as a 
technical vocabulary, inaccessible to most, allows it to be used by a narrow class of 
practitioners to further marginalise the excluded. Social stratification and exclusion will 
always be factors in marginalising the agendas of the disempowered, this is not a unique 
result of the use of the rights discourse. However, the power relations that drive such 
processes can be made more visible when needs are the lens used, enabling those who 
claim to seek to represent victims to more readily see the gap that exists between the 
promise of current practice after conflict and victims‟ goals of transition. Taking needs as 
the focus of victim demands can thus both broaden the range of issues that post-conflict 
processes address, and serve as a tool to make visible the lack of agency that victims 
have. The data of this study suggest that challenging processes that serve the agendas 
of elites is crucial to realising victim-centred approaches, and empowering the language 
that most victims used, that of needs, is one step in doing this, accompanied by 
mobilisation that enables victims to articulate their agendas (Section 10.3).  
This study suggests that for responses to political violence to be relevant and 
emancipatory for its victims they cannot be universal. Grounding such approaches in 
local needs demands that global ideologies, including that of a hegemonic and externally 
derived liberal democracy, must be discarded. The human rights discourse can remain a 
powerful tool for improving the concrete lives of victims and others, but must not become 
a constraint used to deny victims agency by shrinking the vision of what responses to 
violence can include. The understanding that the needs of victims are necessarily 
contingent upon their context and circumstance, that they are local and particular 
(Section 2.2.4), leads to the subordination of the universal to the local intrinsic to the 
victim-centred approach.  
10.3 Conceptualising victim-centred process 
Victim-centred transitional justice has been referenced by a number of processes, most 
notably the South African TRC (Republic of South Africa, 2003), but has never been well 
conceptualised (Section 3.2). One important distinction that emerges from this study is 
that between a process that understands victim-centred as simply involving the victim in 
a procedural sense and that which delivers agency, where the victim has a role in driving 
a process. Whilst Timor-Leste‟s truth commission claimed to be “victim-centred” (CAVR, 
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2005: Part 10: 18), this meant only that victims had a central role to play in the 
performative component of that process (Section 8.2), but no role in determining what 
process took place or what its goals were. This understanding of „victim-centred‟ thus 
encompasses the instrumentalisation of victims, whilst continuing to deny them any 
agency in the process itself. One can consider the „typologies of participation‟ (Arnstein, 
1969; or, with an explicit Nepali focus, Lawoti, 2009) of victims in transitional justice 
processes and see that almost all those examined here constitute modes of inclusion of 
victims that can best be defined as either instrumental or nominal. The term victim-
centred here is used to define transitional justice processes that are at least consultative, 
in that they represent a response arising from an effort to understand victims‟ views, but 
at best are participatory and transformative. This section concretises what a victim-
centred process would look like and how it could be created. It begins with a discussion 
of how needs of victims and their communities can become the basis for such process, 
and then discusses victim mobilisation as its key driver. It engages with the issue of how 
victim priorities can be balanced against the broader societal aims of transitional justice 
process and concludes with the implications of such process for governance and 
legitimacy after conflict, through an engagement with the concept of recovery.  
 
The data of this study imply that prescriptive and mimetic approaches to 
transition be jettisoned in favour of those that are context specific, participatory and 
bottom-up: what Lederach (2002) has called „elicitive‟. This challenges the model of 
transitional justice as implemented largely by national or supra-national institutions, 
proposing a process that evolves from the grassroots and is as likely to operate in local 
spaces where victims live as in state institutions in the capital. The political project in 
which such approaches are embedded should change from being primarily restitutive to 
being perceived as part of a broader movement of social change that is politically 
transformative and empowering for the marginalised. Such approaches challenge the 
nature of broader discourses such as peacebuilding, seeking to move beyond a peace 
that emerges fully formed „from above‟ with an everyday peace that is constituted in and 
of the lives of ordinary people.  
10.3.1 Victim agency: empowerment and mobilisation 
Perhaps the greatest impression that emerges from an engagement with the data of this 
study is that of a set of victims who feel powerless to affect their own destinies; this lack 
of mastery over their own lives as well as over the life, death and remains of missing 
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relatives was a source of significant emotional and psychological distress (Section 9.2). 
Here the issue of victim agency in transitional justice process will be discussed and 
proposals made for enabling such agency in the context of a victim-centred approach, 
through victim mobilisation.  
Agency can counter the dehumanisation of political violence which serves to 
emphasise the powerlessness of victims. Here, the enabling of victims as agents will be 
considered a prerequisite to a victim-centred approach, in contrast to top-down 
approaches that are imposed on victims and emphasise their disempowerment. This 
challenges the idea of a dichotomy between victim and agent,54 by proposing that 
mobilisation around the concept of victim can both provide support to victims and enable 
positive change in their lives. Whilst the concept of agency is at the heart of Western 
notions of liberalism, including that of rights, the victims met in this study construct 
themselves very often in a pre-modern, collective and spiritual way that can potentially 
deny the individual agency (and indeed the individual rights) of the modern subject. 
Here, it is assumed that recognising local agency demands that this be respected, 
seeing agency as self-determination, in contrast to the rights discourse that perceives 
this solely as a lack of consciousness to be remedied. In the traditional societies of Nepal 
and Timor-Leste the individual subject constructed by human rights is at odds with 
identities that are far more complex and through which a violation is experienced at a 
social level. The identities revealed in the data of this study show that victimisation and 
agency are not extremes in opposition (Schneider, 1993), but lived realities of everyday 
life.  
Just as becoming a victim of conflict adds to the complexity of socially 
constructed identity, so mobilisation must be around the totality of a victim‟s experience. 
Mobilisation of women for example cannot be exclusively around the issue of missing 
husbands, but must also include issues of domestic hierarchy which are an integral part 
of their experience of victimisation, magnified by the loss of husbands (Section 6.2.3). 
Such mobilisation necessarily challenges the narrower interpretations of the role of 
transitional justice that are integral to liberal understandings of transition and articulated 
by the rights discourse. Richmond writes of ensuring “contextual legitimacy” in such a 
situation: “Here the task of politics is to uncover local, everyday agencies, and to make 
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 This is reinforced by the effort to rename victims „survivors‟, which serves to confirm „victim‟ as 
a negative identity (see Section 2.3) rather than seek to make it a positive and enabling one. 
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each capable of translating, engaging, recognising, assisting and negotiating, without 
reverting to older colonial and racist patterns of understanding.” (2010: 18) This reveals 
the challenge of mobilisation of the most disempowered: to find ways in which those with 
access to resources, both intellectual and otherwise, can support such empowerment 
without imposing external agendas.  
Legalist approaches put the perpetrator and the violation at the centre of 
transitional justice process and see victims as passive, which “replicates the former 
subordination of the victims of past abuse by rendering them the passive recipients of 
government actions that they have little or no control over.” (Waterhouse, 2007: 3) A 
victim-centred approach counters their exclusion and serves to challenge the devaluing 
of victims that is an aim of political violence through a process of empowerment within 
both their communities and the broader nation. The victim‟s experience is one of 
marginality: derived from exclusion and inequality in many cases and only amplified by 
the experience of conflict. Mobilisation is then the first step in the “retrieval of voice” (Das 
and Kleinman, 2000: 20). The identity of „victim‟ is a social construct (Rombouts, 2000-
2003) and that is why a victims‟ group serves to validate experience, by sanctioning it on 
victims‟ terms. Such a group can then serve to construct a victim identity acceptable in 
broader social worlds, such as the community and the nation.  
It was only when we met other families of those disappeared, we felt that we 
had common problems; we knew that we had the same pain. For this reason, 
we could share our sorrows. We wept and cried together and that helped us 
ventilate our sorrows. Then we formed this association. It helped us to meet 
friends having similar problems. Then we organised the sit-ins. As many 
friends gathered we felt greatly relieved. From that time onward, we felt 
courageous to fight for our cause. (Wife of missing man, Kathmandu) 
The empowerment of solidarity and collective action can transform experiences of 
victimhood, and help victims to “reinhabit the world” (Das, 2000: 223). Even where it 
leads to no action from the authorities, mobilisation allows victims to meet others in the 
same position and to construct the meaning and identities that permit them to cope 
(Section 9.2), aiding recovery and addressing social impacts of violence in families and 
communities, even without the engagement of the state. Such local agency can also 
serve to drive the creation of processes that directly address the needs of families at the 
local level. The data show victims‟ groups allowing victims to move from passive isolation 
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to active engagement, and from there to concrete action that can influence the 
authorities: an example of „active coping‟ (Colic-Peisker and Tilbury, 2003; Section 9.2). 
It is crucial to differentiate such mobilisation from civil society, an “often liberally 
projected artifice” (Richmond: 2010: 667), that in both Nepal and Timor-Leste 
represented not victims, but a discourse largely alien to them. 
Seeing self-organised victims‟ groups as the route to representation in a 
transitional justice process redefines the meaning of participation. Rather than victims 
joining a process or mechanism created by Government or NGOs, victims themselves 
create the most decentralised units of the transitional justice process; such victims‟ 
groups initiate processes to address the impacts of victimhood in their communities as 
well as advocating for the required central mechanisms. Victims‟ groups can act to 
democratise the creation of transitional justice mechanisms, serving as drivers of a 
bottom up process, in principle with few limits to the degree of participation. The role of 
civil society in such a victim-centred process is then to encourage and support the 
creation of grassroots associations and reflect the agendas that emerge, rather than 
themselves seeking to represent victims. The agendas that victims articulate, as has 
been shown here, encompass issues of exclusion, social injustice and development, and 
their organisations will reflect this; ultimately such groups may aim to become national 
social movements with political goals. The Khulumani group has demonstrated what is 
possible, but in societies such as Nepal and Timor-Leste, whilst the challenges to such 
mobilisation remain great, such organisations have even greater promise precisely 
because these societies are characterised by social exclusion and lack of a route 
between rural people and governance. The evidence of this study in Nepal is that with 
adequate support, such mobilisation is feasible.  
Participation on victims‟ terms is seen here as both a means and an end in 
transition: mobilisation can impact on the creation of institutional transitional justice 
mechanisms, but in victims‟ communities can itself begin to address victims‟ needs 
(Section 10.3.1). Victims‟ groups can themselves constitute a mechanism with effective 
access to affected communities at a fraction of the cost of central institutions. 
Participation in development has been widely critiqued (e.g. Cooke and Kothari, 2001), 
largely around issues between the NGOs driving participatory approaches and the 
„participants‟ themselves, and a lack of understanding of the importance of power 
relations within communities. The conclusions of this research echo such critiques in that 
NGOs are themselves part of a hierarchy that fails to advocate for victims‟ agendas 
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(Section 9.1). True participation demands not that „participants‟ take part in realising the 
agendas of others, but that agendas are themselves determined by those being 
empowered. Such a modality threatens the power not only of political elites but of NGO 
and human rights elites, whose ownership of transitional justice discourses and the 
resources it brings both drives and justifies paternalistic approaches. Mobilisation of 
victims to impact on transitional justice processes can learn from discussion around 
rights-based approaches (RBAs) in development and elsewhere (see Section 2.2.3), 
which can challenge such paternalism. RBAs have been accused of being co-opted by 
elites prioritising formal and often legal avenues, failing to acknowledge the informal 
strategies many of the disempowered adopt (Cornwall and Nyamu-Nusembi, 2004). 
These data make clear that to both address the psychosocial needs of victims and to 
ensure that agendas articulated represent those of victims, mobilisation has to challenge 
such formulaic participative approaches and ensure the genuine agency of victims.  
The challenges of representation are core to a victim-centred process, both in the 
sense of „speaking for‟ victims and of „re-presenting‟ their stories and needs (Madlingozi, 
2010). The assumption here is that victims represent themselves; that victims self-
organise and choose their own representatives from amongst themselves, as in the 
victims‟ associations in both Nepal and Timor-Leste. There remains a limit to 
representativeness that is clear in the data, in the sense that leaders will reflect 
hierarchies of gender, ethnicity and power, but even where leaders are predominantly 
male, or of a higher educational level than the typical victim, they are of the community, 
both that of victims and those in which victims live. It has been observed in some Asian 
contexts that within such highly collective societies, there is widespread acceptance of 
the power and status of key decision makers (Hailey, 2001); indeed this was seen in 
Family Associations in Nepal, where CVC in Bardiya for example was led by a local 
schoolmaster. Such societies depend on networks of highly personal relationships (ibid), 
suggesting that the informal connections that are prioritised in the communities met here, 
potentially with a traditionally higher status individual leading such associations, may be 
a better way to construct empowering structures than a formal NGO - community 
relationship. This emphasises that the individualistic understanding of participation in 
development orthodoxy is very different from the more collectivist approaches seen in 
these two Asian contexts.  
A greater threat to representation is the fragmentation of the victim community, 
most notably according to the divisions of the conflict, but also potentially along longer 
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standing fault lines. The politics of transition necessarily leads to partisan positioning 
over which mechanisms to create and which issues to prioritise, with truth and justice 
seen as tools that, as servants of memory, advance particular political positions. It has 
been seen in the data of this study however that at the grassroots, in the villages of 
Nepal and Timor where victims of all sides live alongside each other, solidarity on the 
basis of victimhood can be, and usually is, stronger than many partisan divisions. The 
evidence of these data is that it is precisely the influence over victims of political actors at 
regional and national levels that is largely responsible for polarisation; this can best be 
countered by the grassroots empowerment of a victim-centred approach. This is in 
contrast to centralised approaches to transitional justice that most effectively empower 
political actors in the capital with the greatest interest in seeing such processes fail. 
Victim-centred process can thus serve to depoliticise transitional justice process in the 
partisan sense, whilst repoliticising it in that issues of social justice and marginalisation 
are integrated into it. 
Integrating the everyday into transitional justice: Examples from Nepal and 
Timor-Leste 
An additional implication of empowerment is that processes can occur in communities to 
address the many impacts that occur there, using local resources that are often of 
greater relevance to victims than centralised state-led processes. These aim not to 
expand the holism of transitional justice to address every post-conflict issue (the 
transitional justice demand to „design interventions‟ must be resisted), but to create 
space in communities such that local process can emerge there: the role of the central 
authorities is not to create such process, but to empower communities to be able to. 
Whilst tradition has been most used in transitional justice processes in a judicial role 
(e.g. Waldorf, 2006; Huyse and Salter, 2008), data from both Nepal and Timor-Leste 
suggest the positive role that traditional structures can play, even where perpetrators are 
absent. 
In Bardiya, Nepal, the badghar, the traditional elected headman in Tharu 
communities (Bellamy, 2009), were arbitrating the separation of women from families 
from which their husbands are missing, and negotiating the division of property. The 
Bardiya association of families of the Missing, CVC, had advocated on behalf of such 
women and supported such process. CVC had also created a local truth-telling process, 
by initiating what they called „social harmony discussions‟ at the village level. These were 
seen to permit an understanding of the impact on the most vulnerable, notably women, in 
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ways that allow communities to collectively address issues of stigma and 
marginalisation, as well as constructing the shared meanings and identities that this 
study suggests best address the impacts of ambiguous loss in a highly collective society, 
serving as both reconciliatory sharing and collective counselling. Supporting such truth-
telling with the resources available to a national transitional justice mechanism would 
permit the documentation of histories of violations in a participatory way, serving to drive 
national truth-telling and reconciliation practice from the local level, inverting current top-
down approaches. 
In Timor-Leste an informal proposal has been made to address serious crimes, 
such as disappearance, through a process analogous to the Community Reconciliation 
Programme (CRP, Section 4.3.3).55  Such a process would be rooted in the community, 
be led by local traditional leaders and would demand truth-telling at a local level. The 
emergence of such truths could potentially address many of the needs of families of the 
Missing, allowing for information about the location of remains to emerge in Timorese 
perpetrated cases as well as in the many cases where local people assisted Indonesian 
crimes. Whilst such truth is already emerging informally in some cases, within an explicit 
framework of reconciliation and with the support of the authorities, such a process can 
address a range of needs of victims and communities.  
Whilst customary healing processes appear to be the most useful and relevant to 
victims of conflict in traditional societies, they have rarely been used as part of 
transitional justice processes. This in itself reflects a Western perspective, since in 
Timorese culture, as many other traditions, the sacred and the secular are inextricably 
linked: custom encompasses both, and traditional law and governance gain their 
authority from relations with ancestors (Hohe and Nixon, 2003). In both Nepal and Timor-
Leste traditional healers are providing support to families in terms of addressing health 
needs and psycho-spiritually. One demand of Tharu community leaders was that a 
reparative process should attempt to both strengthen and legitimate tradition. This could 
be done by integrating the badghar into local government structures, both in terms of 
governance and as the lowest rung of the justice system, and by ensuring that traditional 
healers (the guruwa in Tharu communities) who constitute the principal health system for 
many could be supported as the lowest level of a health system that currently struggles 
to reach most. In addition to delivery health services such approaches would also serve 
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to represent recognition for the indigenous community and underwrite the social and 
cultural rights that have long been denied indigenous people in Nepal, acting as a 
valuable part of collective reparation.  
These examples demonstrate ways in which local structures and understandings 
can be engaged to support local process that doesn‟t challenge central mechanisms but 
informs and potentially drives them. All are inconceivable as part of the top-down 
processes that currently characterise transitional justice process, but represent the most 
natural approaches for the families of the Missing and their communities in the contexts 
studied. One dilemma in seeking to work with traditional structures in an emancipatory 
approach is the conflict between structures that are male and (locally) elite, and an 
agenda that seeks to be representative and transformative. All the structures discussed 
here, the badghar and guruwa in Bardiya, the lia nain (Sections 4.3.2 and 9.3) in Timor, 
and many (but not all) the leaders of the family associations, are men; many are older 
and linked to hierarchies of family, wealth or status. A risk of working through such 
structures is that this does not challenge existing power relations in a community, but 
reinforces them (Merry, 1992). A compromise must be found between the “tendency to 
idealize local spaces” (Khadiagala, 2001: 58) and processes that have the greatest 
emancipatory potential. Resolving such dilemmas must be done at a local level, case by 
case, and ideally by those most concerned with them. Mobilisation of victims, where this 
includes the most marginalised, represents one of the few routes to empowerment of 
women and others seeking to both work with and challenge traditional hierarchies, and to 
negotiate solutions that can find a path through such apparent contradictions. 
10.3.2 Victims needs and societal priorities in transition 
This study proceeds from the understanding, common to all peacebuilding approaches 
and underpinning transitional justice, that the goal for societies emerging from violence is 
to resolve conflict and create sustainable peace. More than this, it contends that 
addressing the needs of victims of conflict is an important component of this process, 
and this drives the victim-centred approach. This section will attempt to understand what 
the data communicates about the broader benefits to societies emerging from conflict of 
an approach steered by the addressing of victim needs and concerning potential conflicts 
between victims‟ needs and broader societal goals. The victim-centred approach acts as 
a lens to look at a cross-section of the most vulnerable in a society, as a result of the fact 
that victims are ordinary people who face the same challenges as most, albeit 
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heightened by victimhood. Such an approach therefore serves as a way to interrogate 
the needs of the population at large, serving as an intrinsically „bottom-up‟ view of a post-
conflict society. This contrasts the individual focus of the rights discourse with needs that 
are collective and shared widely beyond direct victims. This has significant implications 
for concepts of the legitimacy of post-conflict governance, and these are discussed in 
Section 10.3.3. 
The evidence of this study is that contemporary transitional justice process is 
driven by a small minority in most contexts, whose interests diverge from those of the 
majority. These „national processes‟ are in fact often far from representing societal 
priorities, but serve to advance elite interests and legitimate new regimes. The greatest 
value of a victim-centred approach is that it can challenge the priorities of such a process 
with the views of those most impacted by conflict. Since much contemporary conflict 
targets marginalised communities and individuals, a victim-centred process highlights the 
addressing of the needs of the most vulnerable, whoever they are. In both Nepal and 
Timor-Leste large fractions of the population were impacted by the conflict, with few 
untouched by it. Nevertheless, even where the victim constituency is small, a victim-
centred perspective creates an approach to post-conflict societies that emphasises the 
addressing of disempowerment and it is precisely this which permits a transformative 
agenda to emerge. Whilst acts of violence are emphasised by transitional justice 
process, it is an argument of this thesis that structural violence and issues of social 
injustice must also be brought within the remit of efforts to address legacies of violence. 
As such, issues of marginalisation, gender and poverty will ensure that issues facing a 
broad mass of the disempowered propel the post-conflict agenda: the aim is not that 
transitional justice will expand to address all such issues, but that a victim-centred 
approach can coincide with and drive a broader progressive politics. Additionally, many 
of the reparative demands of victims serve to link the addressing of the range of 
individual and collective needs arising from violence with norm-setting processes in 
society (Section 3.1), something necessary for societies to come to terms with their past 
if they are to succeed in inclusive peacebuilding (Section 8.4). Whilst a broad reparations 
process could face resistance in a poor state, the linking of such process to structural 
violence, communal reparations and development (Section 8.4) can be aligned with 
agendas that enjoy a wide consensus of both political and public support.   
In both Nepal and Timor-Leste the transitional justice debate has been 
characterised by a sterile stand-off typical of many transitional contexts between rights 
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activists advocating for prosecutions and authorities linked to perpetrators who seek to 
avoid any retributive process. The data suggest that the preoccupation of rights activists 
with prosecutorial justice as a prerequisite for sustainable peace is normatively driven 
and has little empirical basis in the expression of the priorities of victims and implications 
for governance.56 Victims generally do not share one of the founding assumptions of 
transitional justice that retribution and an end to impunity are central to ending cycles of 
violence: for victims in Nepal and Timor-Leste the law is remote, inaccessible and often 
perceived as something used against them (Sections 6.2.5 and 7.3.1). This finding 
counters perhaps the greatest potential drawback of a victim-centred process, that it will 
be held hostage to victim insistence on prosecutions independent of the political 
environment, or to agendas that represent one party to the conflict. The evidence of this 
study is that victims perceive economic issues and acknowledgement as most driving 
their acceptance, or rejection, of post-conflict dispensations. Where victims saw 
prosecutions as important they sought a process that was accessible and local, exactly 
the opposite of the remote tribunals that the internationalisation of post-conflict justice 
has created.  
This finding leads the victim-centred approach to point to a potential resolution of 
the conflicting demands of victims and the rights discourse. The concept of sequencing, 
which was central to early transitional justice practice when faced with political obstacles 
to prosecutions, is largely absent from current practice, as a new absolutism has seen 
accountability emerge as the key non-negotiable rights-based demand of transition. In 
asserting the predominance of a need for retribution and ignoring the politics that 
necessarily envelops all transitions (McGrattan, 2009), such absolutism almost 
necessarily results in an abandonment or suspension of transitional process (as seen in 
Nepal), since those in power are threatened by such an approach. Rigby (2001) has 
suggested that such sequencing should prioritise the „securing of peace‟, through an 
imperfect process, and only once this is done move forward with issues of truth, justice 
and acknowledgement. The victim-centred approach permits such sequencing to be 
driven by victim priorities: where victims do not see retributive justice as a priority there 
may well be no internal constituency to drive prosecutions and no compelling reason to 
prioritise them. Challenging such legalistic approaches can then serve to ensure that 
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 Care should be taken in generalising this finding to other contexts, since it appears this is a 
consequence of both disempowerment and overwhelming basic needs; whilst likely to be 
replicated in many low income states, the extent to which other factors play a role is unclear.  
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concrete domestic agendas drive the creation of transitional justice mechanisms, 
creating process that serves both a sustainable peace and the needs of victims, and 
questioning the aligning of victim agendas with a largely prosecutorial approach. This 
then allows victim needs, notably for economic support and recognition, to be met in the 
short term, while postponing issues such as prosecutions that may be politically 
problematic.  
10.3.3 Navigating justice and recovery: implications of a victim-centred 
approach for governance and legitimacy 
A victim-centred approach to addressing the impact of political violence has implications 
for actors on the national stage and beyond, and for the understanding of governance 
and legitimacy in states emerging from conflict. Victims articulate a demand for recovery 
both individually and collectively. One element of this is restitutive, permitting a return to 
normality and the everyday, to the situation that preceded violence:  
Everything would be different and easier in our life if my sons were here 
today. We wouldn‟t be lacking anything in this house. I don‟t want anything 
else if they will return my sons. (Mother of missing men, Bardiya, Nepal.) 
Another element looks forward, providing hope of a future better than the past; a third 
seeks the addressing of issues of both individual and collective memory. This section will 
attempt to summarise how the range of disciplines that seek to address the 
consequences of conflict and violence can best be harnessed to meet victim needs.  
Typically, understandings of post-conflict recovery include reactivating social and 
economic development, as well as the addressing of vulnerabilities and a corrective 
dimension to righting wrongs (Barakat, 2005). In this latter aim recovery overlaps with 
understandings of transitional justice, but acknowledges that much of the impact of 
conflict is on the individuals and communities who were most exposed to it, and that this 
has legacies that can lead to renewed conflict: “Post-war reconstruction begins in the 
hearts and minds of those who suffer the horrors of war and want to change societies so 
there is no return to mass violence.” (ibid: 1) One way of bridging the perceived gap 
between the justice of transitional justice and broader recovery is to understand what 
victims mean by justice. Where the rights discourse prioritises processes centred on 
recognition, notably of victims and perpetrators, victims in the low income states studied 
also seek distributive justice, perceiving justice as social justice, including elements 
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related to class, gender, caste, ethnicity and livelihood, as well as linked to recognition 
and public memory. In practice the range of needs expressed by victims shows that 
neither transitional justice nor post-war recovery can alone address all their needs. The 
lack of interchange between the discourses of justice and recovery has led to an artificial 
compartmentalisation, where respective experts are reluctant to acknowledge 
repercussions of efforts to deliver one on the other. An example in Nepal is the refusal of 
rights agencies to concern themselves with the livelihood of victims, despite engaging 
them in ways that impinge on it. Conversely, in Timor the institution building and 
economic development driven by post-war recovery neglected issues of recognition and 
memory that are considered the remit of a transitional justice approach.  
It is the experience of this study that compartmentalising justice and recovery is 
an artificial division of issues that necessarily overflow such efforts to contain them. The 
creation of disciplines and areas of expertise imposes these divisions on societies and 
on efforts to address the impacts of conflict, rather than permitting inclusive processes to 
emerge from the context. Responses in Timor-Leste have reflected such approaches, 
with little connection between internationally sponsored efforts at institution building, the 
addressing of legacies of violence and the needs of ordinary victims (Cohen, 2006; Kent, 
2008). Victims do not compartmentalise their social, economic and legal demands; whilst 
they express priorities, they seek an addressing of all their needs and see them as 
linked; this study shows how such needs are in practice always interconnected. Only a 
holistic approach that spans both transitional justice and recovery, and that is firmly 
situated in the context in which victims live, will resonate with their concerns. Efforts to 
separate issues of law and truth from the social and economic represent an attempt to 
impose an external and artificial division onto the social worlds of victims and act to 
reduce the effectiveness of interventions. The victim-centred approach advocated here 
challenges this paradigm by allowing the victims‟ worldview to drive action. 
The data can be used to draw conclusions concerning the impact on governance 
of issues raised by families of the Missing from the two studied contexts. Whilst issues of 
legitimacy are typically understood by examining governance structures in the light of 
global benchmarks, here legitimacy is approached as the collectively constructed 
perception of the state of the governed. The victim-centred approach allows the most 
crucial component of legitimacy, the consent of the population, to be explicitly probed. 
These empirical studies confirm that a state‟s ability to deliver certain services to families 
and communities drive local concerns above the existence of state institutions or the rule 
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of law. This echoes concepts of performance legitimacy (Francois and Sud, 2006) that 
construct perceptions of authority in terms of the perceived effectiveness of the state in 
addressing needs. For victims in the two states studied those needs considered most 
important are basic needs, such as can best be satisfied through adequate livelihood 
and an addressing of the impacts of conflict which, for the families studied here, are 
dominated by the need for an end to ambiguity about the fate of missing relatives.  
In Timor-Leste the greatest implication for the state of a transitional justice 
process that has failed victims is their alienation from those who govern them. The 
Timorese leadership‟s emphasis on the charismatic authority of a few individuals for 
legitimacy fails as a strategy when these figures are themselves perceived as a source 
of betrayal by victims of the conflict. The lack of victim participation or voice in either the 
transitional justice process or the broader political sphere apparent from the data 
confirms perceptions that commitments to inclusivity are tokenistic. In Nepal the conflict 
was driven by a crisis of legitimacy that emerged from the absence of the state in rural 
parts of the country and a remote Government perceived as unrepresentative. The 
ethnic and caste issues that drove the conflict impact legitimacy, with victims perceiving 
that such social identities drove exclusion that has been deepened by victimisation. 
Victims of the state in particular link attitudes to Government, even that led by the Maoist 
party, to the addressing of the impact of violations:  
Although there are many problems to be solved, the Government should first of 
all solve the problems of the family members of martyrs as they have sacrificed 
their lives for this change and if the Government will not address these problems 
at the proper time, the country may go back towards the previous stage of civil 
war. (Son of missing man, Siraha, Nepal.)  
Transitional justice advocates typically claim that that a lack of accountability reduces the 
legitimacy of the state, but in both contexts this study finds that economic and social 
issues are far more important contributors. Fairness is seen as doing right by victims in a 
reparative way through expanding participation and inclusiveness and reducing 
inequality: where this fails to happen, the authorities are held responsible and legitimacy 
is threatened. This emphasises the importance of grassroots approaches:  
Legitimacy [...] includes a relatively simple process of “meeting people where 
they are” and fulfilling their needs and expectations rather than prioritising 
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external agendas associated with state-centric approaches to good 
governance. (Barakat, Evans and Zyck, 2010: 1)  
This study reveals the challenges to legitimacy where this is not done and suggests that 
efforts to address the impact of conflict require governance that gives voice and agency 
to those most impacted by it. A victim-centred approach can deliver this. 
These data indicate that opposition, armed and otherwise, is bolstered by 
resentment of the post-conflict leadership, demonstrating a direct link between a failure 
to address victim needs and insecurity. In Timor, families linked the impression of 
neglect generally with the specific issue of the Missing, perceiving that their loved ones 
had been „forgotten‟ by their rulers. Whilst the missing issue is far from the sole driver of 
such resentment, the issue crystallises the grievances of many in Timor-Leste, 
combining as it does issues of conflict, poverty and the spirits. In Nepal, the state 
continues to face many armed threats, largely from ethnically motivated groups in the 
Terai and elsewhere. Families of the Missing in Nepal, largely close to the CPN-M, saw 
the missing issue as one that could bring them into conflict with both the authorities and 
what they have traditionally seen as „their‟ party,57 with a significant minority threatening 
to take up arms: “If the government of this twenty first century does not understand our 
problem, the counter-revolution will take place.” (Brother of Missing man, Gorkha) A 
clear message from the data is that victims‟ families in both contexts question the 
legitimacy and effectiveness of the authorities as a result of needs not being addressed, 
in ways that have implications for security, notably through their potential participation in 
violence against the state.  
10.4 A programme for future research 
This study has examined the addressing of the issue of missing persons in conflict and 
of transitional justice more generally from a perspective, that of victims‟ needs, that 
remains underexplored. In so doing it has demonstrated that non-elite perspectives can 
radically alter approaches to addressing the impact of violations of human rights. Here, 
the potential for such an approach to be extended is examined, in terms of both 
deepening understandings of the impact of disappearance and of constructing a 
transitional justice from below. Implicit in this is that such approaches must transcend 
                                               
57
 The Nepal fieldwork was undertaken at a time when the Maoists led the Government,  
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disciplinary boundaries and be driven by the needs of individuals and societies, rather 
than by definitions that reinforce boundaries in both the academy and praxis.    
The lack of empirical approaches in transitional justice is a critique from which 
much of the value of this study derives. The optimal approach to seeking an evidence 
based transitional justice is through longitudinal methods that permit the understanding 
of the impact of transitional justice mechanisms on a context as they unfold. A victim-
centred approach would then use a particular victim population and seek to understand 
their evolving attitudes towards unfolding process. For example, the families of the 
Missing studied here could be met repeatedly over the coming decade to determine if 
and how any process that emerges impacts upon their needs: the Nepal data lays a 
foundation for such future studies. Similarly, should a reparations process be initiated in 
Timor-Leste its impact on the needs of families met here can be investigated. Such 
diachronic research permits empirical work that is independent of many of the biases 
and uncertainties that arise when comparing two different contexts.  
Methodology has been seen as a crucial driver of the research perspective here, 
steered by an effort to be participatory and empowering. There are however limitations to 
the depth of this approach possible in the studies described here, and clear routes to 
increasing the role and agency of victims in such studies. The optimal methodology 
would perhaps be one where families, led by the most vulnerable such as women, would 
conduct the research themselves, with only minimal support from an „expert‟ outsider. 
This would then constitute a maximally emancipatory approach that would lead naturally 
to participatory interventions driven by the most disempowered. The challenges of such 
a modality, however, are significant: such Participatory Action Research demands the 
investment of significant resources in terms of training and technical support, and the 
very fact of spending money on such research, rather than assisting the most vulnerable, 
raises ethical issues. An approach that combines both the research demands and the 
empowerment agenda would be to embed any future study in a mobilisation process, 
such that the research could itself be an investigation of mobilisation processes. This is 
consistent with the conclusion of this thesis (Section 10.2) that victim mobilisation is the 
principal route to empowerment. Such a study could build on preliminary efforts in Nepal 
to create an independent national association of families of the Missing and serve to both 
support that process and learn lessons that could be applied in other contexts where 
marginal communities are seeking to mobilise and advocate for their rights. Such a study 
would necessarily engage with the significant literature on social movements, and 
 299 
 
constitute a test of the extent to which the victim-centred approach to transitional justice 
is feasible.        
This study is one of few to explicitly use the model of ambiguous loss to 
understand the impact of conflict related disappearance on families, and novel in 
applying ambiguous loss in a non-Western cultural context. Ensuring that interventions 
encompass the psychosocial can increase the possibility that they address the full range 
of needs of families of the Missing. The Nepal research has prompted an intervention on 
exactly this basis and the most obvious next step in terms of optimising practice is to 
evaluate the impact of the ICRC intervention in Nepal, using both the qualitative methods 
of this thesis and quantitative psychological methods. Given this first understanding of 
ambiguous loss in two Asian contexts, it would now be interesting to attempt to ask a 
similar research question in other cultures, to both attempt to confirm the universal 
relevance of the model and to understand better its cultural dependence. The natural 
extension is to make studies of families of the Missing in other non-Western contexts, 
where family structure, religion and culture are radically different from the two contexts 
studied here. This would permit an understanding of those elements of human response 
to disappearance that are culturally dependent and any which appear universal.    
The broader peacebuilding agenda is explicitly addressed in this thesis as 
something that efforts to address legacies of political violence cannot ignore. It is hoped 
that this study represents an attempt to fuse empirical social science approaches with 
critiques of liberal peacebuilding that typically use analytic tools that derive from 
international relations perspectives. There is a huge potential for exploring such 
empirical approaches „from below‟ to complement the large body of existing work on 
emancipatory peacebuilding that whilst emphasising the importance of „the everyday‟ 
(Roberts, 2011) largely fails to engage with actual instances of it. 
10.5 Conclusions 
This study has attempted to reach a broad and deep understanding of the needs of 
families of the Missing in Nepal and Timor-Leste with the aim of evaluating the actual 
and potential impact of transitional justice process on those needs. Whilst there has 
been a focus on the violation of disappearance, which creates very particular needs, 
conclusions have also been drawn for the broader impact of such process on victims of 
conflict and political violence. This thesis positions itself as an empirical counter to the 
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largely normative literature on transitional justice, seeking to play a role in the creation of 
an evidence base on which such process can be steered.  
A relative missing in conflict has a range of impacts on individuals, families and 
communities that are social, emotional, psychological and economic in nature. 
Disappearance is seen to be situated in contexts where it represents the extension of 
existing disempowerment, constituting a special case of the liminality with which such 
marginalised people live. The Missing occupy a space of absent presence, both 
unforgettable and unmournable: the emotional, social and psychosocial impacts appear 
to be well described by the model of ambiguous loss, which provides a set of guidelines 
that can be operationalised according to culture and context. Whilst families seek an 
answer about the fate of the Missing that can only be delivered by investigation and 
exhumation, the many denied such process must be supported to live with ambiguity. 
The insistence of the Missing, for both their families and their societies, puts issues of 
memory at the heart of efforts to address the issue, and this permits the framing of 
efforts at recognition, acknowledgement and reparation around concepts of collective 
and political memory that can give value to victims and their families.             
Victims have not been well served by transitional justice process which is elite 
driven and prescriptive, institutional and remote from victims‟ everyday lives. Families in 
both Nepal and Timor-Leste expressed the needs with which they are confronted daily, 
that are a product of their local and particular circumstances, not least their poverty and 
disempowerment, derived from traditional spiritual beliefs and from social hierarchies in 
family and community. Transitional justice processes are driven by a global rights 
discourse that is abstracted from this social context and whose universalism necessarily 
reduces its relevance to the everyday lives of those most impacted by violations. The 
mechanisms of transitional justice that have become a part of global practice, 
exemplified by trials and truth commissions, have had little impact on the victims met in 
Timor-Leste, despite the transitional justice process being considered largely complete. 
The single mechanism which had most impact on the families of the Missing was the 
valorisation scheme in which medals and pensions were awarded to those who had died 
as part of the resistance to the Indonesian occupation, demonstrating the value of both 
acknowledgement and economic support to victims in low income states.    
This study proposes that a victim-centred approach be adopted towards 
transitional justice, such that victims‟ needs can be placed at the heart of processes to 
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address legacies of violence. Such an approach challenges one-size-fits-all prescriptions 
with processes that are rooted in the cultures and contexts of those most affected by 
conflict and can be situated not in remote institutions in the capital, but in affected 
communities. Such process can challenge the elite understandings that currently drive 
transitional justice as a universal project of transition towards liberal democracy, and 
attempt to ensure a degree of victim agency in such schemes. In both Nepal and Timor-
Leste most who became victims of conflict had been historically marginalised and see 
their needs as deriving not only from the direct impacts of violence but also from the 
poverty and marginalisation that facilitated violations. As such they seek an approach to 
transition which is transformative, which promises them not just a return to the poverty of 
the past but that encompasses broader political goals of challenging their 
disempowerment. The transformative agenda that emerges from the data is a critique of 
the disappointments of transitional justice process in recent decades, emphasising 
issues of social exclusion and structural violence, poverty and development and 
embracing the challenging of oppressive hierarchies of gender, ethnicity and caste.   
The everyday is a space where it can be expected that global norms have to 
compete with visions of the world rooted in local understandings. In the contexts studied 
here indigenous perspectives are seen to exist largely independently of global 
discourses such as rights. Meanings are constructed collectively in ways that are often 
unique to the cultures from which victims and the conflict itself emerges, and these 
define how both war and peace are perceived and how community is understood: culture 
has a constitutive role in the initiation and cessation of conflict (Avruch and Black, 1987). 
Whilst basic needs have a degree of universality, many of the everyday impacts on 
victims emerge directly from local and highly particular social or spiritual understandings. 
That culture is important, indeed perhaps “the most important issue of all” (Ramsbotham 
et al., 2005: 302) in conflict resolution, is seen in the range of needs that victims 
articulate in this study. This thesis suggests that there is a need for a “cultural turn” (da 
Costa, 2010) in transitional justice, steered by processes rooted in the everyday lives of 
victims of conflict. Challenging the universalism of the discourse of transitional justice 
also demands that efforts be made to subvert the normal research practice of defining 
the local only with reference to its deviation from the Western. 
For approaches to post-conflict contexts to be relevant to victims, a novel 
approach is required that renegotiates agency in the addressing of the impact of violent 
pasts, replacing mimetic models imported from remote contexts with action and 
 302 
 
intervention rooted in the everyday lives of the conflict-affected. Such processes can 
resonate with local approaches and cultural preferences, and can build on custom and 
tradition and relevant understandings of society and politics. They will take from the 
paradigm of the liberal peace what they can, but will resist those elements that are not 
consistent with a locally owned and driven vision of a post-conflict future. Not only can 
such autonomously driven processes address the needs of victims of conflict, they can 
begin to address the causes of conflict rooted in inequality and disempowerment.  
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Appendix I. The Missing in Law 
In this section the legal and other definitions of missing persons will be discussed, and a 
working definition for this work identified.  
Persons missing in conflict are those: “unaccounted for as a result of international 
or non-international armed conflict or internal violence” (Crettol and La Rosa, 2006: 355). 
The issue of missing persons is relevant in a large number of contexts, with almost every 
contemporary conflict leaving significant numbers of families with no news of loved ones.  
Legal definitions can be used to identify those whose absence violates international 
humanitarian law or international human rights law and from these legal definitions flows 
an implicit definition of missing persons. These emphasise the difference between the 
“missing” and the “disappeared”, since the latter refers only to those arrested or 
abducted by a state party. In some states the term “missing” is itself defined in law.  
Various bodies of law can be used in referring to the issue of persons missing in 
conflict or political violence, and these will be discussed here:  
 International humanitarian law, also known as the law of armed conflict, 
defines the conduct and responsibilities of nations and individuals 
engaged in warfare, in relation to each other and to protected persons.  
 International human rights law codifies legal provisions governing human 
rights in various international human rights instruments, and obligates 
states. 
 International criminal law deals with international crimes and the courts 
and tribunals set up to adjudicate cases in which individuals have 
incurred international criminal responsibility. 
International humanitarian law  
International humanitarian law (IHL) places obligations on parties to conflict regarding 
persons arrested and detained as well as those killed and injured.  Violation of these 
obligations may lead to persons becoming missing, and so can be used to define the 
term.  
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IHL contains a significant body of constraints on warring parties in international 
conflicts regarding the maintenance of contact between family members when someone 
is captured (Geneva Conventions, 1949: IV: Art.26). Such communication should ensure 
that a captive is not considered missing by his family.  Further to this, IHL states that 
families have the right to be informed of the fate of missing relatives (Geneva 
Conventions, Add. Protocols, 1977, I :Art. 32). The parties to a conflict must search for 
persons reported missing by an adverse party (Geneva Conventions, Add. Protocols, 
1977, I :Art. 33) and facilitate enquiries made by members of families dispersed as a 
result of the conflict so as to help them restore contact and to reunite.  It is also 
incumbent upon the parties to a conflict that lists showing the exact location and 
markings of graves, together with particulars of the dead interred therein, be exchanged 
(Geneva Conventions, Add. Protocols, 1977, I :Art. 34). Whilst these demands apply only 
in international conflicts, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), which 
has a mandate as the guardian of the Geneva Conventions, has stated that “…similar 
treaty-based and customary rules apply in non-international armed conflicts” (ICRC, 
2007) and that “[T]he great majority of the provisions of the Geneva Conventions … are 
considered to be part of customary international law” (Henckaerts, 2005). The most 
complete study of customary international humanitarian law reports a customary rule 
valid in both international and non-international armed conflict:  
Each party to the conflict must take all feasible measures to account for 
persons reported missing as a result of armed conflict and must provide their 
family members with any information it has on their fate.  (ICRC, 2005) 
From this body of international humanitarian law can be drawn a definition of 
missing persons, i.e. those where the legal obligations regarding the informing of 
relatives have not been met.  Those detainees who do not have contact with their 
families, and those killed but whose families are not aware of the death or of the location 
of the body, are missing. This definition of missing persons, according to the ICRC, 
includes:  
 Those arrested, abducted and killed on capture, but whose families are 
unaware of their fate; 
 Those held incommunicado; 
 Members of armed forces or armed groups whose fate is unknown;  
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 Children separated from families when fleeing or by forced recruitment;  
 Refugees of those displaced with no means of communication;  
 Those dead whose identities are not recorded.  
(Crettol and La Rosa, 2006) 
Human rights law  
Human rights law is that most often applied to disappearances, although in many 
contexts both IHL and international human rights law will be relevant.  The broad 
definition of the missing arising from IHL can be contrasted with narrower definitions 
arising from human rights discourse.  Human rights (HR) law is concerned with rights 
that can be violated or denied, any this implies an “active” violation in contrast to the 
“passive” definition of IHL, where it is the failure to pass information concerning the 
missing person that itself constitutes the violation.  In practice the definition of 
disappearance in human rights law includes an active violation (arrest or abduction) and 
a passive one (a failure to inform). The other substantive difference between IHL and HR 
law is that HR law obligates state parties only, and not non-state actors, although the law 
regarding non-state actors continues to evolve.  
Whilst HR law prohibits the extra-judicial killing that gives rise to some missing 
cases, it generally gives little recourse in a situation where nothing is known of the fate of 
a missing person.  Traditionally such issues have been tackled through the use of 
habeas corpus in domestic courts, but this requires evidence that the state was involved 
in the circumstances that led to the person being missing.  Additionally, protection is 
provided against disappearance by basic rights contained in the UN universal declaration 
of human rights, including: right to recognition as a person before the law, the right to 
liberty, security of the person and the right not to be subjected to torture and other cruel 
and inhuman or degrading punishment.  An example of the use of this type of law to 
define disappearance was demonstrated by a judgment of the European Court of human 
rights that found that the right of relatives of the Missing to be free from torture, cruel and 
degrading treatment had been violated by the lack of knowledge of the fate of the 
Missing (ECHR, 1998 and 2001).  
HR law has attempted to tackle cases where the state is involved, defining this 
phenomenon as “enforced disappearance”.  In the early 1980s the Organisation of 
American States defined forced disappearance as a crime against humanity (OAS, 
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1982), and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACHR) cited this in the 
Valasquez Rodriguez case (OAS, 1988). The IACHR has also indicated that where the 
illegal act of disappearance is perpetrated by a non-state actor, the state is responsible 
where it has acquiesced or not taken measures to prevent it or punish those responsible 
(Clapham, 2006).  
The issue of disappearances has also been addressed through the finalisation of 
the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced 
Disappearance (UN ICPPED, 2006). The convention defines disappearance as follows:  
For the purposes of this Convention, "enforced disappearance" is considered 
to be the arrest, detention, abduction or any other form of deprivation of 
liberty by agents of the State or by persons or groups of persons acting with 
the authorization, support or acquiescence of the State, followed by a refusal 
to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty or by concealment of the fate or 
whereabouts of the disappeared person, which place such a person outside 
the protection of the law. (UN ICPPED, 2006: Article 2).  
This convention was adopted by the UN General Assembly in December 2006 and has 
been signed by 72 states and ratified by one (OHCHR, 2007). It will enter into force 
following ratification by 20 state parties.  This instrument makes the prevention of 
disappearance an obligation of states.  The declaration‟s preamble (intended to guide 
interpretation) also contains nuances implying that disappearance is a crime against 
humanity when “systematic” since it may incur individual criminal responsibility 
(Clapham, 2006).  
However, since in all definitions disappearance demands an active violation by 
the state, this definition excludes many of those missing persons implicitly recognised in 
IHL. Those persons missing in action or children recruited forcibly or separated from 
parents during conflict are excluded from the provisions of the convention on enforced 
disappearance. Additionally, the convention applies only in cases where state parties are 
responsible for disappearance58 and excludes those disappearances perpetrated by the 
                                               
58
 In May 2006, the UN Working Group on Enforced and Involuntary Disappearance reiterated: 
“enforced disappearances are only considered as such when the act in question is perpetrated by 
state actors or by private individuals or organized groups (e.g. paramilitary groups) acting on 
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many non-state actors involved in contemporary conflict. Disappearance thus defines a 
subset of those missing according to the IHL derived definition. 
International criminal law 
International criminal law has begun to deal with the issue of the missing through 
international and hybrid criminal tribunals as well as the International Criminal Court. The 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court includes a definition of enforced 
disappearance: 
Enforced disappearance of persons` means the arrest, detention or 
abduction of persons by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence 
of, a State or a political organization, followed by a refusal to acknowledge 
that deprivation of freedom or to give information on the fate or whereabouts 
of those persons, with the intention of removing them from the protection of 
the law for a prolonged period of time. (Rome Statute, 2002: Article 7(2)(i)) 
And notes that this is a “crime against humanity” when “…committed as part of a 
widespread or systematic attack..” (Rome Statute, 2002: Article 7(1)). „Political 
organization‟ here permits such a violation to be perpetrated not only by states, but also 
by non-state actors.    
Similarly to that from human rights law, this definition describes the active 
violation of deprivation of liberty combined with the passive violation of the withholding of 
information.  Commentators interpret the latter as the refusal to supply information when 
requested by families: a simple failure to provide information without a request is not a 
violation (Werle, 2005). This is in contrast to IHL since international criminal law places a 
stricter test, as it addresses individual, rather than state, responsibility 
National law 
During or following conflict states can legislate to support families of missing persons. In 
Bosnia Herzegovina, following the conflicts of 1991-6, a Law on Missing Persons 
(Bosnian Ministry for Human Rights and Refuges, 2006)  was passed in which families 
were spared the process of having to declare a family member dead to deal with legal 
                                                                                                                                            
behalf of, or with the support, direct or indirect, consent or acquiescence of the Government.” (UN 
WGEID, 2006). 
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issues related to disappearance. Additionally, this enshrined in national law a definition 
of a missing person, based on both IHL and the convention on forced disappearances.  
In Argentina, following pressure from families, a legal status of “forcibly 
disappeared” was created. This was the legal equivalent of death in terms of inheritance, 
but allowed for the possibility of the Missing returning alive and acknowledged the fact of 
disappearance and the state‟s role in it (Hayner, 2011).   
The Missing in practice 
In the various contexts where the Missing are an issue, both the IHL and HR derived 
definitions have currency. The narrower definition of “disappeared” is however often 
privileged, both because it is a discussion that the human rights narrative tends to 
dominate, and because it refers to a situation where there is a clear perpetrator. When a 
society is emerging from conflict the disappeared is often a more straightforward 
category than the Missing to define, comprehend and ultimately to address.  There may 
also be political motivations for attempting to advance a certain definition, since the 
“disappeared” are restricted to victims of the state.  
The ICRC defines missing persons as follows, extending the definition arising 
from IHL and in doing so acknowledging the primacy of families in determining the status 
of the missing:  
The missing persons are those persons whose families are without news of 
them and/or are reported unaccounted for, on the basis of reliable 
information, owing to armed conflict or internal violence. The term family and 
relatives must be understood in their broadest sense including family 
members and close friends and taking into account the cultural environment. 
(ICRC, 2003) 
This family-centred definition is an articulation of the fact that without families to inform 
others, the missing will remain invisible. The ICRC extracts from IHL a “right to know” 
(Crettol and La Rosa, 2006; Naqvi, 2006) for families of those missing in conflict, which 
implies that all those whose relatives are unaware of their fate, whether dead or alive, 
are considered missing and the state has an obligation to seek answers for the family.   
The deep subjectivity of whether or not someone is missing remains a challenge for the 
addressing of the issue, but in any victim centred approach cannot be avoided.  
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In this work the IHL derived definition will be used, since it is the most inclusive, 
and in a needs based approach, the needs of families of all types of Missing have been 
seen to largely coincide.   
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Appendix II. Interview scripts 
A2.1. Nepal: Semi-structured research instrument 
1 Introduction 
- Wish to talk about the impact of Missing relative - have no news.  
- Researcher: seeking to work with families, understand what they want and try to ensure 
process considers them – a report will be passed to authorities 
- All information will be confidential: would like to record and quote, but without naming or 
identifying 
- If you don‟t want to talk about some issues that is fine; you can choose to stop 
whenever you like – don‟t want to upset.  
2 General Information  
2.1 The Interviewee 
- Name - Relation to the missing person   
- Ethnicity / caste   - Nature & size of family  
- Responsibilities within the family / 
employment 
- Educational level 
- Who else is present?  
 
2.2 The Missing person            
- Name - Age:   
- Married?    - Children? (number of):   
- Responsibilities within the family / 
employment 
- (income generation?) 
- Educational level 
- civilian / political activist/ PLA / security 
forces 
- (what reason could there be for the 
disappearance?) 
 
 
- Date / Circumstances of disappearance (if known)  
- emphasis on place of arrest (more trauma when the arrest took place at home?); 
violence committed during arrest against person arrested and other family members; 
which members of the family witnessed the arrest; 
3 General Priorities 
Aim to understand what families articulate as their needs, without prompting of 
possibilities.  
- What are the greatest problems that they face as a result of the Missing?   
- What action would the family like to see?  
4 Attitude to the fate of the missing person 
4.1 What do you think personally has happened to your relative (since the 
disappearance)?   
- seek articulation of general beliefs: hopes and fears  
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-  
IF believe still alive 
- What leads you to this conclusion? 
- Did you, or does someone in the family, think about other possibilities regarding the 
fate of your loved one? Could he be dead? If yes: explain. (Go to -) 
-  
IF believe dead, 
- What made you believe that your missing relative might be / is dead ?  
- Do you, or does someone from the family, believe that he could still be alive? (Go to 
4.2) 
-  
IF clearly ambiguous,  
- The interviewee / the family still has doubt about the fate of their missing relative (going 
clearly from hope he/she is alive to acceptance of death) Where on the spectrum are 
they? 
- Have you, or others in the family, considered that he could be dead? Could be alive?  
4.2 Have any rituals been made concerning the missing person? If yes, what led family 
to do this? If not, why not?  
- What rituals would the family seek to make?  
4.3 Does the wife consider herself a widow?  
4.4 Would it be important to know where his/her body is? Is knowing the gravesite 
sufficient?   
4.5                                       to get his/her body back ?                            
- Why? (religious reasons, confirmation of death, need for gravesite etc)   
- What do you expect from the body? Recognise? Bones?              
4.6 If it is not possible to retrieve the bodies of missing persons, what do you think could 
help you to deal with such situation ?  
4.7 What would constitute a satisfactory answer concerning the fate? 
4.8 Would you trust officials who returned remains to you claiming they were of your 
relative? Why (not)? 
5 Psychological and Psychosocial issues 
Observe body language of the interviewee. Note if others are present that may inhibit 
discussion of emotional and psychological issues. 
5.1 From a general point of view, how does the disappearance change something in your 
life? What would be different if he/she were still here?  
- - “Your” life here can be that of the individual, the family or the community, as the 
subject chooses  
 
EFFECT ON THE INDIVIDUAL  
5.2 What effect did the disappearance have on your heart (man)? 
5.3 How do you feel now compared to at the time of the disappearance?      
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5.4 What specific problems do you have related to your heart (man)? Ask probing 
questions 
- Is the missing person constantly on your mind? [Flashbacks] (obsession, this is NOT 
just remember the missing)             
- Nightmare / recurrent dreams: did the Missing appear in your dreams?             
- Sleeping problems 
- Depressed mood/ sadness: dukha 
- Anxiety/ faear / worry: cintaa 
- Isolation, withdrawal, suicidal tendencies 
- Uncertainty, irritation, frustration 
-  
- If yes: Detail content of thoughts: 
5.5     Do these problems affect you in your daily life and activities?  
- understand level of disability, if any, and impact on functioning 
- how does it affect you:  
- behaviour - emotional  
- social - physical 
 
5.6 How do you cope with these problems? (Resilience, coping strategies) 
- Where do you go? What do you do? 
- With whom do you share problems?   
- Does this allow you to manage? 
5.7 Have you any physical problems since your relative went missing? What? Where? 
- Have you consulted any medical person or healer concerning these problems? Was 
any problem identified? 
5.8 (If thought to be dead) Have you been troubled by spirits? 
5.9 Do other members of the family seem affected ?      
- If other family members are present during the interview, it is best to ask them directly. 
Emphasis on the impact on children. If yes: who and how ? 
 
PSYCHOSOCIAL ELEMENTS: FAMILY AND COMMUNITY  
Social ecology / Human capacity / Material environment / Culture and values 
5.10 Has the disappearance of your relative affected your situation within your family? 
- Emphasis on the daughters-in-law: Dilemma between staying with the in-law family 
(who might treat her as a 'slave' and without the necessary link to the in-law family 
which was the missing husband) and going back to live with her family without her 
children and in most cases without any skills for earning a living. (Note, this question 
may be worthwhile only where in laws are not present.)  
5.11 Who now fulfils the role of the Missing person in the family? How has the absence of 
a family member affected the family structure and the family responsibilities?  
5.12 Did the fact that your relative went missing change something in your relations with 
others: friends, peers, neighbours, community, etc? If yes, how?  
5.13 Is the community divided in any way due to the conflict? Does this affect you / your 
family? 
5.14 Does your community have needs arising from people Missing? What? 
5.15 What is / are the most difficult thing(s) to overcome / to deal with ? 
5.16 What helps you to feel better? (Prioritise) 
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- To talk and share with a friend or 
family 
- Having work and income 
- My religious beliefs - Meeting and discussing with other 
families of missing - knowing others 
have the same difficulties 
- My belief  in the future - hope - Receiving support from different 
organisations 
- Meeting with the Government bodies - Local leaders 
- Being member of a family 
association 
 
5.17 Did you participate in: 
- Rituals (religious, traditional, political)                                    
- Collective / commemorative ceremonies 
- Did these help? If so, why or if not, why not? 
- Are there rituals you want to make but cannot?  
5.18 Did you contact a traditional healer (dhami / jhakri)?  
5.19 Do you talk about your missing relative and/or your difficulties? 
- If yes: With whom?  Does it help ?  
- If no: why not?   
 
5.20 Would you like to discuss your missing relative or your situation with someone (else) 
in particular? 
- If yes:  With whom?  
5.21 Did you contact a family association / NGO / other victims (for psychological or other 
support) ? 
- If yes: Which one? Why?  
- What kind of help/support do you get there?   
- If no: Why not? 
- Do you think it could be important for you?  Why? 
5.22 How do you feel about the future?  
5.23 Did your political activity increase as a result of the disappearance? Does this help 
you in any way?  
6 Economic Situation of the Family  
6.1 Describe the members of the household: number of persons, status, sex, including 
children, elderly or handicapped people 
6.2 What are the family's dwellings (private house / apartment, property/rent, village/city) 
? 
6.3 What are the main sources of income (e.g. agriculture, salary, etc.) ? 
- If rural how much land owned.  
- Other sources of income? 
- Any debt?  
6.4 Do/did you encounter economic problems because of the absence of your relative? 
6.5 Did/Do you receive economic support from :  
- Extended family, neighbours, friends and/or other community members               
- Non Governmental Organizations  
- Compensation?                
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6.6 Do these sources of income cover your basic needs (including access to education 
and health care)? 
- What does the family go without as a result of financial hardship?  
- If no: how do you make ends meet?  
7 Legal / Administrative Issues  
7.1 How did you learn of the disappearance of your relative ?  
- Witnessed (by whom?), formal notification from authorities? 
7.2 Did you yourself (or someone from your family) report / register the disappearance of 
the missing person?        
- If yes :Who? When ?                   
- If not,:  why not ? 
7.3 Did you (or someone from your family) make personal investigations to know the fate 
of your missing relative?                                                                               
  
- If yes: when? Do such efforts continue? 
- Result of the investigations/search ?  
- Did you receive particular information ?                
-                                                       
- If Yes,what, and from whom? 
- Have you transmitted this unofficial information (or other)?                                             
 
7.4 Do/did you encounter legal / administrative difficulties because of the absence of 
your relative? (inheritance, bank loans etc.)        
- Would a “declaration of disappearance” help?  
8 Justice, acknowledgement, reconciliation and rights 
Start with an open question and then ask details, depending upon what emerges… 
8.1 What does the family expect from the authorities responsible for the disappearance?  
8.2 What does the family understand as their human rights?  
8.3 What does the family understand by justice? 
- - acknowledgement, compensation, prosecutions?   
8.4 Do they believe that someone should be punished for what has happened?  
8.5 Who should be punished?  (informers, perpetrators, politicians?) 
- Where should judicial process be? (local, Kathmandu, international?) 
- Is the Nepali justice system capable of such process?  
8.6 Would the family accept amnesty for perpetrators if that gave access to the truth? 
Even if there was no guarantee that truth or justice would emerge otherwise?  
- Could the family forgive the perpetrators?  
8.7 Has their situation has been recognized / acknowledged by the authorities?  
- Has there been any acknowledgement from authorities (e.g. CPN-M, Government, 
compensation etc) ? 
- What about acknowledgement from others (agencies, lists etc.)? Is this important? 
8.8 What do they understand by compensation?   
- Why is compensation important?  
- Compensation/ reparations – do they mention need for truth and/or admission of 
responsibility? 
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- Would they accept compensation with no truth or admission of responsibility?   
- What is their opinion of the Rs. 1 lakh that has been offered to families of the dead?   
8.9 How should compensation be given? To individual families, to communities?  
8.10 Does the family consider some sort of memorial appropriate? What? Where?  
8.11 How should Nepal try to record and remember what happened to the Missing?  
8.12 Is there a need for reconciliation between people in Nepal?  
- Between whom?  
- How could this be done?  
 
9 Institutions and response of the state 
9.1 What is the family’s opinion of the army/ police/ CPN-M now? What could be done 
that would give you confidence in these institutions?  
- should people who have committed violations be permitted to hold public office or 
political positions?  
9.2 What confidence do you have the new Government will address the issue of the 
Missing?  
9.3 What will you do if it does not?  
9.4 Have you heard anything about the TRC or the Disappearance Commission?  
- - What do you think of this?   
10 Feedback 
10.1 Are there any issues that have not been discussed that are important to you?  
10.2 Does the family have any questions or comments?  
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A2.2. Timor-Leste: Semi-structured research instrument 
1 Introduction 
- Wish to talk about the impact of Missing relative - have no news.  
- Researcher: seeking to work with families, understand what they want and if what, if 
anything, has helped; ICRC will use this to advocate with the authorities  
- All information will be confidential: would like to record and quote, but without naming or 
identifying 
- If you don‟t want to talk about some issues that is fine; you can choose to stop 
whenever you like – don‟t want to upset.  
2 General Information  
2.1 The Interviewee 
- Name - Relation to the missing person   
- Ethnicity / language - Nature & size of family  
- Responsibilities within the family / 
employment 
-  
 
2.2 The Missing person               
- Name - Age:   
- Married?    - Children? (number of):   
- Responsibilities within the family / 
employment 
- (income generation?) 
 
- Date / Circumstances of disappearance (if known) 
3 General Priorities 
Aim to understand what families articulate as their needs, without prompting of 
possibilities.  
- What are the greatest problems that they face as a result of the Missing?   
- What action would the family like to see?  
4 Attitude to the fate of the missing person 
4.1 What do you think personally has happened to your relative (since the 
disappearance)?   
Seek articulation of general beliefs: hopes and fears  
IF believe still alive 
- What leads you to this conclusion? 
- Did you, or does someone in the family, think about other possibilities regarding the 
fate of your loved one? Could he be dead? If yes: explain.  
 
IF believe dead, 
- What made you believe that your missing relative might be / is dead ?  
- Do you, or does someone from the family, believe that he could still be alive?  
IF clearly ambiguous,  
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- The interviewee / the family still has doubt about the fate of their missing relative (going 
clearly from hope he/she is alive to acceptance of death) Where on the spectrum are 
they? 
- Have you, or others in the family, considered that he could be dead? Could be alive?  
4.2 Have any rituals been made concerning the missing person? If yes, what led family 
to do this? If not, why not?  
- What rituals would the family seek to make? Traditional  - stone from place of death / 
Church 
- Is it a problem that no rituals have been made? Why? What would constitute a 
satisfactory answer concerning the fate? 
4.3 Would it be important to know where his/her body is? Is knowing the gravesite 
sufficient?   
4.4                                       to get his/her body back ?                            
- Why? (rituals, religious reasons, confirmation of death etc)               
5 Psychological and Psychosocial issues 
Observe body language of the interviewee.  
5.1 From a general point of view, how does the disappearance change something in your 
life? What would be different if he/she were still here?  
- “Your” life here can be that of the individual, the family or the community, as the subject 
chooses  
 
EFFECT ON THE INDIVIDUAL  
5.2 How does the disappearance affect you emotionally? (How are things going?) 
5.3 How do you feel now compared to at the time of the disappearance?      
5.4 What specific problems do you think it has caused?  
5.5 Do these problems affect you in your daily life and activities?  
- understand level of disability, if any, and impact on functioning 
5.6 How do you cope with these problems? (Resilience, coping strategies) 
- Where do you go? What do you do? 
- With whom do you share problems?  Family Association?  
- Does this allow you to manage? 
5.7 Has the family any contact with the spirit of the Missing? 
Has the spirit given any problems?  
5.8 Have you had dreams of the Missing?  
What was the content? 
 
PSYCHOSOCIAL ELEMENTS: FAMILY AND COMMUNITY  
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5.9 Has the disappearance of your relative affected your situation within your family? 
Has it changed your identity in the family or community? 
- Any problem for the daughters-in-law: 
- If remarried: What happened to children? 
- Does the wife consider herself a widow?  
5.10 How has the absence of a family member affected the family structure and the family 
responsibilities? Who now fulfils the role of the Missing person in the family? 
5.11 Did the fact that your relative went missing change something in your relations with 
others: friends, peers, neighbours, community, etc? If yes, how?  
5.12 Is the community divided in any way due to the conflict? Does this affect you / your 
family? 
5.13 Does your community have needs arising from people Missing? What? 
6 Economic Situation of the Family  
6.1 How do you live day by day? 
6.2 Describe the members of the household: number of persons, status, sex, including 
children, elderly or handicapped people 
6.3 What are the family's dwellings (private house / apartment, property/rent, village/city) 
? 
6.4 What are the main sources of income (e.g. agriculture, salary, etc.) ? 
- If rural how much land owned.  
- Other sources of income? 
- Any debt?  
6.5 Do/did you encounter economic problems because of the absence of your relative? 
6.6 Did/Do you receive economic support from :  
- Extended family, neighbours, friends and/or other community members               
- Non Governmental Organizations, church  
- Compensation, pensions, veteran‟s payments                                                                                                                          
6.7 Do these sources of income cover your basic needs (including access to education 
and health care)? 
- What does the family go without as a result of financial hardship?  
- If no: how do you make ends meet?  
7 Legal / Administrative Issues  
7.1 Do/did you encounter administrative difficulties because of the absence of your 
relative?  
- Property / land, marriage, pension 
8 Justice, acknowledgement, reconciliation and rights 
Start with an open question and then ask details, depending upon what emerges… 
8.1 What does the family expect from the authorities regarding the disappearance?  
8.2 What does the family understand as their human rights?  
8.3 What does the family understand by justice? 
- -  acknowledgement, compensation, prosecutions 
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8.4 Who do they think should deliver justice? 
8.5 Do they believe that someone should be punished for what has happened?  
- Who should be punished?  (informers, perpetrators, politicians?) 
- Where should judicial process be? (local, international?) 
8.6 Has anyone been punished for the disappearance?  
- Any nahe biti bot, or other local discussion of such issues? 
8.7 Is the family aware of any trials of persons responsible for such crimes? The 
following processes:  
- UN Special panels 
- Indonesian human rights court 
8.8 Did they give any information to CAVR?  
- Do they know what CAVR is? 
- If so, what happened?  
- What do they feel about this process? 
8.9 Could they reconcile with or forgive those responsible? 
8.10 Has their situation been recognized / acknowledged by the authorities?  
8.11 Is the Missing person considered a veteran? CAAC / CAVF / CAQR?  
- Has this helped the family in any way?  
8.12 Has the family received any compensation or reparation? Why is compensation 
important?  
- Compensation/ reparations – do they mention need for truth and/or admission of responsibility? 
- Would they accept compensation with no truth or admission of responsibility?   
8.13 Does the family consider some sort of memorial appropriate? What? Where?  
- What about the Falintil martyrs‟ cemetery?  
8.14 How should Timor-Leste try to record and remember what happened to the Missing?  
8.15 Is there still a need for reconciliation between people in Timor? In their community? 
- Between whom?  
- How could this be done?  
9 Feedback 
9.1 Are there any issues that have not been discussed that are important to you?  
9.2 Does the family have any questions or comments?  
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Appendix III. List of persons interviewed 
This Appendix lists all those persons interviewed in Nepal and Timor-Leste for this study, 
notably families of the Missing (where the principal interviewee is noted in terms of their 
relationship to the Missing and anonymity maintained) but also elites in Government and 
civil society. (It should be noted that in many cases several relatives were met and in 
others several different relatives are missing and so the interviewee had multiple 
relationships with the Missing.) 
A3.1. Nepal  
Families of the Missing interviewed59 
Reference 
Relationship to 
missing person 
Location 
Date 
interviewed 
Comments 
KATHMANDU 
FK001 Brother Baluwatar, Kathmandu 25.04.08 Sofad family association leader 
FK002 Sister Kalimati, Kathmandu 15.05.08  
FK003 Wife Min Bhawan, Kathmandu 16.05.08  
FK004 Mother Chhabil, Kathmandu 04.06.08 Interviewed at workplace
60
 
FK005 Brother Ratnapur, Sindhuli  13.08.08 Interviewed at workplace
60
 
FK006 Brother Bishalnagar, Kathmandu 14.08.08  
FK007 Son Chatisghar, Nawalparasi 15.08.08  
FK008 Brother-in-law 
Sindhukot, 
Sindhulpalchowk 
17.08.08  
FK009 Brother Gyaneshwor, Kathmandu 25.08.08  
FK010 Wife Dhapasi, Kathmandu 26.08.08 
Three wives met together at place 
of work. 
60
 
FK011  Wife Baluwatar. Kathmandu 22.09.08  
FM001 Brother Balaju, Kathmandu 05.06.08  
FM002  Brother Kathmandu 07.06.08  
FM008 Wife & Brother Koteshwar, Kathmandu 
 
 
BARDIYA  & BANKE 
FB001 Father Balapur, Gulariya 
06.05.08 & 
23.07.08 
 
FB002 Father Balapur, Gulariya 06.05.08  
FB003 Wife and brother Dhaulagiri, Bageshwori 08.05.08  
FB004 Wife Balapur, Mahadevpuri 08.05.08  
FB005 Brother Pattabhar, Rajapur 17.07.08  
FB006 Mother Pattabhar, Rajapur 17.07.08  
FB007 Mother Pattabhar, Rajapur 18.07.08  
FB008 Daughter-in-law 
Madhavpur, Pattabhar-6, 
Rajapur 
18.07.08 
 
                                               
59
 Cases perpetrated by the Maoists were differentiated using the code FM in some cases in 
preference to the district code.  
60
 During the CPN-M led Government of 2008-9 a large number of members of families of the 
Missing were appointed to Government jobs, notably at the Ministry of Information. 
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FB009  Wife & Mother 
Jaipur, Badalpur-6, 
Rajapur 
18.07.08 
 
FB010 Daughter 
Belasa, Bhimapur-7, 
Rajapur  18.07.08 
 
FB011  Mothers 
Nawranga, Manau-8, 
Rajapur 19.07.08 
Group of four mothers of missing 
men 
FB012 Wife 
Bikrampur, Manpur 
Tapara-8, Rajapur 
19.07.08 
 
FB013 Wife 
Dallapur, Suryapatuwa-4, 
Rajapur 
20.07.08 
 
FB014 Mother & Father 
Badke Tadumwa, 
Suryapatuwa-4 
20.07.08  
FB015 Mother Madaha, Motipur 22.07.08  
FB016 Wife Madaha, Motipur 22.07.08  
FB017 Wife Nawada, Motipur 22.07.08  
FB018 Brother Jainpur, Gulariya 23.07.08  
FB019 Son Baidi, Dhadawar 24.07.08 Founder of CVC Bardiya 
FB020 Father Baisahi, Mohammedpur 25.07.08  
FB021 Wife Sujanpur, Neulapur-4 28.07.07  
FB022 Mother Sujanpur, Neulapur-4 28.07.07  
FB023 Son 
Thaukdwara, 
Thakudwara-6 28.07.07  
FB024 Mother, Father & 
Brother 
Shivpur, T'wara-9 28.07.07  
FB025 Mother Khusalpur, T'wara-7 28.07.07  
FB026 Mother & Wife Bhurkaiya, T'wara-1 29.07.07  
FB027 Wife Takiya, Bagnaha-6 29.07.07  
FB028 Wife 
Laxmana Chowk, 
Deudakala-7 
30.07.08 & 
12.04.09 
One of two wives of missing man; 
other wife left home leaving 3 
children behind 
FB029 Father Masurikhet, Banke 31.07.08 Two sons missing 
FB030 Wife Lakna, Belawa-4, Bardiya 01.08.08  
FB031 Mother  Betahani. Belawa-7, 
Bardiya 
01.08.08 Two sons missing 
FB032 Mother & Father 
G-gaun, Bankatwa-4, 
Banke 04.08.08  
FB033 Wife 
Chhumaniya, Bankatwa-
8, Banke 04.08.08  
FB034 Wife 
Chanahauwa, 
Samserganj-4, Banke 
04.08.08  
FB035 Mother & Father 
Habrahawa, Phattepur-8, 
Banke 05.08.08  
FB036 Mother & Father 
Ladahaura, Naubasta-4, 
Banke 06.08.08  
FB037 Brother 
Godahana, Sonapur-9, 
Banke 05.08.08  
FB038 Wife 
Near Sitala Bazzar, Kalika  05.08.08 & 10 
– 11.04.09 
Vice President of CVC Bardiya 
FB039 Wife Macchaghar, Deudakala 13.04.09  
ROLPA 
FR001 Two brothers Darbot, Kotgaun  11.06.08  
FR002 Sister Satali Khola, Liwang-5  12.06.08  
FM003 Wife Bhawang 14.06.08  
FM004 Wife & Daughter Liwang 10.06.08  
FM005  Father Kotgaun, Kotgaun  12.06.08  
FM006 Wife 
Majhing, Dhabang-3 (met 
in Liwang) 12.06.08 
 
 323 
 
FM007  Brother Thulo Gaun, Uwa 12.06.08  
DHADING 
FD001 Son Worcharang, Jogimara 19.08.08 
This group represent the families of 
more than 20 men from Jogimara 
disappeared while working in 
Kalikot district. 
FD002 Father Worcharang, Jogimara 19.08.08 
FD003 Father Worcharang, Jogimara 20.08.08 
FD004 Mother Khirraghari, Jogimara 20.08.08 
FD005 Wife Worcharang, Jogimara 20.08.08 
FD006 Mother Ghatto, Jogimara 20.08.08 
FD007 Wife Dharke, Maubise 21.08.08  
FD008 Wife Archabe, Thakre 21.08.08  
FD009 Wife Fogatpur, Dharke 21.08.08  
FD010 Wife 
Mahadevbesi bazzar, 
Thakre 21.08.08 
 
GORKHA 
FG001 Brother  Khoplang-2, Pokharabesi 16.06.08  
FG002 Brother Choprak-9, Chorkate 16.06.08  
FG003 Daughter Khoplang-2, Pokharabesi 17.06.08  
FG004 Brother Arupokhari-8, Kausini 17.06.08  
FG005 Husband Hansapur-4, Tintare 17.06.08  
FG006 Brother 
Prithvinarayan-1, 
Tindhara 
18.06.08 
 
FG007 Sister-in-law Gorkha HQ 18.06.08  
SIRAHA / DHANUSA 
FJ001 Father Janakpur, Dhanusa 09.09.08  
FS001 Father Bhulke, Bhadaramal-6 15.09.08  
FS002 Wife Ramnagar Mirchaiya 15.09.08  
FS003 Father Fulabriya, Mulabari 15.09.08  
FS004 Wife Pariharpur, Mahadewa 
Portaha 
16.09.08  
FS005 Brother Danghadi (Siraha) 16.09.08  
FS006 Son Tetsihbigaha, Phulkaha 
Katti 
16.09.08  
FS007 Wife Brahmpuri, Arnama 
Lalpur 
16.09.08  
FS008 Wife Siraha municipality, 
Thana chowk 
17.09.08  
FS009 Brother Malhaniya, Malhaniya 
Gamharia 
17.09.08  
FS010 Wife Saharwa, Sanhaitha 17.09.08  
 
Focus groups with families of the Missing  
DISTRICT PLACE TYPE NO. OF 
PARTICIPANTS 
Bardiya 
 
Katarniya Wives of the missing (Tharu & 
Muslim; state & CPN-M ) 
6 
Gulariya Family members (state & CPN-M) 6 
Nawranga, Manau, 
Rajapur 
Family members from single 
village, Tharu victims of state 
7 
Dhading Jogimara Family members of victims of the 
incident in Kotwade, Kalikot 
9 
Gorkha 
 
Gorkha Victims of state 7 
Gorkha Victims of state, women 6 
Kathmandu Balaju (Sofad) Victims of the state 7 
ICRC Victims of CPN-M 9 
Rolpa Liwang Victims of CPN-M, displaced 8 
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Elites interviewed 
Contact was maintained with a large number of actors in Kathmandu and outside, from 
Government, political parties and civil society (national and international), with many met 
repeatedly through the period of the study. Included here are those where a formal 
interview was made and recorded.  
Name Organisation Position 
Date 
interviewed 
Comments 
GOVERNMENT 
Prabhakar 
Ministry of 
Peace and 
Reconstruction 
Minister 24.09.08 Ex-PLA commander 
Janak Joshi  
Ministry of 
Peace and 
Reconstruction 
Secretary 28.08.08  
Madhu Regmi 
Ministry of 
Peace and 
Reconstruction 
Joint Secretary  
15.04.08 
18.05.08 
15.07.08 
11.08.08 
31.03.09 
 
Binod Singh Nepal Police 
Senior Superintendent 
of Police / Head, 
Human Rights cell 
24.08.08  
Shiva Prasad 
Nepal Bardiya district Chief District Officer 25.07.08  
CIVIL SOCIETY 
Jitendra Bohara 
Advocacy 
Forum (NGO) 
Transitional Justice 
responsible 
14.07.08 
02.04.09 
 
C.P.Singh 
FORCE Nepal 
(Nepalgunj 
based NGO)  
President   
Kashi Ram 
Dungana 
Advocacy 
Forum (NGO) 
Bardiya district in-
charge 
09.05.08 
10.04.09 
 
Shrestha 
CAHURAST 
(NGO) 
President 02.04.09 
CPN-M affiliated Human Rights 
NGO 
Govinda Bandi 
International 
Commission of 
Jurists 
 
04.09.08  
Yagya Adhikari / 
Basudev 
Bajagain 
Nepal Human 
Rights 
Commision 
Head of Protection /  
Protection Officer 
02.06.08  
Gopal Dahit 
Tharu academic 
and activist  
Repeatedly 
2008 - 2009 
Met to discuss history of 
landlessness in Bardiya and Tharu 
cultural tradition 
Ekraj Chaudhary 
Nepalgunj 
Media Centre 
(Tharu 
advocacy group) 
 
Repeatedly 
2006 - 2009 
A regular interlocutor who gave 
details of Tharu tradition, 
particularly spiritually and 
concerning traditional healing. 
Political parties 
Ekraj Bhandari CPN-M 
CA member/ 
Sofad central member 
28.05.08 Son is missing 
Kabir CPN-M Bardiya in-charge 26.07.08  
Gagan Thapa Nepali Congress CA member 28.08.08  
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Pasang 
CPN-M / 
People‟s 
Liberation Army 
CPN-M central 
member / 
PLA  Deputy 
Commander 
11.09.08  
Shankar 
Pokharel 
UML 
CA member / 
UML central member 
27.08.08 In 2009-10 Minister of Information  
Krishna Prasad 
Sitaula 
Nepali Congress Senior NC leader 03.09.08 
Negotiated the CPA on behalf of 
the non-Maoist parties 
 
A3.2. Timor-Leste 
Families of the Missing interviewed 
Reference 
Relationship to 
missing person 
Location 
Date 
interviewed 
Comments 
DILI  
DIL001 Father Colmera, Dili 
13.07.09 
 
 
DIL002 Father Santa Cruz, Dili 15.07.09.  
DIL003 Wife & / Brother Lesibuta, Comoro, Dili 16.07.09 Met in ICRC Office 
DIL004 Brother-in-law Comoro, Dili 16.07.09  
DIL005 Father Audian, Dili  16.07.09  
DIL006 Mother & Father Matadoro, Dili 04.08.09 2 brothers taken together 
DIL007 Sister & Brother Lahane, Dili 04.08.09 2 brothers taken in 1975 & 1979 
DIL008 Brother Becora, Dili 05.08.09 
2 brothers missing at Sta Cruz 
massacre 
DIL009 Sister Becora, Dili 05.08.09  
DIL010 
Wife, Son &  
Daughter 
Bairo Pite, Delhi 
07 &  
09.08.09 
Mother met alone, then 2nd 
interview made together with 3 
children 
DIL011 Brother Bairo Formosa, Dili 07.08.09  
DIL012 Wife & Son Santa Cruz, Dili 15.08.09  
DIL013 Sister Bairo Formosa, Dili 16.08.09  
DIL014 Mother Aiutlaran, Santa Cruz, Dili 19.08.09  
DIL015 Daughter & Son Becora, Dili 20..08.09  
DIL016 
Brother and 
Sister-in-law 
Taibessi, Dili 21.08.09 
 
MANATUTO  
MAT001 none Behau, Iilimanu, Umaduak 18.07.09;  
MAT002 Brother Behau, Iilimanu, Umaduak 18.07.09;.  
MAT003 Husband / Father Behau, Iilimanu, Umaduak 18.07.09;  
MAT004 Mother & Brother Salamata, Ailili 19.07.09 Boy taken as TBO age 15 in 1978 
MAT005 Mother & Brother Salamata, Ailili 20.07.09 Boy taken as TBO age 7 
MAT006 Mother & Sister Rembor, Aiteas 20.07.09  
MAT007 Daughter Rembor, Aiteas 20.07.09  
MAT008  All Behau, Iilimanu, Umaduak 21.07.09 
Joint interview, two men, both with 
relatives Missing by Fretilin 
MAT009 Niece Weali, Umakaduak 21.07.09  
MAT010 
All (Entire family 
missing) 
Weali, Umakaduak 21.07.09 
Entire family killed by Fretilin 
MAT011 Wife & Daughter Laclo town 22.07.09 
Man known to be dead, but body 
burnt 
MAT012 
Mother, Sister & 
Niece 
Raidodok, Lakumesak 22.07.09 
 
MAT013 Son & Nephew Taha Gamu, Lakumesak 22.07.09 
Three family members killed by 
Fretilin 
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MAT014 Two Sisters Lanao, Lifau, Laleia 22.07.09  
MAT015 Sister Lanao, Lifau, Laleia 22.07.09 
Interview terminated after some 
minutes due to upset. 
MAT016 Sisters Uma Clalan, Lifau, Laleia 23.07.09  
MAT017 Daughter Ralan, Hatularan, Laleia 23.07.09  
MAT018 Son Tuketin, Cribas 23.07.09 
Mother killed in front of them, body 
not retrieved. 
BOBONARO  
BOB001 Uncle Ibuc, Lebos, Lolotoi 28.07.09  
BOB002 Brother Ibuc, Lebos, Lolotoi 28.07.09  
BOB003 All  Ibuc, Lebos, Lolotoi 28.07.09 Entire family killed in mountains 
BOB004 Wife Cailaco  29.07.09  
BOB005 Wife Dau Udo, Cailaco 29.07.09  
BOB006 Wife Dau Udo, Cailaco 29.07.09  
BOB007 Son Oepo, Tapo 29.07.09 Falintil veteran, CPD-RDTL activist 
BOB008 Mother Oepo, Tapo 29.07.09  
BOB009 Wife Tunubibi. Memo 30.07.09  
BOB010 Father Simololo, Memo 31.07.09  
BOB011 Father Meligo, Cailaco 01.08.09  
BOB012 Wife Meligo, Cailaco 01.08.09  
BOB013 Wife Meligo, Cailaco 01.08.09  
BOB014 Brother Faturasi, Rairobo, Atabae 06.08.09  
LAUTEM  
LAU001 Brother  Lequidica, Samalari, Ililai 10.08.09 
Interviewed when working as part 
of community road gang. 
LAU002 Nephew  Saegeli, Daudere 10.08.09  
LAU003 Son  Soikili, Parlamento 10.08.09  
LAU004 Uncle Iparira, Parlamento 10.08.09 Raised children of missing man 
LAU005 Brother Poruwari, Serelau 11.08.09  
LAU006 Brother Poruwari, Serelau 11.08.09  
LAU007 Father Irapala, Baduro 11.08.09  
LAU008 Daughter 
Laruara, Fuiloro, Los 
Palos 
11.08.09 
 
LAU009 Son 
Lilapuhu, Home, Los 
Palos 
12.08.09 
 
LAU010 Wife 
Lilapuhu, Home, Los 
Palos 
12.08.09 
 
LAU011 Wife & Son 
30 de Augusto, Fuiloro, Ls 
Palos 
12.08.09 
 
LAU012 Son & family 
Larinatcha, Home, Los 
Palos 
12.08.09 
Knows where body is - with support 
could retrieve it; Lulik can identify 
body. 
LAU013 Father 
Motolori, Fuiloro, Los 
Palos 
13.08.09 
 
LAU014 
Brother & ex- 
comrades 
Lali, Souro, Los Palos 13.08.09 
Focus group style discussion with 
group of Falintil veterans 
LAU015 Son & Grandson 
Souro Kecil, Leuro, Los 
Palos 
13.08.09 
 
LAU016 Sister Central, Fuiloro, Los Palos 13.08.09  
LAU017 
Wife and 
Brother-in-law 
Ira-ada, Fuiloro, Los Palos 14.08.09 
 
LAU018 Wife Central, Fuiloro, Los Palos  14.08.09 
Body recently exhumed with three 
others, but no identification 
possible.  
LAU019 Mother 
Bemoris, Fuiloro, Los 
Palos 
14.08.09 
 
LAU020 
Brother &  
Nephew 
30 de Augusto, Fuiloro, 
Los Palos 
15.08.09 
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LAU021 Wife & Son 
Lospala, Fuiloro, Los 
Palos 
15.08.09 
 
LIQUICA  
LIQ001 Wife Liquica 
15.07.09 & 
21.08.09 
 
 
Focus groups with families of the Missing  
DISTRICT PLACE TYPE NO. OF 
PARTICIPANTS 
Bobonaro 
Cailaco Families of the Missing, mixed 
gender. 
14 
Maliana Wives of the Missing: highly 
mobilised and active women‟s 
group 
11 
Atabae Families of the Missing, all men: 
included Xefe suku and 
Administrator. 
9 
Dili Comarca Balide (ex-
CAVR) 
Komite 12 Nov. (Families of victims 
of the Santa Cruz massacre) 
35 (In 4 
groups) 
Manatuto 
Behau, Umakaduak 
Most family members known dead, 
3 families of the Missing, mixed 
gender: Fretilin perpetrated 
8 
Bahadik, Iliheu Families of the Missing and the 
dead, and chefe aldeia; village 
highly impacted by Fretilin assaults 
4 
 
Elites met 
In Timor-Leste the advanced stage of the transitional justice process and the large 
amount of documentation available made formal elite interviews largely unnecessary. 
During the research was however continuous contact with both Government and civil 
society was however maintained, notably as part of advocacy around the study and 
efforts to mobilise a formal mechanism to address the Missing issue (see Section A4.5). 
Those met include those listed below. 
Name Organisation Position Comments 
GOVERNMENT & POLITICAL PARTIES 
Zacarias Albano da 
Costa 
Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs 
Minister of Foreign 
Affairs 
Guest of honour at the launch of the report of the 
research results 
Brig. Gen. Lere 
Anan Timur 
Falintil - Timor-
Leste Defence 
Force 
Chief of Staff 
Recently reunited with missing son after 30 
years.   
Fernanda Borges 
Member of 
Parliament / 
Leader of PUN 
party 
Chair of Parliamentary 
Committee „A‟ 
Leading process to pass law on the Missing 
issue. 
Manuel Tilman 
Member of 
Parliament / 
Leader of KOTA 
party 
Member of 
Parliamentary 
Committee „A‟ 
Interviewed 13.05.10 
Vicky Tchong 
Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs 
Secretary General 
Met around meetings of the for Joint Ministerial 
Commission July 2009with Indonesian minsters, 
on the Missing issue.  
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Aniceto Guterres 
Member of 
Parliament / 
Fretilin 
Member of 
Parliamentary 
Committee „A‟ /  
Party Parliamentary 
leader 
Ex-CAVR Commissioner 
Jose Teixeira 
Member of 
Parliament / 
Fretilin 
Party spokesperson  
Olandina Caeiro 
Public Service 
Commission 
Commissioner Ex-Commissioner CAVR 
INTERNATIONAL AGENCIES 
Ben Larke UNDP  
 
Ex-CAVR staff 
Soren Blau 
 
Intl. Forensic 
Team /  
Victoria Institute 
for Forensic 
Medicine 
Forensic 
anthropologist 
 
Luis Fondebrider 
Intl. Forensic 
Team /  
EAAF 
Forensic 
anthropologist 
 
Julia Alhinho 
Serious Crimes 
Investigation 
Team / UNMIT 
External Relations 
Officer 
Met repeatedly during data taking 
Marek Machan 
Serious Crimes 
Investigation 
Team / UNMIT 
Senior Investigator 
 
Met 24.07.09 
CIVIL SOCIETY 
Isabel Amaral-
Guterres 
Cruz Vermelha de 
Timor-Leste 
Secretary-General Ex-Commissioner CAVR, Commissioner CTF 
Pat Walsh 
Post-CAVR 
Secretariat 
Senior Advisor Ex-CAVR staff 
Lia Kent 
University of 
Melbourne 
Researcher Ex-CAVR staff 
Mark Harris - 
 
Ex-Serious Crimes Unit 
Naomi Kinsella 
Int. Center for 
Transitional 
Justice 
 
Ex-CAVR staff 
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Appendix IV. Recommendations and impact of 
the study in the two contexts 
These recommendations were those that appeared in the reports of the research 
published with an advocacy aim in both Nepal (ICRC, 2009) and Timor-Leste (ICRC, 
2010a).  
A4.3. Recommendations to the Government of Nepal  
These recommendations are derived from the findings of the study and represent an 
attempt to address the needs of the families of the Missing within the current strategy of 
the Government around a Disappearance Commission and, at some future time, a Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission (TRC).  
General recommendations regarding the transitional process 
- The Government to consult as broadly as possible among victims, beyond easily 
accessed urban activists, to ensure that needs of typical victims, who are 
overwhelmingly poor and rural, are understood.  
- Victims‟ organisations, including associations of families of the Missing, to be 
involved in the creation of any mechanism to address victim needs; victims‟ 
representatives to be included as commissioners of the Disappearance 
Commission and TRC.  
Clarifying the fate of the missing: the Disappearance Commission 
- The Commission‟s mandate to include all those missing as a result of the conflict 
and not only those taken into custody by the parties.  
- The Commission to have a presence in every region of the country and to 
embark upon a programme of dissemination of its role such that victims in 
remote areas are informed.  
- The Disappearance Commission to not only inform the family of the death of the 
Missing person but to be obliged to inform the family of all information about the 
missing person found during the investigations, including place, time and 
manner of death.   
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- The Disappearance Commission to be explicitly given the role of clarifying the 
fate of the Missing; this demands that: 
- The Commission receives access to the required capacity in terms of 
investigation, exhumation and identification of human remains, either within the 
Commission itself, or through a specialised agency for that purpose;  
- the Commission is funded and staffed at a level where it is able to administrate a 
broad programme of exhumations nationwide; 
- the duration of the Commission is open ended to ensure that work can continue 
for the many years likely to be required to complete this task beyond the lifetime 
of the Constituent assemble that is implicit in current legislation;.   
- Those missing persons determined by the Commission to be dead to be given 
the status of martyrs and their names published.   
A legal status for the Missing 
The Government to create a legal category of “Missing” that can be declared by an 
appropriate competent authority (such as the Disappearance Commission) such that on 
receipt of a well founded claim of a person being Missing, a certificate is issued declaring 
such a person officially missing, granting a well defined legal status to that person and 
permitting property to be transferred to heirs.  
An end to impunity for those who committed offences that led to persons going 
missing 
 Individuals, political parties and state institutions leading Nepal‟s transition to 
make a commitment to prosecute all persons suspected to have been involved 
in criminal offences that led to persons going missing during the conflict, whether 
they are members of security forces, political parties or otherwise.  
 Trials of persons suspected of crimes that led to persons going missing to be 
held wherever possible in a way that is accessible to the victims of those 
offences, whether this be through broadcast of proceedings or through direct 
access for the families of those missing.   
 The pattern of disappearances at the most intense times of conflict and in the 
worst affected areas to be considered by the authorities to determine if these 
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constitute crimes against humanity in light of their systematic and widespread 
nature.  
Relief and reparations policy 
 The Government to urgently embark upon a programme of economic support to 
victims of the conflict, through the provision of interim relief, independent of any 
other transitional justice mechanisms; such a programme should not 
discriminate between relief to families of the dead and families of the Missing.   
 A reparations policy to be prepared, drawing on the needs of victims and 
international experience, and including:  
 compensation policy to families of the Missing to be drawn up with reference to 
compensation received by families of members of the security forces killed 
during the conflict; compensation and reparation payments to be made once the 
truth concerning the fate of the Missing is known; compensation to consider 
long-term educational support for children and health care support for the family 
of the Missing;   
 a dedicated programme of reparations to be developed to target the wives of the 
Missing who may have special needs; this to be done in conjunction with the 
Ministry for Women, Children and Social Welfare, relevant bodies at district level 
and victims‟ representatives;  
 reparations policy to include explicit public acknowledgement of the fate of the 
Missing once it is known, and an admission by the authorities that the security 
forces and the CPN-M were responsible for violations leading to persons going 
Missing; a programme of memorialisation of the Missing to be funded at both the 
local (District, VDC) and central levels;  
 an additional programme of community reparations to be drawn up for the most 
affected communities, e.g. Tharu communities in Bardiya, in conjunction with 
local authorities and victim representatives.  
Psychosocial support to families and communities 
The Government to engage with affected communities, district authorities and 
agencies having appropriate capacities in a programme of psychosocial assessment 
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and intervention with families of the Missing. These should build on the capacities of 
families and communities to address their own needs.  
Reconciliation process in communities 
The Government to engage with conflict affected communities, district authorities, 
victims‟ groups and agencies having appropriate capacities in a programme of 
community reconciliation, potentially as part of the TRC process, such that 
communities divided by the conflict can address such issues where judicial action is 
impossible. Such process will notably have to address the issue of informants 
presumed to have provided information that led to persons going missing, even 
where those informants have committed no criminal offence. 
Transformation of institutions 
A policy of vetting to be introduced for the army, police and Government service: 
where a member of the Nepal Army or Nepal Police is found to have been 
responsible for persons becoming missing, in addition to any prosecutorial action, 
that person to be dismissed forthwith from the security forces; any member of a 
political party found to be responsible for persons becoming missing to be excluded 
from Government office or employment.  
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A4.4. Recommendations to the Government of Timor-Leste 
The contact with victims that this study has permitted allows a series of 
recommendations to be made to the Timor-Leste authorities to further the addressing of 
the needs of families of the Missing.  
Establishment of an Office for Missing Persons 
There exists no entity in Timor-Leste tasked with assisting families of the Missing, or 
acting as a focal point for families, despite the issue affecting thousands of families in the 
country.  
An Office for Missing Persons (OMP) to be established as an independent 
body, as envisaged in the recommendations of the Working Group on Reparations 
advising Parliamentary Committee A. The OMP„s structure and activities to be informed 
by the ICRC Model Law on the Missing, and the Draft Law on Missing Persons in Timor-
Leste.  
The objectives of the OMP to be:  
- To assist families to learn about the fate of loved ones, and reunify 
families where possible;  
- To determine the whereabouts of the remains of the Missing and to 
assist with exhumations and reburial where they have died.  
Clarifying the fate of the Missing and accessing human remains 
Understanding the fate and retrieving remains are one of the highest priorities for 
families: whilst many cases require the involvement of the Indonesian authorities, a 
number of cases can be solved using information available in Timor-Leste.  
Continue an engagement with the Government of Indonesia on the issue of 
missing persons, using the inter-ministerial Joint Ministerial Commission as the forum for 
this; continue the ongoing initiative regarding minors missing from 1999, and engage the 
GoI on the broader issues of missing persons wherever possible.  
The Office for Missing Persons or other entity in Timor-Leste to have 
responsibility to liaise with families of the Missing and fulfil other domestic functions as 
required to support the JMC process on the Missing.  
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The OMP (or other body) to work independently to determine the fate of those 
Missing at the hands of Timorese perpetrators, and to exhume bodies where they have 
died.  
The OMP (or other body) to support families in Timor-Leste who have 
significant information concerning the location of improper graves of loved ones to 
exhume and rebury them with appropriate ritual.  
The F-FDTL exhumations programme to continue in conjunction with the 
OMP, and be funded, as long as it is able to retrieve human remains.  
Reparations and recognition for families of the Missing  
The Missing have not been acknowledged or recognised by any Government 
programme to date, and families of the Missing are not eligible to receive any benefits as 
a result of their status.  
The GoTL to consider creating a medal to honour civilians and others who 
were not part of the resistance effort who are dead or missing as a result of the conflict in 
Timor-Leste, as part of its valorisation programme.  
The GoTL to initiate a programme of memorialisation, potentially under the 
post-CAVR institution, to commemorate those persons who died or are missing in the 
conflict and who have no graves; funding to be provided at sub-district level, where this 
is requested by district authorities, to support the efforts of communities to build 
memorials to the dead and Missing.  
The GoTL, in consultation with the 12 November Committee and families of 
the Santa Cruz victims, to support construction of a memorial to the victims of 12 
November 1991.  
The GoTL to define in law the status of Missing, such that families can 
address any issues arising from the absence of their loved one, including inheritance and 
valorisation, without having to declare him or her dead.  
Assistance to families of the Missing  
The scale of victimhood during the conflict in Timor-Leste likely prevents a 
comprehensive programme of individual reparations to families of victims. Given the 
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efforts of the state to develop social assistance programmes to the vulnerable, it is 
recommended that families of victims be explicitly included in these:  
Having a missing relative, or otherwise having been victimised during the 
conflict, to be considered as an additional indicator of vulnerability in the evaluation of 
suitability to benefit from social assistance programmes of the Ministry of Social 
Solidarity.  
Psychosocial programmes to be developed with Family Associations  
Family members of the Missing are still suffering from both the impact of the violence 
during the conflict and of the long-term uncertainty over the fate of loved ones. Existing 
Family Associations can serve as a framework through which to develop psychosocial 
interventions to assist affected persons.  
The GoTL to develop, in cooperation with relevant agencies, a programme to 
assist Associations of Families of the Missing in offering psychosocial support to their 
members. These activities to include:  
- Events for women and others where victims can share experiences and 
issues;  
- Creation of peer counselling capacity in Family Associations;  
- A referral service so that those suffering from mental illness or the 
impact of trauma can receive appropriate treatment;  
A4.5. Impact of the study in the two contexts 
This study seeks to advocate for policy concerning legacies of armed conflict in the 
studied contexts and beyond to be evidence based. More than this the research seeks to 
use a modality derived from concepts of Action Research, constituting not just an 
academic inquiry but a process that impacts on both the community of victims who are 
its collaborators and on decision makers in the concerned contexts (Chapter 5). This 
challenges the ontological dilemma revealed by this study: actors in Government and 
donors who seek to support peacebuilding have power but no knowledge of needs, while 
victims of conflict who are all too intimately aware of the needs arising from victimhood 
have no power. Here, the impact of the research on the two contexts is described in 
terms of that on the families of the Missing and the family associations, changes in policy 
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of the authorities in the two states, and changes in approaches to the Missing issue by 
other actors, notably the ICRC who collaborated with the research. The study contributed 
to a reconceptualisation of the ICRC approach based on the needs and expectations of 
the families consistent with guidelines established in 2003 (ICRC, 2003; ICRC, 2010b), 
and in particular concerning the development of an ICRC methodology to assess the 
needs of the families of the Missing. It is of course clear that there can only be a limited 
impact in the short time since the research was completed and the data published; it is 
hoped that greater impacts may follow. This section summarises the measurable impact 
of the study in both contexts, and as such discusses those changes, necessarily the 
more incremental, that can occur in the 1 - 2 years since the two studies were 
completed.  
Impact of the study in Nepal  
The most direct way for the study to impact on families is through the research contact 
with them and more especially the long term engagement with family association 
representatives. In Bardiya, a leader of CVC said that for families the study served as a 
form of recognition that they had not otherwise received, “it gives them satisfaction [...] it 
is important for the children that they understand what missing means and what is the 
pain of the families” (CVC leader, Bardiya, July 2010); he also saw the report as an 
antidote to the fatigue of families speaking to many visitors from agencies who never 
return. This confirms the ethical imperative of taking the research „back‟ to participants 
and the report of the study as an appropriate way to do this. He considered the report 
important enough that he sought that all families of the Missing should receive a copy, 
even illiterate families who, aware of its contents, would value it. This suggests that such 
a report, even in a form not directly accessible to many, can confirm meanings and 
identities that are useful to families, demonstrating that acknowledgement need not 
come only from the state. The ICRC assistance programme (see below) that flowed from 
the report began only after the completion of this study and thus its impact on 
perceptions of the research has not yet been well understood.  
For leaders of family associations, the study appeared to legitimate feelings that 
rights agencies in Nepal did not accurately represent families‟ needs, encouraging then 
to assert their independence from them. The empowerment agenda has most clearly 
been realised through the creation of an independent association of families of the 
Missing, that seeks to bring together all those district based groups (such as CVC) that 
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are not associated with either a political party of a rights NGO. This national grouping61 
was initiated by the leader of a group in Lamjung district met during the study and with 
whom contact was maintained over the period of the study and beyond. Whilst this group 
is only beginning its work, it has 16 district associations associated with it, and is 
receiving seed funding from international agencies. It has the potential to act as a 
national voice for all families of the Missing in Nepal and to serve the needs of providing 
a conduit for victims‟ needs to reach decision makers.  
The ICRC has seen the research as a trigger to initiate further advocacy that 
uniquely in the context focuses not on the violation to which victims have been subject, 
but its impacts. This has included a series of documentary films addressing the missing 
issue including one that specifically focussed on the needs of a selection of relatives of 
the Missing with a focus on their needs.62 This took its direction entirely from the results 
of this study. This has permitted elites in civil society and Government to be exposed to 
implications of disappearance that have not to date featured prominently in advocacy 
around the issue or in proposals to address it. Rights agencies working on 
disappearances have made informal acknowledgement in the light of this study, both in 
the field and in Kathmandu, that they have devoted insufficient attention to social, 
economic and cultural rights as well as to the global needs of families of the 
disappeared. This has however led to no change in the emphasis of their work, with 
there still being not a single publication from a major Nepali rights organisation that 
focuses on social and economic rights: rights advocacy on the issues of disappearance 
remains legalistic, focussed largely on prosecutorial elements. Whilst this represents a 
failure in one aspect of the aims of this study it is unsurprising, given the hegemony both 
in Nepal and globally of such approaches. There has however been a recent upsurge in 
agencies discussing reparation (e.g. IOM, 2010; Advocacy Forum, 2010a), which is to be 
welcomed, but cannot necessarily be claimed as an impact of this study. 
The most important advocacy target of this work is the Government of Nepal that 
was explicitly addressed in the publication of results. A report of the research, 
summarising the principal findings, was published in English and Nepali (ICRC, 2009) in 
Kathmandu in May 2009 and launched by the ICRC at a function in Kathmandu with the 
                                               
61
 The National Network of Families of the Disappeared and Missing Nepal, NEFAD.  
62
 Shadows of Hope: missing persons in Nepal, ICRC: 2010. 
http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/nepal-news-060810 
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Chairman of the Constituent Assembly Human Rights Committee, in the presence of a 
group of family members of the Missing from around the country. The report has been 
widely reported in the Nepali media (e.g. NepalNews, 2009; Kathmandu Post, 2009) and 
internationally (The Guardian, 2010), and has been shared with all Constituent Assembly 
members and with those working in relevant Government departments. It has also been 
quoted in the grey literature that has emerged since its publication (International Crisis 
Group, 2010). Since then the report has served as a basis for advocacy with the 
authorities by both Family Associations and others, notably the ICRC. Such advocacy 
around the report succeeded in impacting on drafts of the Disappearance Bill, with later 
versions broadening the definition of disappearance beyond the narrow understanding of 
Human Rights Law (Appendix I) to include all those missing. In the longer term the report 
continues to be used by family associations as a reference for the full range of their 
demands of the state. 
The greatest impact of the study in Nepal however has been the implementation 
by the ICRC of a broad intervention with families of the Missing. This has attempted to 
take the entire range of needs identified by this study and construct approaches to 
address all of those that can be addressed, in a substitutive modality, by a non-
governmental agency. This is unprecedented in the two decades that the ICRC has 
worked on the Missing issue and reflects the increased opportunity to respond to needs 
offered by a comprehensive understanding of them. This programme begins from the 
needs identified in the study and uses the ambiguous loss model (Section 9.2) to drive a 
holistic approach that aims to address needs that include social and family stigma, the 
need for peer support, livelihood and alternative rituals derived from local cultural and 
spiritual traditions, as well as containing a livelihood component. The initial programme 
restricts itself to women, wives and mothers of the Missing, and includes: 
 The initiation of local support groups of wives or mothers of the Missing 
that are funded to meet regularly, and led by a trained „accompanier‟ 
through discussions of the impact of disappearance.  
 Support of local commemoration activities in communities, organised by 
support groups that include the building of resting places marked with the 
names of the Missing, community prayer ceremonies and other locally 
driven memorialisation. 
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 Interaction programmes with local communities and community leaders 
to encourage an understanding of the challenges families of the Missing 
face.  
 Provision of family mediation capacity. 
 Provision of economic assistance in terms of animals (pigs and goats) to 
assist with livelihood.  
The intervention is being piloted in the district worst affected by disappearance, Bardiya, 
and initial results are encouraging: a full evaluation is underway which will constitute an 
empirical victim-centred evaluation of the efficacy of such an approach. Similar 
interventions will be initiated in ten other districts in 2011.  
Impact of the study in Timor-Leste  
It had been assumed that the advanced stage of Timor-Leste‟s transitional justice 
process would predicate against this study having significant impact on policy. In fact, 
whilst Nepal‟s process remained substantially blocked by the political stalemate over the 
period of the study, in Timor-Leste the Government began to address unresolved issues 
from the CAVR process and the research of this thesis was able to influence those 
processes as they unfolded.  
As a result of the few Family Associations active in Timor-Leste the study worked 
far more with individual victims than in Nepal, with most interactions lacking the 
mediation of victims‟ representatives. As such, there are fewer routes for the study to 
mobilise such groups. At the time of the study an initiative was underway to create a 
national victims‟ movement, through the holding of Victims‟ Congresses in all districts 
and then a national meeting in Dili (National Congress of Victims of Human Rights 
Violations, 2009). This study focuses on a set of victims whose needs had emerged in 
the Victims‟ Congress‟s own work and it is hoped that it can support their future 
advocacy.  
The ICRC‟s response to the study has, in analogy with Nepal, been to initiate a 
psychosocial programme with families. A pilot project will shortly begin in one of the 
districts visited for this study, supervised by a dedicated expatriate psychologist. The 
psychosocial component will consist of both group counselling, likely to benefit from the 
experience of the ICRC Nepal programme, as well as individual support from trained 
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local service providers. This will be accompanied by a programme of economic 
assistance to the most vulnerable families and the continuation of support to burial and 
other ritual processes.  Since the completion of the study the ICRC has been supporting 
a small number of families to permit both the retrieval of human remains where their 
location is known and the performance of death rituals and construction of graves. In 
parallel with this action to target families ICRC will support the forensic capacity of the 
Timor-Leste Police and the Dili mortuary to increase local capacity to make exhumation 
and identify human remains.     
During the field work the researcher engaged closely with the Government of 
Timor-Leste, notably the Foreign Ministry as it developed the bilateral Joint Ministerial 
Commission (JMC) with the Government of Indonesia, established following 
recommendation in the CTF report. This was a mechanism that aimed to address 
outstanding issues between Indonesia and Timor-Leste, including pensions of ex-
Indonesian civil servants in Timor, visa arrangements between the two states and 
management of borders as well as issues related to the conflict. The latter included 
proposals for the management of Indonesian memorial parks in Timor-Leste, support to 
Timorese health facilities with a focus on treatment of trauma and the issue of the 
Missing. For the first ministerial level meeting of the JMC in 2009, the researcher drafted 
the submission of the Timor-Leste Government on the missing issue and was invited to 
join the Government‟s delegation as an advisor. Whilst the Indonesian Government has 
shown interest in addressing issues concerning children taken from Timor who may now 
be living in Indonesia, it is clear that the broader missing issue remains extremely 
sensitive and a deeper engagement with it is likely to require further confidence building.  
As for the Nepal study, the results of the research in Timor-Leste were published 
in Dili in relevant languages (Tetun, Indonesian, Portuguese and English) by ICRC 
(ICRC, 2010a) in May 2010. The report was launched at a ceremony in Dili held at the 
site of the main prison in Indonesian times that had served as the national headquarters 
for CAVR. The report was launched by the Minister of Foreign Affairs and was attended 
by the Chair of the Parliamentary Committee preparing legislation to address issues 
remaining from the CAVR and CTF processes (AlertNet, 2010). Family members met 
during the research made contributions from the floor. Since publication of the report the 
Parliamentary committee has published draft legislation that will create a new institution, 
the Public Memory Institute (Instituto da Memória). The new institution aims to develop 
 341 
 
programmes of reparation and memorialisation for victims; the draft includes the 
following commitment:  
It is also imperative to remember and to honour those who died in the 
context of the conflicts that  happened in Timor-Leste between 1974 and 
1999, and to provide support to the families of those who have disappeared, 
who are as yet unaware of what happened to them and who are believed to 
have died.  (National Parliament, Timor-Leste, 2010: 1) 
The draft also commits to: “assist the Government in fulfilling the State‟s obligations with 
regard to missing persons” (ibid: 15), to create a database of missing persons and to 
undertake forensic work and investigations. In June 2010, an additional draft bill was 
prepared on reparations that commits the Government to provide “symbolic and material 
reparations” (National Parliament, Timor-Leste, 2010a: 2) to victims of the 25 year 
conflict, and explicitly includes the families of the missing as victims (ibid: 3). During the 
research and immediately following the report‟s publication both the researcher and the 
ICRC maintained a close dialogue with relevant Government actors and the impact of 
this is clear in the draft legislation. In June 2010, the same Parliamentary Committee 
produced a draft law on reparations. Elsewhere the study was referenced in other media 
concerned with Timor (e.g. Rai Ketak, 2010).  
The Public Memory Institute and the planned framework for a National 
Reparations Programme represent the creation of structures that could potentially 
address a range of needs of the families of the Missing discussed here. In combination 
with an ongoing process of engagement with the Government of Indonesia on the issue 
of the Missing, this allows for some optimism that some of the needs discussed here will 
be addressed. Whilst there remain significant obstacles, both in terms of political will on 
both sides of the border and in terms of availability of resources to address needs for 
reparation, recognition and exhumation, the situation is far more favourable than could 
have been conceived at the start of this research.  
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Glossary of terms and abbreviations 
aldeia (Timor-Leste: Portuguese) Village, smallest administrative unit.  
badhgar (Nepali) Traditional leader of the Tharu community at the village 
level 
Brahmin (Nepali / Sanskrit) Brahmins are the highest, priestly class of Indo-
Aryan origin, also known as Bahuns in Nepal 
CA (Nepal) Constituent Assembly 
CAVR (Timor-Leste: Portuguese) Comissão de Acolhimento, Verdade e 
Reconciliação de Timor Leste (Commission for Welcome, Truth 
and Reconciliation) 
CPD-RDTL (Timor-Leste: Portuguese) Conselho Popular pela Defesa da 
Republica Democratica de Timor Leste (Popular Council for the 
Defence of the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste), a political 
party that sees itself as the heir to the original republic declared in 
1975. 
CTF Commission of Truth and Friendship Indonesia-Timor-Leste 
CPA (Nepal) Comprehensive Peace Agreement 
CRP (Timor-Leste) Community Reconciliation Process 
chautara (Nepali) Resting place on a path or road 
Chepang (Nepali) The commonly used name given to an indigenous ethnic 
group living in central and southern Nepal. 
Chhetri (Nepali) The warrior and ruler caste group or varna of Hinduism 
chinta (Nepali) Worry, anxiety, care or concern 
CPN-M (Nepal) Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist)  
CVC (Nepal) Conflict Victims‟ Committee: An association of families of 
the Missing in the district of Bardiya.  
dalit (Nepali / Hindi) Self-designation for a group of people of low caste 
(shudra), traditionally regarded as Untouchables. 
dimaag (Nepali) Brain-mind, centre of mental process 
dukh (Nepali) Sadness or depression 
Falintil (Timor-Leste: Portuguese) Forças Armadas da Libertação 
Nacional de Timor-Leste; Fretilin‟s armed wing and later broad 
armed liberation movement.  
F-FDTL (Timor-Leste: Portuguese) Falintil - Forças de Defesa de Timor 
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Leste; armed forces of independent Timor-Leste.  
Fretilin  (Timor-Leste: Portuguese) Frente Revolucionária de Timor-Leste 
Independente.  
Gurung (Nepali) An indigenous ethnic group that migrated from Mongolia 
in the 6th century to the central region of Nepal. 
guruwa (Nepali) Tharu traditional spiritualist and healer 
Hansip (Indonesian) Abbreviation of Pertahanan Sipil – „Civilian Defence 
Organization‟: an Indonesian militia raised locally in Timor-Leste 
ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross 
Jana Andolan (Nepali) Lit. „People‟s Movement‟: Used to reference both the 
2006 movement that overthrew the king‟s authoritarian rule, and 
the 1990 democracy movement.  
Janajati  (Nepali) Indigenous people, defined as persons who have their 
own language and traditional culture, and who are not part of the 
conventional Hindu caste structure 
hanoin barak (Tetun) Lit. „thinking too much‟, a term indicating anxiety or 
intrusive sadness.  
katha (Nepali) A measure for land area (1 katha = 130.2 m2) 
kus (Nepali) A grass used in death rituals as a substitute for an absent 
body.  
lia nain (Tetun) Lit. „culture speaker‟: Those in Timorese communities 
entrusted with spiritual matters.  
liurai (Tetun) Traditional former kings who maintain some political 
power. 
lulik (Tetun) Lit. „sacred‟: the practise of spiritual matters.  
Madeshi (Nepali)  Persons considered to be of recent Indian origin, living 
largely in the Terai, who constitute about 35% of Nepal‟s 
population 
Magar (Nepali) An indigenous ethnic group of mongoloid origin living 
largely in western hill districts.   
mangalsutra (Nepali / Hindi) Traditional necklace worn by Hindu wives, as a 
yellow thread, gold chain, or string of black beads 
man (Nepali) Heart-mind, centre of emotion 
mestiço (Portuguese) A population of mixed Portuguese-Timorese origin, 
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traditionally close to the colonial elite.  
Newar (Newa) (Nepali) An indigenous people who traditionally occupied the 
Kathmandu valley.  
PLA (Nepal) People‟s Liberation Army; armed wing of the CPN-M.  
PTSD Post-traumatic stress disorder 
puja (Nepali / Sanskrit) Hindu expressions of honour, worship, 
devotional attention; prayer. 
RNA (Nepal) Royal Nepal Army 
sindhur (sindoor) (Nepali / Hindi) A traditional red or orange-red coloured cosmetic 
powder worn by married women along the parting of their hair. 
Sofad (Nepal) Society for the families of those disappeared by the state 
(CPN-M aligned association of families of the Missing).  
suku (suco) (Timor-Leste) Sub-district, administrative unit.  
Tamang (Nepali) An indigenous ethnic group from the north central hill 
region of Nepal, who practise Buddhism. 
TBO (Indonesian) Lit. „staff assisting operations‟: Young men and boys 
taken, often forcibly, to assist the Indonesian military in Timor-
Leste.   
Terai (Nepali) A geographic for districts in the plains bordering India, 
constituting a strip the length of the country.  
Tharu (Nepali) An indigenous traditionally non-Hindu. community living in 
the Terai.   
tika (Nepali) Traditional mark worn on the forehead by Hindus; married 
women wear red tika  
TRC Truth and Reconciliation Commission (most often referencing the 
South African TRC).  
UDT (Timor-Leste: Portuguese) União Democrática Timorense. 
uma (Tetun) Lit. „house‟ 
uma lulik (Tetun) Lit. „sacred house‟: A sacred building that constitutes the 
centre of the sacred life of a community.  
UNTAET  UN Transitional Administration in East Timor 
VDC (Nepal) Village Development Committee (Administrative unit) 
Xefe suku (Chefe 
suco) 
(Timor-Leste) Suku chief.  
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